
JAPAN'S EMPIRE
DISASTER
JEAN SÉNAT FLEURY

JAPAN'S EMPIRE DISASTER

JEAN SÉNAT FLEURY

Copyright © 2021 by Jean Sénat Fleury.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2020921068

ISBN:	Hardcover	978-1-6641-3871-1
	Softcover	978-1-6641-3870-4
	eBook	978-1-6641-3869-8

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Getty Images are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Getty Images.

Rev. date: 01/22/2021

Xlibris

844-714-8691

www.Xlibris.com

812681

CONTENTS

List of Maps

Introduction

PART I

THE ORIENTAL WARFARE STATE

1. From Samurais to Soldiers

Persecuting Foreigners

Meiji Restoration Becomes Meiji Warfare

More Expeditionary Warfare

Fomenting Korea

Political Turmoil

2. Bad-Neighbor Syndrome

War against China

War against Russia

Annexation of Korea

PART II

DEIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

3. Training a Tyrant

A Prince Was Born

The Crown Prince’s Education

Dynasty

The Prince Regent

4. Make-Believe Government

Taking the Throne

Facing Economic Crisis

Fighting Communism

5. Emperor’s Clothes

A Political Monarch Emerges

The Rise of Nationalist Ideology

Driving Through Disasters

PART III

THE CONTINUAL WARFARE STATE

6. Into Manchuria

The Mukden Incident

Rejecting International Sanctions

A Diabolic War Machine

Army Training

7. Into China Again

Making Enemies

Japan Contrives an “Incident” at the Marco Polo Bridge

Joining the Axis Powers

Report on Nanking Massacre

Invading More Territories

8. Sneak Attack

Prelude to Pearl Harbor

Pearl Harbor: Attack, Casualties, and Facts

Pearl Harbor: Analyzing the Attack

More Analyses on Pearl Harbor

More Japanese Attacks

PART IV

THE REIGN OF BRUTE FORCE

9. Land and Sea Invasions

Attacking the Philippines

Invading Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma

Controlling the Pacific

10. Criminal Behavior

Sacking Nanking

More Crimes on Prisoners of War and Civilians

Bataan Death March

Kamikaze

Unit 731

Washington’s Cover-Up

Comfort Women

Drug Trafficking

Concentration Camps

PART V

JAPAN'S LOST CAUSE

11. Empire's Defeat

The Battle of Okinawa

12. Fight to the Death

The Potsdam Declaration

The Atomic Bomb

13. Aftermath

The Potsdam Declaration

14. Paying for the War

15. Hirohito: A Warrior Monarch

16. Angel’s Face and Devil’s Soul

Hirohito’s Responsibility

The Supreme Commander

17. Denial of Responsibility

18. Apologizing for the War

Revenge is not the Solution

19. Japan’s Empire Disaster

The Taishō Period

Destabilizing the Pacific

PART VI

EMPEROR'S ESCAPE, EMPIRE'S DEMISE

20. The Tokyo Trial

Composition of the Tribunal

A Great Absent

Analyzing the Trial

Critics on the Trial

Epilogue

Flash Back

APPENDIX

Testimonies

Key Figures

Notes

Bibliography

Author

To my wife, Joanna Gleason

“Revisiting history: it is not the privilege of a few, or a negotiable right poorly granted or questioned by the State. It is, first, a necessity. It is also the inescapable current brought by the evolutionary points of view of the successive generations. It is, at the same time, an indispensable step if one wants to keep alive the memory of the People.”

— Jules Roy, The Trial of Marshal Pétain

“As for the people I am accusing, I do not know them, I have never seen them, and I have no rancor or hatred against them. They are for me only entities, spirits of social malfeasance. And the act I am doing here is only a revolutionary way to hasten the explosion of truth and justice.”

“I have only one passion, that of light, in the name of humanity that has suffered so much and who has the right to happiness. My fiery protest is only the cry of my soul. So, let’s dare translate me into the Assize Court and let the investigation take place! I wait.”

— Emile Zola, “I Accuse…!”

LIST OF MAPS

Manchuria, 1931–1933

The Far East, 1930–1941

The Japanese Advance in the Pacific, 1942

War in the Pacific, 1941–1945

INTRODUCTION

August 25, 2018: Dongguk University, Seoul, South Korea,

Jennifer’s graduation. In this picture from the left to the right:

Jean Sénat Fleury, Prof. Kim Jinsum, Jennifer Fleury, Prof.

Lee Sang Hogun, Prof. Jung UK, and Pascal Justin.

M ay 2018, I received an email from my daughter Jennifer inviting me to Seoul for her college graduation. She had just finished her degree in global finance at Dongguk University. Two days later, I called her to confirm that I would attend. I was excited. First, I could see my oldest daughter years after she left our home in Boston. Second, a visit to South Korea would offer me the opportunity to learn more about the part of World War II that happened in the Far East and the Pacific. My interest and concern about the war was more than a curiosity. My bridge partner Richard Silverman who passed away twelve years ago was a World War II veteran. He was nineteen years

old when having to fight ashore during the invasion of Normandy in "Operation Overlord." [1] One of the great benefits of Richard's friendship was the opportunity to hear him tell his stories about the war and then about what life was like for him afterwards.

"It was my 19th birthday," he said. "Escaping my plan to go to college, I decided to join my older brother at war. After the German army invaded France, in June 1944, I was posted at Colmar, a small town located fifty miles away from the German border. I participated in the liberation of Strasbourg during the Alsace Campaign (November 1944—March 1945), in the last months of the Second World War."

"They told us it would be a difficult task. However, I didn't expect to go through a suicide mission. The fighting was brutal. We ran into some Panzer divisions nobody seemed to have knowledge of their existence. In the morning of January 5, 1945, four months before World War II ended in Europe, I was captured and sent to a labor camp near Dresden, Germany, at 390 miles away from Strasbourg. The camp commandant in broken English told me: "American prisoners were simply killed after they arrived here. We shot them like animals." Almost naked, I saw the laughing German commandant who was standing some two meters from me and screaming his injurious words in my face.

"Fate intervened. Two months later, British and American planes began raining firebombs on Dresden. The prison camp took a direct hit and I was able to escape through a broken wall. The horrors I saw over the last sixty days that I spent at the camp would haunt me for the rest of my life. Being a witness to such war crimes was a tragic experience that I don't want to remember, and I don't want anyone to ever endure."

In 2010, I met Mario Sullivan during the National Bridge Tournament in Las Vegas, United States. Deployed to the Pacific two years after the Japanese attacked the United States Naval Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Mario also was a veteran of WWII. Initially, he was put to work cataloging thousands of encrypted Japanese radio messages that American listening posts were intercepting each day. Japanese leaders using German technology believed messages encrypted by the German Enigma machines that could generate 103 sextillion combinations, and messages encrypted with the katakana

characters (the phonetic Japanese script), were all but unbreakable.[2] However, in the months since the start of the war, the Intelligence Unit (HYPO), under Captain Joseph Rochefort, had developed sophisticated decrypting techniques. Using coding clues picked up from the papers of a downed Japanese aircraft at Pearl Harbor, Rochefort and his team broke the JN-25 Code.[3]

“I didn’t really know what war was,” Mario said. “I only knew it was an armed conflict between two or several nations, and all the countries involved have to respect international law. I was wrong. From my experience in the Pacific and East Asia, I learned another side of going to war. The Japanese were very brutal to their prisoners. A soldier who decided to surrender rather than die would be used for medical experiments and target practice. Allied prisoners of war captured by the Japanese were beaten to death, beheaded, buried alive, cut into pieces, and in some cases eaten by “starving to death” Japanese soldiers.”[4] Then Mario continued, “Thousands of American POWs during World War II were made to work in a very harsh environment in Japan’s War industry. Many of them died of starvation, illness, or abuse. Those POWs were routinely beaten, starved, and abused. They were forced to work in mines and factories in violation of the Geneva Conventions.”[5]

As we became friends, Mario often explained how those years of war had permanently changed his life. He was a young college student when he was told the country needed volunteers to fight the Germans and the Japanese during World War II. He accepted without hesitation to engage in the army. “I didn’t dream a career in the Armed Forces,” said Mario, but I really believed it was my duty to serve the United States of America and defend the “Democratic Ideals.”[6]

I felt lucky to have met these two men who fought worlds away from each other: Richard in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Mario in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Memories of them and the stories they told persuaded me to research and write books about World War II for my own education and for readers yet unknown to me. The inspiration for my first book Adolf Hitler: Trial in Absentia at Nuremberg came from conversations with Richard who believed it was a mistake for the Allies not to accuse, indict,

and try Adolf Hitler in absentia at Nuremberg.[7] He said this was because, at the time of the trial, the prosecutors were unsure whether Hitler was alive. In fact, at the end of May 1945, the Soviet Russian dictator, Joseph Stalin, had declared to the American delegation led by William Inverell Harriman that Hitler was alive, hidden somewhere with his private secretary Martin Bormann and his chief of staff Hans Krebs. Later, Stalin declared to Churchill that Hitler had fled by submarine to Japan, and he could be in Argentina or Spain. The five Red Army law clerks, who examined the remains of Hitler on May 8, 1945, did this work clandestinely. The simple statement of German Gestapo, Heinrich Muller, revealing to the U.S. CIC, that he had arranged the escape of Hitler to Barcelona, on April 22, 1945, is an element of doubt sufficient to consider Hitler as disappeared at this time and allow his trial at Nuremberg.[8]

Like Richard, I formulated the same remarks. Why did the Soviets hide the results of the autopsy they performed on the body they claimed was Hitler? It was not until 1972, at the Sixth International Meeting of Forensic Sciences, in Edinburgh, Scotland, that Dr. Reidar Fauske Sognnaes, a dental expert at the University of California-Los Angeles [UCLA], discovered that the images of the corpse prostheses in Hitler's files exactly match those of the radiographic plates of Hitler's teeth taken by a German dentist in 1943.[9]

All of this, combined with conversations with Mario, inspired me to write a companion book, The Trial of the Emperor: Hirohito Guilty or Innocent. In similar fashion, to my book on Hitler, I asked, "Why wasn't Japan's Emperor Hirohito, an acknowledged war criminal, tried in Tokyo's after the war in the Pacific?" As emperor, Hirohito was the ultimate controller of all of Japan's war operations. From his very first arrival on-scene, years before, he had invoked massively armed parades to formalize his militarization of Japan as part of his vast plan to attack, subdue, and occupy all of Japan's neighbors.

As I learned, in August 1945, before Japan's surrender, Gen. Douglas MacArthur had already ordered Allied prosecutors to list those they would bring to trial. It fell to Gen. Bonner Fellers, who served as military secretary for MacArthur, to decide whether to include Hirohito's name on the list. Fellers noted that Hirohito, in his role as commander-in-chief of the

Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy, was neither ignorant of the military's innumerable crimes nor blameless of them. To Fellers, the emperor's guilt was evident. However, he feared that Japan, devastated as it was, could fall to Communism. Therefore, he concluded, "Japan's destiny is at stake. We must maintain the imperial regime."[10]

But as I read, compared, and digested many sources, the take-home message to me was constant and definite: Emperor Hirohito should have been indicted and put on trial as a war criminal. His trial would have decisively condemned crimes against peace, war ethics, and crimes against humanity. Contrary to Fellers and MacArthur, former United States secretaries of state Dean Gooderham Acheson and Cordell Hull were among those who told President Harry Truman that Hirohito had to be charged with war crimes. Acheson said that "liquidating the imperial system was the ultimate way to democratize Japan."[11] In a lengthy report on October 4, 1946, George Atcheson Jr., advisor for Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, argued that Hirohito was "a war criminal and that the imperial system must disappear in order to the country to become a democratic state."[12]

Opposing Atcheson, MacArthur told his staff that Hirohito "was emperor by inherent birth, but in that instant, I knew I faced the First Gentleman of Japan in his own right."[13] MacArthur also confided that, "At first, I arrived here with the intention of treating the emperor more harshly, but this was not necessary. He is sincere, authentic, and he is a liberal man."[14] According to Kōichi Kido, who served as the lord keeper of the privy seal of Japan from 1940 to 1945, and was the closest advisor to Hirohito throughout World War II, MacArthur said that, "Hirohito is best placed to know the important men of his country's political universe. So, I'd like to hear his opinion on different topics."[15]

Ultimately, the victors made geopolitical excuses for not putting Hirohito on trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). However, there is no doubt that as the face of the nation, he was culpable and should have been tried. Although some said he was at first reluctant to start World War II, he nonetheless "welcomed" the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the subsequent victories early in the war. Based

on archives and historical records, Hirohito was a war criminal. On November 13, 1948, Sir William Webb, the president of the tribunal, declared: “This immunity of the emperor as contrasted with the part he played in leading the war in the Pacific is, I think, a matter which the Tribunal should take into consideration in imposing the sentences.”[16]

Thus, Hirohito’s trial that did not take place became a simulated exercise in my previous book: The Trial of the Emperor: Hirohito Guilty or Innocent. In it, I created an “International Opinion Tribunal” with five judges from different countries to lead the proceedings. Based on the fictionalized charges from 180 Chinese survivors of Japan’s biological weapons and torture “Unit 731,” the symbolic result was the condemnation of Hirohito as a war criminal.[17]

Arriving in South Korea

August 25, 2018, Dongguk University, Jennifer’s graduation.

In this picture from the left to the right: Wandy Phan, Jean

Sénat Fleury, Jennifer Fleury, Pascal Justin, Gilbert Owusu-

Gyamfi, Géronime Guedou, and Mariz Nera Puyo.

On July 22, 2018, I arrived in Seoul. The long flight from Boston with a layover in Chicago made me extremely tired. The morning after my arrival, I went to my daughter's graduation. In the days that followed, I spent a good deal of time touring museums, libraries, and other cultural sites. From my visits, I gained an idea of how difficult life in Korea was during Japan's occupation, and to what degree the war had affected the population that, in 1950, only five years after World War II, resumed wartime suffering.[18]

My visit to Korea's War Memorial Museum was fascinating and instructive.[19] Located in Yongsan-dong district in Seoul, the museum opened in 1994 on a former army base location to exhibit, educate, and memorialize the country's military history, actors, victims, and events that led to the modern nation-state. The following day, Jennifer drove me to Seodaemun Prison History Hall. The prison was opened on October 21, 1908, under the name Gyeongseong Gamok. During the early part of the Japanese colonial period, it was known as Keijo Prison. Its name was changed to Seodaemun Prison in 1923. Now a museum, it was used during the Japanese occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 to imprison Korean liberation activists.[20]

Walking through the Seodaemun halls my broken heart made me feel like I had arrived at the end of the world. I stopped at the "Room of Isolation" where prisoners were forced to sit, squat, or stand without moving for hours. I tried to imagine the terror and suffering of those who were placed in torture chambers. I visited, with tears in my eyes, the "Room of Indocile," where the most indomitable prisoners were relegated. Some were bound to the railings of beds by double chains that restrained their movement. Guards then beat them with canes. Other prisoners were stripped naked to benches, hands tied behind backs, while guards struck them violently.

Visiting the torture room was a terrible experience for me.[21] It is said that in this room thousands of prisoners died from torture. They were subjected to all kinds of physical and mental torment: restriction of movements, use of

handcuffs, thumb screws, ropes and irons, deprivation of food, water, sleep, and light, and denial of toilet during interrogations. The prisoners were beaten with fists, feet, and blows with various instruments. Water torture was prevalent (today known as “waterboarding”) where guards cover prisoners’ faces with cloths, then inundate the captives’ heads to make breathing impossible. Contaminated bathwater from previous victims was frequently used.[22]

By the time I departed Seoul, I knew more than I ever did about the Pacific War and especially about the Japanese occupation of Korea before and during those years. I began to understand the “Japanese agenda” for annexing Korea and invading China and other countries in the Pacific and East Asia. The agenda was about development and domination, both self-serving and exclusionary. Its seeds were Japanese ideology of divine right and blind obedience, and delusions of racial superiority. Some of the techniques, justifications, and rationalizations were imitation of what Japan learned from Western empire nations that it came to hate. It was not just that Japan depended on imports for industrialization; it was also about how Japan would acquire or be entitled to those resources.

Returning to Massachusetts with copious notes and other materials from my visits to places like Seoul Metropolitan Library and Starfield Library, I felt I had gathered enough published information to write a book on the fall of Japan. A working title emerged from my longtime friend Stuart Leiderman, an educator, environmentalist, and humanitarian. He suggested, “Japan’s Empire Disaster.” I thought this title was excellent, and, from it, I immediately asked him, “Why was Japan’s empire a disaster?”

While Richard and Mario were World War II veterans, Stuart is a bit younger. He was born early in 1945, six months before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Before his parents married in 1944, his father worked in accounting at the Washington, D.C. Navy Yard. His mother and her sister traveled more than a thousand miles from their home in Iowa to work in the government’s war administration in Washington. All six of their brothers (Stuart’s uncles on his mother’s side) fought in the war as flyers and fortunately survived. Stuart remembers his mother keeping a small

collection of Pacific War-era currency his uncles carried back from overseas.

Stuart told me about the relative deprivation of American families during the war years when commodities were strictly rationed, and about the atmosphere in America after the war when the country began to import floods of cheap and inferior goods of all kinds that consumers called "Japanese junk." Clearly, there are more stories about the war and post-war (workers, economies, victor-loser relations, etc.) still to be told.

Stuart was honest with me when he answered my question quite generously and fully as follows:

— "Although I have learned, read and watched (both fact and fiction) about Japan empire over the years, I have not systematically studied it nor sought to study it, nor visited Japan, nor have I had significant Japanese friends, colleagues, or clients. Further, I don't recall that either of my parents or any of my relatives ever expressed themselves to me about the Japanese or about war-time Japan. Answering your question, why was Japan's empire a disaster, I would simply say, "Japan's empire was a disaster because it intentionally and violently stopped civilization in its tracks and forced it back hundreds of years. Japan's empire violated the tenets of individual and collective freedom, coexistence, diversity, self-determination, and restraint that the world had codified to that point. The adverse consequences have still not been fully measured, comprehended, and recuperated."

"Japan's empire was a disaster," Stuart continued, "because it intentionally and violently caused overwhelming loss of life, property, livelihood, environment, productivity, and freedom that Japan itself could not repair, recover, or replace. And despite its superficial post-war commitment to pacifism, Japan's disastrous adoption and proliferation of nuclear power plants in the known catastrophic earthquake zone of the Western Pacific Rim has caused further disastrous world consequences, e.g. the Fukushima explosion and contamination; this tells us its "empire mentality" is still there.[23] Neither its citizens nor its neighbors are safe."

"Japan's empire was a disaster, because it caused the overwhelming individual and societal '"mental stress"' of deciding whether its actions

were forgivable; this at a time when people and nations should be focused on their immediate (and likely coming) emergencies and disasters."

With that said, beyond his friendly and helpful interest in my themes and concept, Stuart also helped with the quality of the manuscript, especially through suggestions on the sequence, structure, and content of the chapters. He encouraged me to write "a blockbuster of a book," not just publish a catalog of people, places, and events. Among others, of course, I am so thankful that my daughter Jennifer invited me to her graduation in South Korea and guided me around Seoul. I wonder myself if I would have been motivated to write this book so passionately without traveling to Asia. My principal thanks go to my wife, Joanna Gleason, to whom I dedicate the book. She has helped me afford to travel and continue my research and writing. I particularly want to thank Charley Granvorka for taking her valuable time to read the manuscript and advise me through the succession of drafts.[24] Charley made insightful comments and accepted that I used some of her remarks written for one of my previous book.[25] I would also like to thank Prof. Jacques Raphael Georges, Prof. Ginny Greiman, Sarah Cadorette, John Gallagher, Max Joubert, Medgine Fleury, and Ricot Orméjuste among others, for reviewing the manuscript and helping prepare the final version.

Although we have never met, I feel nonetheless indebted to Professors Herbert P. Bix and John W. Dower for their tremendous, original research on Japan in the Pacific War. The information that they provided in their respective books, Hirohito: And the Making of Modern Japan (Bix) and Embracing Defeat (Dower) have been rich and inspiring sources for me. Reading these two books helped me to structure my content. I also thank Francis Pike for his book, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1954), that thoroughly covers that terrible period, and Prof. Noriko Kawamura who wrote several books on Japanese history.

Finally, I thank all others who have toiled, written, and published on the subject, each one contributing something new. I have tried to do likewise. Japan's Empire Disaster bows to and remembers all the millions killed in combat and the forcible occupation of foreign lands during the fifty years of Japanese armed aggression covered in this book. I wish particularly to

remember the victims of the Nanking Massacre, Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, the innocent sex slaves, the fatalities from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the victims of Japan's cruel and murderous Unit 731, and similar secret killing places. I hope the readers will come to realize a) why wars start, b) the atrocities that ensue, c) the costly, necessary task of ending wars, d) and the need to live on Earth without violence.

As I complete my writing, I express my deepest sympathies to today's victims of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), a deadly pandemic that evidently grew from an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and has spread across the world, infecting millions.[26] Imagine the irony of my learning that eighty-five years ago, during World War II, the Japanese conducted bacteriological weapons experiments on captured Chinese during the occupation of Manchukuo. The details are in my endnotes.[27]

In fact, inside secret laboratories in China, Japanese military and civilian medical personnel conducted experiments on human subjects without their consent.[28] As early as 1930, Gen. Shirō Ishii, in his role as Professor of Immunology, in his laboratory in Tokyo, began to conduct secret involuntary experiments on humans. Having the strong political support of Minister of Health, Koizumi Chikahiko, and General Nagata Tetsuzan, Ishii and his men experimented on thousands of prisoners. The Japanese doctors employed vivisection to examine body parts for experiments.[29] Lt. Gen. Kitano Masaji, the second commander of Unit 731, played the role of sending back lab technicians to Japan in order to bring rats for breeding fleas in Singapore.[30] According to a lab technician, two planes were required to transport the rats, estimated to number approximately 30,000.[31]

Looking at the past, and analyzing all those facts, I must say, any discussion on Covid-19 requires an examination of the unethical biomedical experimentation conducted by Japan scientists during the years leading up to the Pacific War and throughout the war. The question is, how what happened inside Unit 731 in Manchuria, nine decades ago, had opened the road to unethical biomedical experimentation in China and other countries in the world?[32]

A Historical Book

After publishing my book on Hirohito's responsibilities in the Pacific War —essentially an "episodic biography,"— my motivation to keep writing has grown with my horror at each additional detail learned about Japan's beliefs, policies, and practices from 1895 to 1945. Japan's Empire Disaster is a book of information and training; a reference document that I would like to present as an educational tool, not as a catalog of events or an exhaustive profile in malevolent behavior. At minimum, I would like readers to be outraged at the phenomenon of "invasion," per se.[33] Emperor Hirohito was not just titular head of an island country; he was responsible for war in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, for how it unfolded and for the crimes of his soldiers, diplomats, emissaries, and businessmen.[34]

In this book, I realistically portray Hirohito, who was, by his position as a constitutional monarch, in charge of protecting Japan's national entity (kokutai), and commander in chief and spiritual leader of Japan, as a war criminal.[35] By examining newly available historical records, as well as reevaluating the works of many scholars and historians, I expose his true personality: A politically astute man who possessed the ability to make his own judgments with considerable objectivity.

-Jean Sénat Fleury, 2020

PART I

THE ORIENTAL WARFARE STATE

1

FROM SAMURAIS TO SOLDIERS

D etermined to challenge Japan's centuries-old trade isolation, Matthew Calbraith Perry, fifty-nine years old, commodore of the United States Navy, left Norfolk, Virginia, on November 24, 1852, in command of the East India Squadron. [1] Brother of Olivier Hazard Perry, the hero of Lake Erie, Matthew made his name in the Mexican War. For all his achievements, he was the right man for the mission of opening Japan to trade. Traversing the length of the Atlantic Ocean, he rounded the Cape of Good Hope at the far southern tip of Africa, and then crossed the wide expanse of Indian Ocean to the Orient. Perry's first ports of entry were Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Before continuing northward to Japan, he took his modest fleet of four vessels, two of them coal-burning "black ships," into the port of Naha in the Ryukyus Islands. There, he threatened that he would occupy Shuri Castle if the Okinawan government refused his demand to open their ports to American ships for trade. Without any resistance, the Ryukyu government accepted.

In the late afternoon of July 8, 1853, Perry's four "black ships" —the steamers Susquehanna and Mississippi, and the sloops Saratoga and Plymouth— anchored off the town of Uraga, in the bay of Shimoda. Perry's mission was to force Japan to accede to diplomatic and trade relations with the United States.[2] When representatives of Japan's hereditary military rulers, the Tokugawa Shogunate, told him to leave, he refused and threatened to bombard the city if the Japanese didn't allow him to deliver a letter from President Millard Fillmore. For effect, he fired blanks from his fleet's ninety-three cannons. Then he ordered his men to begin surveying the coastline and surrounding waters over the objections of local officials.[3]

To the Japanese, the encounter was unprecedented. They were paralyzed by indecision, made worse by the illness of Tokugawa leyasu.[4] On July 11, 1853, Abe Masahiro, the chief councilor (rōjū), after talking with the Uraga

Magistrate, decided that simply accepting a letter from the Americans would not violate Japanese sovereignty. He invited Perry to come ashore. On July 14, at Kurihama, Perry handed President Fillmore's letter to the Shogunate and told them he would return for a reply. Seven months later, in February 1854, Perry returned to Japan with a larger war fleet, four sailing ships and three steamers, carrying sixteen thousand men-at-arms. The Japanese had prepared a draft treaty, and, after a brief diplomatic standoff, negotiations began. On March 31, 1854, Perry co-signed what became known as the "Convention of Kanagawa," or "Kanagawa Treaty," that promised a permanent "Japanese-American friendship." The Treaty allowed U.S. ships (including warships) to obtain fuel and other supplies at two minor Japanese ports, enabled a consulate to be established at Shinoda, and paved the way for trading rights.[5] An instrumental in the signing of the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854, Abe Masahiro did not sign the treaty or participate in the negotiations; this was done by his plenipotentiary Hayashi Akira.[6] Edwin P. Hoyt wrote:

The American success was followed by frantic European action. The British sent Sir James Sterling to secure a treaty, and he did. The Russians sent Admiral Yevfimiy Vasilyevich Putyatin back to Japan, and he got a treaty in 1855. Then came the Netherlands, then France, all jumping on the bandwagon. The result was a powerful reaction among the barons to throw all the rascally foreigners back out, and thus began a new struggle for power in Japan, with the foreigners at the center of it, and the barons lining up either with the Tokugawa shogunate or the Imperial Restoration party.[7]

To the Shogun officials, the meeting with Perry was significant in more ways than trade. They obviously took special note of American technology exemplified by the expedition's sea power, weaponry, and global reach. It gave them ideas how to challenge China for control of the Orient.[8] One year after signing the Kanagawa Treaty the Japanese established their imperial navy. The same year, in 1855, they opened schools in Edo, where young Japanese studied foreign languages and attended lectures by foreign engineers, physicists, chemists, and other technologists and scientists. On

August 4, 1855, Townsend Harris accepted an appointment as Consul to Shimoda, and then the United States established Consular relations with Japan. Full diplomatic relations were established on July 29, 1858, with the signing of an official accord by the U.S. Consul General Townsend Harris and the Japanese representatives at the Japan capital of Edo (Tokyo).

Two years later, in 1860, Japan sent an official mission to the United States to celebrate the Kanagawa Treaty's ratification. This first delegation included some prominent figures such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, an education and publishing magnate, who was already very active at encouraging the Westernization of Japan. The visitors were amazed by scenes of American prosperity and development. They saw railroads connecting thousands of miles of territory, tall buildings made of iron, and steel foundries pounding out rails, girders, and sheet metal.[9] When the mission returned to Japan, all the details were reported to the Shogun.[10]

Persecuting Foreigners

Between 1860 and 1863, terror against foreigners was common in Japan. Even Japanese were assassinated when seen as too pro-western. In 1862, the British merchant Charles L. Richardson was killed by a satsuma samurai after failing to respect the tradition of giving way to a Clan procession.[11] That incident led to major diplomatic problems between Britain and Japan. On March 11, 1863, Emperor Kōmei issued an edict named: "The Order to Expel Barbarians" (jōi shukumei or jōi jikkō no shukumei). It was an ordinance against the Westernization of Japan following the opening of the country by Perry in 1854. The ordinance was based on widespread anti-foreign and legitimist sentiment called the "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians' movement." Emperor Kōmei personally agreed with such sentiments, and —breaking with centuries of imperial tradition— began to take an active role in matters of state. He publicly protested against the signing of the Convention and attempted to interfere in the shogunate succession. Because of his opposition to the treaty, attacks began against the Shogunate who refused to enforce the edict, as well as against foreigners in Japan. The most common incidents were the firing on foreign shipping by Chōshū forces in the Shimonoseki Strait off Chōshū Province. The Western powers, such as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States responded by bombarding Shimonoseki in 1864.[12]

The British requested the Tokugawa Shogunate government to pay an indemnity of one hundred thousand pounds for Richardson's death.[13] A squadron of British Royal Navy warships went to the Satsuma port of Kagoshima to pressure the daimyo shogun. Instead, the Japanese opened fire on the English ships and the squadron retaliated. These events had direct consequences on the shogunate, which had been seen too powerless and compromising in their relations with Western powers. In 1865, the Chōshū clan rebelled against the Tokugawas and overthrew the shogunate in the Boshin War and the subsequent Meiji Restoration.[14] Trained in Western ways and equipped with Western weapons, the Chōshū destroyed

the Shogun’s now obsolete samurai army.[15] With the Chōshū now in power conditions began to favor an imperial restoration. The Tokugawas continued to lose prestige and the support of the barons. Little by little, the imperial court regained the powers it had granted the shoguns six hundred years earlier: the right to allocate territory in particular.[16] By 1866, Emperor Kōmei began to listen to advisors who had traveled in Europe and America and who warned that Japan, in order to become a world power, had to learn technology and sciences from the Westerners. The new goal became to modernize Japan.[17]

Meiji Restoration Becomes Meiji Warfare

Emperor Kōmei (Kōmei-tennō) died on January 30, 1867. His son, Meiji, fifteen years old, became emperor. On October 23, 1868, the Meiji Restoration officially started. The events restored practical abilities and consolidated the political system under the Emperor of Japan.[18] The Restoration led to enormous changes in Japan's political and social structure and combined the ideas from the late Edo period often called the Bakumatsu and the beginning of the Meiji era.[19] Emperor Meiji began to address his father's ambition. Railroads were constructed across the countryside; the new administration developed industries and built port facilities. A shipyard was built at Yokosuka. With the modernizing trend, several rich trading families including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumotomo, Yasuda, Kawasaki, Tanaka, and Asano began to industrialize, and thus gain enormous economic, political, social and war-making power. Some of these families are still prominent.[20]

Beginning in 1869, under the slogan fukoku kyōhei: "enrich the country, strengthen the military," Japan aggressively industrialized, particularly for military purposes, to compete with the West and attain physical control of the people and resources in Asia. The growth in Japan's per capita GDP in 1869 reflects this industrialization, which continued through the years before World War II.[21] Statistically, Japan's per capita GDP was 23 percent of Britain's and 30 percent of the United States.

On January 3, 1869, with the approval of the emperor, the leaders of the Satsuma and Chōshū clans presented a united front against the Shogun. The Imperial Palace announced that all power was restored to the emperor. In 1870, Emperor Meiji signed the first Conscription Law that required all Japanese serve three years' active military service followed by two years' reserve. Soon, ten thousand Japanese were being conscripted. By five years later, Japan was building its own ships and the country was manufacturing its own guns and ammunition. As the country approached self-sufficiency, the politicians and the business elite became divided as to the purpose.

Some wanted to consolidate and build up the country's resources and others wanted to imitate the West in conquering and acquiring territories, i.e., empire-building.[22] After several years of internal conflict, the expansionist faction prevailed and, with the support of the emperor, moved quickly on this agenda.

Living during the late Edo and early Meiji periods, Saigo was one of the most influential samurai in Japanese history.

(Image from Japanese book Kinsei Meishi Shashin vol. 1, Published in 1934-1935)

Photo of the leading members of the Iwakura-mission It was

made in 1872 in London. In the middle is sitting Iwakura Tomomi, the leader of the Japanese diplomats.

(Image retrieved from Rutgers.edu)

Among the leading expansionists was Saigō Takamori, who had done his best to return the imperial party to power. Saigō was born on January 23, 1828, at Kagoshima. A giant among his contemporaries, he possessed all the samurai virtues: bravery, generosity, and excellent swordsmanship. Living during the late Edo and early Meiji periods, he was one of the most influential samurai in Japanese history, and one of the two great nobles — the other being Kido Takayoshi— who led the Meiji Restoration. Saigō was not in favor of empowering men he regarded as bureaucrats while he assisted in the degradation of the samurai class.[23] He became a leader in the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Later, he rebelled against the weaknesses of the imperial government. Having arranged the surrender of the fief of Chōshū to the authority of the Shogunate in 1864–65, he was a member of the small group who negotiated the secret alliance of Satsuma and Chōshū in 1866. He also worked secretly to force the shogun's resignation, which occurred on November 8, 1867.[24]

In 1871, after refusing several times, Saigō joined the army and was given command of the newly created imperial guard consisting of tens of thousands of troops. During the Boshin War, he led the Japanese forces at the Battle of Toba-Fushimi, and then led the Japanese army toward Edo, pushing the surrender of Edo Castle from Katsu Kaishū. Leaving his general's position, he was appointed to the Council of State (Dajōkan) and assumed joint responsibility (with Kido Takayoshi) for carrying out the new program. By the end of 1871, the national government had eliminated all potential military positions, and, in the summer of 1872, Saigō was promoted to the new rank of full general. He became the leading military in the nation who believed that Japan has a divine mission to dominate the world.[25]

In 1874, to begin what he called his "Revolution," Meiji authorized Saigō to embark on a punitive expedition to Taiwan in retaliation for the murder of fifty-four Ryukyuan sailors in December 1871 by indigenous Paiwan near the southwestern tip of Taiwan. The expedition with a total of thirteen ships and thirty-six hundred soldiers embarked for Taiwan. The Chinese authorities protested vehemently. Saigō and his friends were not worried about Peking's claim. They moved forward with their mission that led to the

annexation of the Ryukyus in 1879 and many years later of Taiwan in 1895.[26] The success of the expedition, which marked the first deployment overseas of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy, revealed China's Qing Dynasty's weak hold on Taiwan and encouraged more Japanese adventurism.[27]

In June 1876, Japan began to harry Korea as well. Emperor Meiji dispatched a naval squadron along the Korean coast with a warning that unless Korea opened its country to trade with Japan, the next force to appear would be a fleet of warships. The Koreans were forced to sign the Treaty of Kanghwa the same year, which opened three Korean ports to Japan: Busan, Incheon, and Wonsan. The treaty also granted Japanese nationals the same rights in Korea that Westerners enjoyed in Japan, such as extraterritoriality.[28] Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that Japan and Korea would exchange envoys within fifteen months and permanently maintain diplomatic missions in each other's country. Article 9 guaranteed [both countries] the freedom to conduct business without interference from either government and to trade without restrictions or prohibitions. From that time on, China and Japan struggled for control of Korea. Both countries strove to increase their influence in the peninsula. China helped open Korea to the United States and supported the efforts of Koreans for modernization, while, Japan's commercial relations with Korea emerged much stronger.[29]

Meanwhile, within Japan, there were several violent samurai revolts against the Meiji government. As background, in December 1876, the government sent a police officer named Nakahara Hisao and fifty-seven armed men to Kagoshima on the pretense of investigating reports of subversive activities at a private academic school and an artillery school belonging to Saigō. The men were captured and confessed that their mission was to assassinate Saigō himself. The disaffected samurai in Satsuma believed that a rebellion was necessary in order to protect their leader. On January 30, 1877, unable to prevent the revolt, the Meiji government sent a warship to remove the weapons hoarded at the Kagoshima arsenal. Scandalized by the government's move, fifty students from Saigō's academy attacked the Somuta Arsenal and carried off the weapons. The students' success motivated more than one thousand other students around Kagoshima to join the revolt.

The following month, the government sent a mission led by Hayashi Tomoyuki, an official from the Home Ministry and Adm. Kawamura Sumiyoshi, to negotiate with the rebels. Failing in their attempt to stop the rebellion, Hayashi and Kawamura returned to Kobe. On February 12, 1877, in Tokyo, they reported their failure to Gen. Yamagata Aritomo and Itō Hirobumi. Both officials decided to send more troops to quell the movement. Meanwhile, on the same day, after a closed private meeting with his lieutenants Kirino Toshiaki and Shinohara Kunimoto, Saigō decided to march on Tokyo with a force of several thousand men. On February 14, his men crossed into Kumamoto Prefecture. The commandant of Kumamoto Castle, Maj. Gen. Tani Tateki, decided to stand on the defensive rather than ordering his forces of thirty-eight hundred soldiers and six hundred policemen to attack Saigō's troops. On February 22, the Saigō's army attacked Kumamoto Castle. Despite initial successes, Saigō failed to take the castle after several weeks of fighting.

On April 12, the imperial Japanese forces under Gen. Kuroda Kiyotaka, assisted by Gen. Yamakawa Hiroshi, arrived in Kumamoto Prefecture. After an eight-day-long battle with heavy casualties on both sides, the imperial army troops were victorious over Saigō's rebel men. Each side had suffered more than four thousand killed or wounded. After a series of victories at Miyakinojō, Nobeoka, Oita, Saiki, and Shiroyama, the majority of Saigō's remaining five hundred men died fighting rather than surrendering. Only forty rebels were kept alive. Several of them with Saigō had committed seppuku.[30] Saigō's revolt against the Meiji government represented the resistance of the old warrior class against the Westernization of Japan. This incident could be viewed as the starting point for "Japan's empire disaster."

More Expeditionary Warfare

Starting in 1879, Japan conquered several groups of small islands not far from its homelands without having to fight for them. The Ryukyu Islands, nominally vassal states of China, ceased paying tribute to the Chinese Qing Dynasty in 1874, and the islands were annexed by Japan in 1879. Okinawa was officially established as a prefecture bringing an end to the 450 years of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Like the Ainu in Hokkaido, the Ryukyuan people had their own culture and traditions, many of them suppressed by the Meiji government.

In 1880, King Gojong of Korea sent a mission in Japan led by Kim Hong-jip in order to observe the reforms taking place there. While in Tokyo, Kim met with Chinese diplomat Huang Zunxian who presented him a study called “Chaoxian Celue” (A Strategy for Korea).[31] Huang warned his interlocutor of the threat posed to Korea by the Russians, and recommended that Korea must work closely with China. He advised the Koreans to seek an alliance with the United States as a counterweight to Russia.[32] In 1880, following Huang’s advice, Gojong decided to establish diplomatic ties with the United States.[33]

During the talks with the Americans, Chinese officials insisted that the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, also known as the Shufeldt Treaty signed in 1882 between the United States and Joseon Korea, should contain an article declaring that Korea was a dependency of China, and argued that the country had long been a tributary state of China. The Americans opposed this, arguing that a treaty with Korea should be based on the Treaty of Kanghwa, which stipulated that Korea was an independent state. After negotiations through Chinese mediation in Tianjin, a compromise was finally reached, agreeing that the king of Korea would notify the U.S. president in a letter that Korea had special status as a tributary state of China.[34] On May 22, 1882, in Incheon, Korea, the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation was formally signed. Korea

subsequently signed similar trade and commerce treaties with Great Britain and Germany in 1883, Italy and Russia in 1884, and France in 1886.

On January 4, 1882, Emperor Meiji issued what is known as the Imperial Rescript for the Military (Gunjin Chokuyu). The rescript marked the beginning of a period of rapid change where Japan became less of an isolated feudal state and more of an industrialized and military-aggressive nation. The Meiji Renovation imposed practical emperor rules on the Japanese. The imposition of their rules led to the modernization and Westernization of Japan. Meiji used his imperial authority to abolish feudalism and the samurai, create a constitutional monarchy, and open technology schools and universities.

Meanwhile, Japanese leaders such as Itagaki Taisuke, leader of the Jijutō Party; Shigeyuki Masuda, leader of the Taiseikai Party; Ōkuma Shigenobu, leader of the Rikken Kaishintō Party; and other names such as Itō Hirobumi, Iwakura Tomomi, Kido Takayoshi, Okubo Toshimo, and Yamagata Aritomo, were all concerned that Korea was a threat to the national security of Japan. The 1880s' discussions in Japan about national security were focused on the issue of Korean reform. As the German military adviser Maj. Jacob Meckel stated, Korea was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan."[35] According to Meckel, the proximity of Korea to Japan and the latter's inability to defend itself against outsiders made the country a real threat for Japanese security. The political consensus was that Korea required a program of self-strengthening like the post-restoration reforms that were enacted in Japan.[36] In regard to Meiji leaders the issue was not whether Korea should be reformed but how these reforms might be implemented.

Fomenting Korea

In 1882, the Korean peninsula experienced a severe drought that led to food shortages. Korea was on the verge of bankruptcy. Falling months behind on military pay had caused deep resentment among the soldiers. Thousands of them had been discharged in the process of overhauling the army. A military mutiny and riot broke out in Seoul.[37] The Imo Incident began on July 23, 1882. This violent riot was carried out by soldiers of the Korean army who were later joined by disaffected civilians. The riot occurred in part because King Gojong's supports for reform and modernization.[38] Many Korean soldiers were worried by the prospect of incorporating Japanese officers in a new army structure. The rioters destroyed homes of high government ministers and occupied Changdeokgung. After the rioters attacked many government buildings in Seoul and released from jail several political prisoners, they turned their attention to the Japanese officials.[39] During the day of rioting, several of them were killed. They went to Lt. Horimoto Reijo's quarters and killed him.[40] The rioters also attacked the home of Min Gyeom-ho who held joint appointments of Minister of Military Affairs and the high-level official of the Agency to Bestow Blessings. They also lynched Lord Heungin, Yi Choe-eung, and attempted to murder Empress Myeongseong, after reaching the Royal Palace.

The rioters entered the Japanese Ambassador's residence, where Hanabusa Yoshitada, the minister to Korea, and twenty-seven staff resided.[41] The rioters threatened to kill all the Japanese inside.[42] Hanabusa gave orders to burn the residence. All important documents were set on fire. The members of the legation escaped through a rear gate, fled to the harbor, and boarded a boat that took them down the Han River to Chemulpo. There, they were again forced to flee after hearing the news coming from Seoul. They escaped to the harbor and were pursued by Korean soldiers. Six Japanese were killed, while another five were seriously wounded.[43] The remainder boarded a small boat and headed for the open sea, where, three days later, they were rescued by a British survey ship, HMS Flying Fish, which took them to Nagasaki.[44] The following day, the rioters entered the Imperial

Palace and killed Min Gyeom-ho, as well as twelve other high-ranking officers.[45]

A few weeks later, on the evening of August 30, 1882, Korea and Japan signed the Treaty of Chemulpo. The treaty specified that Korean conspirators would be punished, and each Japanese family victimized during the attack would receive ¥50,000 yen. The Japanese government would also receive ¥500,000 and permission to station troops at their diplomatic legation in Seoul. Heungseon Daewongun, accused of fomenting the rebellion and its violence, was arrested by Chinese troops and taken to China where he spent three years in custody and only returned to Korea in 1885.[46] The Chinese used the riot to reinforce their influence over Korea. They began to directly interfere in Korean internal affairs.[47] They sent two special foreign affairs advisers to press Chinese interests in Korea. These were Paul Georg von Möllendorff, a German, and close confidant of Li Hongzhang, and the Chinese diplomat Ma Jianzhong.[48] A group of Chinese officers took over the training of the Korean army, providing it with one thousand rifles, two canons, and ten thousand rounds of ammunition.[49] The Chingunyeong (Capital Guards Command), a new Korean military formation, was created and trained along Chinese lines by Yuan Shikai.

In October 1882, China and Korea signed a treaty stipulating that Korea was a dependency of China.[50] Over this treaty, the Koreans gave the Chinese substantial advantages over Japanese and Westerners and granted them unilateral extraterritoriality privileges in civil and criminal cases. Under the treaty, Chinese merchants were granted the right to conduct overland and maritime business freely within its borders; Koreans were allowed reciprocally to trade in Beijing.[51] Korea became a semi-colonial state of China with many thousands of Chinese troops stationed in the country to protect Chinese interests.[52]

In January 1885, the Japanese dispatched two battalions and seven warships to Korea. This threat resulted in the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1885, also known as the Treaty of Hanseong, signed on January 9, 1885.[53] The treaty not only restored diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea broken since the Bunroku-Keicho War at the end of the sixteenth century, but Korea also agreed to pay the Japanese ¥10,000 for damages to their legation

three years earlier, and to provide a site for the building of a new legation. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, in order to seek peace with China, visited the country and met Li Hongzhang. The two parties signed the Convention of Tianjin, an agreement signed between the Qing dynasty of China and the empire of Japan in Tianjin, China, on April 18, 1885. Under the agreement, both countries, —China and Japan— agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea. They also pledged to notify each other if in the future they would send any troops to Korea.[54] One year later, this agreement failed. Tensions between Japan and China rose starting with the Nagasaki Incident on August 13, 1886.[55]

Of their side, the Russians were watching and waiting for an opportunity to enter Korea. One came when Korea sought to modernize its army. The Russians offered military trainers in exchange for them to use the port of Wonsan, which they called Port of Lazarev. The Koreans were opened to the idea. However, China and Japan opposed it, and, together, they succeeded in stopping it. They did not, however, eliminate Russia’s desire for an entry to and foothold in Korea, something that continues up to this day.[56]

Political Turmoil

By 1886, various popular movements emerged in Japan. The Liberal and Progressive parties competed to impose their views. The Liberals wanted popular democracy, while the Progressives also wanted democracy, but to a lesser degree. Both parties were supported by the oligarchs, particularly the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi, who quarreled for personal political position in order to achieve their political and moral goals. These two families, first rice merchants, then bankers and industrialists, had become the most important corporations in Japan.[57] Mitsui took over the Liberals and Mitsubishi supported the Progressives. And, thus, the "zaibatsu," was born, the political-economic cartel in Japan grouping industrial and financial business conglomerates, whose influence and size exercised control over big parts of Japan's economy from the Meiji period until the end of World War II. During the same interval other political alignments arose. These included groups of belligerent samurai seeking variously to overthrow the government, return to the days of feudalism, or to invade Korea. On the one hand, the pacifist Seikanron faction was not in favor of invading Korea. On the other hand, the Bakufu clan, dating back to Japan's feudal military government days, approximately 1600 to 1868, favored Japanese expansion into the Pacific and East Asia.

Japan, in 1889, had trade relations with the United States and Korea, and essentially lorded over Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands. Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji and his government faced enormous social and political tensions, particularly from the Nationalists, a faction led by Gen. Prince Yamagata Aritomo, also known as Kyōsuke Yamagata. Yamagata was among the Meiji oligarchy and the main architect of militarism in early Japan. It was he who brought the major issue of extraterritoriality of the Europeans in Japan. Anti-foreigner sentiment was so strong in Japan at that time, that when centrist Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu was attempting to renegotiate the "unequal treaties" with the Western powers in 1889, a member of the Gen'yōsha faction attacked him with a bomb and blew off his right leg. The treaty negotiated by Ōkuma was perceived by these extremists

as too conciliatory to the West.[58] Ōkuma's attack was so shocking that the whole cabinet resigned. It was replaced by a government under hawkish Gen. Yamagata Aritomo, the result of an agreement among the Chōshū and Satsuma clans.[59]

The constitution of the empire of Japan, known informally as the Meiji constitution, was proclaimed by Emperor Meiji on February 11, 1889. It was a form of mixed constitutional Charter and absolute monarchy.[60] By that time, the Imperial Japanese Army had increased to 73,000 men with a reserve that would bring it to 274,000 troops in a time of war. The Imperial Japanese Navy was building twenty-three ships. The army and navy together accounted for a third of the Japanese government's budget. The ambition to build a big army was rationalized not because another nation was threatening Japan, but by the fact that Japan wanted to expand its territory as the Western nations: United Kingdom, United States, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, and Russia that had established colonies all around Japan. In regard of the Japanese officials, Japan must gain colonies of its own.[61]

In accordance with provisions of the Meiji constitution, Japan's first general election for the lower house of the national assembly was held on July 1, 1890. Although the regular election of the 245 members of the House of Councilors (dai-nijūgo-kai Sangiin giin tsūjō senkyo) resulted in victory for the Liberal and Progressive parties; however, the real power was held by the oligarchs represented by the prime minister. The new Japanese constitutional government with Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo was controlled by the military. Yamagata was one of seven political leaders, later called the genrō that came to dominate the government of Japan. Yamagata held a large and devoted power base in the officers of the army and the militarists. He became the towering leader of Japanese conservatives. He profoundly distrusted all democratic institutions and devoted the action of his government to build and defend the political power of the army. He has been considered by the historians as the "father" of Japanese militarism.[62]

The year 1891 was a troubled one. When the first government of Yamagata fell, the oligarchs chose a member of the Satsuma clan, Matsukata Masayoshi, to become prime minister. As background, in 1868, Matsukata was appointed governor of Hita Prefecture by Ōkubo Toshimichi, who was

the powerful minister of the Interior for the new Meiji government. As governor, Matsukata instituted several reforms including road building, starting the port of Beppu, and many other infrastructural projects. He moved to Tokyo in 1871, and began drafting laws for the Land Tax Reform of 1873–1881. He became lord home minister in 1880. In the following year, when the Japanese economy was in crisis due to huge inflation, he became lord finance minister. He introduced a policy of fiscal restraint that resulted in what has come to be called the "Matsukata Deflation." The economy was eventually stabilized, and he established the Bank of Japan in 1882. But when he sought to protect Japanese industry from foreign competition, he was restricted by the unequal treaties.[63]

Appointed prime minister, Prince Itō Hirobumi named Matsukata finance minister. Matsukata kept this position during the three years Hirobumi was head of the cabinet and during the term of the next government. During this period, he instituted numerous fiscal reforms, cut spending, and most importantly, returned Japan to a silver-backed currency. He favored privatization and, thus, sold several unproductive government holdings. In just eighteen months, he deflated the national money supply by 14 percent. This decision caused agricultural land prices to plummet by fifty per cent.[64] On May 6, 1891, Yamagata resigned, and Matsukata was appointed prime minister during which time he concurrently was finance minister.

One major political faction that Matsukata was forced to deal with during his time in office was the Black Ocean Society. This influential and secret Pan-Asianist organization active in Japan was founded as the Koyōsha by Kotarō Hiraoka, a wealthy ex-samurai and mine-owner with interests in Manchuria. The Black Ocean Society was an ultranationalist group. It operated with the support of certain powerful figures in the Japanese government such as Tōyama Mitsuru and other former samurai of the Fukuoka Domain. The group was powerful enough to demand concessions from the government.

On February 15, 1892, Japan held its second general election for members of the house of representatives of the Diet. Historically, the 1892 election was the most violent in Japanese history, with numerous riots, in which twenty-five people were killed and three hundred eighty-eight wounded. Violence was particularly severe in areas of the country in which support for the opposition Liberal Party (Jiyutō) was strong. Encouraged by the government

led by Matsukata, police chiefs arrested candidates alleged by the officials as "disloyal," and used gangs to harass voters and burn opposition politicians' property. Prefectural governors were secretly ordered to disrupt campaigns of the opposition's leaders and aid pro-government supporters.[65] Ballot boxes were stolen in Kōchi Prefecture and voting was made impossible in parts of Saga, Ishikawa, and Fukuoka Prefectures.

Despite the violence, the so-called mintō/the Rikken Kaishintō (Liberal parties) and their affiliates maintained their majority in the house of representatives, winning 132 seats as opposed to 124 for pro-government candidates, with 44 independents.[66] Facing an angry lower house (even members of the House of Peers were outraged with the manner in which the election was held on May 11), Matsukata was forced to resign. He was replaced by Itō Hirobumi who became on December 22, 1885, the new prime minister of Japan.

Hirobumi's political career started when Ōkubo Toshimichi was assassinated on May 14, 1878, in Tokyo, by Shimada Ichirō and six other samurai of the Kaga domain. He succeeded Toshimichi as minister of home affairs.[67] His advancement brought him into conflict with Ōkuma Shigenobu, the leader of the Rikken Kaishintō (Progressive Party), credited as being one of the major forces behind the introduction of modern democratic government to Japan. Hirobumi forced Shigenobu and supporters out of the government in 1881, and, soon after that, he persuaded Emperor Meiji to adopt Japan's first constitution. The new constitution came into force in February 1889, and in 1890, the National Diet was established.

Hirobumi played a crucial role in building modern Japan. He helped draft the Meiji constitution. On the model of several countries in Europe and the United States, he came up with the idea for a bicameral National Diet. In the draft of the new constitution, he called for a bicameral parliament (the Diet) with an elected lower house, a prime minister, and a cabinet appointed by the emperor. A privy council composed of the Meiji genrō advised the emperor, who played the role of the commander in chief of the army and navy.

Hirobumi's preeminence in Japanese political life continued in the 1890s. As prime minister, he is remembered for two reasons. The first was his work on an agreement in 1894 with Great Britain called the "Anglo-Japanese Treaty

of Commerce and Navigation" (Nichi-Ei Tsūshō Kōkai Jōyaku). Regarded by the British government as a breakthrough agreement in international relations, it superseded the "Unequal Treaties" and ended the concept and practice of extraterritoriality in Japan. The treaty was signed in London on July 16, 1894, by John Wodehouse, First Earl of Kimberly for Britain, and Viscount Aoki Shūzō for Japan. The agreement came into force five years later on July 17, 1899.[68] From that date, British citizens residing in or visiting Japan were subject to Japanese laws rather than British. The second was Hirobumi's role in Japan's war against China in 1895. A result of China's defeat was its cession of Formosa (later known as Taiwan) to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895.

In 1894, in order to get taxes and fines from rich citizens, the magistrate of Gobu, Jo Byeonggap, created various oppressive laws and forced the peasants to build reservoirs and settle in unowned lands. This decision caused the Gobu Revolt on January 11, 1894. Angered peasants allied under Jeon Bongjun and Kim Gaemam began the movement. The Gobu revolt was suppressed by Yi Yongtae, and Jeon Bongjun fled to Taein. In April 1894, Jeon gathered an army in Mount Baek and recaptured Gobu. The rebels then proceeded to defeat the government forces in Hwangto Pass and the Hwangryong River. Jeon then captured Jeonju Fortress and fought in a siege with Hong Gyehun's Joseon forces. In May 1894, the rebels signed a peace treaty with the government forces, and built agencies called Jibgangso that handled affairs in rebel-controlled areas.

King Gojong, on the recommendation of the Min clan and at the insistence of Yuan Shikai, requested aid from the Chinese government in order to suppress the rebels and take control of the situation. Qing sent 2,700 soldiers to Korea.[69] The first garrison of 2,500 troops, under the command of Gen. Ye Zhichao, sailed on board three British ships chartered by the Chinese government. The Chinese troops arrived at Asan on June 9, 1894. Two weeks later, on June 25, a further 400 Chinese troops arrived. The Japanese cabinet decided to reciprocally send troops to the peninsula as China did. Japan sent four warships and a battalion of troops to Seoul to protect Japanese interests. This decision sparked the First Sino-Japanese War.

Building an Empire

From Samurais to Soldiers

Samurais (or bushi) were Japanese warriors. They were members of the important military class before Japanese society changed in 1868. They had high prestige and special privileges such as wearing two swords. They cultivated the bushido codes of martial virtues. The Meiji Revolution ended their feudal roles, and they moved into professional and entrepreneurial roles.

Image retrieved from the Smithsonian Institution, Freer

Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery Archives

Young man dressed in a samurai costume. The young man is posing waving a sword.

Image retrieved from openculture.com

Image of a samurai, Japan’s warriors. It was former samurai who put Japan on the road to what it would become, and many would become leaders in all areas of modern Japanese society.

Photographed by Kozaburo Tamamura, c. 1876

A samurai and his servant.

Image from the Henry and Nancy Rosin Collection

of Early Photography of Japan

The five men in the picture are holding Katana or samurai swords.

For centuries only the samurai could own such weapons.

Image retrieved from historicalarchives.org

2

BAD-NEIGHBOR SYNDROME

J apan’s road to war began many decades before the attack at Pearl Harbor. At the end of 1800, the Japanese decided to expand Japan’s territory in Asia. According to the Japanese officials, this decision would help the country to get resources that it would need, particularly oil. Japan’s desire to build a modern industrial civilization drove it through politics of extension. Near the turn of the twentieth century, the Japanese embarked on a period of aggressive expansion to change the trajectory of their nation isolated from the rest of the world for much of its history. Nationalist Japanese leaders believed that Western powers such as United States, Britain, France, and Russia had enacted tariffs that prevented Japan from accessing natural resources that it needed to develop its industrial capacity. At the end of July 1894, Japanese troops attacked Chinese forces that out posted the peninsula of Korea. Four days later, on August 1, 1894, Japan declared war on China. [1]

War against China

Japan decision-making to go to war with China was motivated by the nation's interest to become a great power. The First Sino-Japanese War occurred for diverse reasons. First, Japan and China competed for influence in Korea. Second, the Japanese wanted to add the island of Formosa in their territory. China's military became a threat and Japan did not tolerate that China closed its ports to Japanese vessels. The dispute between Japan and China over control of Korea reached its apogee between 1890 and 1894. By the early 1890s, Chinese influence in Korea had increased. Japan was looking for an excuse to deploy more troops in the peninsula in order to take control of Korea. An excuse came in 1894 when a band of anti-Japanese Koreans called the Tonghak rebelled against the Korean government. Korea called for the military assistance of China. The Chinese sent several thousands of troops to quell the rebellion. The Japanese on alert also quickly rushed troops into Korea. With the rebellion crushed, neither side withdrew. On July 23, 1894, the Japanese invaded the King of Korea's Palace in Seoul and forced him to sign an agreement that would push the Chinese out of the peninsula. Two days later, in July 25, during the Battle of Pungdo, off Asan Chungcheongnam-do, the Japanese Cruiser "Naniwa Kan" commanded by Tōgō Heihachirō sank a British-owned steamship, the Kowshing, as it transported Chinese troops and officers to Korea.[2] After that tragedy, war was officially declared between China and Japan. This was the starting point of the First Sino-Japanese War.[3]

When the war began on August 1, 1894, China held a clear advantage over Japan. China's military far outnumbered Japan's forces: nearly 900,000 Chinese soldiers to Japan's 120,000, and twice as many warships.[4] China's officer training school, the Tientsin Military Academy, was established in 1885, nine years before the war. As early as 1875, Emory Upton, an American general, had suggested to Li Hongzhang, one of the most powerful officials in China, and leader of the "Self-strengthening Movement," to establish a Chinese military academy. Li rejected Upton's proposal as too expensive for nine 'professors and instructors' from the United States and a

six-year program of instruction in the English language.[5] In 1885, ten years later, Li Hongzhang founded the Tianjin Military Academy for Chinese army officers with German advisers.[6]

Meanwhile, Japan borrowed the British Royal Navy as a model. Reforms under the Meiji government gave significant priority to the armed forces. The country modernized its national army and navy with special emphasis on warship construction.[7] In addition, Japan sent numerous officers abroad for training. Those officers had to observe and evaluate the relative strengths and tactics of Western armies and navies. British advisors were sent to Japan to train the naval establishment, while Japanese students, in turn, went to England to study and observe the Royal Navy. Through drilling and tuition by Royal Navy instructors, Japan developed expertise in the arts of gunnery and steamships.[8] In 1885, Jacob Meckel, a former general in the German army and a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), used his experience as a military advisor to bring the Japanese armed forces to a high level of efficiency.

Following Germany's victory over France, the Japanese invited Meckel (with the rank of major at the time) to Japan. Meckel became a professor at the Army Staff College and an advisor to the general staff of the Imperial Japanese Army. From this position, he worked closely with future Prime Ministers Tarō Katsura and Yamagata Aritomo and with army strategist Gen. Kawakami Soroku. He helped to reorganize the war ministry, refine the general staff, improve military education, and develop systems of logistics and medical services. He also helped to restructure the army into divisions and taught the Japanese the demands of full-scale mobilization, including a strategic railway network, a new conscription act, and improved staff exercises. Altogether, it could be said that Meckel had a tremendous impact on the development of Japan's military. He is credited with having introduced Clausewitz's military theories and the Prussian concept of war games (Kriegspiel) as a way to refine fighting tactics.[9] To honor his services, in 1910, the Japanese displayed his bust in front of the Army Staff College in Kita-Aoyama, Minato, Tokyo, where he taught.[10]

By 1872, the Japanese government introduced conscription, i.e. forced military service to promote military consciousness, attitudes and practice among the people. At the same time, it created centralized military and naval

academies and sent Japanese officers abroad for additional training. In 1878, an independent general staff was created, and, in 1883 a staff college. Close cooperation was ensured between the army and navy.[11] At the start of the hostilities with China, in 1893, the Imperial Japanese Navy comprised a fleet of twelve modern ships, eight corvettes, one ironclad warship, twenty-six torpedo boats, and numerous auxiliary armed merchant cruisers, and converted ocean inners. The Japanese also had a relatively large merchant navy, which, at the beginning of 1894, consisted of two hundred eighty-eight vessels. Of these, sixty-six belonged to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Shipping Company that Japan subsidized to maintain the vessels for use by the navy in case of war. Consequently, even without a large fleet of battleships, Japan could call on enough numbers of auxiliaries and transports.[12]

When fighting began on August 1, 1894, most military experts had predicted an easy victory for China. China, they said, had several advantages over Japan. Its army was vast, and its navy was strong; they both outnumbered and outweighed Japan's capability. Foreign observers considered a Japanese victory improbable. However, in an interview with Reuter News Service, German officer William Lang predicted that despite significant Chinese advantages, the Japanese forces would win the war due to critical operational weaknesses that ultimately doomed China —lack of a unified command, lack of regular pay and medical care for its soldiers, failure to appreciate the importance of naval power or to use an appropriate naval battle formation. — Lang continued to say, China only has one operable railway, poorly maintained roads, encryption broken by Japan, a defensive strategic posture, and the country has been unable to mobilize international sympathy. [13] Lang states that at the end, there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed the Chinese army and navy.

By mid-September 1894, the Japanese navy controlled the Gulf of Chihli avoiding the Chinese in order to ship reinforcements to Korea by sea. They captured Port Arthur on November 21. Following a victory at Lüshin, the same month, General Yamagata prepared to march on Beijing. By March 1895, the Japanese forces had successfully invaded Shandong province in Manchuria and had fortified ports that commanded the sea approaches to Beijing. China, after suffering more than six months of unbroken losses to Japan's land and naval forces, and the loss of the port of Weihaiwei, sued for peace in February 1895. Despite the formal opening of peace talks at

Shimonoseki, Japanese ships bombarded and landed troops on the Pescadores Islands. The surrender of the Pescadores resulted in China's cession of those islands to Japan including Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895.[14] The treaty demanded cession of the Liaodong peninsula as well. The conflict between the Qing dynasty of China and the empire of Japan over influence in Joseon, Korea, ended in February 1895.[15] In April 1895, China was forced to give up its claims to vassal suzerainty over Korea. The same year, under the guise of protecting Korea, Japanese plotters, with official connivance, murdered Empress Myeongseong. By the end of 1895, Japanese troops occupied Korea. The successful war that Japan won against China (1894–95) also added the Ryukyus to its empire.[16]

Japan's victory over China demonstrated the Qing dynasty's failure to modernize Chinese military and fend off threats to its sovereignty. For the first time, regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan. Some claimed Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi had arranged the war to cement his political control of Japan. The war rather came from the pressure that Hirobumi received from several different political and economic interests in Japan that wanted further expansion in order to build a vast empire. Starting in 1895, Japan had the strongest and most successful army and navy in Asia. Following their victory over China (1894–1895), the Japanese decided, in 1904, to go to war against Russia over rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea.[17]

1904: Japanese and Russian soldiers during the Russo-Japanese War.

War against Russia

In 1904, the Russian Empire was one of the largest territorial powers in the world, with vast territories in Eastern Europe and central Asia under its control. Since the late nineteenth century, Russian political influence in Asia had become a major problem for many countries in the region, especially Japan and China, which considered Russia as a real threat for them. As several Western powers that established diplomatic relations with Japan and China, Russia obtained concessions from China after the Second Opium War (1856–1860). Under the Treaty of Aigun in 1858, and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860, China ceded to Russia's extensive trading rights and regions adjacent to the Amur and Ussuri rivers. The Chinese allowed Russia to begin building a port and naval base at Vladivostok.

The 1856 Treaty of Paris, signed at the end of the Crimean War, demilitarized the Black Sea and deprived Russia of southern Bessarabia. The Treaty gave the West European powers the nominal duty of protecting Christians living in the Ottoman Empire, removing that role from Russia, which had been designated as such a protector in the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. Russia lost naval access to the Black Sea. By 1867, the logic of the balance of power and the cost of developing and defending the Amur-Ussuri region dictated that Russia sell Alaska to the United States in order to acquire much-needed funds.[18]

In the late 1800s, Russia faced major domestic problems. In 1891, a famine claimed a half-million lives. The activities by Japan and China near Russia's borders were perceived as threats from abroad. In 1894, the accession of Tsar Nicholas II upon the death of Alexander III had changed the country foreign policies agenda. At the turn of the century, Russia's ambition to strengthen its dominance in Asia was facilitated by its alliance with France and the growing rivalry between Britain and Germany. By 1895, Germany was competing with France for Russia's favor, and British statesmen hoped to negotiate with the Russians to delimit spheres of influence in Asia. This situation enabled Russia to intervene in northeastern

Asia after Japan's victory over China in 1895. In the negotiations that followed, Japan was forced to make concessions in the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur in southern Manchuria.[19] The next year, Russia got France capital to establish the Russo-Chinese bank. The goal of the bank was to finance the construction of a railroad across northern Manchuria and thus shorten the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Within two years, Russia had acquired leases on the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur and had begun building a trunk line from Harbin in central Manchuria to Port Arthur on the coast.

In March 1898, the Russians forced China to grant them a lease covering Port Arthur, Dairen, and much of the Kwantung Peninsula in the southern Liaoning province. Under this agreement, Russia took control of this strategic region for twenty-five years with renewal options. In the early years of the twentieth century, Russia had increased its control over most of Manchuria, stationing troops in key points of the region.[20] While, with the Siberian shipping center of Vladivostok forced to close for much of the winter months, Russia sought a warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean for its navy and for maritime trade. Vladivostok was operational only during the summer, whereas Port Arthur, a naval base in Liaodong Province leased to Russia by China, was operational all year.

In 1900, China reacted to foreign encroachments on its territory with a popular, armed uprising, the Boxer Rebellion. Russian military contingents joined forces with Japan, France, and the United States to restore order in Northern China. A force of 180,000 Russian troops fought to pacify part of Manchuria and secure its railroads. Three years later, the Japanese were backed by Britain and the United States and insisted that Russia evacuate Manchuria. Japan, after its victory over China during the First Sino-Japanese War, was widely viewed as the dominant force in Asia. Seeing Russia as a rival, Japan offered to recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria, and Japan would have maintained influence over Korea. Russia refused and demanded that Korea north of the 39th parallel be a neutral zone between Russia and Japan. Based on the superiority of his forces, Tsar Nicholas II knew that Japan would not take any chances to go to war against Russia. Since the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, Russia had deployed more than 150,000 troops to Manchuria. The Tsar boasted a first-class naval base at Vladivostok and another on the southern tip of Manchuria, at Lüshun,

which was home to seven battleships, ten cruisers, twenty-five destroyers, and an assortment of gunboats. The Tsar also knew Russia had three times the population of Japan, eight times its gross national product, twice its per capita standard of living, and seven times its armed forces. The war would ultimately cost Tokyo 8.5 times what the First Sino-Japanese War had cost.[21]

On February 8, 1904, after negotiations between Japan and Russia broke down, the Japanese navy surprise-attacked the Russian Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur. The same day, Japan formally declared war against Russia. The Imperial Japanese Navy, commanded by Adm. Tōgō Heihachirō, sent torpedo boats to attack Russia naval vessels, significantly damaging three of them: Tsesarevich, Retvizan, and Pallada. On April 12, 1904, two Russian battleships that tried to evade the Japanese attack did not escape undamaged. Japanese torpedo boats sank the Petropavlovsk and caused the Pobeda to return to Port Arthur heavily damaged. In August 1904, forces from northern Russia sent to assist the fleet at Port Arthur were defeated by the Japanese in a series of battles: Battle of the Yellow Sea (August 10, 1904), Battle of Ulsan (August 14, 1904), Battle of Korsakov (August 20, 1904), Battle of Liaoyang (August 24, 1904), Battle of Shaho (October 5–17, 1904), Battle of Sandepu (January 25–29, 1905), Battle of Mukden (February 20–March 10, 1905), and Battle of Tsushima (May 27–28, 1905).

By mid-1905, the Japanese navy had sunk every ship in Russia's Pacific fleet. The hostilities ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth mediated by American President Theodore Roosevelt, and signed on September 5, 1905.[22] Japan's decisive military victory not only surprised military experts in the world but changed the balance of power in East Asia. It was the first major military victory of an Asian power over a European one.[23] Defeating Russia in 1905, then Japan took the south half of Sakhalin and the southern tip of Manchuria, known as the Liaodong peninsula. At this time, Japan's empire consisted of the home islands, the Ryukyus, and the Kuril Islands, which stretch approximately 1,300 kilometers (810 miles) northeast from Hokkaido, separating the Sea of Okhotsk from the North Pacific Ocean, and which Japan had acquired in a compromise with Russia by giving up claims to the southern half of Sakhalin Island.[24] The next step became the annexation of Korea.

Annexation of Korea

In 1898, America's ambition to control the Caribbean Sea and bring Cuba under its power resulted in a conflict between the United States and Spain. On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war against Spain. During the hostilities, on May 1, 1898, just ten days after the USS Maine exploded in Havana harbor, the American Asiatic Squadron, led by Commodore George Dewey, sailed from its base in Hong Kong to Manila Bay in the Philippine Islands, where it sought out and sank the Spanish Pacific fleet. In the initial naval engagement, 167 Spanish sailors were killed, and 214 wounded out of a total of 1,875 sailors. The Americans had no deaths and only seven wounded out of 1,748 men in action. As a result of this victory, the United States took the Philippines from Spain, and acquired the region's second largest archipelago after the Dutch East Indies. With this conquest, the United States became Japan's neighbor to the south and its regional rival.

A series of discussions and meetings were held since 1905 between officials of Japan and the United States regarding the position of the two nations in greater East Asian Affairs, especially regarding the status of Korea and Philippines in the aftermath of Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War. On July 27, 1905, the two countries reached an agreement: The United States recognized Japan's sphere of influence in Korea; in exchange, Japan recognized the United States' sphere of influence in the Philippines. This agreement was signed by United States Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Prime Minister of Japan Count Tarō Katsura. Under the Taft-Katsura Agreement, Japan would control Korea if it would keep its hands off the Philippines.[25]

On August 22, 1910, five years after the Taft-Katsura Agreement, Japan annexed Korea.[26] Ye Wanyong, Prime Minister of Korea, and Terauchi Masatake, who became the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea, signed "The Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty." In the treaty, Emperor Gojong of Korea lost his title. He received a new one, "King Emeritus Yi of

Deoksu," and was recognized as a member of the imperial family of Japan.[27]

Soon the new governor of Japan in Korea took drastic measures to break any resistance of the Korean population. It forbade any association and meeting of Koreans, and any "insubordinates" were severely oppressed by the gendarmes in order to counter popular uprisings. To create a colonial economy that served Japan, Masatake proclaimed a decree on societies. The aim was to crush Korean capital and turn Korea into a market of Japanese capitalism. Masatake undertook land investigations set to determine land ownership. Upon investigation, the general government appropriated the lands belonging to the former royal court and abandoned lands, and these lands were distributed to Japanese settlers or spread to the Koreans through the Eastern colonization. Thousands of dispossessed Koreans immigrated to Manchuria.

The 1910 annexation treaty, while making Korea an integral part of Japan, had subjected the de facto peninsula to ruthless colonial rule. This period of occupation provided irrefutable evidence of atrocities of the Japanese army against the Korean. André Fabre, in his book, History of Korea, (Éditions l'Asiathèque), notes that "once fully mastered Korea, the Japanese made every effort to exploit it to the fullest, deprive it of its soul, and make it a loyal province Of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan."

By 1911, all Korean forests were under the control of the Japanese government, which implemented a policy of massive deforestation to increase the country's agricultural area. In 1912, Japanese authorities took control of the Korean fisheries and permitted Japanese fishermen to exploit Korean waters. In the early 1930s, under Hirohito's rule, Japan took 40 percent of the Korean land to increase rice production for export to Japan. Land expropriations in the countryside led Korean peasants to rural exodus or immigration to Manchuria or Siberia, sometimes, to Japan's mainland, where their status as migrant workers forced them to work in ruthless conditions. In the industrial sector, the share of capital invested by the Japanese in 1929 was ten times greater than that provided by the Koreans.

Despite the new activities developed by the occupiers in the country, the Japanese occupation corresponded to an impoverishment of the Korean

population, both in the countryside and the city. Koreans were forced to supply rice or raw materials such as wool and cotton to limit the cost of Japan's imports into third countries, while at the same time, the low cost of Korean labor encouraged Japanese entrepreneurs to settle on the peninsula without giving any benefit to the inhabitants. In 1939, the Japanese authorities imposed a compulsory labor service on Koreans for more than 4,000,000 people in 1945, including 1,260,000 employed in Japan as unskilled labor. In 1941, with the Japanese occupation relying on 60,000 police officers supported by 180,000 auxiliaries, the situation of Koreans worsened, especially that of peasants (70 percent of the population) who now saw two-thirds of their rice crops sent to Japan. During the war, Koreans were mobilized in the Japanese army. At the same time, tens of thousands of young Korean women were being abducted from their families to serve as "comfort girls" in pleasure homes reserved for the Japanese military throughout occupied Asia.[28]

Under the Japanese military law, the Korean must be blind, deaf, dumb, and defenseless. Blind, he was forbidden to read uncensored Japanese newspapers; deaf, he must not listen to the stories of the recent resurrection of Poland; dumb, he must not express his own aspirations; and defenseless, the nation remained powerless in front of the garrison of the soldiers who possessed it. No Korean could leave his territory. His correspondence was censored in the mails. His person was searched on trains and in the streets.[29]

After the annexation of Korea, further opportunity to get more territories was provided to Japan by World War I. A League of Nations mandate gave Tokyo temporary command of the German colony of Tsingtau. Then Japan controlled many of Germany's former South Pacific territories including Palau, the northern Marianas Islands of Saipan, Tinion, and Rota, as well as the Truk Lagoon and Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands.[30]



Emperor Meiji, also called Meiji the Great, was the 122nd Emperor of Japan reigning from 3 February 1867 until his death on 30 July 1912. Meiji

was the leader of Japan’s transformation from a late-feudal to a modern nation-state.

Image retrieved from japanesemonarchist.blogspot.com

On February 8, 1904, the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Russian Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur. Adm Tōgō Heihachirō commanded this attack. (Image retrieved from HistoryNel)

Prime Minister of Japan, Count Tarō Katsura signed the Taft-Katsura Agreement in which the United States recognized Japan's sphere of influence in Korea; and in exchange, Japan recognized the United States' sphere of influence in the Philippines. (Image retrieved from Wikimedia)

Emperor Meiji is the father of the constitution of Japan that ruled the country from 1889 to 1947. During his reign, Japan emerged as a modern, industrialized state. (Image retrieved from Getty Images)

The founder of the Rikken Seiyūkai, the dominant Japanese political

party from its beginning in 1900 until 1940, Itō Hirobumi was the first Prime Minister of Japan. He was also a preeminent member of the genrō, a group of senior statesmen that ruled Japan during the Meiji Era. (Image retrieved from charts-stock.com)

PART II

DEIFICATION OF VIOLENCE

3

TRAINING A TYRANT

A Prince Was Born

J apan’s longest-reigning monarch, Emperor Hirohito, was born Michinomiya Hirohito, on April 29, 1901, in the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo. Hirohito was the first grandson of Emperor Mutsuhito and the first son of Crown Prince Yoshihito (later Emperor Taishō) and Princess Sadako (later Empress Teimei). [1] Being the first male child in the family, Hirohito was destined to carry on the tradition of an imperial line whose descent is traced in legend from Amaterasu Omikami, the sun goddess in the pantheon of Shinto. [2]

According to Japanese tradition, the imperial line began in 660 BC with the legendary Emperor Jimmu, considered as a direct descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu. Around the third century AD, this “imperial clan” defeated rival chieftains and first asserted dominance over central and western Japan. The imperial institution survived for more than 2,600 years despite some individual emperors being deposed and others murdered from court intrigues. For the next several hundred years, power shifted to various aristocratic and military clans. In 1868, the leaders of what is now called the Meiji Restoration claimed the reestablishment of direct imperial rule.[3] Japan became a centralized nation-state with the emperor as the symbol of national unity; loyalty to him was expected to be a sacred duty and a patriotic obligation. Assuming the position of highest priest of the Shinto cult and claiming to be of divine ancestry, the Japanese emperor presented himself with an aura of sacred inviolability.[4]

Hirohito was born into this 2,600-year lineage. Upon his birth, scholars of the imperial court sought an appropriate name for him. They found a passage written by Confucius in the year 500 BC, about instructions given by a Chinese emperor to his young brother that said, “Make yourself broad-minded and let people live in comfort.” The Chinese character that Japanese pronounce “hiro” was taken from the classic Chinese rendering of the word “broad-minded” and was combined with the word “hito” meaning “benevolence,” which is part of the personal name of every Japanese emperor.[5]

Mutsuhito was still emperor when Hirohito was born in 1901. Following imperial custom, the emperor chose to have his grandson raised not by his parents but by a surrogate family that could teach him the merits of honor and discipline. Therefore, while only a few months old, Hirohito was taken to the residence of ex-navy minister and former vice admiral, Count Kawamura Sumiyoshi.[6] When Kawamura died three years later, in November 1904, at age sixty-seven, Hirohito and his younger brother Chichibu-no-miya Yasuhito Shinno (born in 1902) rejoined their parents at the Togū-gosho, the crown prince's palace in Akasaka. On January 3, 1905, Hirohito's second brother, Takamatsu-no-miya Nobuhito, was born.[7]



At the Aoyama Palace, the Taishō Emperor goes for a walk with his sons, the Prince Regent (Hirohito) and Prince Chichibu (Yasuhito) circa 1905 (Image Source: collections.mfa.org)

The Crown Prince's Education

After Kawamura died, Count Maresuke Nogi, an illustrious warrior of the Japan military, a hero of the First Sino-Japanese War and the war with Russia, became one of Hirohito's tutors.[8] By then, Nogi was an old soldier and the headmaster of a school for the sons of the aristocracy. He taught Hirohito the traditional spirit of Bushido and the way of the samurai.[9] To Hirohito, Nogi personified the virtues of patriotism and the samurai ethic of personal austerity and devotion to duty, which constituted part of the legacy of Tokugawa to Meiji Japan. In addition, Nogi emphasized physical fitness, 'the habit of diligence,' punishment for misbehavior, no leniency in grading, plain living, and military training.[10] Thus schooled from an early age to military principles, Shintoism and respect for the Daigensui, this was effectively a military education.

A firm believer in Confucianism, Bushidō, and the precepts of Zen, Nogi favored a strict military-style education for Hirohito.[11] Under the routine he established; the young prince had a very difficult schedule. He awoke early in the morning for prayers to honor the sun goddess and Emperor Meiji. Then he attended lessons. He was instructed in many subjects considered important for the education of an emperor: math, physics, economics, calligraphy, language (French, Chinese, and Japanese), ethics, martial arts, and natural history. All were part of teiōgaku, the making of an emperor.[12] Before the Meiji constitution; monarchs in Japan were educated in subjects such as abstract Confucian philosophical texts and practiced reciting Shinto prayers.[13] Hirohito's education as the future emperor was well prepared and meticulously oriented. First, he attended the Gakushūin Peer's School, from 1908 to 1914, and was tutored by the special institute established for the crown prince's education. An academy called Tōgū-gogakumonsho took over his tutelage from May 4, 1914 until late February 1921.[14]

From 1914 to 1921, Dr. Hirotarō Hattori became Hirohito's teacher of natural history and physics. Under Hattori's guidance, Hirohito read Darwin's theory of evolution as interpreted by the popular writer Asajirō

Oka, whose book Shinkaron kōwa (Lectures on evolution) was published in 1904.[15] Hirohito developed at this early age an interest in marine biology.[16] Hattori remained his mentor and chief scientific collaborator for more than thirty years.[17] He accompanied him on many collecting expeditions and also served as his scientific proxy.[18] He wrote to European naturalists and distributing specimen collections on the emperor's behalf.[19]

Hirohito's regular military teachers at the Ogakumonjo School included the president of the peer's school, Ōsako Naoharu. Ōsako, the older brother of General Naomichi, was a general in the early Imperial Japanese Army, and expert on the Russo-Japanese War. Capt. Satō Tetsutarō, who served as a lieutenant in 1892, as chief navigator aboard the gunboat Akagi, delivered lectures to Hirohito on the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories of naval power, especially those explained in his first two books: The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812.[20]

From Mahan's theories, Hirohito learned "how having a strong presence on the seas is one of the biggest factors that help a country win wars and become an influential world power." According to Mahan, control of the sea by a large fleet of battleships was key to successful expansionist.[21] Satō also lectured Hirohito on Western and Japanese military history (including the Battle of the Sea of Japan, [May 1905] in which the combined Japanese fleet with large British-made battleships under Admiral Togō destroyed the Russian Baltic squadron, effectively ending the Russian-Japanese War).

Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, Hirohito's uncle, supervised the first stage of his royal nephew's naval training, which started in July 1916. Hirohito's army lecturers were generals Ugaki Kazushige and Nara Takeji. Ugaki was sent as a military attaché to Germany from 1902 to 1904 and again from 1906 to 1907. In 1910, he was promoted to colonel, and in 1915 was promoted to major general. In 1917, he participated in planning the Siberian Expedition to stop the spread of the Russian Revolution into that region.[22]

During Hirohito's last year at the Tōgū-gogakumonsho Academy, Nara drafted a seven-point guideline for the Crown Prince's continued education, stating that he should emphasize military affairs and take a deep interest in

commanding the country's army and navy. Nara prepared him for the different role he was to play as an emperor, taught him the nation's history, which combined elements of nationalism and racism in the myth of his descent from the gods.[22] Under Nara's direction, Hirohito mastered horsemanship and practiced firing weapons.

Sugiura Shigetake, an ultranationalist Confucian educator, lectured Hirohito on the principles that should guide his behavior. In his lectures, Sugiura named several great men in world history whose lives illustrated the value of knowledge. Among them were Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for his philosophy of education and independence of thought; George Washington, for his sense of justice and fair play; and Thomas Robert Malthus, for his ideas on population growth and economic change.[23] Another fundamental point was that Hirohito had to respect all the rules contained in Meiji's "Charter Oath of Five Articles" (1868), which included the statement, "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of Imperial rule" and the "Imperial Rescript on Education" (1890).[24] Sugiura regarded the "Charter Oath" as an important document for political reasons. The document stated that deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion, and that "all classes, high, low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the administration of affairs of state."[25] Sugiura pointed out that the Meiji constitution had endorsed that vision by providing for an elected lower house of representatives, as well as an appointed upper house of peers. Together, the charter of oath and the constitution signified that the Japanese monarchy had reached a new stage in its historical evolution that of constitutional monarchy.[26]

Sugiura's lectures to Hirohito illustrated a crucial link between domestic reform and maritime expansion, while demonstrating a debt to the new ideologies of Japanism and liberalism. His teachings revealed a distinctive strain of colonial thought that envisioned people on the periphery of a unified Japan, from Ōmi merchants to social outcasts, as central agents of expansion.[27]

Dynasty

Emperor Meiji died on July 30, 1912. His son, Crown Prince Yoshihito, Hirohito's father, became emperor, and Hirohito was formally named Crown Prince in a special national ceremony that was held on November 2 that year. He was eleven years old. Eight years later, Hirohito attained the ranks of major of the Imperial Japanese Army and lieutenant commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy. A year later, after graduating from the Ogakumonjo School, he began a six-month trip to England and Continental Europe on March 3, 1921. Dressed as a naval officer, he boarded the 16,000-ton Japanese battleship Katori off the coast of Hayama. Several nobles accompanied him, including some cousins and his uncle, Gen. Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni. While for many years, Japanese soldiers and sailors had gone abroad to observe and train, Hirohito's trip was the first time a member of the royal family had left Japan. Two-thirds of the way there, the battleship Katori passed into the Red Sea, then through Egypt's Suez Canal, and stopped at Cairo where the British Lord Allenby gave a garden party. Prince George of England (later King George VI) met Hirohito at the island of Malta and took him to a performance of Othello by an Italian opera company. On April 29, 1921, near Gibraltar, at the mouth of the Mediterranean Sea, Hirohito celebrated his twentieth birthday. At Gibraltar, he visited Britain's naval base and attended some horse races. He arrived in England at Portsmouth's naval base on May 9th. Again, dressed as an admiral, he inspected the crew of a British battleship.

On May 10, 1921, a second member of the British royal family, Prince Edward, known as the Prince of Wales, son of the reigning King George V and Queen Mary, greeted Hirohito. King George invited the Crown Prince and his entourage of eighteen people to stay at Buckingham Palace. In the following days, Prince Edward ushered him through a series of receptions, banquets, and parades. Hirohito visited the British Museum and enjoyed the exhibits. He went to the Bank of England and visited Oxford University. He met Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George. On May 21, Hirohito and his entourage went to Scotland. There, he met Sir John George Stewart-Murray,

Marquis of Tullibardine and 8th Duke of Atholl. Returning to England, he visited the industrial city of Manchester, touring factories, meeting and shaking hands with shipyard workers.

On May 30 Hirohito traveled to France. Arriving in Paris, he visited the Louvre Museum. Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain showed him the battlefields of the war's Western Front. The following day, France's President Alexandre Millerand, previously prime minister, gave a reception for Hirohito at the Elysée Palace. The next day, he visited the Palace of Versailles, France's principal royal residence from 1682 to the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789.

Thus, from March 3 to September 3, 1921, Hirohito and his accompanying relatives and officials toured Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy as the first royal member to have gone abroad. This trip in Europe informed and educated the future emperor about the Western world beyond Japan, its politics, alliances, technological powers, and empire aims.[28] Under the guidance of Baron Chinda Sutemi, one of the most experienced diplomats in Japan, he learned to appreciate the importance of international peace. "War is a terrible thing," he said, looking over the ruins of the Battle of Verdun in France, where more than two million soldiers had killed each other, on orders of their superiors, only a few years earlier. Hirohito considered his visit to King George V and the British royal family as the most valuable lesson of the trip. As he said many decades later, "George V intimately explained to me the British constitutional monarchy as it ought to be. Ever since, it has been always on my mind, and I have been constantly thinking about how a monarch under a constitutional monarchy should behave."[29]

On November 10, 1921, Hirohito at twenty years old was appointed Prince Regent of Japan (Sesshō) to carry on the imperial functions of government because of his father's debilitating mental illness. It was a difficult task for the young Prince Regent as future emperor. The same year, Britain refused to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and a few months later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that Japanese were ineligible to become U.S. citizens. These decisions angered the Japanese people and encouraged the creation of many secret societies funded by the army, such as the Black

Dragon Society, a prominent paramilitary, ultranationalist group in Japan founded by martial artist Uchida Ryochei, which made public threats against anyone who did not follow the precepts of “good Japanese citizenship.” In 1923, Hirohito was promoted from major to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Japanese Army. In 1924, he married Princess Nagako Kuni. And in 1925, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant commander to that of captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy.

As an officer in both the army and navy, Hirohito received many years of military training during the Siberian Expedition. During these years of training, he was witness to several political and social “events” in Japan. The Imperial Japanese Army was required to exert “brutal force” against its own citizens. For instance, in the wake of Russia’s “Bolshevik Revolution” against Tsar Nicholas, riots erupted throughout Japan in the summer of 1918. The government mobilized approximately sixty-thousand soldiers to put down the riots. They were the most violent strikes in Japanese history, more brutal than the Tokyo Artillery Arsenal and the Kamaishi iron mine in 1919, the Yawata Steel in 1920, the Ashio copper mine in April 1921, and the Kawasaki-Mitsubishi shipyards strikes in Kobe in July 1921. During the Kobe strikes, thirty-five thousand shipyard workers demonstrated for autonomy in the workplace, better wages and working conditions. The Mayor of the city called in the army. More than three hundred workers were wounded and some two hundred and fifty arrested.[30]

Japan, in the 1920s, was a country of intense ideological and cultural conflicts and collisions. Several social protest movements that surged during World War I gained in force after the end of the war. Labor strikes, union organizing, and an incipient student movement were the most notable. The Japanese protested labor inequities, political injustices, treaty negotiations, and Japanese involvement in World War I. The number of labor strikes rose from 108 in 1914 to 417 strikes in 1918. At the outset of the war there were forty-nine labor organizations; by the end of the war, there were 187, with a total membership approximately a hundred thousand. A movement for women’s suffrage was started soon after.[31] The country’s early women’s organization advocated overturning of Article 5 of the Police Security Act that had prevented women from joining political groups and actively participating in politics. The movement also challenged cultural

and family traditions as women entered the workforce in greater numbers and sorted their financial independence.[32]

This spectrum of critical social issues had accumulated and burst upon post World War I Japan. “Society” wanted to become more “liberal,” meaning free, appreciated, enlightened, and advanced. In 1925, the government gave all men over twenty-five the right to vote if they were not indigent. In 1926, the Japanese National Health Insurance Law of 1922 became operative. The Peace Preservation Law was another. It intended to mollify conservatives, particularly those in the appointed, not elected, House of Peers. The law made it illegal to advocate the abolishment of private property, or the creation of a different political structure than the one in place in Japan. It also established military training at universities and high schools.

Despite the general instability that accompanied modernization, the efforts that started with Emperor Meiji in 1860s, continued throughout the Taishō era, which has become known as “Taishō democracy.” Slowly, Japan began to want, enjoy, and benefit from a climate of political liberalism after decades of Meiji authoritarianism. In 1874, Katō Hiroyuki, a Japanese scholar, who analyzed the dominance of Western civilization and urged progress for the Japanese nation, wrote the Kokutai Shenron “New Theory of the National Body/Structure,” which criticized traditional Chinese and Japanese theories of government and, adopting Western theories of natural rights, proposed a constitutional monarchy for Japan. Sharing Katō’s vision, the liberal intellectuals envisioned a political system along the lines of a Western-style parliamentary democracy and wanted to remove the imperial house of Japan completely from politics and government. According to them, the transition from a concept of the monarchy as an institution blessed by the gods to the new image of the sovereign as an emblem of the state under a democratic constitution was a success.

This political change took place in Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. However, it was not being tolerated by traditional conservatives, who insisted on keeping the vision of kokutai intact: a concept of national identity in which a personal rule of male emperor has the absolute political authority. The kokutai concept required all imperial subjects to support imperial rule. Those who were part of the so-called nationalist/conservative

movement would hold to the centuries of Japanese tradition, rejecting any shifts in gender roles or education and military reforms. For the leaders' traditional conservatives in Japan, the kokutai was immutable, and that those who tried to turn the emperor into a mere symbol were guilty of lèse-majesté.[33]

Dr. Sakuzō Yoshino, a Japanese Christian politician and educator, was one of the leading political figures who introduced the term "Taishō democracy." Yoshino graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1904. He had a long career teaching political history and theory in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University. There, he began to write a series of articles promoting the development of a liberal and social democratic tradition. He was, currently, one of the most influential advocates of parliamentary government in the country. Without questioning the monarchy system with the emperor as the head of state, he nevertheless called for a "government for the people" (minponshugi), insisting that the people's demands to be the basic goal of government. He also advocated universal suffrage, civilian control of the army, the transformation of the House of Peers to a popularly elected body, and the gradual establishment of a socialist state. To materialize these goals, he formed his own party, the Reimekai, in 1918.

In the preface of his 1916 essay, "On the Meaning of Constitutional Government and the Methods by Which It Can Be Perfected," Yoshino wrote: "The fundamental prerequisite for perfecting constitutional government, especially in politically backwards nations, is the cultivation of knowledge and virtue among the general population. This is not the task that can be accomplished in a day. Think of the situation in our own country [Japan], we instituted constitutional government before the people were prepared for it. As a result, there have been many failures... Still, it is impossible to reverse course and return to the old absolutism, so there is nothing for us to do but cheerfully take the road of reform and progress. Consequently, it is extremely important not to rely on politicians alone but to use the cooperative efforts of educators, religious leaders, and thinkers in all areas of society."[34]

Many Japanese intellectuals at that time were following Yoshino, who wrote that the global trend toward democracy was coming to Japan. The group's attempt was to make Japan's national ideology compatible with modern scientific thought, as well as to address the legitimacy of the emperor's rule and the sort of moral value that he and the imperial system had, or ought to have, in Japanese society.[35] The final goal was to reconcile the imperial house with the spirit and logic of Taishō democracy.[36]

One of the leaders of the rightist organizations, who militate against the concept of liberalism and the spirit and logic of democracy in Japan, was Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō. Son of a low-ranking samurai from the Tsuyama Domain of Mimasaka Province, Hiranuma was the vice president of the Privy Council, which advised the emperor. He graduated with a degree in English law from Tokyo Imperial University in 1888. After graduation, he obtained a posting in the Ministry of Justice. In 1911, he was the prosecutor for the High Treason Incident, the 1910 socialist-anarchist plot to assassinate Emperor Meiji. In 1921, he became chief of the Supreme Court of Japan. Under the second Yamamoto administration, from September 1923 to January 1924, he became Minister of Justice. As such, he advocated the creation of the Tokkō to combat Communism, socialism, and the spread of what he considered subversive ideologies. In 1924, he became chairman of the House of Peers and was appointed to the Privy Council. In 1926, he was elevated to the title of danshaku (baron) under the kazoku peerage system. The emperor appointed him prime minister serving for less than a year, from January 5 to August 30, 1939. He returned to the government after his resignation as prime minister, accepting the post of home minister in the second Konoe Fumimaro administration from December 21, 1940, to July 18, 1941.[37]

During this critical time of intense conflict that emerged between liberals and traditional conservatives in the Japanese society, in 1919, at twenty years of age, Hirohito became Japan's functional leader due to the failing capacities of his father, who was stricken with neurological disorders and mental illness. Emperor Taishō contracted cerebral meningitis at an early age. The ill effects of the disease, including physical weakness and episodes of mental instability, plagued him throughout his reign. Because of his sickness, there was a shift in the structure of political power from the old

oligarchic advisors under Meiji to the members of the Diet of Japan. The elected representative officials increasingly gained more and more influence and power. By 1919, Emperor Taishō's illness prevented him from performing any official duties. On November 25, 1921, Hirohito became Prince Regent.[38]

The Prince Regent

Hirohito took the role of Prince Regent during a period of economic turbulence in Japan. The Japanese economy of the 1920s went rapidly into a significant regression. After the boom of the First World War, starting in 1919, the economy on the island remained blunt, with low economic growth, mild deflation, and an unsettled financial system. In March 1920, stock prices plunged in Japan as investors anticipated a hard landing for the Japanese economy.[39] The next month, Masuda Bill Broker Bank in Osaka failed. The bank had been engaged in the intermediation of interbank transactions, and its customers had included both local banks and large city banks.[40] Over the next four months, from April to July 1920, operations were suspended at twenty-one banks, either permanently or temporarily. The Bank of Japan extended various types of "special loans" to ease tensions within the financial markets in general and stabilize the markets by relieving specific key industries.[41]

At the end of February 1922, Ishii Corporation, a lumber company engaged in speculation, went bankrupt. That affected the bank activities in Kochi Prefecture (in the southwestern part of Japan), and Kansai region (Osaka, Kyoto, and their environs). From October through December 1922, bank activities were interrupted across the country, from Kyushu (the westernmost part of Japan) through Kantō (Tokyo and its environs in eastern Japan). In 1922, operations were suspended at fifteen banks in Japan. The BOJ extended "special loans" to twenty banks from December 1922 to April 1923. By enacting the Saving Bank Act of 1921, the government tightened regulations on small-sized saving banks.

What became known as "The Great Kantō Earthquake" in September 1923 hurt the financial system in Japan much more, damaging the financial assets of banks, as well as their physical capital such as the bank headquarters buildings and branches. The delays in the repayment of bank loans affected all financial systems on the island. On September 7, 1923, the government promulgated an emergency ordinance, allowing for the postponement of

payments in the districts affected. As the situation became worse, the BOJ made special arrangements, including “special loans.” On September 27, the government promulgated the Earthquake Casualty Bills, or ECBs, to indemnify the BOJ for any losses incurred in the re-discounting of bills and certain other papers payable in the stricken areas.

During the period that historians have called “Taishō Democracy,” on January 7, 1924, a new cabinet led by Prime Minister Kiyoura Keigo came to power. At this critical time, the chief figure of the government was a general named Kazushige Ugaki, the minister of war. Ugaki graduated in 1891 at the reformed Imperial Japanese Army Academy and in 1900 from the Army Staff College. A protégé of Gen. Kawakami Soroku and Gen. Tanaka Giichi, as a captain, he was sent as military attaché to Germany. Starting in October 1923, Ugaki served as vice minister of the army. In January 1924, he was appointed army minister by Keigo.

Nominated minister of war, in 1924, Ugaki’s assigned task was to strengthen the army by creating a modern armored force. First, he strove to protect the superior position of the Imperial Japanese Army in Japanese politics. Second, he called for an army of fifty divisions. With the fiscal retrenchment policy practiced by the Katō Takaaki cabinet in May 1925, Ugaki was forced to eliminate four infantry divisions (the IJA 13th Division, IJA 15th Division, IJA 17th Division, and IJA 18th Division), which resulted in the firing of approximately two thousand commissioned officers. He was also forced to shorten the period that conscripts served with the remaining divisions and push many senior officers into early retirement. Those measures to implement modernization into the army represented a struggle for him. He had to navigate between the old Chōshū clan faction who represented the samurai of the past and the new officer class, which had grown up in the Meiji era, and was largely led by officers who came up through the ranks from the peasantry.

Crown Prince Hirohito’s leadership was challenged by many events that happened in Japan at that time. In September 1923, an earthquake struck the Tokyo area, killing about 140,000 people and destroying 63 percent of the city’s houses. The 7.9 magnitude earthquake occurred near the densely populated, modern industrial cities of Tokyo and Yokohama. The epicenter

was in Sagami Bay, just southwest of Tokyo Bay. The earthquake devastated Tokyo, the port city of Yokohama, and the surrounding prefectures of Chiba, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka causing widespread damage throughout the Kantō region. According to the archives, the earthquake's force was so great that it moved the Great Buddha statue in Kamakura over 60 km (37mi) from the epicenter.

That earthquake brought logistics and infrastructural problems, such as cutting off telephone and telegraph lines, rail communication between Tokyo and the rest of Japan was also cut off. For the army and the army-controlled police, the disaster offered an opportunity to settle many old scores. The Koreans who had migrated to Japan since their country had been annexed in 1910, and who had become Japanese nationals, were massacred in the thousands by the police in the confusion of the earthquake and fires. The Kempeitai, the army's special police, used the occasion to wipe out many leftists. Comparable to those of Hitler's Brown Shirts and Mussolini's Black Shirts, the Kempeitai's soldiers were free in this time of natural disaster to murder hundreds of political opponents of the regime.

Three months after the earthquake, on December 27, 1923, Hirohito was on his way to the opening of the forty-eighth session of the Imperial Diet. In downtown Tokyo, at the Toranomon intersection between the Akasaka Palace and the Diet of Japan, a "Communist agitator" named Daisuke Nanba, a young son of a member of the Diet, attempted to assassinate the Prince Regent by shooting into the emperor's horse-drawn buggy. The shot missed the target but wounded one of Hirohito's chamberlains.[42]

Nanba's attempt to kill Hirohito was motivated by his leftist ideology, and by a strong desire to avenge the death of Kōtoku Shūsui, a Japanese socialist who played a leading role in introducing anarchism to Japan in the early twentieth century. Kōtoku translated into the Japanese society the works of European and Russian anarchists, such as Peter Kropotkin executed on January 24, 1911, aged thirty-nine, for his alleged role in the High Treason Incident of 1910.[43] Although Nanba claimed that he was rational, he was proclaimed insane to the public. On November 13, 1924, he was found guilty at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Court of Japan. Sentenced to death, he was executed by hanging two days later.

On January 26, 1924, Hirohito and Princess Nagako Kuniyoshi were married at the Imperial Palace. The Shinto wedding ceremony was performed in traditional fashion, which included the purification ritual where the couple exchanges cups of sake. Seven hundred noble guests, all of them Japanese, attended the ceremony, which was followed by 101 salutes from the battery on Miyake Hill, from the ships in the harbor, and from the guns of the forts all over Japan. Then the couple went on their honeymoon, to the palace of Hirohito's brother, Nobuhito Prince Takamatsu, at Okajima.

One-year-old Hirohito clutches the military flag

of the Rising Sun. (K.K. Kyodo News)

(Image from 2db.com)

Crown Prince Yoshihito, the future Taishō emperor, poses with Hirohito at his Aoyama Palace. (K.K. Kyodo News)

(Image retrieved from UnofficialRoyalty.com)



Hirohito was the 124th emperor of Japan. He reigned as the Emperor of the Empire of Japan from 25 December 1926 until 2 May 1947 and of the state of Japan from 3 May 1947 until his death on 7 January 1989.

4

MAKE-BELIEVE GOVERNMENT

Taking the Throne

T he four months from the end of 1921 to the beginning of 1922 were consequential for Japan. On November 4, 1921, a right-wing railroad switchman, Nakaoka Kon'ichi, stabbed to death Prime Minister Hara Takashi in Tokyo station. [1] Three weeks later on November 25, 1921, Crown Prince Hirohito became Prince Regent, a stand-in position conferred on him by the Diet to allow his rule in place of his ailing father, Emperor Taishō. Three months later, on February 6, 1922, the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan signed a treaty in Washington, D.C., mutually agreeing to limit their construction of warships, specifically battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft carriers.

Japan's delegation, prominently led by Marshal-Admiral Viscount Katō Tomosaburō, Japan's chief commissioner plenipotentiary to the Washington Naval Conference, promised that Japan would withdraw its troops from Siberia and its military forces from Kiaochow Bay (on the Southern side of the Shandong peninsula), and from other regions in northern China. The Japanese agreed to share with the United States the right to establish and maintain cable and radio stations and residences on the island of Yap in the Caroline Islands. In return, the United States consented to Japan's mandate of the Pacific Islands north of the equator that had been granted to Japan at Paris. The British and Americans agreed to build no naval bases west of Hawaii or north of Singapore. According to the agreement, Japan agreed it would have only three big warships for every five for Britain and the United States. It was agreed that no nation would keep aircraft carriers larger than 27,000 tons or that had guns with bores larger eight (8) inches.[2]

In Japan, Takahashi Korekiyo, Uchida Kōsai's successor as prime minister, was very concerned about the influence of the United States in the Pacific and East Asia. As a tactician, he arranged Japan's participation in the Washington Conference to strengthen the ties with the United States.[3] Takahashi believed that in order to flourish economically, Japan had to adopt policies that appeased the Americans.[4] But his political move was not well received by right-wing groups and some Japanese military leaders who

railed against the Washington treaties.[5] They denounced that the United States had drafted the Washington treaties to restrain Japan in China and roll back the advances it had made there during World War I.[6] Japan's Chief of the Naval Board, Commander Kato Kanji, was so upset that he declared a war between the United States and Japan had begun.

On September 1, 1923, a powerful earthquake and tsunami struck Yokohama and Tokyo. Eight months later, on May 10, 1924, a general election was held. No party won a majority of seats, resulting in a coalition of the two political parties: the Kenseikai and the Rikken Seiyūkai Club that formed the first coalition government in Japan led by Katō Takaaki. On December 27, 1924, a dynamite explosion killed ninety-four people in Temiya Railroad Station, Otaru, Hokkaido. Despite the continuing climate of tension and violence stemming from dissatisfaction from the Washington Naval Treaty, Prime Minister Katō was able to enact significant legislation. The General Election Law of 1925 extended the vote to all male citizens over the age of 25. Up to that time, only were permitted to vote those who were taxpayers. His government also produced the Peace Preservation Law that suppressed leftist political organizations and concluded the Russian Japanese Basic Convention. He also initiated universal military service and strove to reduce government spending.[7]

On December 25, 1926, Emperor Taishō died. On November 10, 1928, at twenty-five years old, Hirohito came to the throne. He became officially the 124th emperor of Japan. This marked Japan's entry into the Shōwa era, meaning "radiant or enlightened peace." According to the 2,600-year-old tradition, the emperor was regarded as a monarch of divine essence, for whom Article 3 of the constitution of February 11, 1889, enshrined the "sacred and inviolable" character of his person.[8] The structure of the Meiji constitution and the de facto divine status inherited by birth placed Hirohito at the top of the state. He was the nation's highest spiritual authority and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[9] All branches of government, including the Diet and the cabinet, had to refer to him before making any important decision.

One year after he took the throne, a nationwide financial panic was expanded to the country. The debates in the Diet revealed financial

difficulties between the Bank of Taiwan and Suzuki & Co. Ltd. This huge trading house based in Kobe was founded in 1874 by Iwajiro Suzuki as a trading house for importing Western sugar. The firm became one of the eight major trading companies in Kobe, specializing in Western sugar and oil. Later, the company added beer, alcohol, flour milling and metal businesses in the Dairi region of Kita-kyushu.

After the Great Kantō Earthquake of September 1, 1923, the company was forced to inflate loans from its main bank, the Bank of Taiwan. As the economic climate continued to worsen due to the post-war recession, it eventually succumbed to bankruptcy during the Shōwa Financial Crisis of 1927. The crisis necessitated reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of public funds on the market. In January 1927 the Wakatsuki cabinet of the ruling Kensei-kai Party submitted a legislation to the Diet, requiring adjustments of the ECBs. This primary step was to facilitate the final disposition of the bad debts incurred during the Great Kantō Earthquake. The legislation would allow the government to issue bonds, which would be exchanged with the ECBs. On March 14, 1927, Finance Minister, Kataoka Naoharu, declared that the Tokyo Watanabe Bank had failed. This statement set off a financial panic in the regions, particularly in Tokyo and Osaka. On March 23, the Diet approved the legislation, temporarily calming the depositors' panic.[10]

This was only for a short period, however, during the first week of April, the cabinet led by Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō drafted an emergency ordinance authorizing the BOJ to send the Bank of Taiwan relief funds, and indemnifying the BOJ for any losses incurred by this action up to a ceiling of ¥200 million. The Privy Council, instead of approving the emergency ordinance, politicized the cabinet's plan and rejected it on April 17. The Wakatsuki cabinet resigned on April 20, 1927, and financial panic spread nationwide.

On the same day, Giichi Tanaka, of the opposition Seiyu-kai Party, took office. Takahashi Korekiyo became finance minister for the fourth time, and the government proclaimed an emergency ordinance imposing a three-week moratorium, effective from April 22 to May 12. The following day, the Diet during an extraordinary session deliberated on measures to dispose of the

bad loans and stabilize the financial system. On May 30, 1927, under the governor of the Bank of Japan, Junnosuke Inoue, the new Banking Act was promulgated. Despite all those measures, the Japanese economy continued during the interwar period (1927–1931) to be in chronic crisis. Japan experienced the deepest economic downturn in modern history. From 1929 to 1931, WPI fell about 30 percent, agricultural prices fell 40 percent, and textile prices fell nearly 50 percent. After the Shōwa Financial Crisis of 1927, Japan's economy was facing the challenge of the Great Depression of the 1930s. This worldwide economic collapse had been intensified in the country by the return to the gold standard at the old parity in January 1930.[11]

Facing Economic Crisis

The stock market crash of October 29, 1929, in the United States, started a worldwide economic crisis called “The Great Depression.” This economic crisis had devastating effects in all countries in the world. Between 1929 and 1932, worldwide (GDP) fell by an estimated 15 percent. Cities were hit hard, especially those dependent on heavy industry. Construction was virtually halted in many countries. Farming communities and rural areas suffered as crop prices fell by about 60 percent. Personal income, tax revenue, profits, and prices dropped, while international trade plunged by more than 50 percent. In some developed countries, unemployment rose as high as 33 percent.

Japan experienced the deepest economic downturn in modern history. Some economic measures taken by the government of Osachi Hamaguchi had major consequences on the economy. The Minsei Party government led by Prime Minister Hamaguchi, Finance Minister Inoue, and Foreign Minister Shidehara deliberately adopted a deflationary policy in order to eliminate weak banks and firms and prepare the nation for the return to the prewar gold parity (fixed exchange rate with real appreciation).[12] The policy of deflation and return to gold was strongly advocated and implemented by Finance Minister Inoue. Inoue was deeply committed to the policy of deflation and returning to gold. This policy caused severe depression. People became greatly frustrated with the cabinet. Finally, the government (second Wakatsuki cabinet) was removed and succeeded by a Seiyukai government led by Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi who took charge on December 13, 1931.[13]

Japan, contrary to countries in Asia like China, Russia, Malaya, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and India, because it has few natural resources, relied almost entirely on foreign trade. When the Great Depression hit the world in the early 1930s, foreign countries no longer imported Japanese luxuries such as silk. The value of Japanese exports dropped by 50 percent between 1929 and 1931.[14] As soon as the new government was sworn in, Finance

Minister Takahashi Korekiyo completely reversed Inoue's policies. On the very first day, Takahashi ended the gold standard and the fixed exchange rate and floated the yen that had immediately been depreciated. The new government took the two major measures to fight the crisis: fiscal expansion financed by government bonds issues (called "Spending Policy,") monetary expansion, and low interest rates. Despite fiscal pressure, the army and navy pressured for more military spending. Takahashi resisted. For his position, he was assassinated by a member of Ketsumeidan in the League of Blood Incident, on February 26, 1936.

The assassination of Takahashi greatly opened the door to the return of these policies and systems that were deliberately adopted by Japan in the late 1930s through the early 1940s. Tanaka Chigaku, a Japanese Buddhist scholar and preacher of Nichiren Buddhism, orator, writer, and ultranationalist propagandist in the Meiji, the Taishō, and early Shōwa periods, was one of the spiritual leaders of the Kokuchūkai, National Pillar Society, based in Miho. Tanaka was deeply hostile to Taishō democracy. He was a fervent partisan to the expansion of the Japanese Empire. From his nationalist and imperialist convictions, he believed that Japan's 1931 takeover of Manchuria was divinely ordained and part of a divine plan to spread the "true" Nichiren Buddhism throughout Asia.[15]

Tanaka even went as far as to predict that "Nichirenization" would spread around the world. He subordinated everything to the kokutai, and asserted that Japan, with its "unbroken" line of emperors, had a unique destiny "to guide and induce every country in the world to become a state ruled by the Way of the Prince."[16] Only the emperor of Nippon was "unchangeable for good with his origin in Heaven…a God or morality itself," he said. All the emperors had "inherited from the first Emperor Jimmu, his virtues and brilliant work," and "the extraordinary great Emperor Meiji [had] appeared to become the axis of the world." This was finding fulfilment in Manchuria, and, with Japan's help, it would spread to China and the whole world.[17]

In Bukkyō fūfu ron, a work dedicated to the imperial family, Tanaka wrote that, while previous sages had spoken of enbudai no Nippon (Japan of the inhabited earth), Nichiren had used the term Nippon no enbudai, to include the whole inhabited earth in Japan. He claimed that, as a result, the

mausoleums of Japan's imperial deities, Amaterasu Ōmikami and Hachiman, were to become universal objects of worship. Ishiwara wrote that he had believed in Nichiren because he had a completely satisfying view of the kokutai, and so had to be the one to unify world thought and faith.[18] This objective was to be realized by shakubuku, which means to conquer evil aggressively.[19] He extended the meaning of shakubuku to justify military aggression against China in 1931: "When it is said that the Imperial Japanese Army is an army of humanity and justice, for maintaining justice and building peace, it means that it is a force for compassion. The shakubuku of Nichirenism must be like this."[20]

Tanaka used his contacts inside the imperial court to make the Nichiren faith as the state religion of Japan, and to introduce the Nichiren philosophy into the army. Ishiwara Kanji was one, who worked hardly to implement Tanaka's vision among the Japanese troops. After graduating from the War College, through his wife's influence in 1919, Ishiwara joined the Kokuchū-kai (Pillar of the Nation Society) founded by Tanaka. After studying military science in Germany in 1923–1924, Ishiwara joined the staff of the military academy in Tokyo, before being sent to Manchuria in 1928. He later became the chief plotter of the 1931 Manchurian Incident. "He saw Japan's mission as that of overthrowing the military clique, freeing Asia from domination by the United States and Europe and forming a single economy and combined defense system for Japan, Manchuria and China. He helped to establish the puppet state of Manchukuo and believed that, with the cooperation of China, a model state would develop. However, in 1949, after Japan had been defeated by the Allied powers, Ishiwara wrote to General MacArthur, recognizing he had been wrong in supposing that the "final" war would be fought between East Asia on the one hand and Western countries on the other. But he still hoped for "a fundamental world reformation" based on new family life, new villages, and government according to Rissho ankoku.[21]

As Tanaka, Ishiwara believed that world unity centered on the Japanese emperor and would be achieved when the Lotus Sūtra was recognized by the court as the substance of the Japanese polity.[22] The same perception was shared by Shigeru Honjō, the commander of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, who was also a Nichiren believer, and also by Ikki Kita who

was in contact with many people on the extreme right of Japanese politics. Different governments such as Saitō Makoto, Keisuke Okada, Kōki Hirota, and Senjūrō Hayashi, saw Kita's ideas as disruptive and dangerous. Therefore, after imposing the kokutai, which literally means "national body," as a unique sense of significance regarding their national community, which is variously expressed as national character, national essence, national substance, state structure, national polity; the next challenge for the ultranationalist groups was to fight the expansion of Communism in the region, particularly in China.

Fighting Communism

By the fall of 1916, Russia had been at war for more than two years with the Central powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire (modern-day Turkey). The Russian Empire's involvement in World War I began in 1914 when Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum that threatened Serbian sovereignty in the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Frantz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne. Russia, as an ally of Serbia, mobilized its armies. France and Great Britain as Russia's allies in the Triple Entente also went to war with the Central powers.

Russia suffered a disastrous defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg in the first weeks of the war, resulting in 78,000 Russian soldiers killed and wounded and 92,000 captured by the Germans. After the defeat, Tsar Nicholas II assumed direct control of the army as commander in chief. Over three years, nearly 2 million Russian soldiers were killed in battle and another nearly 5 million were wounded. The Russian people blamed the Tsar for entering the war and for getting so many citizens killed.

In February 1917, the Bolsheviks Revolution led by Vladimir Lenin and a group of revolutionaries had started with the peasants and working-class people of Russia revolting against the government. The revolution began when several workers decided to strike. Tsar Nicholas II ordered the army to suppress the protesters. However, many of the soldiers refused to fire on the Russian people, and the army began to mutiny against the Tsar. After a few days of riots, the entire army turned against the Tsar, who was forced to exile. A new government that was run by two political parties: the Petrograd Soviet (representing the workers and soldiers), and the Provisional Government (the traditional government without the Tsar), took over. Over the next several months, the two sides ruled Russia. In October 1917, Lenin who led the main factions of the Petrograd Soviet and the Bolsheviks took full control of the government issued from the Bolshevik Revolution. Russia became the first Communist country in the world.[23]

In Japan, the beginning of the Shōwa era was the years of the “Red Scare.” Japanese officials feared more than anything the expansion of Communism in Asia, particularly in China, where Vladimir Lenin intended to spread the Bolsheviks revolution with Mao Zedong as an ally. The officials in Japan believed that invading China was the only solution to set limits to the expansion of Communism in the region. Also, responses to the Russian Revolution were therefore for Japan to occupy the entire countries in the Pacific and East Asia in order to eliminate the harm of Communism.[24]

5

EMPEROR’S CLOTHES

A Political Monarch Emerges

A t the start of his reign on December 25, 1926, Hirohito avoided implicating himself in the defense of the country. He relegated this role to the generals and admirals in the army and navy. With his entourage, he preferred to concentrate on domestic affairs. As he assumed control of the empire, Japan was at the stage of a crisis with a military-industrial complex that was seizing more and more executive power. [1] The Diet had limited power and could not make important decisions. Generals and admirals were more powerful than the rest of the Diet. They had direct access to the emperor, and could veto any policies that were unfavorable to them, for example opposing cuts to the military budget by the Diet, and more. [2] The officers in the army and navy very often intervened to impose their choice when it came to governmental cabinet picks.

As time passed, although Hirohito maintained a very low interest in military affairs, generals and admirals wanted him to participate more and more in questions related to the plan to strengthen Japan's military capability. Japan Empire at that time faced major threats from the United States, Britain, France, and Russia. Those countries tried to prevent it from expanding its territories. Starting in 1927, naval officers presented strategies on how best to meet the navy's national defense requirements. Adm. Kanji Katō, the leading opponent of the Washington Naval Treaty, advised Hirohito on the benefit to enlarge the geographic sphere of national defense.[3] Kanji wanted a big navy and believed in the doctrine of winning a war by fighting a decisive naval battle.

Thus, ideas advanced by one of the leading figures of the Imperial Japanese Navy were well received by those in Japan who publicized the Japanese right to safeguard Asia from the West. Hirohito had responded by supporting the military. As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, he believed, maintaining a good standing with his recalcitrant army was more important to him at that moment than international goodwill.[4] Japanese supporters of continental expansion got more and more power and were able to execute their political agenda.

On March 24, 1927, soldiers of China's Nationalist Revolutionary Army led by Chiang Kai-shek pillaged the Japanese consulate in Nanking and assaulted the consul. On that day of violence, six foreigners were killed, and several others were wounded. Demonstrations and boycotts against foreigners occurred throughout China. Two schools of thought dominated. On the one hand the nationalist movement dominated by the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party focused its demands for treaty revision and diplomatic equality for China. Being called moderates, the nationalist people believed the Kuomintang represented China's greater hope for unity and strength.[5] On the other hand the conservatives favored the continuance of the treaty system and accused the Nationalists as Bolsheviks who wished to turn China "red."[6]

For the Japanese supporters of continental expansion, the frictions in China offered a unique occasion to launch with full speed their policy of military and economic expansion on the Asian continent. Also, with the strong advice of his chief aide-de-camp Baron Takeji Nara, Hirohito gave his consent to the army's dispatch of troops to China's Shandong Province in order to protect Japanese residents.

On April 20, 1927, Hirohito appointed Gen. Tanaka Giichi as prime minister. Tanaka replaced Wakatsuki Reijirō who was forced to resign during the Shōwa Financial Crisis.[7] Upon taking his post, the new prime minister began actively campaigning for Japan to develop an aggressive policy toward China. On May 8, 1927, Hirohito approved another deployment of troops to China. Five thousand troops of the 6th Division, under Lt. Gen. Hikosuke Fukuda, were deployed to the port of Tsingtao, Shandong, a Japanese protectorate. On May 28, he approved the dispatch of reinforcements to Tsinan where 17,000 Japanese troops were deployed to protect some 2,000 Japanese civilians. A few weeks later, he sanctioned a fourth deployment of troops to Shandong Province. This garrison was led by Col. Kōmoto Daisaku whose staff officers, on June 4, 1928, had assassinated the Chinese leader Zhang Zuolin.[8]

The plan to kill Zhang was planned several months in advance by Japanese officers of the Kwantung Army staff who remained dissatisfied with the move of forming a puppet government in Manchuria. In 1926, Chiang Kai-

shek, the leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), began a series of campaigns designed to win control of the Yangtze Valley and the north. By the spring of 1927, Chiang established his capital in Nanking and during the following year, extended his authority toward Peking. As a result, he came into conflict with Zhang, whom Japan had been supporting in Manchuria since 1921. The Tanaka cabinet pressured the Chinese leader to withdraw from northern China into Manchuria, where he could be protected by the Japanese forces. Zhang, after consulting his son Zhang Xueliang, the effective ruler of Northeast China, reluctantly agreed. Several officials in Japan, and several generals in the army, believed that Zhang Zuolin's assassination would be the most expeditious way of installing a new leader in Manchuria more accountable to Japanese demands. They asked Col. Kōmoto Daisaku, senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army to carry out the assassination. Capt. Kaneo Tōmiya, Kōmoto's subordinate, oversaw the execution's plan. One of the officers, Sapper First Lt. Sadatoshi Fujii, planted the bomb on the bridge where Zhang's train passed. On June 4, 1928, at 5:23 a.m. the bomb exploded. Several officials, including Wu Junsheng, the governor of the Heilongjiang Province, died immediately. Zhang died from his injuries within a few hours at the Shanghai Huadong Hospital.

The following day, the Kwantung Army spokesmen falsely accused elements of China's Southern Army of executing the attack. Two months later, Prime Minister Tanaka learned that Japanese officers had committed the crime and were blaming it on Chinese soldiers. Tanaka ordered that hearings be held in connection with the assassination. A special commission was designated. The prime minister wanted to punish the real assassins and reestablish discipline in the army. Many figures in the cabinet led by Army Minister Yoshinori Shirakawa and Railway Minister Gōtarō Ogawa strongly opposed Tanaka's decision. This group was rejoined by Adm. Kantarō Suzuki and other influential Japanese officers who wanted to prevent the army's reputation from being defamed. With the entire army united against him and several members of his own cabinet such as Colonel Kōmoto, and Kwantung Army commander Chōtarō Muraoka, Tanaka went to see the emperor for his support.[9]

Instead of supporting his prime minister, who told him on December 24, 1928, that he intended to court-martial the assassins, Hirohito pressed Tanaka to give his resignation. At that point, Hirohito accepted the army's intention to lie to the public about the incident instead of punishing the officers' involved.[10] By firing Tanaka, Hirohito signaled to the political community that a cabinet led by the head of the Seiyūkai Party was not qualified to govern under his rule. On July 2, 1929, he nominated Osachi Hamaguchi, nicknamed the "Lion Prime Minister" (Raion Saishō), a member of the Rikken Minseitō party, as the new prime minister of Japan.[11]

The Rise of Nationalist Ideology

The introduction of universal military conscription introduced by Yamagata Aritomo in 1873, along with the proclamation of the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors in 1882, signaled and institutionalized the indoctrination of military-patriotic values across Japanese society. These values included honor, courage, mastery of martial arts, and loyalty to a master above all, and were drawn from the samurai code, the Bushidō. The aspect of unquestioning loyalty to the emperor became the basis of the Japanese state (kokutai), i.e. the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The appearance of political parties in the late Meiji period was coupled with the rise of secret and semi-secret patriotic societies such as the Gen'yōsha (1881) and Kokuryukai (1901), which coupled political activities with paramilitary activities and military intelligence, and supported expansionism overseas as a solution to Japan's internal problems and failures.[12]

Nevertheless, this agenda and obligatory relationship between ruler and ruled developed throughout the Taishō and Shōwa periods provided political and ideological cover for Japan's military in the decades leading up to World War II. During the Taishō period (July 30, 1912 – December 25, 1926), Japan had a short period of democratic government, the so-called "Taishō democracy." Japanese for a short period of time enjoyed a climate of political liberalism after decades of Meiji authoritarianism. After it annexed Korea in 1910, Japan sought acceptance internationally. It participated in the League of Nations in 1920 and it signed the Washington Naval Treaty. These were diplomatic efforts to advertise its concurrence with "peace" as a world goal. However, with the beginning of the Shōwa era, particularly beginning in 1931, the damage from the Great Depression and the imposition of trade barriers by the West, fanned the sparks of Japanese super-patriotism, a set of attitudes and behaviors that threatened to kill any who objected to or defied the military and its expansionist mission.[13]

During the Meiji era (1868–1912), Japan's soldiers and sailors were forbidden by law to take part in any political activity. Starting in 1927, with the Showā era, ultra-nationalism was affecting every aspect of life in Japan. The conventional wisdom was that empire expansion through military conquest would solve Japan's internal economic problems. It was argued by several experts that the rapid growth of Japan's population, which stood at close to 65 million in 1930, necessitated large food imports. To pay for such imports, Japan had to export things of equal value. Western tariffs limited exports. Thus, it was decided by Japanese officials that Japan had no recourse than to invade its neighbors and take what it wanted by force. This political behavior led to the resurgence of so-called "jingoistic" patriotism, a belief that the military could solve all threats both domestic and foreign. Patriotic education also played a key role in strengthening the sense of a hakko ichiu, a divine mission to unify Asia under Japanese rules.

Some figures who resisted the "military solution" such as Gen. Jōtarō Watanabe, one of the victims of the February 26 incident, Gen. Tetsuzan Nagata, famous as the victim of the Aizawa Incident of 1935, and ex-foreign minister Kijūrō Shidehara, a member of the kazoku, the leading proponent of pacifism in Japan before and after World War II, were revoked from their official positions or placed in an active role in the government. Several fractions in Japan criticized "Kijūrō Diplomacy," which to them seemed too soft on China. In 1925, Prime Minister Katō Takaaki had cut off the army by four divisions. Many Japanese officers objected to the restraint shown by Japan toward the Chinese Nationalists' northern expedition of 1926–1927 and wanted Japan to take a harder line in China. The primary goal was to defend the Japanese interests in Manchuria, more precisely in eastern part of Inner Mongolia.

On January 28, 1926, during the period that historians called "Taishō Democracy," Prime Minister Katō Takaaki died. He was replaced by Wakatsuki Reijirō. After fifteen months, Wakatsuki was forced to resign during the Shōwa financial crisis. On April 20, 1927, Tanaka Giichi became Prime Minister of Japan. Tanaka was the third son of a low-ranking samurai family in the service of Chōshū Domain in Hagi, Nagato Province (modern day Yamaguchi Prefecture). At the age of thirteen, he participated in the Hagi Rebellion. He joined the Imperial Japanese Army at the age of twenty.

In 1892, he graduated from the 8th class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy and the 8th class of the Army War College. He served as a junior officer during the First Sino-Japanese War. At the end of the war, he was sent as a military attaché to Moscow and Petrograd. In 1906, he helped draft a defense plan that was adopted by the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff as basic policy until World War I.

Tanaka's politics as prime minister differed both tactically and strategically to Wakatsuki, the former prime minister, who had been viewed as a moderate. On the domestic front, Tanaka attempted to suppress leftists, Communists, and suspected Communist sympathizers through widespread arrests. The March 15 incident of 1928 and the April 15 incident of 1929 are two good examples. On foreign policy, Wakatsuki preferred to evacuate Japanese residents abroad where conflicts occurred with local nationals, while Tanaka preferred using military forces. Wakatsuki theoretically respected China's sovereignty, while Tanaka openly pursued a "separation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia policy" (Man-Mō bunri seisaku) to create a sense of difference between those areas and the rest of China.[14] At two separate occasions in 1927 and 1928, Tanaka sent troops to intervene military in Shandong Province in order to block Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition to unify China.

In deficit of support from the Diet and the emperor, Tanaka and his cabinet resigned on July 2, 1929. He was succeeded by Osachi Hamaguchi. Hamaguchi joined the Rikken Dōshikai political party led by Katō Takaaki in 1915. The Party became the Kenseikai party in 1916. After being elected to the lower house in the Japanese Diet in 1915 from the Kōchi Second District, Hamaguchi served as Finance Minister under the first Katō administration. He held the same position under the first Wakatsuki administration. As Finance Minister, he pursued fiscal retrenchment and proposed reducing government spending by 17 percent. In 1927, he became the chairman of the new Rikken Minseitō political party formed by the merger of the Kenseikai and the Seiyūhontō.

As Prime Minister, Hamaguchi formed a cabinet based largely on Minseitō party members who favored domestic economic reforms over overseas military adventurism.[15] Taking advantage of a strong support from the

emperor and his entourage, including the genrō Saionji Kinmochi, Hamaguchi restored the policy of moderation. His government was able to implement several fiscal austerity measures. His primary concern was the Japanese economy, which had been in a long-term recession since 1919, and had been greatly weakened by the devastation caused by the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake. The situation became worse with the 1929 Great Depression. Hamaguchi's cabinet promoted retrenchment, deflation, the rationalization of industry, and fiscal restraint. Backed up by the Minseito party that scored an overwhelming victory in the House of Representatives election in February 1930, winning 273 seats, and gaining the support of some close allies in the Imperial Palace, such as the genrō Saionji Kinmochi, the cabinet implemented fiscal austerity measures, which included ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. This decision helped the government to impose a restriction on military spending.

The Treaty negotiations focused on the extent of naval disarmament with restrictions to be placed on the aggregate tonnage of auxiliary ships (cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc.). It set limits for the first time on the number of cruisers and other auxiliary ships that each nation could build. At the same time, it restricted the number of capital ships of each signatory. It set maximum tonnage for cruisers at 339,000 tons for Great Britain, 323,500 tons for the United States, and 208,850 tons for Japan. The maximum numbers of heavy cruisers were set at 18 for the United States, 15 for Great Britain, and 12 for Japan. It extended the provision of the 1922 treaty that prohibited new capital ships building for five years. Hamaguchi approved the London Naval Treaty that was signed on April 22, 1930, by Japan, and four other countries: United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy.[16]

On October 2, 1930, the treaty was ratified by the Japanese Diet. A few days after the ratification, Hamaguchi was publicly attacked by the Seiyūkai leaders.[17] The group —Katō, Suetsugu, and Tōgō— accused him of having signed the treaty without the support of the navy general's staff, thereby infringing on the emperor's "right of supreme command." The group also accused the advisers around the throne —Makino, Suzuki, and Kawai— of relying on arms limitation treaties to gain the "cooperation" of Britain and the United States on the dossier of China. Katō and consorts believed that

Grand Chamberlain Suzuki had blocked the formal report of the navy general's staff to the emperor, and that the government was pursuing a dangerous defense policy.[18]

One month after the ratification of the treaty, commanders and staff of the army began to criticize Hamaguchi. Those military leaders retained considerable power. They were supported by several organizations pushing to the theme of internal purity and expansion. These fought against excessive Western influence. Another group that opposed civil government control in Japan in the early 1930s was formed by junior military officers. They were largely from rural backgrounds. Born and raised into poverty, ignorant of political economy, distrustful of their senior leaders, such officers were already vulnerable to rightist theorists' ideas. Also, by allying with other extremist groups, the junior military officers alternately terrorized and intimidated their presumed opponents. Several business leaders were killed.

Kita Ikki, a former socialist and one-time member of the Black Dragon Society, declared that the Meiji constitution should be suspended in favor of a revolutionary regime advised by "national patriots" and led by a military government, which should nationalize large properties, limit wealth, end party government and the peerage, and prepare to take the leadership of a revolutionary Asia. Kita encouraged several young officers to take part in the violence of the 1930s with the hope of achieving these goals.

The military declared that the treaty's ratification "infringes on the Emperor's Supreme Command."[19] The Privy Council president, at the time of the naval treaty deliberations, Yūzaburō Kuratomi, later wrote in his memoirs a detailed account of the exchange between Navy Minister Takarabe Takeshi and the privy councilors over the usurpation of the prerogative of supreme command. The minister of foreign affairs, Kijūrō Shidehara, using the service of Home Minister Makino Nobuaki, sent a letter with an attachment describing the negotiations process at that time. Chief of General Staff Katō (Hiroharu) Kanji, who had accepted the compromise proposal at one point, sent a report to the emperor requesting him to block the treaty.

Hamaguchi's failure on economic policies played into the hands of the extremist activists. Those groups were already enraged by the government's conciliatory foreign policies and also by Japan's increasing unemployment.[20] Several members of the Rikken Seiyūkai opposition party joined within the Imperial Japanese Navy to accuse Hamaguchi of infringing of the emperor's "right of supreme command" as guaranteed under the Meiji constitution.

On November 14, 1930, Tomeo Sagoya, a twenty-one-year-old, member of the rightist group Aikokusha (Patriots Association), shot Hamaguchi at Tokyo Station.[21] Sagoya was a member of an extremist organization supported by the Seiyūkai politicians under the leadership of Heikichi Ogawa. So, the cabinet participated in the fifty-ninth session with Foreign Minister Baron Kijūrō Shidehara who had been chosen as acting prime minister to replace Hamaguchi in convalescence. The Seiyūkai condemned the cabinet on the grounds that Prime Minister Hamaguchi was absent from Diet proceedings and that Kijūrō was not in fact a party member.[22] Devastated by the Seiyūkai politician plans that contributed to an atmosphere of extremism, Hamaguchi resigned at his post of prime minister. He was replaced by Kijūrō Shidehara.

Starting in April 1931, after Hamaguchi's departure, the Shōwa government viewed Japan as threatened by Western imperialism. The prime motivation was to strengthen Japan's economic and industrial foundations, so that a strong military capacity could be built to defend the nation against outside powers. It was the start of the collapse of Japan's parliamentary system and its replacement by an expansionist military agenda through the growing power of the army in a country whose economy was subsumed by the Great Depression. The collapse of the Menseito government in December 1931 brought to power right-wing politicians who believed in a more interventionist approach to solve Japan's economic problems. The maintenance of the yen's gold parity caused capital outflows that were only solved by the Japanese Diet's passing of the Capital Flight Prevention Act of 1932.[23] This measure was followed by the Gold Purchase Act of 1934, which gave the Ministry of Finance complete power over species holding.

Driving Through Disasters

In October 1929, the stock market crash in the United States. The 1930s financial crisis caused a significant decline in Japanese production. Most of the industrial growth during the boom following World War I was used to expand the nation's military power. The social consequences of the economic recession were catastrophic for Japan. Between 1929 and 1930, almost half of small businesses were forced to close. Many Japanese emigrated to Brazil or Manchuria. Children from poor agricultural villages were sold as slaves. In the six prefectures of northeastern Japan, the number of women sold rose from 12,180 in 1932 to 58,173 in 1934. In the pre-war years, an estimated 200,000 women a year were sold as maids and nursemaids. This troubling situation had affected the recruitment in the army as well. By the end of 1931, there were more and more military nationalists entering the Japanese army. The ideology Nihon gunkou shugi reasoned inside each division. The ideology Nihon gunkou shugi refers that militarism should dominate the political and social life of the nation, and that the strength of the military is equal to the strength of a nation. It was the time when the Wanpaoshan Incident happened.

The Wanpaoshan Incident occurred on July 1, 1931, two months before the Mukden Incident.[24] A group of ethnic Koreans, subjects of the Japanese empire, dug a ditch several miles long, extending from the Itung River across a tract of land not included in their lease and occupied by local Chinese farmers. The Chinese protested to the Wanpaoshan authorities, who dispatched police and ordered the Koreans to cease construction and leave the area. The Koreans called on the Japanese authorities. The imperial Japanese consul based at Changchun responded by sending Japanese consular police to protect the Koreans. The Japanese police fired on the Chinese and dispersed them. Several anti-Chinese riots erupted throughout Korea, starting at Incheon on July 3, and spreading rapidly to other cities, with the worst one occurring in Pyongyang on July 5. The Chinese government alleged that 146 people were killed, 546 wounded, and considerable properties were destroyed. In China, the Chinese attacked

Japanese residents and stormed a Japanese hospital. It has been reported that in Jilin, one of the three provinces of northeast China, Chinese rioters massacred 10,000 Koreans in retaliation and burned or looted Korean houses all over the province, as well as in Changchun, the capital of the province. Starting by Manchuria, the Japanese then decided to invade China.

PART III

THE CONTINUAL WARFARE STATE

Manchuria, 1931–1933

6

INTO MANCHURIA

S ince the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), Manchuria has been the scene of perpetual conflict. In 1897, Russia occupied the Liaodong Peninsula, built the Port Arthur fortress in Mukden, and there based the Russian Pacific Fleet. By 1898, the Russians consolidated their position in the region. They constructed the South Manchurian Railroad from Harbin through Port Arthur. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the Russians sent troops in Manchuria and threatened to attack the Japanese occupying Korea. The Japanese navy then decided to attack the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur. Early in 1904, Russia and Japan fought the Russo-Japanese War. The major theaters of operations were the Liaodong Peninsula, Mukden in Southern Manchuria, and the seas around Korea, particularly the Yellow Sea. The Battle of Mukden was a major defeat for Russia. Following the Battle of Tsushima, a combined Japanese army and navy occupied Sakhalin Island, forcing the Russians to sue for peace. Japan's victory was concluded by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. [1] In it, Japan gained two important positions: the Guangdong (Kwantung) Leased Territory, which consisted of a 218-square-mile (560 km²) peninsula in the southernmost part of Manchuria and southern Sakhalin.

The line of the Chinese Eastern Railway ran through northern Manchuria and ended on either side of the tracks. The other side of the railway was Russian territory. Despite its defeat during the Russo-Japanese War, Russia kept a part of southern Manchuria that included the South Manchuria Railway. However, this railway was seen by the Japanese as essential to their future expansion in China. An alliance between Japan and Great Britain allowed the Japanese to station troops in the region to guard their interests.[2] They began to develop the area and sent troops from the Kwantung Army to protect their assets. This army maintained 7,000 to

14,000 men in Manchuria and had been tolerated by the Chinese Fengtian Army under the command of Zhang Zuolin.[3]

During the long civil war that followed the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to 1912, Manchuria was controlled by Zhang, an influential Chinese warlord during the warlord era in China. Backed by Japan, Zhang successfully influenced politics in China during the early 1920s. He invaded China proper in October 1924, during the second Zhili-Fengtian War, and by August 1925, he gained control of three large provinces near the Great Wall (Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui). His forces even marched as far south of the city of Shanghai. Zhang's adventurism collapsed in the winter of 1927. In May 1928, he was defeated by the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. As it was clear that the Nationalists were soon going to take Peking, Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi forced Zhang to withdraw from northern China into Manchuria, where the Japanese forces could protect him. While on his way to Manchuria, Zhang was killed on June 4, 1928, by a bomb planted by members of the Japanese Kwantung Army Staff, who remained dissatisfied with the decision of placing Manchuria under the control of a puppet warlord.[4]

After Zhang's assassination, his son, Zhang Xueliang, nicknamed the "Young Marshal," became the effective ruler of northeast and northern China.[5] In early 1931, Xueliang requested financial assistance from the Kuomintang government in Nanking to begin construction of railroads in Manchuria. The success of this project would directly compete with Japan's South Manchurian Railroad and would hurt the Japanese's interests in the region. By March 1931, the Kuomintang government decided to open offices in all Manchurian cities. In April 1931, the Chinese government announced that it would very soon reclaim all former Chinese territories and rights, including concession railroads and other properties. The Chinese claimed that treaties between China and Japan were invalid. China also announced new acts, so the Japanese people who settled frontier lands and opened stores or built their own houses in China were expelled without compensation.[6] The officials in Japan, particularly Japanese army officers, convinced themselves that controlling of Manchuria, a land rich in natural resources, was essential to Japan's territorial expansion over the Pacific and

Southeast Asia, decided to take over the region. On September 18, 1931, the Imperial Japanese Army launched an attack and within a few days occupied several strategic points in South Manchuria, which became important during 1930s to Japan’s economy. This invasion created what has become known as the Mukden Incident.[7]

The Mukden Incident

Japan's opening to military expansion began with the notorious Mukden Incident. On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops sabotaged with explosives a section of track belonging to Japan's South Manchuria Railway. The explosion was "heard" in Washington. A few days later, U.S. secretary of state, Henry Stimson, wrote in his diary: "Trouble has flared up again in Manchuria. The Japanese, apparently their military elements, have suddenly made a coup."[8] Stimson was correct. The Japanese army officers who wanted to be more powerful than the cabinet had launched this attack. A group of active officers, linked to the nationalistic Nichiren movement, and influenced by the millenarianism of Tanaka's Kokuchūkai, decided to start a war during which Japan would expand its territory through the Pacific and East Asia by taking advantage of increasing ultra-nationalism in the Japanese society.

For many historians, Japan's road to World War II began on September 18, 1931, with the Mukden Incident.[9] In the spirit of the Japanese concept of gekokujō, by provoking the armed conflict, Col. Seishirō Itagaki and Lt. Col. Kanji Ishiwara made a plan to prompt Japan's invasion of Manchuria. They chose to sabotage the rail section at 800 meters away from the Chinese garrison of Beidaying under the command of Zhang Xueliang. The two officers, with the support of two other members of the Kwantung Army, Col. Kenji Doihara and Maj. Gen. Takayoshi Tanaka, had arranged the attack. The plan was executed by 1st Lt. Suemori Kawamoto of the independent garrison of the 29th Infantry Regiment, which guarded the South Manchuria Railway.[10]

The attack on the night of September 18, 1931, was not just an act of rebellion of a group of officers of the Kwantung Army. It had been a sophisticated operation that had been orchestrated by Army General Staff in Tokyo as well as at Army Headquarters in Korea.[11] The morning following the sabotage, a message from Gen. Shigeru Honjō, commander of the Kwantung Army, reached Lt. Gen. Senjūrō Hayashi, commander of the

Korean army at Seoul, asking for immediate reinforcements of the Kwantung Army. A few hours later, a detachment of Japanese fighter planes from Pyongyang, Korea, took off for Mukden. Troops of the 20th Division at Seoul and Pyongyang had deployed by train for the Korea-Manchuria border to stay there and await instructions.

The same day, early in the morning, Gen. Jirō Minami called a meeting with the vice minister of war, Gen. Hajime Sugiyama and the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, Gen. Kuniaki Koiso. The three officials were on the same page. A few hours later, early in the afternoon, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō called a meeting of the cabinet. The Diet approval was requested before troops in Korea would move. After the meeting, Wakatsuki had failed to get support from the cabinet and the commander of the army to stop the rebellion.

American secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, wrote in his diary, on September 19, 1931, “The situation is very confused in Manchuria, and it is not clear whether the army is acting under a plan of the government or on its own.”[12]

The next day, September 20, a new military oligarchy had seized control of the army in Japan, while, in Manchuria, 12,000 troops assigned to the Kwantung Army were moving out and engaging the Chinese. No serious effort was made from Tokyo to stop the invasion. Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, the emissary sent from the War Ministry to stop the incident, encouraged the enlargement of the field of action.[13] Taking full advantage of Yoshitsugu’s position, Lieutenant Colonel Kanji proposed to move the army north. After Japanese troops took Hardin, they continued their advance inside of Manchuria. Next, they attacked Kirin and captured it without resistance. General Tamon, commander of the Japanese forces, compelled the local general, Hsi Ch’ia, to proclaim “independence.” Without waiting approval of the cabinet, the Korean army moved across the border into Manchuria and joined the revolt.

At this point, Japanese Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō tried to obtain Hirohito’s disapproval for what had been done in Manchuria. He secured an audience at the Imperial Palace with the emperor and asked him to condemn the action. Hirohito refused. As commander-in-chief of the armed

forces, the emperor was not a partisan of strong action against the conspirators. Since 1929, as soon as he had revoked Tanaka's cabinet over the incident of Zhang Zuolin's assassination, he had already made his choice, "strengthening the power of the army over civil government." By 1930, the right wing of the army was pouring hundreds of thousands of yen into propaganda against the civilian government. Several newspapers had been bribed with secret army funds to hide the information.

While the conversation for peace continued between China and Japan, the Japanese army commander of the Chōsen Army, Lt. Gen. Senjūrō Hayashi, on his own authority, ordered his troops to continue the attack. Stimson sent a warning note to Japan and China, urging a cessation of hostilities. Baron Kijūrō Shidehara, the Japanese foreign minister, replied:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of September 25, in which you were so good as to convey to me the views of the American government about the actual conditions of affairs in Manchuria. The Japanese government is deeply sensitive to the friendly concern, the fairness, and the attitude with which the American government has observed the recent course of events in Manchuria. Sharing with the American government the hope expressed in your note under acknowledgement this government has already caused the Japanese military forces in Manchuria to refrain from any further acts of hostility unless their own safety as well as the security of the South Manchurian Railway and of Japanese lives and property within the Railway zone is jeopardized by the aggression of Chinese troops and bands…[14]

Not wasting any time, on September 19, 1931, Gen. Shigeru Honjō, an ardent follower of Sadao Araki's doctrines, ordered his forces to extend operations all along the South Manchuria Railway. Three days later, on September 22, Army Chief of Staff Hanzō Kanaya reported to the emperor that despite orders to stand by on alert, the Mixed Brigade of the Japanese colonial army in Korea, in accordance with the principle that the field commanders have such discretion, "had crossed the border and advanced on

Mukden."[15] General Shigeru dispatched 10,000 soldiers in the region escorted by a squadron of bombers in advance on Chinchow from Mukden. Hirohito summoned Wakatsuki and told him to see that the Manchurian situation was aggravated. Having now understood the need to reinforce the vastly out-numbered Kwantung Army's forward units, he accepted the situation as a fait accompli.[16]

Nara's diary entry for September 22 reported Hirohito's attitude at this critical moment:

In the afternoon, when I was summoned by the emperor, he asked me whether I had warned the chief of staff [Kanaya] not to broaden the action. I replied, "Yes, I did warn him, but even without my warning he understood very clearly both the cabinet's intention and your majesty's will, and he is already addressing each part of the problem in turn. Regrettably, it is touch-and-go with the outlying army, and they often go their own way." …[Later] [At 4:20 P.M. Chief of Staff Kanaya had an audience with the emperor and asked him to approve, post facto, the dispatch of the mixed brigade from the Korean Army. I heard the emperor say that although this time it couldn't be helped [the army] had to be more careful in the future.[17]

For two more months, Japanese troops and Chinese soldiers clashed in Manchuria. On November 15, 1931, despite having lost hundreds of soldiers, Chinese Gen. Ma Zhanshan, acting as Governor and Military Commander-in-chief of Heilongjiang Province, in absence of Governor Wan Fulin, maintained his position at Qiqihar. Ma declined Japan's ultimatum to surrender. On November 17, 1931, 3,500 Japanese troops, under the command of Gen. Jirō Tamon, commander of the IJA 2nd Division of the Kwantung Army, attacked the Chinese position. This attack forced the Chinese general to leave Qiqihar in November 19.[18]

Meanwhile, at the urging of Stimson, the League Council had invoked the Kellogg-Briand Pact against both China and Japan.[19] The Council then passed a moral resolution setting a time limit for Japan to withdraw its

troops from the occupied areas.[20] On December 13, 1931, Prime Minister Wakatsuki was replaced by a new cabinet led by Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai. Inukai's first assignment was to initiate negotiations with Hsueh-liang, the leader of the Kuomintang government. As those negotiations failed, the Japanese government authorized the reinforcement of its troops in Manchuria. At the end of December, the rest of the 20th Infantry Division, along with the 38th Mixed Brigade from the 19th Infantry Division, was sent into Manchuria from Korea; while the 18th Mixed Brigade from the 10th Infantry Division was sent from Japan. The total strength of the Kwantung Army was thus increased to around 60,450 men.

On January 3, 1932, Japanese forces occupied Chinchow. The following day, they occupied Shanhaiguan, completing their military takeover of southern Manchuria. With southern Manchuria secure, the Japanese turned north to complete the occupation of Manchuria. Col. Kenji Doihara requested collaborationist Gen. Xi Qia to advance his forces in order to take Harbin. The Chinese soldiers resisted and repulsed Japanese forces until the arrival of the IJA 2nd Division under Gen. Jirō Tamon. The Japanese troops had completed the occupation of Harbin on February 4, 1932.

Rejecting International Sanctions

The months following the invasion of Manchuria were marked in Japan by a series of violence. Japanese ultra-nationalism, dressed as an intellectual movement, simultaneously promoted fascism and expansionism as a remedy to perceive national weakness at home and abroad. Among its leaders were Tōyama Mitsuru (an old generation rightist, godfather of ultranationalist groups, founder of the Genyosha and Black Dragon Society nationalist secret societies), Kametarō Mitsukawa, Shūmei Ōkawa, and Ikki Kita (three right-wing activists and writers), Unosuke Wakamiya, Kōjirō Sugimori, Yanunobu Kuchita, Kanoki Kazunobu, Kaku Mori, and Ichirō Hatoyama.

The young Japanese officers, supported by the ultranationalist groups, had convinced that the army could control the political life in Japan. On May 15, 1932, in what the historians called “the May 15 Incident,” young naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. Hirohito blamed the government rather than insubordinate officers for their actions. The Inukai cabinet resigned the same day. Hirohito appointed Takahashi Korekiyo, the former Governor of the Bank of Japan, as prime minister.

Four months earlier, on January 7, 1932, United States secretary of state, Henry Stimson, issued a statement that the United States would not recognize any government that was established as the result of Japanese actions in Manchuria. In March 1932, China appealed to the League of Nations. The Council of the League, supported by the United States, sought to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict. First, it requested the withdrawal of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. However, Japanese officials in Tokyo ignored the League. In April 1932, a League delegation led by British Diplomat Lord Victor-Bulwer Lytton went to Manchuria to study the situation. The Lytton Commission included four other members: Maj. Gen. Frank Ross McCoy, from the United States; Dr. Heinrich Schnee, from Germany; Luigi Aldrovandi Marescotti, from Italy; and Gen. Henri Claude, from France. By the time the Lytton Commission arrived in China,

the Japanese army had already conquered the entire region of Manchuria. They established the Manchurian puppet state of Manchukuo.[21] Aisin-Gioro Puyi, the last Qing emperor of China, was officially installed as head of state.

In October 1932, the commission recommended that Japan should leave the region. It stated that Japan was the aggressor. The Japanese forces had wrongfully invaded Manchuria, and that the territory should be returned to China. The Commission also argued that the Japanese puppet state at Manchukuo should not be recognized. Further, it recommended Manchurian autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. On February 24, 1933, forty members of the League of Nations voted the recommendations. They blamed Japan for the war and said it should withdraw its troops in Manchuria. Only Japan Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka voted against the resolution.[22]

The same day, the Japanese delegation in Geneva, defying world opinion, withdrew from the League of Nations. General Sadao Araki, one of the principal politicians nationalist right-wing in Japan, who served as minister of war under Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai, and later served as minister of education during the Konoe and Hiranuma administrations, opened the discussion on the Manchuria Incident and the League of Nations during a press conference on September 23, 1933. Araki said: “The principle of the Imperial way is that the emperor and the people, the land and morality, are one and indivisible.”[23] He gave at this point a clear view of the new army’s training method: seishin kyōiku, “spiritual training.” It was a mixture of ideas such as Japanese ultra-nationalism, militarism, fascism, and state capitalism that were proposed by several political philosophers in Japan during the first part of the Shōwa period.

Araki floated the idea of Japan forming its own “League of Nations.” To him, it was clear that if the officials in Tokyo did not comply with the request to withdraw their troops in Manchuria; the League of Nations would impose sanctions on Japan. Despite the consequences and expected sanctions against the country, any of the other generals were prepared to back down. ‘“A question of life or death for Japan,”’ Araki called it. That was the army line: Japan must be imperialist or die.[24]

In April 1934, Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota announced that the relation between China and Japan was not considered to be the business of the League of Nations or of any other power. In November 1935, there was a proposal protocol to resolve the crisis. First, China's recognition of Manchukuo, second the suppression of anti-Japanese activities in China, and third an anti-Communist Sino-Japanese alliance. Nine months later, in August 1936, Prime Minister Kōki Hirota approved a statement known as the "Fundamentals of National Policy," from which the essential features of both the New Order and the Co-Prosperity Sphere were eventually to be developed. In order to achieve those goals, there was to be "'a strong coalition between Japan, Manchukuo, and China,'" in which north China was to be a "'special region'" because of its economic significance. Further afield, Japan would extend its interests into Southeast Asia, though only in gradual and peaceful ways.

At the end of 1936, in China, nationalists and Communists reached an agreement. The leaders of both camps decided to make a common cause against Japan. The growing determination of the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists led by Mao Zedong was to prevent China's fragmentation and ruled out the attainment of Japanese ends without a general conflagration.

A Diabolic War Machine

The Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to the emperor by the newly created armed forces. The rescript asserted that commands from superior officers were equivalent to command from the emperor himself. Top-ranking military leaders got direct access to the emperor with the authority to transmit his pronouncements directly to the troops. By the twentieth century, the Imperial Japanese Army became the most modern army in Asia; well-trained, well-equipped, and with good morale.

Army Training

The Imperial Japanese Army inaugurated its Office of Military Training in 1898. Its mission was to provide centralized oversight for the army training efforts. This included the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, specialized weaponry and technical training schools, and the various military preparatory schools located around the country. The Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training (OIGMA) was also responsible for tactical training. Over time, the OIGMA acquired responsibilities for army logistics, transportation, and support matters. The OIGMA also acquired considerable prestige and political power within the Japanese army. He reported directly to the emperor through the Imperial General Headquarters rather than to the army minister or the chief of the Imperial Japanese Army staff. The IG post by the 1930s had become the third most powerful position within the Imperial army.

The Imperial Japanese Army Academy was Japan's principal training school for the Imperial Army. The academy was initially opened at Heigakkō near Kyoto in 1868. It was renamed the Imperial Japanese Army Academy and relocated to Ichigaya near Tokyo in 1874. In 1898, the Academy was assigned to the Army Education Administration. The academy was divided in two sections. The Senior Course Academy was relocated to Sagamihara, in Kanagawa Prefecture, while the Junior Course School was moved to Asaka, Saitama. A separate school was established for military aviation officers in 1938.

After successfully completing the two-year junior portion of the training at Asaka in Saitama, army cadets were assigned for eight months to infantry regiments. This was to familiarize them with actual weapons and give them experience with platoon leadership. Next, they started their two-year senior program at Sagamihara in Kanagawa. Graduates were assigned to a regiment with the rank of sergeant-major but treated as officers. After a four-month probation period, the army commander commissioned the graduates as second lieutenants.

Japanese conscripts were drafted for two years. A year of that two-year period was devoted to training. Soldiers trained for upward of a year, focusing on marksmanship, squad tactics, and physical conditioning. They also faced “spiritual training,” where they were taught the codes of loyalty, honor, etc. Once the war began, in 1942, the training was shortened to three months. Most conscripts had already received military training through the schools beginning in the primary years. The training was extremely rough and brutal. Recruits were sometimes beaten by their superiors, and there were lots of physical punishments. Discipline was harsh. During the war, those recruits were among the most disciplined, well-trained, and committed soldiers in the world.

Conscripts were marched for miles in the summer heat without helmets, and when they were completely exhausted and ready to drop, their officer would give the command for double time and they would run at the last minute. In the winter they trained in the cold, maneuvers were held without tents in subzero weather. The soldiers were taught to be fierce as well as hardy. Always, their officers told them, they must attack. Never must they think of defense.[25]

> Under the falling blade there is a river of hell.
>
> Jump into it and you might float.
>
> Let the enemy cut your skin
>
> You cut his flesh
>
> Let the enemy cut your flesh
>
> You cut his bones.[26]

Whether I flow as a corpse under the waters, or sink beneath the grasses of the mountainside, I willingly die for the emperor." Every day, every morning for two years, that chant greeted the rising sun as the soldiers began their training."[27]

It took two years' time for the cadet to grasp the meaning of such quotations. "Take the offensive," "surprise the enemy," "—Death rather than surrender, —" "—No retreat—"; these were the rules of the Japanese army. The army law is: Obey without question.[28] The Japanese army promptly became a diabolic war machine that soon invaded and occupied its neighboring countries.

7

INTO CHINA AGAIN

I n March 1933, the newly inaugurated American president Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Tennessee Senator Cordell Hull to be his secretary of state. Previously, Hull had served as chairman of the Democratic National Committee and became a presidential candidate at the 1928 Democratic National Convention. In 1930, Hull won election to the Senate, and then resigned to become Secretary of State. From this position, he protested Japan's annexation of Manchuria, pushing the United States to boycott the puppet state of Manchukuo. [1]

But, evidently, this was only for public consumption. Privately it is believed Hull wanted to avoid anything that might provoke war with Japan. Others close to Roosevelt, however, were less cautious. The commander of the Asiatic fleet, Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, was vocal, declaring that withdrawal of American armed presence in Asia was not an option: "The time has passed, he said, "when a great nation can increase its safety by such a method."[2] Adm. William D. Leahy, chief of naval operations, seconded Yarnell, requesting that four additional warships be sent to Shanghai. Roosevelt disapproved the request because he did not want to oppose his secretary of state's stance.

On March 27, 1933, a League of Nations' report unequivocally condemned Japan for invading Manchuria. In an international telegram to the Secretary-General of the League, Sir Eric Drummond, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Uchida Kōsai, "gave notice in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, of the intention of Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations."[3] Kōichi Kido, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan to become one of the most influential advisors to Emperor Hirohito, noted in his diary, "Hirohito urged his government to note that despite its forced but inevitable and truly '"very regrettable"' withdrawal, Japan would continue its policy of cooperation

and intimate international relations with other powers."[4] Contrary to Kido's account, most of Japan's foreign policies were based purely on selfish national expansion at the expense and suffering of neighboring countries. Japan's successive governments were marked by the pursuit and embodiment of ultra-nationalism. Imitating Nazism, Japan's foreign policy was a succession of invasions beginning in 1933 with Jehol, the Chinese province next to Manchuria. This occurred soon after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and marked the start of a larger war in the East.[5]

Hopping Upon Spare Tire of Handy Auto North End Burglar Makes His Escape
TAUNTON DAILY GAZETTE.
JAPS GET OUT OF LEAGUE
MYSTERY AS TO CAUSE OF SERIOUS FIRE
BIRD WAS SHOT WHEN FRIENDS REACHED TREE
NO PROTEST TO GERMANY FROM UNITED STATES
NORTH END BURGLAR IS FIRST OVER WIRE FENCE IN PURSUIT
CONSERVATION WEEK TO BEGIN NEXT MONDAY
CAR HITS THE GUARD RAIL AT NECK O' LAND
WEST SECTION STREETS ARE IN BAD SHAPE
FARM CREDIT ORDER READY FOR CONGRESS
FAMILY OF 4 WIPED OUT IN AUTO CRASH

Feb. 24, 1933: The Japanese delegation withdrew from the League of Nations after the assembly had adopted a report blaming Japan for events in Manchuria.

Image from rarenewspapers.com

Japan repudiates the League: Delegates walk out.

Image from iconicphotos.wordpress.com

Image from sutori.com

Japan walks out of the League of Nations

Making Enemies

Soon after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, its armed aggression began to spread across the subcontinent. Its army began the invasion of Jehol and continued to neighboring Manchuria.[6] The Japanese forces occupied Hopei and created a demilitarized zone in the North of this region. They then took control of many regions near the Great Wall of China while maintaining their main garrisons around Tianjin.[7] The Japanese began to concretize their policy goals: military expansion on the continent, naval control of the western Pacific and Southeast Asian sea lanes, and equalization of relations with the Great Powers.

In mainland Japan, political instability and violence continued. In November 1934, there was an attempted coup d'état organized by a group of Japanese officers. The rebellion led by Capt. Takaji Muranaka and Capt. Asaicho Isobe failed. Five cadets were expelled from the Academy and the two officers' leaders, Muranaka and Isobe, were suspended for six months from duty. On December 29th, the Japanese government noticed that it intended to withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. The treaty, they said, limited Japan's capital ship construction, and this, in turn, with the per vessel tonnage limitations, the efforts to build large battleships with bigger guns in wartime were enormously handicapped. The Japanese also rejected the London Naval Treaty of 1930 on the reduction of naval armaments.[8]

Behind the decision calling for not to be part of the international community, the Japanese wanted to be free of their obligations for respect for international law. They wanted to be free to act alone without applying international agreements signed by them after World War I. For many politically active Japanese officers of the army, instability and violence represented the strategy to strengthen army influence in politics and open the military's expansion abroad with notions to overcome the West in every field of modernity and greatness. In the Japanese's mind, Japan is fighting a war of "self-defense" and a spiritual one over "Western moral decadence."[9]

On August 12, 1935, Saburō Aizawa, a Japanese military officer of the Imperial Japanese Army, assassinated Maj. Gen. Tetsuzan Nagata during the Aizawa Incident. A strong supporter of the Kōdōha (Imperial Way), the radical militarist political faction of the Imperial Japanese Army, Aizawa despised Nagata's political moves against Jinzaburō Masaki, the Inspector-General of Military Training, who was forced to retirement. The Military Academy Incident and the Aizawa Incident were two separate events that illustrated the increasing politicization and political polarization of the Japanese army, characterized by violence to resolve political differences.

Six months later, on February 26, 1936, there was a second attempted coup d'état against the government led by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada. A group of young radical Japanese officers led some 1,400 troops to attack several official buildings in Tokyo. The insurgents killed Home Minister Saito Makoto, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, and Army Inspector General of Military Training Watanabe Jotaro. The group failed to assassinate the prime minister or secure control of the Imperial Palace. Three days later, on February 29, the rebels surrendered. Hirohito ordered the army to arrest a hundred twenty-three conspirators. Kita Ikki, a Japanese author, intellectual and political philosopher, and a harsh critic of the Emperor system and the Meiji constitution, and politician activist Nishida Mitsugi, were among the nineteen conspirators who were executed on August 19, 1937.

After the February 26 Incident, following in the fall of 1936, several attacks from the Chinese on the Japanese nationals living in central and south China occurred. The Japanese forces had no restraint against wholesale attack on China.[10] Japan declined to sign the naval treaty on March 25, 1936, and decided to withdraw from the London Naval Treaty in order to concretize its policy goals: military expansion on the continent, naval control of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia sea lanes, and equalization of relations with the Great Powers.

In August 1936, the Russians made a non-aggression pact with the Chinese and sold them a quantity of military aircraft and munitions. Angered by this, on November 25 of the same year, the Japanese signed the "Anti-Comintern Pact" with Nazi Germany directed against the Communist International

(Comintern), but, specifically against the Soviet Union.[11] Seven months later, on June 4, 1937, Hirohito appointed Prince Fumimaro Konoe prime minister. One month later, on July 7, 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War was formally declared after Japanese forces attacked Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge. The Japanese army commanded by Maj. Gen. Kanji Ishiwara enlarged its grip on China. Thus, the Japanese began to imagine an empire in the Orient large and powerful enough to exclude the West. To achieve this agenda they launched the Pacific War.

The Pacific War was engaged over a vast area that included the Pacific Ocean, the South-west Pacific region, and the Southeast Asian area. Japan conscripted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Taiwan to help it fight the war. Its main ally was the authoritarian government of Thailand, with which it formed a dangerous alliance. The leader of Thailand, Plaek Phibunsongkhram, sent his Phayap Army to help Japan. Other countries members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere also assisted Japan in the war, such as the anti-British Indian National Army of Free India, the Burma National Army of the State of Burma, the Manchukuo Imperial Army, and the Collaborationist Chinese Army of the Japanese puppet of Manchukuo. The German and Italian submarines and raiding ships deployed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans gave limited help to Japan.

On the opposite side, a group of countries, led by the United States, formed a coalition against Japan. There were China, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom (mostly through its colonial troops from the armed forces of India, Burma, Malaya, Fiji, and Tonga). Those countries were all members of the Pacific War Council.[12] Mexico provided some air support and Free France sent naval support. Some active pro-Allied guerrillas in Asia including the Malayan Peoples'Anti-Japanese Army, the Korean Liberation Army, the Free Thai Movement, and the Viêt Minth participated alongside the Allies.[13]

Japan Contrives an “Incident” at the Marco Polo Bridge

On the night of July 7, 1937, Japanese units stationed at Fengtai, twenty miles south of Peking, crossed the border to conduct military exercises. A Japanese soldier failed to return to his post. The Japanese requested permission from Chinese commander Ji Xingwen to enter Wanping to search for the missing soldier. Ji refused. Although the soldier returned to his unit, the Japanese deployed reinforcements to surround Wanping. The commander of the Chinese 37th Division, Gen. Feng Zhi’an, following an order from Qin Dechen, the acting commander of the Chinese 39th Route Army, placed his troops on heightened alert. The battle quickly degenerated into an excessive war, which had provided Japan the pretext for opening a second round of hostilities against China.

On July 8, 1937, the Japanese troops deployed in northern China opened fire on the Chinese troops and attacked them at the Marco Polo Bridge. Col. Ji Xingwen led the Chinese defenses with about one hundred men with orders to hold the bridge at all costs. On July 9, 1937, Fumimaro Konoe, who became prime minister of Japan in June of the same year, had a meeting with his cabinet. The group met again on the eleventh. The same day, the Japanese Foreign Affairs, Kazushige Ugaki, began negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist government. The negotiations resulted in the signing of an armistice. The armistice left anxious the expansionists who were since 1931 at work behind the scenes to extend the conflict from Manchuria into north China and so wanted the conflict to be expanded.[14] Thereafter, the Japanese Garrison Infantry Brigade Comm. Gen. Masakazu Kawabe rejected the agreement and against his superiors’ orders continued to bombard Wanping and moved his forces to the northeast.

In Tokyo, some members of the Army General of Staff, Maj. Gen. Kanji Ishiwara, Chief of Operations Section and Head of G-1, and Gen. Torashirō Kawabe, the younger brother of Gen. Masakazu Kawabe, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, decided to send more troops to China. The Konoe cabinet met again in emergency session and temporarily

postponed sending troops to north China. The expansionists, meanwhile, led by General Kanji, lobbied near Hirohito, who favorably reacted to the events. The emperor supported the Chief of Operations Section who made him believe that sending troops to North China might protect Japan against a possible threat from the Soviet Union.

On September 21, while the cabinet was still meeting, Lt. Gen. Senjūrō Hayashi, commander of the Chōsen Army in Korea, on his own authority, ordered thousands of troops to North China. The Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal Prince Kan'in Kotohito, reported to Hirohito that, despite orders to stand by on alert, the Mixed Brigade of the Chōsen Army of Japan in Korea led by General Hayashi had crossed the border and advanced on Manchuria."[15]

Taking over Manchuria was part of a plan constructed by some right-wing Japanese extremists and some expansionist officers led by General Kawabe and Lieutenant General Hayashi. Several months before the invasion of China, the expansionists were already at work. The commander of the Japanese China Garrison Army, Lt. Gen. Kanichirō Tashiro, placed homeland divisions on alert, and drafted orders to send reinforcements to China.

A native of Saga Prefecture, Tashiro was among the members of the Japanese delegation to the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921. Promoted to colonel in the infantry in 1924, he was given command of the IJA 30th Infantry Regiment. He became vice chief of the 5th Section Asian intelligence in 1926 and was promoted to major general in 1930. In 1932, he was promoted to chief of staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and became lieutenant general in 1934. He then served as provost marshal from 1934 to 1935; and as commander of the IJA 11th Division from 1935 to 1936. He was commander of the Japanese China Garrison at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, on July 7, 1937.[16]

Meanwhile, in northeast China, the border between northern Manchuria and the Soviet Union, an area that included Mongolia and Primorsky Krai, growing tensions between Japan and Russia continued. Both sides accused each other of border violations. From 1935 to 1939, in Mongolia and Manchuria, the Soviets and the Japanese fought an escalating round of

border skirmishes and punitive battles. The Soviet and Mongolian victory over the Japanese in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol resolved the dispute and returned the borders to status quo ante bellum.

In the Imperial Palace, despite the agreement signed by Japan and Russia over the borders' dispute, Hirohito became more concerned about a possible threat from the Russians day after day. Would the Russians now attack along the Manchukuo border, the emperor asked Army Chief of Staff, Prince Kan'in Kotohito, before meeting with Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, and Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, the new army minister and army's commander-in-chief.[17]

"What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?" Hirohito asked. Kan'in answered, "I believe the army will rise to the occasion." The emperor repeated his question: "That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?" The prince said only, "We will have no choice, and his Majesty seemed very dissatisfied."[18]

Hirohito was aware of the high-level tension between Japan and Russia regarding the border conflicts. He wanted to know what the army's plan was if Russian troops attacked along the Manchukuo border. Kan'in did not have a clear answer. Nevertheless, despite his disappointment with prince Kan'in's analysis, Hirohito approved the Army General of Staff's decision to move more troops to north China, and without hesitation he put his seal on the order for their dispatch.[19] Now having the emperor's approval to attempt to violently resolve with one blow all of Japan's outstanding problems with China, Prime Minister Konoe, together with the army expansionists, sent thousand soldiers to north China. Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, all-out war between Japan and China ensued. On July 28, 1937, war between the two countries was officially declared. In early August 1937, the large Chinese cities of Beijing and Tianjin were taken by Japanese troops. The same month, Hirohito withdrew Japan from adherence to international conventions on the protection of prisoners of war.[20] He thus deprived captive fighters and civilians of humane treatment by advancing Japanese troops. Additional inhumane decisions were to follow.

As early as August 1937, the confrontation in Shanghai forced the Japanese troops to descend much farther. On August 13, a major clash of forces between the Japanese army led by Lt. Gen. Heisuke Yanagawa and the Chinese National Republican Army led by Gen. Chang Kai-sek was recorded during the Battle of Shanghai. The Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communists suspended their civil war in order to form a nominal alliance against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek deployed his total army of 300,000 Japanese troops to fight in Shanghai.

Joining the Axis Powers

Japan's agenda of continental expansion was at the origin of its alliance with Germany. This alliance was a way to support Japan's expansionism into Asia and the Pacific. Dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the rules of the League of Nations, and the limits and restraints of the Washington and London naval armament treaties, Japanese politicians contrived an ideology based on the idea of Japanese racial supremacy, and thus a right to dominate Asia (if not the world).[21] Many Japanese officers believed in a Japanese form of Manifest Destiny.[22] Japan, according to their views, was destined to become the dominant power in Asia.[23] This ideology was embedded into the position and role of the emperor, purported to be a divine monarch descended from god Amaterasu Omikami. The emperor, under this concept, was accepted by Japanese people as a living god.[24] All citizens were taught to revere Emperor Hirohito as the embodiment of Japan's soul. It was a retrograde combination, attempting to restore the militant Shōwa era.[25]

The ideologies of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan shared the motivation to violently attack, subdue and occupy neighboring countries, enslave or eradicate the citizenry, and exploit the resources for their exclusive benefit. They also shared a wariness of Communism, and both seethed at the post-World War I order of international treaties and arms limitations. Japan had come into the colonial game rather late. Unlike the Western powers it never had much in the way of overseas territorial possessions. It was only during the Meiji era that it had decided to consolidate and build up the country's resources and move out immediately in a program to acquire colonies in Asia. Associated with Italy and Germany, Japan would eventually agree to create with its two allies a new scheme of global domination in which Germany ruled Europe, Italy ruled the Mediterranean and North Africa, and Japan reigned in East Asia and the Pacific.

Under the command of Maj. Gen. Kanji Ishiwara, Japan expanded its regional authority in Asia, pushing forward the plan to build a strong empire

on the model of the Westerns Powers, particularly Britain and France. Despite some setbacks, such as those endured during the Battle of Pingxingguan (won in September 1937 by the Communists), Japanese troops eventually conquered the northern part of Shanxi in China after a stunning victory in Taiyuan.[26] In early of 1938, in Taierzhuang, located on the eastern bank of the Grand Canal of China, two Japanese divisions were surrounded for nearly twenty-four hours by the Chinese army commanded by Gen. Li Tsung-jen.[27] They were able to escape, and Gen. Kenji Doihara, who commanded the Japanese division, narrowly escaped death.[28] Hirohito was very much in favor of such maneuvers aimed at overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and replacing him with a pro-Japanese puppet government.[29] In November 1938, after fifteen months of fighting, Shanghai fell. The Japanese troops decided to take Nanking, the capital of China, where 200,000 Japanese soldiers crushed tired and poorly organized Chinese troops. Between 200,000 and 250,000 Chinese civilians and military personnel had been killed in Nanking.[30]

Report on Nanking Massacre

The London Herald reported on December 15, 1937:

50,000 troops from Shanghai and Nanking are preparing to sail and invade Kwantung. Japanese planes bombed Shumchun about the British leased territory north of Hong Kong. Contradicting earlier Japanese claims to have gained complete control of Nanking, Army spokesman at Tokyo admit that the Chinese are still strongly resisting in the north-east portion of the city.[31]

The Dōmei News Agency (Tokyo) estimated that the Chinese killed in Nanking exceed 70,000 persons. Army spokesmen admitted that the Chinese are still strongly resisting in the north-east portion of Nanking, but claim to have consolidated the position on the Yangtze from Shanghai to Wuhu, (250 miles), and also to have captured Pukow, Kiangpu, Yangchow, and Wulingshan Fort, north-east of the Purple Mountain, capturing eighteen field guns and four anti-aircraft guns. General Matsui issued a proclamation about Wulingshan Fort, urging the residents of Nanking to return to their ancestral homes and pursue their avocations in complete peace."[32]

The Shanghai correspondent for The New York Times, Thomas F. Millard, revealed:

Those Japanese forces crossing the Yangtze between Wuhu and Nanking a few days ago were driven back near Pukow, which the Chinese strongly hold. They are maintaining a line running south-west close to the Yangtze, to a point south of Wufu, and then to Hangchow. Most of this line is within striking distance of the Japanese, whose transit across the river to affect the junction of their forces will not be easy.[33]

“While the Australian Associated Press reported that the Chinese are taking up a line centered at Anking, capital of Anhwei Province, and extending to the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang, and placing a boom across and mining the Yangtze thereabouts.”[34]

Frank T. Durdin, a longtime correspondent for “The New York Times,” who reported on the Second Sino-Japanese War, declared that the Japanese army, six months after the Loukouchiao incident, possessed more than 300,000 square miles of Chinese territory in North China. This area, Durdin said, is comparable with the 301,800 square miles of Manchukuo, and with the 363,700 square miles of the combined areas of Italy and Germany. This North China area covers the whole of Hopei, Chahar, and Suiyan provinces; about half of Shansi and a fair-sized strip of Shandong.[35] According to Dr. C. J. Pao, the Chinese have counter-attacked Japan forces in the north. The Chinese soldiers have driven the Japanese from the part of Shandong Province, which they have occupied for some weeks.

The invasion of China was followed by indications of intensified military activity on the part of Japan. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, requested from the Japanese government a policy of self-restraint. Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro who hoped to gain the support of the international community repeated what he already said during a press conference to the Japanese nation on July 11, 1937. He stated that “troops were being ordered to north China because the Chinese side had deliberately perpetrated an armed attack again st Japan.[36] He continued, “As our empire’s constant concern is to maintain peace in East Asia, however, we have not abandoned hope that peaceful negotiations may yet ensure non-expansion of the conflict.”[37]

On July 12, 1937, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Hiroshi Saito, met with the American officials in Washington. During the meeting, Japan proposed a plan for the withdrawal of its troops in China. In response, Hull issued a statement resuming the fundamental principles of international policy. It stated that “any situation in which armed hostilities were in progress or were threatened was a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either were or might be seriously affected. The United States

avoided entering into alliances or entangling commitments but believed in cooperative effort by peaceful and practical means in support of the above-stated principles."[38]

Nine days later, on July 21, Hull talked separately with Chinese Ambassador Wang and Japanese Ambassador Saito. He said that the United States would help China and Japan to find a peaceful solution to the situation. He emphasized that a war would result in irreparable harm to both countries involved and would have disastrous effect on the entire world. On September 2, 1937, after several exchanges with the officials of China and Japan, Hull sent a telegram to Ambassador Grew in Japan fixing the position of the United States in the China/Japan's conflict. He repeated his speech on August 23, 1937, in which he declared that the issues and problems that were of concern to the United States in the existing situation in the Pacific area went "far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States."[39] He added:

The conditions prevailing in that area were intimately connected with and had a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy made public on July 16. The existence of serious hostilities anywhere was a matter of concern to all nations; that without attempting to pass judgment on the merits of the controversy, the United States appealed to the parties to refrain from war, that the United States considered applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16; and that statement embraced the principles embodied in the Washington Naval Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Act.[40]

On September 28, 1937, President Roosevelt declared: "That merchant vessels owned by the government of the United States would not be permitted to transport to China or Japan any arms, ammunition, or implements of war, and that any other merchant vessel flying the American flag which attempted to transport such articles to China or Japan would do so at its own risk." Following this statement, Hull said:

The United States had been approached on several occasions by other governments with suggestions for joint action; that while, the United States believed in and wished to practice cooperation it was not prepared to take part in joint action, though it would consider the possibility of taking parallel action.[41]

The League was unable to convince the Japanese to leave China, on 4 October, 1937, it turned the case over the Nine-Powers.[42] The following day, during an address at Chicago, President Roosevelt declared:

The political situation in the world was one to cause grave concern and anxiety. The existing reign of terror and international lawlessness had reached the stage where the very foundations of civilization were seriously threatened. He warned that no one should imagine that America would escape from this or that the Western Hemisphere would not be attacked. He called for a concerted effort by the peace-loving nations in opposition to the actions that were creating international anarchy and instability.[43]

Two days later, on October 6, the League of Nations adopted a resolution stating that: “The Japanese action in China was a violation of Japan’s treaty obligations.” On the same day, the Department of State issued a statement that:

The action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles that should govern the relations between nations and was contrary to the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and contrary to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.[44]

In accordance with a provision of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, in November 1937, nineteen nations participated in a Conference held at Brussels to consider “peaceable means” for ending the armed conflict between China and Japan. Norman Davis, the U.S. delegate, declared that the first objective of the foreign policy of the United States was national security, and that consequently his country sought to keep peace and promote the maintenance of peace. He added that the United States as a signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact had renounced war as an instrument of national policy; and that a public opinion in the United States had expressed its emphatic determination that the United States keep out of war.[45]

Despite being invited as an interlocutor, Japan refused to participate in the conference. The Japanese leaders argued that their disputes with China were outside the authority of the Nine-Power Treaty. On November 11, 1937, Japanese troops of the Second Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment entered Shanghai and killed nearly 25,000 Chinese including thousands of women and children. The Shanghai Expeditionary Force’s 16th Division, commanded by Lt. Gen. Nakajima Kesago, from Japanese navy planes, bombed villages and towns along the Yangtze toward Nanking, some 180 miles away. Four days later, on November 15, the conference adopted a declaration affirming that the conflict between China and Japan was of concern to all countries’ parties to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

On December 1, 1937, the Imperial Headquarters ordered the 10th Army and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force to invade Nanking. On December 8, troops under Prince Yasuhiko Asaka began the assault on the Chinese defenses. The city of Nanking exposed to constant attack from Japanese troops of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Central China Area Army, led by Gen. Iwane Matsui, fell on December 13.[46] Gen. Kesago Nakajima’s 16th Division killed approximately 30,000 Chinese prisoners of war, in just the three first day in Nanking.[47] The postwar Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal accepted an estimate of “over 200,000” civilians and prisoners of war” murdered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks.[48]

On December 14, 1937, the day after Nanking fell; Hirohito sent an imperial message to his chiefs of staff, in which he expressed his pleasure at the news of the city's capture and occupation. The Imperial Message of His Majesty the Supreme Commander was the following:

We are deeply gratified that various units of the army and navy in the Central China Area, following up their operations in Shanghai and its environs, have pursued [the enemy] and captured Nanking. Transmit our feelings to your officers and men.[49]

Two days before this message was sent out, on December 12, 1937, Japanese bombers attacked and sank the American gunboat USS Panay that was anchored in the Yangtze River near Nanking.[50] The boat, built in Shanghai, had been used to patrol the river on behalf of Americans and their property in China. The American government sent a note to the Japanese government stating that the United States vessels were on the Yangtze River "by uncontested and incontestable right."[51] Washington requested a formally recorded expression of regret and comprehensive indemnifications from the Japanese government. The message was communicated to Japan on the evening of December 13. On December 14, the Konoe cabinet immediately apologized by sending an official communication to Secretary of State Cordell Hull via Hiroshi Saitō, the Imperial's Japan ambassador to the United States.[52] The Japanese government accepted to pay $2.2 million in reparations after sending two telegrams expressing regret to President Roosevelt and King Georges VI.[53]

On January 9, 1938, encouraging by the result at the Nine-Power Treaty Conference in Brussels, and the behavior of the Nationalist representatives, who failed to persuade the participants to declare Japan an aggressor, the newly established Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference decided on a policy for handling the China Incident.[54] On January 11, during an imperial conference, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, in presence of Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, and the president of the privy council Hiranuma Kiichirō, rejected the Trautmann mediation. This attempt

by the German Ambassador to China, Oskar Trautmann, to broker a peace between Japan and China, fell. Therefore, the group shared Hirota's view by issuing the following statement: "We must strengthen our resolve to fight through to the end with China."[55]

On January 16, 1938, Konoe cabinet shut off negotiations with China and issued a statement declaring that Japan would thereafter no longer recognize the Nationalist Government.[56] Hirohito approved Konoe's decision and by doing so, failed to support his Army General Staff on the crucial matter of continuing peace negotiations. Instead, as emperor and commander of the Japanese Armed Forces, he tended to back up the harder army line.[57]

At that time most of the generals and admirals in the Japanese army believed in gun power. It was assumed that decisive battles would be fought mainly by the big guns of the battleships, supplemented by light cruiser and destroyer attacks and by air attacks from carriers. It was for this strategic reason that the Imperial Japanese Navy had made tremendous efforts to build up its auxiliary strength while its battleships were limited to 60 percent of the U.S.'s number by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and that Japan in 1934 gave notice of withdrawal from that treaty as from 1936.[58]

Invading More Territories

Motivated by a series of rapid victories, the Japanese army continued their advances in China. By November 1938, Japanese troops occupied the “three Wuhan cities” of Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang on the Yangtze River in central China, and Canton in the far south. In November 1938, Prime Minister Konoe issued his famous declaration of a “New Order in East Asia.” The same month he issued his second statement on the war. He declared that it would not veto participation by the Nationalist Chinese government. The next month, on December 22, he made his third statement with the “three Konoe principles.” First, China must cease all anti-Japan activities. It must formally recognize Manchukuo and establish relations of “neighborly friendship.”[59] Second, China would be required to join Japan in defending against Communism.[60] Third, China must accept to develop economic cooperation with Japan, including acceptance of Japan’s right to develop and exploit the natural resources of North China and Inner Mongolia.[61]

By 1939, the Japanese had pressed Chiang Kai-shek’s forces back into Sichuan Province in the southwestern of China and were consolidating their hold on the eastern seaboard.[62] They held all the major cities of northern and central China including Chungking and Yenan. The war did not end. The Chinese, more motivated with aid from the Soviet Union and the United States, fought to the death the Japanese troops in central China. On January 4, 1939, Konoe who presided over Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 and the deterioration in relations with the United States and its allies, unable to end the war in China or to bring about a consensus within his cabinet on a military alliance with Nazi Germany, resigned.[63] The same day, Hirohito appointed Hiranuma Kiichirō as Konoe’s successor.

Being in the past a strong supporter of the army, Hiranuma had distanced himself from the radical right after the army mutiny of 1936 to redefine himself as a partisan of peace. Under coaching from Finance Minister Ikeda Seihin, he dissolved the Kokuhonsha, a nationalistic organization that he led for many years, and which called on Japanese patriots to reject the various foreign political-“isms,” (such as socialism, Communism, Marxism, anarchism, etc.) in favor of a mixture of ideas such as Japanese ultra nationalism, militarism, fascism, and state capitalism. Confronted with military and diplomatic problems arising from the bloodiest war in China, and refusing to enter into a military alliance with Nazi Germany to make enemies of Britain and the United States, Hiranuma resigned on the morning of August 28, 1939, three months after Germany and Italy signed the Pact of Steel, on May 22, 1939.[64]

Japan’s relations with the Western Powers, particularly with Britain and the United States, continued to deteriorate throughout the summer and the fall of 1939. On July 26, 1939, the United States, to protest Japanese invasion of China, advised the Hiranuma government that it intended not to renew the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, scheduled to lapse in January 1940.[65] On August 23, 1939, Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact allowed Hitler to move German forces to the West in preparation for the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Seven days later, on August 30, 1939, Hirohito appointed Gen. Nobuyuki Abe, the interim War Minister, as prime minister.

On September 1, 1939, the first day of the Abe cabinet, German armies invaded Poland, a week after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, called the German-Soviet Pact of non-aggression. From the first day of the invasion of Poland, the Nazis in accordance with the orders received from Hitler via Himmler and Heydrich began a massive deportation of the Jewish people: Men, women, and children were placed in the concentration camps to be exterminated. The occupation of Poland caused Britain and France to declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939, two days after the German invasion of Poland, and to turn Europe into World War II.

In Japan, the war in Europe between Germany and other European nations soon became national news. Abe sought to maintain Japan’s neutrality in the conflict. The ultranationalists in Japan, who favored the choice of Gen. Ugaki Kazushige as potential prime minister after Hiranuma’s departure, did not enjoin Abe’s position to end the war in China. They were against any agreement looking for peace with the United States and Britain. Instead they wanted to form a political military alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Pleading against this alliance, on January 16, 1940, Abe was forced to resign.

Following Abe's resignation, Hirohito appointed Mitsumasa Yonai as prime minister. Navy Minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Senjūrō Hayashi in 1937 and serving in the same position under the first Fumimaro Konoe and Kiichirō Hiranuma administrations, Yonai wanted to defuse the tensions with the international community. He also wanted to develop peaceful diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States. Four months after Yonai's nomination as prime minister, in Western Europe, on May 10, 1940, Hitler launched his armies on the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. The Nazi victories in Europe had created unprecedented opportunities for Japan to take over the Asian colonies of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. At the same time, the Second World War in Europe placed the Yonai cabinet in a delicate position. Despite the pressure from the army requesting Japan to align to Germany, Yonai continued to maintain his strong opposition to the Tripartite Pact with Nazi-Germany and fascist Italy. When Vichy France signed an armistice with Germany, in late June 1940, leaving Great Britain as the only country fighting the war, the ultranationalists and the right-wing officers in Japan entered in direct conflict with Yonai for his anti-German policy. The disagreement became apparent in early July 1940, as Army Minister Shunroku Hata began to criticize the Prime Minister openly. Yonai was forced to resign on July 21, 1940. He was replaced by Fumimaro Konoe, who occupied for a second term, the position of Japan prime minister.

Konoe was aware why Yonai's government fell. As a former prime minister from 1937 to 1939, he learned a lot from his past experiences. His first move was to create the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), a wartime mobilization organization to mobilize the rural population.[66] His second move was to give green light to the army for the invasion of French Indochina. As an advised politician, who assumed the vice presidency of the house of peers in 1931, and ascended to the presidency of the house of peers in 1933, and as a former prime minister, he knew that this invasion would enormously help Japan to get resources it needed to continue the war with China, cut off western supply of Kuomintang armies, and finally intimidate the Dutch East Indies into supplying Japan with oil.[67] His third move was to request an audience with Emperor Hirohito, and tell him that just over a month, if no agreements could be reached with the United States, the war with the Western powers would begin. During that meeting, Hirohito asked a series of questions. He wanted to know the percentage of success that Japan would have to win a war against the United States. "The army and navy chiefs were confident that they could win a war in three months," said Konoe.

Hirohito was not optimistic. When Konoe left that day, he met with Prince Kan'in Kotohito, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, and Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff. Both generals confirmed what Konoe had just said about Japan's percentage of winning a war against the United States. Soon after that meeting, Hirohito asked the Department of National Planning for a report and learned that oil reserves were only for ten days of operations. Kerosene supplies would last one month. There was crude oil to run the industrial plants for forty-five days. The supply of nickel would make weapons for two months. Heavy machine oil, to keep the tanks going, would last only three months. [68]

The report was worrying, and Hirohito realized that going to war against the Western powers was inevitable. On September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, known as the Axis Alliance. The same day Hirohito issued an imperial transcript which declared:

The great principle of the eight corners of the world under one roof [bakkō ichi'u] is the teaching of our imperial ancestors. We think about it day and night. Today, however, the world is deeply troubled everywhere and disorder seems endless. As the disasters that humankind may suffer are immeasurable, we sincerely hope to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a restoration of peace, and have therefore ordered the government to ally with Germany and Italy, nations which share the same intentions as ourselves…[69]

One week later, on October 4, 1940, at a press conference in Kyoto, Konoe issued a strong statement. He said that if the United States did not end its provocative actions and deliberately chose to misunderstand the actions of the tripartite powers, there would be no option left but war.[70] In November 1940, Japan signed the Sino-Japanese treaty with Wang Jinwei, the head of a rival Kuomintang government in Nanjing. In December 1940, the British reopened the Burma Road and lent 10 million pounds to Chang's Kuomintang.[71] Konoe recommended negotiations with the Dutch in January 1941 to secure an alternate source of oil.[72]

In Europe five months later, on June 22, 1941, Hitler broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by invading the Soviet Union. Nazi troops, according to plans that had long matured, entered Russia without any declaration of war. From the very first day of their attack on the Soviet territory, the Nazis, in accordance with the orders received from Hitler, began the destruction of cities, towns, and villages, the demolition of factories, power stations, and railways. While in Asia, on July 28, after being threatened with military actions by the Roosevelt administration for invading and occupying the southern half of French Indochina, the Japanese began to formally occupy southern Indochina. On October 16, 1941, realizing his failure to find an accord with the United States demanding for Japanese troops to withdraw from China and Indochina, Konoe resigned. The following day, Hirohito chose Gen. Hideki Tōjō as prime minister.

Tōjō served in Siberia as part of the Japanese expeditionary force sent to intervene in the Russian Civil War. After that mission, he served as Japanese military attaché to Germany for three years (1919–1922).[73] By 1928, he was bureau chief of the Imperial Japanese Army and was shortly thereafter promoted to colonel taking control of the 8th Infantry Regiment. On July 30, 1940, he was appointed Army Minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe cabinet and remained in that post in the third Konoe cabinet. A militant ultra-nationalist, he believed that the emperor was a living god and favored “direct imperial rule,” ensuring that he would faithfully follow any order from the emperor.[74] He advocated the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. After Konoe resigned, he became prime minister while occupying in its cabinet the position of army minister and assuming the offices of minister of commerce and of industry as well.[75]

In the summer of 1941, three months before Tōjō’s nomination as prime minister, the United States demanded that Japan withdraw from Indonesia, which it had only recently occupied. As the Japanese refused, Washington declared an embargo against Japan, depriving it of strategic commodities, especially oil, on which it depended for the war in China.[76] In response; on December 7, 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the American war fleet at Pearl Harbor. The following day, Japanese troops invaded Thailand and attacked the British colonies of Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as well as the territories of Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines. China remained the main territory where most of the actions started at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War.[77]

BUILDING AN EMPIRE – TREATIES

SIGNED BY JAPAN from 1854 to 1941

Kanagawa Treaty	Japan-American Frienship, March 31, 1854
Treaty of Kanghwa	Japan and Korea, February 27, 1876.
Treaty of Chemulpo	Japan and Korea, August 30, 1882.
Convention of Tianjin	Japan and China, April 18, 1885.
Unequal Treaty	Japan and Western Powers, 1889.
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation	Japan and Britain, July, 16, 1894.
Treaty of Shimonoseki	Japan and China, April 17, 1895.
Taft-Katsura Agreement	Japan and United States, July 27, 1905.
Treaty of Portsmouth	Japan and Russia, September 5, 1905.
Eulsa Treaty	Japan and Korea, November 17, 1905.
Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty	Japan and Korea, August 22, 1910.
Treaty of Versailles	Allied Powers (United States, France, United Kingdom, Italy
Washington Naval Treaty	Great Britain, France, Italy, United States, and Japan, Februa

London Naval Treaty	Great Britain, United States, France, Italy, and Japan, April 2
Tripartite Pact	German, Italy, and Japan, September 27, 1940.
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact	Japan and Russia, April 13, 1941.

8

SNEAK ATTACK

B y the summer of 1941, the Japanese took advantage of the overthrow of the French government by the Nazis and its replacement by the puppet Vichy regime. They expanded their empire with the conquest of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The occupation of French Indochina not only put the Japanese army just across the water from Luzon , but also threatened to cut all supply to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government based in Chongqing. For the next months, step-by-step, Japan's conquest of territories in the Pacific continued. The next major decision was the attack of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The strategy was clear: The Japanese navy should conquer Hawaii. According to Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki:

Time would work against Japan because of the vastly superior national resources of the United States…Unless Japan quickly resumed the offensive —sooner, the better— it would eventually become incapable of doing anything more than sitting down and waiting for the American forces to counter-attack.[1]

For Ugaki, a Japanese victory in this decisive engagement might force Washington to negotiate. Attacking America, the decision was unanimously accepted by the commanders of the Japanese army and navy, who were certain of the success of their plan. However, for some Japanese planners, an attack on Pearl Harbor was very risky because it would automatically represent a declaration of war against the United States, which would not hesitate for revenge to attack Japan from a base in Australia, Guinea, or the Philippines. To counter this threat, the new Chief of the Imperial Japanese

Navy, Osami Nagano, suggested the invasion of north Australia. Talking about this operation, Tōjō declared: “Australia must learn that defense against our invincible forces is impossible in view of her sparse population, the vastness of her territories, and her geographical position, which makes her so distant from the United States and Britain.”[2]

Australian Prime Minister John Curtin took seriously Tōyō’s threat. Speaking on March 13, 1941, he said: “This is a warning. Australia is the last Allied bastion between the west coast of America and Japan. If she succumbs, the entire American continent will be wide open to invasion… I tell you that saving Australia will be the same as saving the Western side of the United States.”[3]

However, for many experts, Japan’s plan to invade Australia was unrealistic. With 70 percent of its troops engaged in China, the Japanese navy had neither the manpower nor the transport capacity to launch a campaign of this magnitude. Accepting this fact, Vice-Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of Japan’s southern fleet, pushed for a more limited campaign. Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, head of the Project Section at Naval HQ, proposed that Australia’s potential as a base for counterattack could be neutered without the logistical cost of conquest and occupation. According to Tomioka, by occupying Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands, the supply to Australia from America could be disrupted.

The Japanese overall plan was to enclose an area that would include Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), to Port Moresby in Papua, and from there to the Salomon islands, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, and on through the central Pacific back to Japan. This vast area, it was thought, could be secured and defended with available naval, army, and air forces, and it would provide Japan with its needs for oil, rubber, minerals, timber, and other resources. It would become part of Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.[4]

To execute this plan, the first thing was to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Prelude to Pearl Harbor

As Japan had prepared to go to war against hypothetical enemies, since 1907, the Japanese military planners had defined a strategy to determine how the country would defend itself in case of an arm conflict, particularly against Russia and the United States. From a geo-strategic standpoint, the Japanese army would have a major role in a war against Russia and the Japanese navy in one against the United States. In 1941, the Americans froze Japanese overseas assets and then imposed a total embargo on oil and oil products to Japan.[5] Following that decision, the basic assumption was that sooner or later, Japan would be fighting a war against the United States.

Japanese's plan to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet that had been stationed at Pearl Harbor since April 1940, had been calculated on the basis to occupy Luzon and Guam, and then the Japanese navy in cooperation with the army would intercept and destroy any forces from the United States that would come to protect the Philippines. The calcul was that destroying the U.S. Pacific Fleet would delay an intervention of the U.S. in the Western pacific to challenge Japanese aggression. Therefore, the Japanese navy had decided to launch a strong attack at Pearl Harbor; while, the Japanese army had been deeply implicated in a plan to simultaneously invade a group of countries in the region.

On June 19, 1940, Japan took advantage of the Nazis invasion of France to present a request to Georges Catroux, the governor general of Indochina. The solicitation was the closure of all supply routes to China and the admission in French Indochina of a Japanese inspection team under Gen. Issaku Nishihara. Catroux initially rejected the proposition and finally in June 20, he complied with the ultimatum. Two days after, the Japanese issued a second demand: naval basing rights at Guangzhouwan and the total closure of the Chinese border by July 7. The inspection team led by Gen. Nishihara Issaku arrived in Hanoi on June 29. On July 3, 1940, Japan issued a third demand: air bases and the right to transit combat troops through Indochina. Although Jean Decoux, the new governor general who arrived in

Indochina in July to replace Catroux, believed that Indochina could not defend itself against a Japanese invasion, he urged the officials in Paris to reject the demands. Gen. Jules-Antoine Bührer, chief of the Colonial General staff, a supporter of Decoux, also counseled resistance.

On August 30, 1940, Japanese foreign minister, Yōsuke Matsuoka, and French foreign minister, Paul Baudouin, signed an agreement, in which it said: "Japanese forces would be stationed in and transit through Indochina only for the duration of the Sino-Japanese War." Five days later, on September 3, negotiations between the supreme commander of Indochinese troops, Maurice Martin, and General Nishihara, began at Hanoi. On September 6, during the negotiation, an infantry battalion of the Japanese 20th Army based in Nanning, violated the Indochinese border near the French fort at Dông Dăng. Twelve days later, on September 18, Nishihara sent an ultimatum to the French government warning that Japanese troops would enter Indochina if the request of the Japanese southern China Area Army, that was demanding that 25,000 Japanese troops be allowed to station in Indochina, was not approved. On September 21, 1940, Martin and Nishihara signed the agreement that authorized the stationing of 6,000 Japanese troops in Tonkin north of the Red River. On September 22, simultaneous with the Battle of South Guangxi, Japanese troops invaded French Indochina.[6] The main objective was to prevent China from importing arms and fuel through the Kunming-Hai Phong Railway. After that invasion, Japanese troops occupied Tonkin in northern Indochina and effectively organized the blockade of China. On September 26, French administration in Indochina was allowed by the Japanese as a puppet government. The following day, on September 27, 1940, Japan joined the Axis powers.[7]

On April 13, 1941, the Japanese alerted that the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939, would be violated by Hitler, immediately decided to sign a treaty of neutrality with the Soviet Union.[8] Japan wanted to have free hands in Asia. After this treaty, the officials in Tokyo, with the approval of Hirohito, had prepared a secret plan to go to war with the United States. One of the chief architects of this attack was Gen. Hideki Tōjō, nicknamed "The Razor."[9] Tōjō's intent was predicated on the assumption that Japan would invade and defeat American forces in

the Philippines. After being defeated, Washington would use the U.S. Navy fleet at Pearl Harbor to retake the Philippines. It was imperative for Japan to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet.[10]

After briefing the emperor, Tōjō ordered Japanese vice Interior Minister, Michio Yuzawa, to concert with the army in order to materialize the attack.[11] The militarists in power quickly outlined a plan to attack the U.S. Pacific Fleet.[12] However, some disagreements came from a group of officials in the cabinet. Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, a senior diplomat and moderate, who replaced Adm. Teijirō Toyoda, pleaded that war with the United States must be put off, and the diplomatic consultation to secure an accommodation with Hull and Roosevelt must be continued. Tōgō was one of those who signed the declaration of war against the U.S. in 1941, but he was not confident about Japan's ability to defeat the U.S. during a war.[13] He was rejoined by Kichisaburō Nomura, who was an admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy and was the ambassador to the United States at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Arguing that those Americans who trusted him were "poor deluded souls" for thinking that he had any influence with the new military cabinet, Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura wrote, on October 23, 1941: "I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people…Please send me your permission to return to Japan." To which Tōgō replied the same day: "I appreciate the efforts you are making…We express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes and remain at your post."[14]

In October 1940 Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto with good sense warned that "to fight the United States is like fighting the whole world…Doubtless I shall die aboard the Nagato [his flagship]. Meanwhile, Tokyo will be burnt to the ground three times."[15] Two months before Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto predicted:

It is obvious that a Japanese-American war will become a protracted one. As long as the tides of war are in our favor, the United States will never

stop fighting. As a consequence, the war will continue for several years, during which [our] material [resources] will be exhausted, vessels and arms will be damaged, and they can be replaced only with great difficulties. Ultimately we will not be able to contend with [the United States]. As a result of war the people's livelihood will become indigent… and it is hard not to imagine [that] the situation will become out of control. We must not start a war with so little chance of success.[16]

Meanwhile, in the Japanese Imperial Headquarters at Tokyo, preparations for war moved quickly. On November 5, Hirohito made the final decision for war by sanctioning both the completion of "preparations for operations" and a deadline for terminating the Washington diplomatic negotiations, at midnight December 1."[17] On November 7, the high command of the Japanese army and Tōyō cabinet had communicated to the United States a revised version of ideas of the Japan-U.S. talks, including the question of stationing troops in China, the principle of nondiscriminatory trade in this country, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. On the question of north China and Mongolia, Tōjō requested a fixed period for the Japanese forces to leave the region, and not automatically to act in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. On the principle of nondiscrimination in commerce, he insisted on attaching the condition that it was acceptable if it was applied not only to China but worldwide. On November 20, Tōjō promised that Japan would not advance by armed forces farther than French Indochina and would withdraw to the northern part of the region after peace was reached in the war with China. In return, the United States was asked to restore relations prior to the freezing of Japanese assets, furnish Japan with a million tons of aviation fuel, and assist it in procuring raw materials from the Dutch East Indies.[18]

On November 26, 1941, after U.S. soldiers abroad were put on high alert, Hull issued a final ultimatum to Japan.[19] As soon as the imperial policy makers in Tokyo had received the ultimatum, the attack on Pearl Harbor was ready to be executed.[20] One week before the execution, Adm. Osami Nagano, navy chief of staff, went over the war plan in detail with Hirohito. "Imperial Navy Operations Plan for War Against the United States, Britain,

and the Netherlands" had been drafted by the general staff of the Combined Fleet aboard the battleship Nagato, and then forwarded directly to the Navy General Staff before going up the chain of command.[21] Hirohito after a secret meeting with the Army and Navy General Staff —no minister of state attended this audience— gave the final go-ahead to attack Pearl Harbor.[22]

Pearl Harbor: Attack, Casualties, and Facts

The Japanese fleet assembled at Hitokappu Bay, aided by German spy service, secretly prepared the attack on Pearl Harbor. Conceived by the commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Isoroku Yamamoto, the operation was designed to immobilize the United States Fleet for one year in order to give Japan enough time to win a certain number of victories before attempting a negotiated settlement.[23] Vice-Adm. Chūichi Nagumo led the mission.[24] On month before the attack, on November 8, 1941, flag officers of the combined fleet were assembled and Admiral Yamamoto, commander in chief Japanese Combined Fleet, told them:

The success of our attack on Pearl Harbor will prove to be the Waterloo of the war to follow…It is clear that even if America's enormous heavy industry is immediately converted to manufacture of ships, aircraft, and other raw materials, it will take several months for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we assure our strategic supremacy from the outset…by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while Americans is still unprepared, we can swing the scale of operations in our favor.[25]

On December 1, 1941, at the final Gozen Kaigi, it was decided that on December 8, Japan would officially declare war with the United States. On December 6, the fourteen-part coded text of the memorandum, which ended with a declaration of war against the United States, arrived at the Embassy of Japan in Washington. The same day, the Imperial Japanese Army attacked British and Dutch troops in the Pacific without a declaration of war.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese Air Force by surprise attacked the U.S. naval base on the island of Oahu, in the U.S. territory of Hawaii.[26]

Authorized by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy Staff, the attack came in response to the U.S. oil embargo on Japan. Confronted with military strangulation by oil embargoes and the pressure to abandon a large part of its continental empire, Japan opted for launching a war against the United States and Britain.[27] The attack also was a response to the economic sanctions taken by Washington against Japan after the invasion of China and French Indochina. It directed to the entry of the United States into World War II.[28]

Led by Gen. Hideki Tōjō and executed by three Japanese commanders of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service: Chūichi Nagumo, Isoroku Yamamoto, and Mitsuo Fuchida, the attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was launched on Sunday, December 7, 1941, at 7:48 a.m.[29] The first-wave strike, a total of 183 planes led by Lt. Comm. Shigeharu Murata, took off from six carriers. They arrived, completely by surprise, at 7:55 a.m. over Hawaii, and began their attack. The first group consisted of fifty Nakajima "'Kate'" B5N bombers armed with 800 kilograms armor piercing bombs, and another forty "'Kates'" armed with Type-91 torpedoes. The primary targets were capital ships, aircraft carriers, and battleships. A second group of forty-four Aichi D3A "'Val'" dive-bombers were targeted at Ford Island, Hickam Field, and Wheeler Field, while a third group of forty-five Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters would provide cover. A second wave of 171 planes, led by Comm. Shigekazu Shimazaki, arrived at Pearl Harbor at 8:40 a.m. The planes attacked Hickam Field as well as the aircraft and hangars at Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point. At 9:15 a.m., the second wave of 167 aircraft caused less damage.

During the operation, in total, 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,247 were wounded. Four battleships were sunk: USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, USS Nevada, and USS West Virginia, and four were severely damaged: USS Cassin, USS Downes, USS California, and USS Oglala, while 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed. The damaged ships also included light cruisers USS Helena and USS Honolulu, which were torpedoed. The destroyer USS Shaw, the repair vessel USS Vestal, and the battleship USS Maryland, escaped with minor damages. Out of 402 planes on the islands, 347 were either destroyed or heavily damaged. Five planes flying back to Hawaii from the carrier USS Enterprise were shot down. By comparison, the

Japanese lost 29 aircraft and had 64 men killed; losses included 5 midget submarines of which 4 were sunk.[30]

General of the Imperial Japanese Army. Tōjō served as Prime Minister of Japan and President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for most of World War II. (historica.fandom.com)

(Image from alchetron.com)

Image retrieved from jacar.go.jp

The structure of the Meiji constitution placed Hirohito at the top of the state with a wider range of authority and influence that made him the most powerful political figure in Japan. Here Hirohito is posing with the cabinet.

In Washington, news on the attack had been received with incredulity. Cordell Hull, the secretary of state, Frank Knox, the secretary of the navy, and Henry L. Stimson, the secretary of war, were shocked when they received the news. The Japanese government's fourteen-part message with its declaration of intent to terminate negotiations with Washington had been delivered by the ambassador of Japan to the United States, Adm. Kichisaburō Nomura. Nomura delivered the message several hours after the attack. The same day, a formal declaration of war with an imperial rescript was issued.

The diaries of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido and Hirohito's naval aide, Eiichiro Jo, allow us to follow a minute-by-minute sequence of the attacks.[31] According to Jo:

“Before dawn on December 8, (Tokyo Time), the forces heading for Malaya started landing at Singora at 1:30 a.m. and completed the landing at 4:30 a.m.

2:30 a.m.: Foreign Minister Tōgō presented the emperor with a message from President Roosevelt, which according to the recollection of a Chamberlain seemed to annoy him.

3:30 a.m.: The Pearl Harbor surprise attack was successful.

4:00 a.m. Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States.

5:30 a.m. Singapore bombed. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, and Wake.

7:10 a.m. All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk.

From 7:15 to 7:30 a.m. the Chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation.

At 7:30 a.m. Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war.

At 7:35 a.m. (Cabinet meeting) the Chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation.

At 10:45 a.m. the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the Privy Council.

At 11:00 a.m. the Imperial Rescript declaring war was promulgated.

At 11:40 a.m. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.

At 2:00 p.m. The emperor summoned the Army and Navy Ministers and bestowed an Imperial rescript on them. The Army Minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor.

At 3:05 p.m. The emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.

At 4:30 p.m. The Chiefs of Staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite Military Pact.

At 8:30 p.m. The Chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack. Throughout the day, Hirohito wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood.

In his post-war Shōwa-Tenno Dokuhaku Roku (The Emperor's Soliloquy), Hirohito said, "[In 1941] we thought we could achieve a draw with the U.S., or at best win by a six or four margin; but total victory was nearly impossible…When the war actually began, however, we gained a miraculous victory at Pearl Harbor and our invasions of Malaya and Burma succeeded far quicker than expected." In the Dokuhaku Roku, Hirohito added, "If not for this [agreement], we might have achieved peace when we were in an advantageous position."[32]

October 1941: Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki with his cabinet. As prime minister, Tōjō approved the attack on Pearl Harbor and was responsible for all aspects of the Pacific War. (K.K. Kyodo News)

(Image retrieved from blue.ap.teacup.com)

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese Air Force by surprise attacked the U.S. naval base on the island of Oahu, in the U.S. territory of Hawaii. Authorized by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy Staff, the attack came in response to the U.S. oil embargo on Japan. Confronted with military strangulation by oil embargoes and the pressure to abandon a large part of its continental empire, Japan opted for launching a war against the United States and Britain. (WorldPress.com)

(Image from airspacemag.com)

Pearl Harbor: Analyzing the Attack

U.S. attempts to deter Japanese expansion into the Southwestern Pacific via the imposition of harsh economic sanctions, redeployment of the U.S. Fleet from southern California to Pearl Harbor, and the dispatch of B-17 long-range bombers to the Philippines all failed because the United States insisted that Japan evacuate both Indochina and China as the price for a restoration of U.S. trade. The United States demanded, in effect, that Japan abandon its empire, and by extension its aspiration to become a great power, and submit to the economic dominion of the United States — something no self-respecting Japanese leader could accept.—[33]

On Pearl Harbor many questions are still today in debate. Whether or not officials in Washington knew that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be attacked by the Japanese navy on December 7, 1941, or did Gen. George C. Marshall, chief of staff, had been advised of the operation? According to a source from the National Archives, Washington knew a Pacific attack was coming but those in position refused to jeopardize the security of their code-breaking success. They decided to not contact Rear-Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The “war warning” arrived at Pearl Harbor after the last attacking plane had departed. Even with advance warning, the U.S. forces in Hawaii could have neither repelled nor neutralized the attack. Washington misjudged Japan’s superior weaponry and the size and skill of her attacking forces.[34]

There were a lot of recriminations and blame on the U.S. Navy for lack of leadership after the raid on Pearl Harbor. Within the week, Secretary of State for the Navy, Frank Knox, visited Hawaii and decided that Admiral Kimmel would have to be replaced. Lt. Gen. Walter Short, technically responsible for the defense of Hawaii, was also relieved of his command. The question was: “How could Kimmel and Short have been so unprepared

to defend Pearl Harbor?" In Washington, Adm. Rainsford Stark, chief of naval operations warned Rear Adm. Claude Bloch, commander of the Fourteenth Naval District in Hawaii: "Tell Kimmel I will be asking him how far out the patrol craft were and in what sectors."

On December 2, 1941, the navy's Fourteen Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit on Oahu, known as Station Hypo, under the command of Lt. Comm. Edwin Layton, had warned Kimmel: "As there had been no radio traffic from four Japanese carriers for fully fifteen and possibly twenty-five days, their location was unknown." A few days earlier, on November 27, 1941, Secretary of State for War, Henry Stimson, sent a message to Kimmel and Short to the effect that a war with Japan could start at any moment.[35]

Adm. Harold Rainsford Stark had himself sent a warning to Adm. Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, "…An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." Stark also informed them that the Japanese embassies had destroyed their codebooks in Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, Washington, and London. The day before the attack, Joseph Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor had asked Kimmel whether Japan would attack America, and the admiral answered categorically, "No, young man, I don't think they'd be such damned fools."

Robert Stinnett in his book Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor claimed that the United States was reading Japan's naval operational messages prior to Pearl Harbor. Stinnett alleged that Franklin Roosevelt and his administration deliberately provoked and allowed the attack to bring the United States into World War II. Stinnett argued that the attacking fleet was detected by radio and intelligence intercepts, but the information was deliberately withheld from Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the Pacific Fleet at that time. In Washington, Adm. Rainsford Stark, chief of naval operations, and Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly, head of War Plans Division of the Navy Department, failed to give Kimmel all the information that was available from PURPLE, a diplomatic crypto-graphical machine used by the Japanese Foreign Office, and JN-25, the name given by code-breakers to the chief, and most secure, command and control

communications scheme used by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Access to this information would have given Kimmel a much direct warning that a Japanese attack was imminent.[36]

While the army passed the full MAGIC intercept information package to MacArthur, Rear-Admiral Turner failed to pass key pieces of information to Kimmel in Hawaii because of an internal political battle with naval intelligence chief, Capt. Theodore Wilkinson. At a later government inquiry into Pearl Harbor, Adm. Patrick Nieson Lynch Bellinger, Kimmel's air defense officer, testified that "the information available to me —limited and unofficial as it was— did not indicate that I should recommend to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet [Kimmel] that distant patrol plane search for the security of Pearl Harbor be undertaken at this time." After the first Pearl Harbor inquiry conducted by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, Adm. Ernest King, who had replaced Stark as head of the navy, declared that Robert's committee had "merely selected a 'scapegoat' to satisfy the popular demand…"[37]

King endorsed the blame allocated to admirals Stark and Kimmel by Supreme Justice Owen Roberts for the disaster. He later retracted his endorsement given to Admiral Hewitt. In April 1948, he wrote a letter to the Navy Department to say that he had been in error in endorsing Hewitt's report and requested that his endorsement be withdrawn. On May 25, 1999, the Senate passed a non-binding resolution exonerating Kimmel and Short, however, the resolution only passed by fifty-two to forty-seven votes, and was not endorsed by Pres. Bill Clinton.[38]

In August 1945, Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt began to conduct the second inquiry, called The Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and under pressure from Secretary of the Navy, James Vincent Forrestal, he pushed to endorse Hewitt's report with an endorsement that read:

Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless, inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties. Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both officers to positions in which their lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors.[39]

David Kahn, in a review of Stinnett's book in the New York Review of Books, November 2, 2000, (59–60), captured the reader's attention to an archived official history of the cryptanalytic section of OP-20-G that reported the number of Japanese naval messages read in 1941. The number was "none." Duane L. Whitlock, a veteran of Station Cast on Corregidor, attested in 1986: "The reason that not one single JN-25 decrypt made prior to Pearl Harbor had ever been found or declassified is that no such decrypt ever existed."

On January 22, 1946, Capt. Joseph R. Redman, chief of naval communications, wrote to the judge advocate general: "All appropriate files of the Naval Communication Service have been searched for any dispatches of a war-warning nature from the Navy Department to naval commanders in the field between noon, Eastern Standard Time, on December 6, 1941, and 2:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time on December 7, 1941, inclusive. This will certify that no such dispatches are contained in those files."[40]

More Analyses on Pearl Harbor

The disaster that awaited Japan in its war with the United States was rooted in a fatal excess of ambition overpower. Japan's imperial ambitions, which included Soviet territory in Northeast Asia as well as China and Western-controlled territory in Southeast Asia, lay beyond Japan's material capacity. Japan wanted to be a great power of the first rank like the United States, Great Britain, and Germany but lacked the industrial base and military capacity to become one.[41]

Who would imagine at this late date, seventy-nine years after Pearl Harbor, the debate is still open among the historians on the veracity of the facts? Robert S. Stinnett and Stephen Budiansky in The Truth About Pearl Harbor: A Debate, wrote: Could this tragic event that resulted in over 3,000 Americans killed and injured in a single two-hour attack have been averted? In his book, Day of Deceit, Stinnett said, that American officials in Washington not only knew that Japanese attack was imminent, but that they had deliberately engaged in policies intended to provoke the attack in order to draw a reluctant peace living American public into a war in Europe for good or ill.[42]

In 2020, two crucial questions are still not been categorically answered by the historians: Did U.S. naval radar in the Pacific had depicted the Japanese naval armada before the attack; and American commanders at Hawaii had chosen to allow the attack to happen and push the United States in World War II? Did Pearl Harbor was indeed a surprise attack and must be regarded as President Roosevelt described it as a "Day of Infamy?"

The Roberts Commission, as it came to be called, commenced sworn, recorded hearings in Hawaii on 22 December. The pertinent question is: When former commanders —Walter Short and Husband E. Kimmel— acknowledged during the hearings that they had made mistakes; to what

degree the two commanders were sincere in their declarations? Short said, “I think that we [the Army] made a very serious mistake when we didn’t go to an alert against an all-out attack.” Kimmel accepted that he underestimated the importance of the code burning message, and that his judgment on torpedoes running (in Pearl’s shallow water had been “entirely wrong.”[43] The two men were not connected in sharing information. For example, Kimmel did not know that Short’s radar was operating only for a limited number of hours each day, and Short did not know that Kimmel was not conducting distant aerial reconnaissance. (Quoted in Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, 144, “The language “dereliction of duty,” originated, apparently, in the White House executive order establishing the Roberts Commission dated 18 December 1941. It mandated that the commission determine whether “dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the part of Army and Navy personnel” had contributed to the Japanese success.”

The testimonies of the commanders present at Pearl Harbor and other important figures in position at Washington such as Gen. Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Rear Adm. Claude C. Bloch, commander Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, chief, War Plans Division, Navy Department, Adm. Harold R. Stark, chief of Naval Operations, Frank Knox, secretary of the Navy, Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief, United States Fleet, and commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, Gen. George C. Marshall, chief of staff, United States Army, Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war, proved one thing: “Washington knew a Pacific attack was coming but the officials there did not believe during the first part of December that Hawaii was directly at risk. They predicted the United States would be at war with Japan within the next few months. Considering all the facts, I must say, the conspiracy theory that accused President Roosevelt to force the United States into war by a secret and deliberate contrivance that place the fleet in harm’s way, is inaccurate.[44]

More Japanese Attacks

One day after Pearl Harbor, Japanese troops attacked Hong Kong, and, two days later, sank Britain's two main warships, the Prince of Wales and the cruiser Repulse. The same day, Japanese forces, led by Lieutenant General Yamashita, landed at Kota Bharu on the border of Malaya and Thailand. Despite being inferior in terms of number, the Japanese pushed the Allied forces farther and farther until they retreated to Singapore. The invasion of the Philippines started on December 8, 1941, ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite resistance led by General MacArthur, on December 10, Japanese troops landed in the country.[45]

Lacking air cover, the American Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines withdrew to Java on December 12, 1941. Guam, Wake Island, fell a few days later. Joint navy-army Japanese task forces seized the Celebes and the Dutch oil fields in Borneo on December 16, and landed troops and planes in the northern, southern, and eastern parts of the Philippines during late December.[46] On January 3, 1942, Japanese troops occupied Manila without resistance. American forces were too weak to defend the capital. Facing defeat, MacArthur had declared it an open city to protect the civilian population. Pushing further into the Southwest Pacific, Japanese troops captured Java in the Dutch Indies, and then seized the Australian naval, and air base at Rabaul in New Britain.[47]

Japanese troops also invaded Thailand and pressured its leaders to declare war on the United States and Great Britain. In less than half a century, Japan had increased its empire from 147,669 square miles to more than one million square miles. In the summer of 1941, Japan controlled an empire of over 300 million people (including 200 million Chinese) and territories covering 3 million square miles. By March 1942, Japan had seized Singapore and Malaysia (127,000 square miles), taking a significant part of the British Empire in the process. The Netherlands' Indonesian colonies (735,000 square miles) were subsumed by Japan after the surrender of Dutch forces on March 9. Added to these territories, Japan also took Guam

(US territory), Wake Island (US territory), Hong Kong (British territory), and the mandated Australian territories of the Bismarck Archipelago. In addition, the islands of Attu and Kiska, in the Aleutian chain linked with Alaska, were captured as a prelude to Yamamoto's Midway campaign. By comparison, in 1939, the British Empire had 449 million people and covered 22 million square miles; France, 56 million people over 7.5 million square miles; Holland, 61 million over 1.3 million square miles; and America, 17 million people over 1.3 million square miles (including the territories of the Philippines, Alaska, and Hawaii).[48]

Japan's empire at its peak, in June 1942, stretched from the Russian borders in the north, the barren wastes of Kamchatka and the islands of Alaska in the northeast, to Jakarta in the southwest and Timor in the south, and from the borders of Burma/India in the west to the Marshall Islands in the east, and Guadalcanal in the southeast. The area covered by Japan, including oceans, was 20 million square miles, an area almost 140 times larger than Japan's home islands. The diameter of Japan's Imperial borders had expanded to 5,000 miles.[49] Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, proclaimed before the war, "The Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Far East is based on the spirit of Hakko Ichiu, or the Eight Corners of the Universe under One Roof …We must control the Western Pacific…" Building an empire was the aspiration for the Japanese officials.

During a short period of time, Japan conquered more territory than had any other military campaign in history over a five-month period. At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese navy sank four out of eight American battleships, destroyed 180 aircraft, and damaged 167 others. The Thai government capitulated on December 10, 1941, the Dutch oil field in Borneo on December 16, and Hong Kong on December 25. Manila fell on January 3, 1942, Australian military bases at Rabaul on January 23, Malaya on January 31, Singapore and the Palembang oil fields on Sumatra on February 15, Lashio on March 8, and Corregidor on May 6.



The Far East, 1930–1941

PART IV

THE REIGN OF BRUTE FORCE



The “Japanese Advance South, 1942”

9

LAND AND SEA INVASIONS

Japan’s aggression in China, military alliance with Hitler, and proclamation of a “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” that included resource-rich Southeast Asia were major milestones along the road to war, but the proximate cause was Japan’s occupation of southern French Indochina in July 1941, which placed Japanese forces in a position to grab Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. Japan’s threatened conquest of Southeast Asia, which in turn would threaten Great Britain’s ability to resist Nazi aggression in Europe, prompted the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to sanction Japan by imposing an embargo on U.S. oil exports upon which the Japanese economy was critically dependent. Yet the embargo, far from deterring further Japanese aggression, prompted a Tokyo decision to invade Southeast Asia.[1]

Japanese troops in 1941 (Image from L’expedition international contre les Boxers)

Attacking the Philippines

I n the six months following Pearl Harbor nothing seemed to stop Japan's advance in the Pacific. [2] As tensions rose between Tokyo and Washington, Japanese troops invaded several islands, looking to take control of their natural resources. On December 8, 1941, they attacked Guam in the Mariana Islands. Naval Governor of Guam, George McMillin, surrendered to the Japanese forces led by commander and leader Tomitaro Horii on December 10, 1941. [3] For the next three years, (Dec. 1941 – August 1944), Guam was controlled by the Japanese troops who were housed in schools and governments buildings in Agama. Commander Hayashi Horace, one of the military leaders during the Japanese invasion of Guam, made the Agama's former governor's palace as the headquarters for the Keibitai. [4]

Japanese troops then attacked the Philippines. The Japanese launched the invasion by sea from Formosa, over 200 miles (320 km) north of the Philippines, and on December 8, 1941, landed on Luzon. Two days later, on December 10, 1941, the Japanese navy sank the British battleship Prince of Wales and the cruiser Repulse off Singapore. In Manila, capital and chief city of the Philippines, Japanese bombers caught most of the U.S. Army's Far East air strength on the ground, destroying more than half its fighter and bomber planes. Other raids, the Japanese forces destroyed Cavite Naval Yard, south of Manila. MacArthur's alternative plans to Rainbow-5 became a total disaster.[5] Adm. Thomas C. Hart, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, in accord with MacArthur, had sent part of his forces south in November.[6] With little air protection left, the remaining surface vessels in the Philippines were in grave danger. Hart sent the rest of his larger ships to Java or to Australia. Only the ground forces, a few fighter planes, about thirty submarines, and a few small vessels remained to defend the Philippines.[7]

Taking advantage of the situation, Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, the commander of Japan's 14th Army invasion force, rapidly achieved the invasion of northern Luzon. A great tactician, Homma encircled the

American forces and cut off their line of retreat to Manila.[8] The American Far East Air Force (FEAF), in the only action, sunk a Japanese minesweeper and slightly damaged several other ships.[9] The triple landings on the main Philippines island of Luzon were made with 4,000 Japanese troops landed at Aparri and Vigan in the north.[10] On December 12, 1941, a group of 2,500 men landed at Legazpi in the south. On December 21, the main 14th Army units, consisting of 43,000 men of the 48th Division, landed at Lingayen Gulf some 150 miles north of Manila.[11] MacArthur's forces composed of 32,000 American troops of which 12,000 were Philippine Scouts, and an estimated 120,000 conscript of the Philippine army, were crushed by the Japanese forces. Major General Wainwright's plan to defend Homma's advance at the Agno River, 16 miles south of Lingayen Bay, with the aim of holding the Japanese advance long enough to enable the Bataan Peninsula to be supplied, failed. Japanese forces landing on Luzon Island continued until December 22 with the U.S. Air Force only capable of offering a weak resistance.

Under pressure of General Homma's troops, the American forces in the Philippines withdrew to the Bataan Peninsula and to the island of Corregidor at the entrance to Manila Bay.[11] As the Japanese converged on Manila, MacArthur began executing plans to retreat his forces on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island so as to deny the use of Manila Bay to the Japanese.[12] On January 2, 1942, the Japanese troops occupied Manila, which MacArthur had declared an open city, ostensibly to protect its civilian population but also because his forces were to weak to defend it.[13] Once the Philippines fell to Japanese troops, Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to travel to Melbourne to take command of the Allied forces in the area. On March 11, 1942, MacArthur and several members of his family and staff left the Philippines island of Corregidor.[14] They traveled in patrol torpedo boats through stormy seas patrolled by Japanese warships and reached Mindanao, the second-largest island in the Philippines, two days later. From there, the group flew to Australia in a pair of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, ultimately arriving in Melbourne by train on March 21.

By early 1942, over 25,000 US troops, unable to travel on the Philippines, had already arrived in Australia. There, MacArthur made his famous speech in which he declared to journalists:

The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines. I came through and I shall return.[15]

Meanwhile, most of the 80,000 prisoners of war captured by the Japanese at Bataan were forced to undertake the infamous "Bataan Death March," to a prison camp 80 miles to the north.[16] MacArthur wrote to Gen. Henry H. Arnold in Washington to explain the annihilation of his Air Force. "Their losses were due entirely to the overwhelming superiority of enemy force," he wrote, "No Unit could have done better…No item of loss can properly be attributed to neglect or lack of care…"[17]

Image from the National Archives and Records

Administration (NAID 531424)

On October 20, 1944, a few hours after his troops landed, MacArthur waded ashore onto the Philippine island of Leyte. That day, he made a radio broadcast in which he declared, “People of the Philippines, I have returned!”

Invading Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma

Under the command of Maj. Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi, an escort of the cruiser Yura commanded by Rear Adm. Shintaro Hashimoto, the destroyers of the 12th Destroyer Division, Marakumo, Shinonome, Shirakumo, and Usugumo, submarine-chaser Ch 7 and the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru, ten transport ships carrying the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade HQ, the cruisers Kumano and Suzuya, the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri commanded by Rear Adm. Takeo Kurita, left Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina. On December 8, 1941, the combined Japanese forces led by Lieutenant General Yamashita landed at Kota Bharu on the border of Malaya and Thailand. This mission was done simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor to prevent America from interfering in Southeast Asia. The Japanese troops attacked British territories in Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, a total of 260,000 square miles.

Those attacks that began four hours after Pearl Harbor were in violation of international law as Japan had no declared war against the British Empire. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Christopher Maltby, the British forces composed by British, Canadian, Indian, as well as the local Hong Kong Chinese Regiment and the Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Corps, could not resist the Japanese 21st, 23rd, and 38th Regiments led by Lt. Gen. Takashi Sakai. It took just 70 days for the Japanese forces to crush the British Empire forces in Malaya and Singapore, which surrendered on February 15, 1942. Hundreds of people were massacred by the Japanese troops in Hong Kong after the surrender.[18]

Controlling the Pacific

The Japanese forces intended to capture Miri and Seria, while the rest would capture Kuching. At dawn on December 16, 1941, two landing units secured Miri and Seria with only very little resistance from the British forces. A few hours later, Lutong was captured as well. On December 22, a Japanese convoy left Miri for Kuching, but was detected by Dutch flying boat X–35. The following day, under the command of Lt. Comm. Carel A. J. van Groeneveld, K XIV infiltrated the convoy and began its attack.[19] The Japanese army transports Hiyoshi Maru and Katori Maru were sunk with the loss of hundreds of troops. The rest of the soldiers were able to land. By the afternoon, although the 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment, resisted the attack, they were outnumbered and retreated up the river; Kuching was in Japanese hands.

The reign of brute force: The troops of the Imperial

Japanese Army during the Pacific War bombed towns

and villages under the slogan, “Burn all, kill all.”

Being responsible for causing war-ravaged in the Pacific during the period from 1937 to 1945, Japan’s empire was a disaster. (Images retrieved from The Mirror)

Three weeks after capturing Kuching, on January 11, 1942, Japanese forces invaded the island of Tarakan. The landing on Tarakan was assigned to the 26th Brigade, a force of around 12,000 troops under the command of Brigadier David Whitehead. The small Dutch garrison managed to destroy some of the infrastructure before being overwhelmed. On January 18, 1942, using small fishing boats, the Japanese landed at Sandakan, the seat of government of British North Borneo. The North Borneo Armed Constabulary, with only 650 men, provided any resistance to slow down the Japanese invasion.

On January 23, 1942, Japanese forces captured Rabaul, the capital of the Australian-controlled territory of New Guinea.[20] The small Australian garrison, Lark Force, was overwhelmed and most of its troops, including six Army nurses, were captured. On January 29, the Japanese Army General Staff ordered the Combined Fleet to capture the strategic point of Lae, Salamaua, and Port Moresby in the British (eastern) part of the island of

New Guinea, thereby implementing the first step of a plan to isolate and ultimately attack Australia.[21]

On February 3, 1942, Japanese aircraft attacked Port Moresby. Months of air battles occurred above the town. Four days later, on February 7, Hirohito placed his seal on Daikairei Number 14, ordering the Combined Fleet to attack the island of Timor in southeastern Indonesia.[22] In the Battle of the Coral Sea, a Japanese invasion fleet headed for Port Moresby, but turned back in the face of an Australian-led naval group in the Jomard Passage. Later, by puting troops ashore at Milne Bay, the Japanese attempted to take Port Moresby by land over the Kokoda Track. This attack was repulsed on both fronts.[23]

On February 14, 1942, the invasion of Sumatra was planned prior to the invasion of Java in order to destroy the west flank of the Allies by giving access to Java. Following a brief resistance, the Japanese succeeded in forcing an under-equipped force of Allied military known as Sparrow Force predominantly from Australia, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands East Indies to surrender. On February 20, 1942, the joint-navy-army task force captured the Portuguese and Dutch territories on Timor. On March 5, they occupied Batavia on Java, and shortly afterward, took control of Bougainville; the largest island in the Solomons chain, threatening American and British supply lanes to Australia.[24] On March 7, 1942, the liaison conference formalized the expanding Pacific offensive. The new policy document in its first article stated: “In order to force Britain to submit and the United States to lose its will to fight, we shall continue expanding from the areas we have already gained,” and while “working long-term to establish an impregnable strategic position; we shall actively seize whatever opportunities for attack may occur.”[25]

By March 1942, Japan had occupied Singapore and Malaysia (127,000 square miles.) The Netherlands’ Indonesian colonies (735,000 square miles) fell into Japanese hands after the surrender of Dutch forces on March 9. Japan also took Guam and Wake Island (US territories), Hong Kong (British territory), and the mandated Australian territories of the Bismarck Archipelago. In addition, the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian chain linked with Alaska were captured as a prelude to Yamamoto’s Midway

campaign.[26] By April 1942, the Japanese had captured strategic points in the remote Andaman and Nicobar Islands, territory belonging to British India and running from the Malacca Straits all the way to the mouth of the Indian Ocean, thereby forcing the small British fleet in the Indian Ocean to remove to the coast of East Africa.[27] The Japanese troops occupied Burma on May 1942, and declared the colony independent as the State of Burma.[28] A puppet government led by Ba Maw was installed. Ba was afterwards declared head of state. His cabinet included Aung San as war minister and the Communist leader Thakins Than Tun as minister of land and agriculture; as well as the socialist leaders Thakins Nu and Mya.

On June 7, 1942, the Japanese pushed their vast Pacific defense perimeter north toward Alaska by placing garrisons on Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians. On July 21, following the failure of a seaborne assault during the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942), Japanese forces landed on the northern Papuan coast at Bhabua, between Buna and Gona, as part of a plan to capture the strategically important town of Port Moresby via an overland advance across the Owen Stanley Range along the Kokoda Track. By August 1942, Japanese control of the Pacific was almost total. Most of the operational goals in the South Pacific that had been set prior to Pearl Harbor had now been achieved. Key strategic resource areas of the south were in Japanese hands; the war's first stage as initially calculated had ended.[29]

In eleven years from 1931 to 1942, Japan had expanded its empire from 243,500 square miles to 2.9 million square miles, and, as an emperor, Hirohito imposed his rules over five-hundred million Asians. The Japan Empire stretched from the Russian borders in the north, the barren wastes of Kamchatka and the islands of Alaska in the northeast, to Jakarta in the southwest and Timor in the south, and from the borders of Burma/India in the west to the Marshall Islands in the east, and Guadalcanal in the southeast. The area covered by Japan's empire including oceans was now 20 million square miles, an area almost 140 times larger than Japan's home islands.[30] Five years of war with China had drained Japan and required a standing army of 120 divisions (1.5 million troops) just to maintain its hold over half of the country. Now, with its sweeping victories over America, Great Britain, Holland, and Australia, Japan had an additional 1.25 million square miles to administer and garrison.[31] Prisoners who had been captured

during these invasions would be put to work as slave labor: building infrastructure, harvesting on plantations, and digging in the mines.

Fighting under the name of hakkō ichiu, a belief that the entire world must be united under one emperor, Japanese troops occupied almost 80 percent of the territories in Asia during World War II. The diameter of Japan's imperial borders had expanded to 5,000 miles. For several years, Japan was at war with most of the countries in the Pacific. At the same time, it was fighting an all-out war with the United States, the world's most powerful economy, Great Britain, the world's largest empire, and China, the world's most populous country.[32]

During the first six months of the Pacific War, Japanese forces achieved victories so shocking and in such rapid succession that in April 1942, Admiral Yamamoto wrote to his geisha, Plum Dragon: "The first stage of operations has been a kind of children's hour, and will soon be over; now comes the adults' hour, so perhaps I'd better stop dozing and bestir myself."[33] Yamamoto was right. From June to December 1942, Japan's control over the Pacific was challenged by MacArthur during the Guadalcanal campaign. In pursuit of Hirohito's instructions, Japanese troops fought to death to maintain their advance in the Pacific. Committing war crimes was one of the most horrific arms that their forces used to avoid defeat.

10

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

A s the war turned in favor of the Allies, Japanese troops committed more and more war crimes without making a difference between civilians and soldiers engaged in combat. The term “war crime” was first defined in 1945, by the Nuremberg Tribunal for the trial of Nazi criminals: “Murders, ill-treatment or deportation for forced labor, or for other purposes, civilian populations in the occupied territories, the murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons at sea, the execution of hostages, the looting of public or private property, the unjustified destruction of towns and villages, or the devastation not justified by military requirements.”

War crimes are considered serious violations in the Geneva Convention.[1]

The first convention of 1864, the second convention of August 12, 1949, the two additional protocols of June 8, 1977, and the 2005 additional protocol defined war crimes and the punishments for the perpetrators. These violations are detailed in several articles. Title II entitled “General Protection of POWs” (Articles 13 to 16) contains the essential principles that must, at all times, and in all places, inspire the treatment of prisoners.[2] These provisions are to “ensure respect for the dignity and value of the human person, by depicting the rights which are, in essence, attached to him and the freedoms without which he loses his raison d’être.” As a result, they mainly prohibit the following:

a. Attacks on the life and bodily integrity of human beings, including torture, and cruel treatment;

b. Hostage-taking;

c. Deportations;

d. Violations of the dignity of persons, including humiliating and degrading treatment and discriminatory treatment based on differences in race, color, nationality, religion, or creed, sex, birth, or fortune;

e. Convictions and executions carried out without prior judgment by a regularly instituted court, with judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by “civilized” peoples.

Title III (Articles 17 to 108) deals with the actual captivity regime and consists of six sections. The first (Articles 17 to 20) envisages situations that arise immediately after capture. The second (Articles 21 to 48) regulates, in eight chapters, the living conditions of prisoners in the camps or in case of transfer: places and modes of internment, housing, food and clothing, hygiene and medical care, etc. The work of prisoners is dealt with in the third section (Articles 47 to 57). The fourth, (Articles 58 to 68) concerns their financial resources. The fifth (Articles 69 to 77) regulates everything related to their correspondence and the relief sent to them. Finally, the sixth section (Articles 78 to 108) determines, in three chapters, the relationship of prisoners with the authorities who hold them.

Japan ratified the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, but did not ratify the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.[3] Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō, in 1942, indicated that it would follow the Geneva rules, and would observe the Hague Convention of 1907, outlining the laws and customs of war. However, the fact remains that, under customary rules of war as recognized by all civilized nations, all prisoners of war and civilian interns must be treated humanely. The Tokyo court made this principle clear in its judgment: “It is the grossly inhumane treatment by the Japanese military that is particularly reprehensible and criminal. A person guilty of such treatment cannot escape punishment on the grounds that he or his or her government is not bound by any convention. The general principles of the law exist independently of those conventions. These conventions merely reaffirm the general principles of the pre-existing law and provide for the general rules of their application.”[4]

The finding of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East established that, from the beginning of the war to Japan's surrender, torture, murder, rape, and other most inhumane and barbaric atrocities, were freely practiced by the Japanese on prisoners of war, and civilians in the occupied territories.[5] "Crimes against humanity" was the appellation of these crimes. The term had first emerged in World War I, in connection with Turkish atrocities against Armenians. It was defined in the four-nation London Charter on which the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was based as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds."[6] These crimes, mainly against the civilian population, "were punishable under international law only insofar" as they were committed in connection with war crimes. At Tokyo, the prosecutors, following the fifty-five-count indictment, defined the notion of crimes against humanity, "as resulting from illegal warfare confined to aggressive attacks or in violation of treaties when the nations attacked were at peace with Japan."[7]

Sacking Nanking

Among the crimes against humanity committed by Japanese during World War II, those committed against the civilian population in the occupied territories played a prominent place. In 1937, Hirohito gave his approval for the Japanese army to conquer Nanking, slaughtering hundreds of thousands of civilians in this Chinese city.[8]

Japan invaded northern China in 1937. When Shanghai fell, the Japanese army advanced on Nanking and occupied it on December 13, 1937. Arriving in Nanking, the former imperial capital, the Japanese troops, under the command of Gen. Iwane Matsui, engaged in a general massacre, killing between 250,000 and 300,000 civilians.[9] People were executed in atrocious conditions: women were raped, men were strangled and children were buried alive. The city was ransacked and burned. The slaughter continued in the city and its six adjacent rural villages for three months. Gen. Kesago Nakajima's 16th Division killed approximately 30,000 Chinese prisoners of war during the first day Japanese troops entered the capital.[10]

On August 5, 1937, Army Minister Hajime Sugiyama notified the Japanese troops in Shanghai of the army's proposition to remove the constraints of international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners. The directive also advised staff officers to no longer use the term, "prisoner of war."

On September 4, 1937, three months before the invasion of Nanking, Sugiyama issued a directive to the Japanese commanders on the ground, stating: "Our present situation is completely different from any our empire has experienced before."[11] On the same day, Hirohito informed the Imperial Diet that while he was constantly preoccupied with "securing peace in Asia through cooperating with China, but China does not really understand our empire's true intention. To our deep regret, they have constantly caused difficulties and problems that have finally resulted in the present incident. Our troops, displaying loyalty and bravery, are suffering hardships solely to make China self-reflect and to quickly establish peace in Asia."[12]

Here is a report on the tragic events in Nanking:

The Japanese army returned to Nanking on December 13, 1937. On the city's main thoroughfare, Zhongshan Avenue, 7,000 bodies lie while at the same time 8,000 Chinese soldiers who surrendered to the Japanese troops were shot. Japanese soldiers entered each house in search of outbreaks of resistance and, at the same time, separate men and women. The men were lined up, tied up, and then murdered either by machine gun or by beheading with the Japanese sword. Most of the women were raped and mutilated only to end up inflicted bayonets and gutted. Finally, after three days of siege, the city fell to the Japanese on December 16, 1937. During this tragic battle, an estimated 20,000 soldiers died in action, and 10,000 civilians were executed by Japanese soldiers.[13]

According to many historians, particularly Chinese and Japanese, such as Ikuhiko Hata, Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Sadatoshi Tomioka, Kasahara Tokushi, Honda Katsuichi, Akira Fujiwara, Chang Iris, and Chichiro Hosoya, during the six-week-long Nanking Massacre, hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians and soldiers were murdered, and between 70,000 and 80,000 women and children were raped by the Japanese military. Once raped, women were killed, often bayoneted, after being subjected to explicit mutilation or other acts of barbarism. Soon after the fall of Nanking, Japanese troops arrested thousands of young Chinese men and women. Most of them were taken to the Yangtze River, where they were killed. The Straw String George Massacre was probably the single largest massacre of Chinese troops that occurred along the banks of the Yangtze River on December 18. Japanese soldiers tied the POWs' hands together, divided them into four columns, and opened fire. The bodies were dumped directly into the Yangtze River.[14]

One day after the Straw String George Massacre, Japanese troops gathered 1,300 Chinese soldiers and civilians at Taiping Gate and murdered them. The victims were blown up with landmines, then doused with petrol and set

on fire. The survivors were killed with bayonets.[15] On December 19, 1937, Reverend James H. McCallum wrote in his diary:

I don't know when it's going to end. I have never heard or read so much brutality. Violation! Violation! Violation! We estimate at least one hundred thousand cases per night on many days. In case of resistance or anything that looks like disapproval, there is a bayonet blow or a bullet. People are hysterical. The women are taken away every morning, afternoon, and evening. The whole Japanese army seems free to come and go as it pleases and do what it likes.[16]

On March 7, 1938, Robert O. Wilson, a surgeon at the U.S. University Hospital in the Security Zone, wrote in a letter to his family: "A conservative estimate of people shot in cold blood is about 100,000 including thousands of soldiers who had laid down their arms." [17]

In his diary, John Gillespie Magee, an American Episcopal priest, who worked as a missionary in Nanking, reported:

It is only when you visit the city that you learn the extent of the destruction. We encounter dead bodies every 100 to 200 meters. The bodies of the civilians I examined had bullet holes in their backs. These people were likely on the run and were killed from behind. The Japanese marched through the city in groups of ten to twenty soldiers and looted the shops. I saw them with my own eyes as they looted the coffee of a German baker in the name of Herr Kiessling. The Hempel Hotel was broken, like almost every shop on Chung Chang and Taiping streets.[18]

Magee continued:

On December 13, about thirty Japanese soldiers came to the Chinese house at 5 Hsing Lu Koo Street in the southeast district of Nanking and asked to enter. The door was opened by the owner, a Muslim called Ha. They immediately killed him with a revolver and Mrs. Hsia, who knelt before them after her husband's death, begging them not to kill anyone else. Mrs. Hsia asked them why they killed her husband and in response she had been shot also. Ms. Hsia was dragged from under a table into the guest room where she tried to hide with her one-year-old baby. After being stripped naked and raped by one or more men, she was bayoneted in the chest and a bottle was then inserted into her vagina. The baby was killed with a bayonet, and other people in the house were executed.[19]

On February 10, 1938, the legation secretary of the German Embassy, Georg Rosen, wrote to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this film shot by Magee.[20] The letter related to the movie is kept in the political archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.[21] Tang Sunshan, survivor and witness of one of the systematic massacres of the Japanese army, testified:

Four of the soldiers went around slicing off the heads of the people in their assigned group while the other four, including the collaborators, picked up the severed heads and lined them up. In other words, the four teams were having a head cutting contest. The three rows of victims were made to kneel facing away from the pit. Tang was at the end of the last row of his group, the row closest to the pit. The soldier began cutting heads on the east end of the front row. Some of the people were crying and screaming, while others were too frightened to move. As each head was cut off, blood spurted up and the body fell over. The heads were lined up in the back. The seventh and last person in the first row was a pregnant woman. The soldier thought he might as well rape her before killing her, so he pulled her out of the group at a place about 10 yards away. While he was trying to rape her, the woman resisted with vigor. The soldier violently stabbed her in the belly with a bayonet. She gave a final scream as her intestines spilled out.[22]

On December 17, 1937, Rabe wrote a complaint to Fukui Kiyoshi, second secretary of the Japanese Embassy. Rabe said:

On the 13th when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone in which there had been very little destruction by stray shells and no looting by Chinese soldiers even in full retreat. All twenty-seven Occidentals in the city at that time and our Chinese population were totally surprised by the reign of robbery, raping, and killing initiated by your soldiers on the 14th. All we are asking in our protest is that you restore order among your troops and get the normal city life going as soon as possible.[23]

According to former Japanese marine Mitani Sho, the army used a trumpet that meant, “Kill all the Chinese who run away.” Thousands were taken away and executed en masse in an excavation known as the Ten Thousand Body Ditch, a trench measuring about three hundred meters long and five meters wide. Researchers and historians estimate that there have been more than twelve thousand. An estimate of victims buried in this ditch range from twenty thousand to thirty thousand. The Japanese officials in Tokyo were aware that awful things happened in Nanking. “Received cable from Shanghai,” Ishii Taro, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Bureau of Asiatic Affairs, wrote in his diary on January 6: “Detailed reports on violence by our army in Nanking: Looting, rapes, scenes too horrible to look at. Alas, is this the Imperial army?”[24]

Iwane Matsui, the commander of the expeditionary forces sent to China in 1937, recognized the excesses of the soldiers under his command. On February 7, 1938, he made a strong statement about the behavior of his men. “It is absolutely necessary to put an immediate end to adverse reports about the discipline and conduct of Japanese troops toward Chinese people and Chinese property,” he said. He added that exemplary discipline was particularly necessary in view of the fact that the Japanese army was facing the prospect of prolonged hostilities before successfully achieving Japan’s mission in East Asia.[25] Sitting on death row in Tokyo’s Sugamo Prison, and

waiting to be hanged for the crimes in Nanking, Matsui, who was allowed to talk to a Buddhist cleric affiliated with a school known as Pure Land expressed disappointment at the behavior of the Japanese troops in Nanking.

“I can only say,” he told the cleric, “that I am very pleased with what is about to happen to me in the hope that it will cause some soul-searching among just as many of those military men present as possible. In any event, things have ended up as they have, and I can only say that I just want to die and be reborn in the Pure Land.”

Archibald Trojan Steele, an American journalist, reported seeing bodies of Chinese soldiers forming mountains nearly two meters high at Yijiang Gate to the north. “The streets are littered with civilian corpses, including women and children. Japanese soldiers forced the families to commit acts of incest. Sons are forced to rape their mothers, and fathers rape their daughters.”[26]

Pat Robinson, who worked for The New York Times as a correspondent during the war, said: “I hear machine gun fire and see Japanese soldiers executing nearly two hundred Chinese in ten minutes.” In a detailed article, The New York Times correspondent, Tillman Durdin, reported that 32,000 Chinese soldiers had died in Nanjing, including 20,000 who had been executed.[27]

According to James Espy, an American vice consul who arrived in Nanking on January 6, 1938, terrible things had happened there. Espy said:

Whether the compound house, shop or building belongs to a foreign mission or a foreign or Chinese national, all have been entered without discrimination and to a greater or less degree ransacked and looted. The American, British, German, and French Embassies are known to have been entered and articles taken therefrom. It has also been reported that the same thing has occurred to the Italian Embassy. The Russian Embassy on January 1st was mysteriously gutted by fire.[28]

The New York Times reported in January 1938 that "Japanese atrocities marked the fall of Nanking."[29]

By February 5, 1938, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, established in 1937 to manage the zone, had forwarded to the Japanese embassy a total of 450 cases of murder, rape and general disorder by Japanese soldiers that had been reported after the American, British, and German diplomats had returned to their embassies. Several members of the committee took the witness stand before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to testify about their experiences and observations during the Nanking Massacre. These included Robert Wilson, Miner Searle Bates, and John Magee. George A. Fitch, Lewis Smythe, and James McCallum filed affidavits with their diaries and letters.

More Crimes on Prisoners of War and Civilians

The war between Japanese and Chinese revolutionary forces lasted ninety-seven months. The Japanese lost one million one hundred thousand people, including those seriously injured and missing. The Chinese had many more casualties, with a total of 3,229,000 soldiers and at least nine million civilians killed. Of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers taken prisoner during the war, only 68 were released alive in 1945. The work published in 2002 by a joint committee of historians, —Mitsuyoshi Himeta, Zhifen Ju, Toru Kubo, and Mark Peattie— shows that more than ten million citizens were forcibly recruited by the Koa-in (Imperial Development Agency of Asia) (East) for work in the mines and factories of Manchukuo. These actions were part of a large scale of crimes committed by the Japanese troops during World War II.

In the final months of the war, the forces of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy bombed civilian populations in major cities such as Shanghai, Soochow, Nanking, Hsuchow, Chongqing, and Changsha in China, as well as Manila in the Philippines, Myitkyina in Burma, and Dimi in Timor. These cities had no defense. It can be assumed that the Japanese air raids were only intended to terrorize and massacre the civilian population, since there were no manufacturing facilities in these settlements.

While Asian peoples were the main victims of these crimes against humanity, Western prisoners of war received similar or even worse treatment. According to the Bushido code, surrender is the ultimate disgrace. As a result, Western prisoners of war lost all right to proper treatment. More than 10,000 Americans died during the Bataan Death March in the Philippines as well as 100,000 men, including 60,000 Commonwealth soldiers, during the construction of Burma’s death line. The hell ships used by the Japanese to move prisoners in appalling conditions had no reports and were attacked by submarines or Allied aviation. Cases of anthropophagy were reported, the ultimate step in the dehumanization of

the adversary. It was discovered after the war that several hundred thousand prisoners or civilians had died. These prisoners were used as guinea pigs for research or other experiments.[30]

As the judgment of the Japanese dignitaries at the Tokyo trial states:

The merciless execution of prisoners, by shooting, beheading, drowning and other means, the death marches during which even sick prisoners were forced to travel long distances in conditions that even well-trained troops would not have endured, many of those who failed being executed or bayoneted by the guards, forced labor in unprotected tropical heat against the sun, the total lack of housing and medical supplies resulting in thousands of deaths from illness, beatings and torture of any kind to obtain information and confessions or for minor crimes, execution without trial prisoners captured for escape or attempted escape, execution without trial of captured airmen and even cannibalism, these are some of the atrocities the court has gathered.[31]

Wu Chang-teh, a policeman at the time in Nanking, testified in front of the judges at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in Tokyo. Wu Wang-teh described his surviving experiences on December 15, 1937, outside one of Nanking's western gates:

These persons in groups of over one hundred at a time were forced to go through the gate at the point of bayonets. As they went outside, they were shot with machine guns and their bodies fell along the slope and into the canal. Those who were not killed by the machine gun each containing more than 100 persons had been forced through the gate ahead of me and these persons were killed. When my group of something over one hundred was ordered to go through the gate, I ran as fast as I could and fell forward just before the machine guns opened fire, and was not hit by machine gun bullets and a Japanese soldier came and stabbed the bayonet in my back. I

lay still as if dead. The Japanese threw gasoline on some of the bodies and set them afire and left.[32]

And the judgment continued:

The comparison of the number of prisoners of war who died due to the lack of food and medical supplies in the European theatre and in the Pacific shows the extent of these atrocities. In Europe out of the 225,473 British and American soldiers captured by the Nazis, 9,438 died in captivity. In the Pacific theatre, of the 132,000 Americans and British taken prisoner by the Japanese, 25,756 died in captivity.[33]

The horror of “prison ships” was another form of torture, which in the Tokyo trials, the judges carefully had detailed in concluding their judgment:

On the prison ships, many prisoners of war were locked up during their transfer to the shipyards where they were forced to work as slaves. Due to the lack of space on these cargo ships, wooden cages of two meters by two were set up for fifteen people on temporary overlay bridges. Detainees were forced to sit cross-legged throughout the trip. To save space, no sanitary facilities existed. Seals had come down at the end of the rope and reassembled as well, letting some of their contents escape. Many inmates suffered from dysentery and their excrement fell on their comrades through the cracks in the partitions. In the absence of kitchens, the food was served without being cooked and the water distributed sparingly. No one could go out on deck. Under current rules, prisoners disobeying orders, those displaying signs of opposition, those who spoke without permission, those who moved without permission or attempted to climb ladders, were punished to death.[34]

According to the judgment reached by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in 1948, it was estimated that “the total number of civilians and prisoners of war murdered in Nanking during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000.”[35]

The war crimes committed by the Japanese army and the Japanese navy in the Pacific are appalling. The evidence shows that in Manchuria, Nanking, and Chiangjiao, the cruelties and mass executions were committed not only on soldiers engaged in combat, but also on civilians, who are foreign to the conflict. In the Chinese and Korean territories, and in other occupied countries, these crimes are part of a plan designed to get rid of all forces opposing the occupation through imprisonment and extermination. Here is a list of massacres in the occupied territories, with the name of the Japanese units responsible for the atrocities:

• Alexandra Hospital Massacre–Unit 100

• Banka Island Massacre–Unit 516

• Changjiao Massacre–Unit 543

• Kalagong Massacre–Unit 731

• Laha Massacre–Unit 1644

• Manila Massacre–Unit 1855

• Nanking Massacre–Unit 8604

• Palawan Massacre–Unit 9420

• Pantingan River Massacre

• Sulong Massacre Parit

• Sook Ching Massacre

- Tol Plantation Massacre
- Wake Island Massacre
- Bataan Death March

Bataan Death March

On the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines, American and Filipino troops led by General MacArthur fought a fierce battle against Japanese forces led by Gen. Masaharu Homma. After three months of major clashes with the Japanese, the U.S. Army surrendered the first week of April 1942. Homma had to manage 76,000 prisoners including 12,000 Americans, most of them sick and wounded. He referred the case to the Army High Staff in Tokyo. The chief of staff, Hajime Sugiyama, via Col. Masanobu Tsuji, ordered Homma to find a solution. Homma was, therefore, decided to apply "natural selection" among the prisoners. He transferred them on foot, without food or drink to a camp located 98 kilometers away.[36] The transfer began soon after Gen. Edward ("Ned") King, U.S. commander of all ground troops on Bataan, surrendered on April 9, 1942.

The siege of Bataan was the first major land battle for the Americans in the Pacific War, and one of the most-damaging military defeats in American history. The surrender of some 76,000 Filipino and American troops was the largest army under American command to cease resistance to an enemy. Mainly starting in Mariveles, on the southern tip of the Bataan Peninsula, the prisoners were force-marched north to San Fernando until Capas. From there they walked an additional 7 miles (11 km) to Camp O'Donnell, a former Philippine army training center used by the Japanese to intern Filipino and American prisoners. Precisely, the march went from Cabcaben on the Bataan Peninsula to the O'Donnell internment camp. The total distance marched from Mariveles to San Fernando, and from the Capas Train Station to Camp O'Donnell, was variously between 75 to 80 miles across the Bataan Peninsula. The prisoners marched for days from its tip to Capas, which lay almost due north. An estimated 500 Americans and ten times that number of Filipinos were estimated to have died in route during the ten-day journey to Camp O'Donnell in Capas, Tarlac Province.[37]

Bataan Death March was one of the most heinous war crimes committed by the Japanese during World War II. For prisoners, this ordeal consisted of a

near-permanent march, day and night, without food, and with very little water, physical violence, murder, and other acts of savagery or sadism perpetrated by Japanese soldiers, throughout the journey. “Denied fresh water and food, the marchers had to drink whatever foul water they could find. Dysentery quickly became rampant. Those who could not keep up were beaten and if they fell behind were shot or bayoneted. Japanese officers on horseback beheaded some of the prisoners with samurai swords.”[38] Any prisoner who stopped or complained was slaughtered, or throat slit. According to the testimonies of the survivors, “The Japanese did not give the prisoners food or water for three days. As the soldiers became weaker and weaker, many of them started to fall behind the group. Those who fell behind were beaten and killed by the Japanese, who used their trucks on the prisoners’ road and drove systematically on anyone who had fallen to the ground.”[39] The official U.S. military reports put the death toll at about 23,500 including 22,000 Filipinos. Some post-war Allied reports indicated that only 54,000 of 70,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war reached their destination.[40]

Sentenced to death, on January 11, 1946, as the main perpetrator of the massacre, Homma was executed by firing squad on April 3, 1946, in Los Baños prison with his colleague Tomoyuki Yamashita.[41] On May 9, 2009, the Japanese government, through its ambassador in the United States, apologized to former American prisoners of war who suffered in the Bataan Death March.

Kamikaze

By late 1944, most of the Japanese commanders recognized that the war was almost over, and that it was only a matter of time until the United States would decide to invade the main islands of Japan. Successive defeats at Midway, the Solomons, and Guadalcanal had not only significantly reduced the offensive capability of the Japanese navy but had also left it with just a few of the experienced combat pilots. The Battles of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, and the Gulf of Leyte, in October of the same year, were catastrophic for the empire of Japan. Two-thirds of the air force involved was lost. In addition to the material losses, hundreds of excellent pilots trained since the beginning of the war against China, in 1937, had died, gone missing, or were taken prisoner by the enemy. The Japanese general staff had one choice: the use of suicide attacks with suicide bombers.

Frustrated by the destruction of the Japanese fleet and the series of defeats during the last six months, Adm. Kakijirō Ōnishi started the Kamikaze Corps in 1944 at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. “One man, one bomb, one plane, one carrier” was the slogan. Confronting defeat, in 1945, the kamikaze concept had gone further. Ōnishi had been involved with naval aviation for many years before becoming the head of the Naval Aviation Development Division in the Munitions Ministry, early in WW-II. He was among the architects of the attack on Pearl Harbor. By May 1945, when Japan’s air power was so weak that conventional attacks could not stop the American raids, Vice-Admiral Toshihira Inoguchi remembered Ōnishi’s speech to his garrison: “In my opinion, there is only one way of assuring that our meager strength will be effective to a maximum degree. That is to organize suicide attack units composed of Zero fighters armed with 250-kilogram bombs, with each plane to crash-dive into an enemy carrier…What you think.”

“I watched the Admiral’s heavily lined face as he spoke again,” said Inoguchi, and Ōnishi continued:

Japan is in grave danger. The salvation of our country is now beyond the power of the ministers of the state, the General Staff, and lowly commanders like me. It can come only from spirited young men such as you. Thus, on behalf of your hundred million countrymen, I ask of you this sacrifice and pray for your success. You are already gods, without earthly desires. But one thing you want to know is that your own crash-dive is not in vain. Regrettably, we will not be able to tell you the results. But I shall watch your efforts to the end and report your deeds to the Throne. You may all rest assured on this point.[42]

During the three last months of the war, the kamikaze tactic was extended to small boats and submarines, and women were being trained to thrust grenades and satchel charges under tanks.[43] As the Allies attacked the Philippines, in what many Japanese experts in war feared would be the last battle of the Pacific War outside of the nation's mainland, senior Japanese naval air commanders decided to use the desperate tactic of loading planes with bombs and crash-dividing them into flight decks of American carriers. The kamikaze attackers, known as tokubetsu kougekitai (special attack units) were initially referred only to the naval planes involved in the Leyte Gulf attacks. At the beginning of the war, they were limited to the Japanese naval air force, but the Japanese army also adopted equivalent units in the last few months of the war.

Japanese martyr soldiers known as "suicide bombers" were drugged to stand up during their attacks on American warships stationed in the Pacific.[44] To help them in their suicide mission, and to maintain their energy, doctors issued Pervitin (methamphetamine) tablets. The Japanese chemist, Nagai Nagayoshi, first synthesized this drug in Japan in 1893. Another Japanese scientist, Akira Ogata, put it in crystalline form in 1919. During World War II, millions of doses of methamphetamine were distributed to give energy, confidence, to Japanese soldiers. The drug played a major part in the effectiveness of the suicide bombers' attacks on the American fleet in the Pacific.

The kamikaze's method of attack was simple. Volunteers were used for this sole mission and placed at the controls of devices ready for reform, usually old "Zeros" packed with explosives. The tanks were only filled for a one-way ticket, as the return was not an option, which, at the same time, doubled the range of the aircraft. Young pilots or recruits, often presented as "volunteers," accepted or were forced to fly these planes destined to crash on U.S. Navy ships, with the promise of being considered martyrs for the homeland. Before they left, the suicide bombers were invited to a small ceremony where they were offered a glass of farewell sake, then flew away to try to hit their target, usually the elevator of an aircraft carrier.[45]

The Japanese, with some elements of German technology, developed a device specially designed for suicide missions: the Yokosuka MXY-8. The official name of this flying craft was "Jinrai" (God's Thunder), but the pilots named it "Ohka." On October 25, 1944, Vice-Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi, during the Battle of the Philippines, created the first corps of "special attack forces," known as suicide bombers (divine wind) to slow down Allied victory in the Pacific. The use of suicide bombers really began with the Battle of Leyte, in November 1944, and reached its climax at the Battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, in April 1945. These two islands are part of the Japanese archipelago, and the Americans intended to use them as bases for their B-29s, which could then easily bomb the entire Japan. In Okinawa alone, there were hundreds of suicide attacks on U.S. Navy ships.[46]

The Japanese developed other suicide weapons: the kaiten, human torpedoes launched from a submarine. About 120 kaiten were prepared. They sank two tankers. Also used were "Shinyo" suicide stars, and even suicide submarines. In November 1944, the Marine Chrysanthemum Unit, in reference to the flower symbol of the Imperial House, was the first unit of suicide submarines. In January 1945, suicide bomber attacks became a national policy. The Japanese people must behave like "martyrs" and sacrifice themselves for the country, said the emperor.

On July 29, 1945, at midnight, less than two months before the signing of the surrender treaty, the American warship USS Indianapolis, after a delivery of equipment, was attacked by the Japanese submarine I-58. Of the

1,196 sailors who made up the crew, only 318 were saved; the others were eaten by sharks. The invasion of Iwo Jima, authorized on October 3, 1944, by Major-General Schmidt, commander of the 5th Division of the U.S. Navy's Amphibious V Corps, killed 600 U.S. soldiers on the first day of operations, and 2,000 soldiers were wounded. After the first five days, 1,600 American soldiers lost their lives and 4,500 were wounded. An attempted counterattack by 1,000 Japanese troops led by Capt. Samaji Inouye on the afternoon of March 8, 1945, took the lives of 90 American soldiers while the number of wounded rose to 347. A total of 6,000 American soldiers died in the Battle of Iwo Jima, and 25,000 Americans were wounded. The Japanese army lost 784 men of 1,000 soldiers engaged in the last battle by Samaji to defend Iwo Jima.[47]

The attack on the USS Nashville by a Japanese suicide bomber on the eve of the American troops' attack on Luzon claimed the lives of 131 American soldiers, including Col. Bruce Hill, Adm. Arthur Dewey Struble, and Captain Abdill. One hundred and ninety-two U.S. Navy soldiers were wounded during the operation, including Brig. Gen. William Dunckel's Chief of Staff.[48] During the battle for the Leste Island on the American side the number of wounded was hundreds of thousands. Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika, commander of the 35th Army in the Philippines, announced as he left the island on March 17, 1945, that about 50,000 American soldiers from his garrison had perished.

There was not enough information to establish the extent of the atrocities committed by the Japanese troops during the Pacific War. The evidence was almost inaccessible, knowing that much of Japan's military archives had been destroyed between the surrender and the arrival of the American occupying forces in Japan. For this reason, in the early years following the Allied victory over Japan, establishing the truth of the facts, —war crimes — was an extremely difficult task, because the war in the Pacific during the twentieth century had attracted much less attention from historians than the Second World War on the European Theater. Over the past thirty years, many works by political scientists, journalists and historians, have illuminated the violence of the wars by the Japanese army and navy in their time, especially during the Second World War. Beyond that, we discover that Nanking was not the only place where the atrocities were committed by

Japanese troops in Asia. Everywhere between Manchuria, Java, Xinxiang, Zhenjiang, and Shenyang, Japanese soldiers committed such abominable crimes that sometimes overshadow the atrocities committed by the Nazis in concentration camps in Europe. Murder, rape, looting, fire, forced labor, forced prostitution, daily humiliation and starvation, were the various forms of abuse of power that the Japanese had used to destroy the sense of rebellion of citizens treated as subhuman in the occupied territories. Tens of thousands of political detainees, prisoners of war, as well as Chinese, Russian, and Korean civilians, were abducted and interned in research camps and subjected to medical, bacteriological, and chemical experiments like guinea pigs.[49]

The most damning war crimes committed by the Japanese during the war were the acts of vivisection and cannibalism.[50] In Khandok, according to a witness, a prisoner of war was tied to a tree. After tearing his fingernails off his hands, a Japanese doctor who was present opened his chest to remove his heart in order to examine the organ. In Guadalcanal, two prisoners who had tried to escape into the jungle were dissected alive and their livers exposed. In 2006, a Japanese military doctor, Akira Makino, eighty-four years old, admitted to carrying out amputations and vivisections on Filipino prisoners, including children, while stationed in Mindanao, between December 1944 and February 1945. “I would have been executed if I had refused to obey orders. That was the rule at the time,” confessed the veteran of Imperial Navy Unit 33. “We must not repeat these horrors. I have a responsibility to reveal the truth about the war.”[51]

According to Makino, vivisections could last between ten minutes and three hours. The limbs were first cut off, then, the organs were removed one by one.[52] Operations were conducted every three days and ceased when American soldiers landed at the end of the war. In 2007, Ken Yuasa, a Japanese surgeon who performed vivisections at a military hospital in Shanxi from 1942 to 1945, claimed that at least one thousand Japanese people, including doctors, participated in vivisections in China.[53] On March 9, 1945, the Japanese Ambassador to Indochina called for the immediate surrender of French forces in the territory. To show the seriousness of his order, a few days later, civilians and officers were tortured, executed, and/or beheaded; between 1.5 to 2 million people died in the Indochinese

population. Numerous reports were written to denounce the atrocities of Unit 731. Takahito, Prince Mikasa, Hirohito's younger brother, personally visited Unit 731, as did his first cousin, Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda. Yasuhito, Prince Chichibu, attended a secret conference in 1939 organized by Gen. Shirō Ishii, the head of Unit 731.[54]

Unit 731

Established in 1935 by imperial mandate, Unit 731 was a military bacteriological research unit of the Japanese army. The main goal of Unit 731 was to create biological and chemical weapons for implementation on the battlefield. Here, methods in delivering bubonic plague, cholera, and smallpox were developed. Under the direction of Gen. Shirō Ishii, this special army unit conducted bacteriological warfare experiments and vivisections of death-row inmates and prisoners of war near Harbin, Manchuria.[55] These experiments were carried out on human guinea pigs without anesthesia for research on various diseases such as the plague, typhus, and cholera, with a view to using them as bacteriological weapons during World War II. Vivisection on humans was routinely performed without anesthetic. Researchers believed that use of anesthesia would create interference with the disease process that they were studying.[56]

Prisoners utilized for surgery drills would be shot in the thigh; the attending doctors would then undertake drills to see how long it would take to extract the bullet.[57] Yuasa Ken, an army doctor, tried to explain the killing of people for research: “When a man suffered… you couldn’t bring him to a hospital … right there at the front line. But there weren’t enough surgeons available. Even ophthalmologists or pediatricians had to be able to do it, and they didn’t know so they practiced. Everyone knew what was going on, though they all pretended they didn’t.”[58]

One of the more common practices was ballistic tests to study the capacity of Japanese arms. In these exercises, prisoners would have live grenades thrown at them, be showered with flamethrowers, or even have bombs strapped to their person. As the charred remains of the victims fell to the ground, Japanese personnel studiously stood nearby, methodically taking notes of the results.[59] It was common practice for prisoners of Unit 731 to be subjected to disease so that attending scientists could monitor the progress of the illness. In even more heinous experiments, completely healthy patients would have organs removed to see how long they could

survive without them. Many prisoners were also inflicted to forced amputation of limbs in order to gather data on the amount of blood that would be lost. There were also several deprivation experiments in which prisoners would be subjected to extreme cold to gauge how long their body could tolerate it before freezing to death.[60]

Bacteriological weapons produced by Unit 731 were used against the Soviets in 1939 and against the Chinese from 1940 to 1945. Operated on orders from the Chief of the Army General Staff, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted through Gen. Hajime Sugiyama or Yoshijirō Umezu, the unit's activities were known at the highest level of the government. Takahito Mikasa, Hirohito's younger brother, refers to it in his personal diary. Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda, cousin of the emperor, visited the facilities as an officer of the Guangdong Army.[61]

Located in Beiyinhe in 1931, Wuchang Municipality, and from 1936 in Pingfang, two towns near the city of Harbin in Manchuria, Unit 731 carried out its experiments on prisoners, mostly Koreans, Chinese, and Russians, including women and children provided by the Kempeitai. As the empire's expansion campaign expanded, more units were added to conquered cities such as Nanking (Unit 1664), Beijing (Unit 1855), Qiqihar (Unit 516), Xinjing, Canton (Unit 8604), and Singapore (Unit 9420).

Shirō Ishii and his team began their experiments on humans in 1939.[62] The first guinea pigs were prisoners sentenced to death and held in Harbin prison or resistance fighters captured by the Kempeitai. The victims were also Chinese soldiers, Communist Russians held in the Hogoin camp, intellectuals, workers guilty of agitation, or simply individuals suspected of disloyalty.[63] With the relocation of the unit to Pingfang, beginning in 1938, the experiments extended to the women and children held at the Mukden camp. It was a question of testing the limits of the human body on prisoners. For example, atrocities committed by the infamous Japanese Army Unit 731 have been revealed in recently discovered historical documents.

These documents, written by Japanese soldiers enlisted in Unit 731, provided an accurate description of how the experiments were performed

on human guinea pigs: “Disease strains are implanted in a patient to see what reactions his body will adopt. The plague is injected into his body, and if by some miracle he survives, we will inject leprosy, then cholera, until death comes to deliver him.”

“The testimony indicated that the atrocious acts against humanity committed by the Japanese invaders constitute an organized crime and moreover, a state crime,” said Jin Shicheng, a researcher at the Museum of Unit 731. Yoshio Shinozuka, a former member of Unit 731, was one of the very few repentants who testified about the horrors committed by the Japanese army in China.[64] In 1995, during an interview with the correspondent of Libération, Frédérique Amaoua, Yoshio said:

At the age of 16, in April 1939, I joined the Imperial Japanese Army and enrolled in the Young Soldiers Unit. I was assigned to the Army Medical School, located in Toyama, Shinjuku district of Tokyo. I didn’t know at first what this unit was all about. When we arrived, we were told that this place was a special military department and that even Japanese planes were not allowed to fly over it. We were also warned against any attempt to escape. It was assured execution.

I learned a little later what was going on inside the buildings of Unit 731. In May 1939, as the conflict raged between the Soviet and Japanese armies, there was the Battle of Nomonhan, near the border between Mongolia, Manchuria, and Russia. At that time, my job was to put preparations in test tubes and then put them in a large box. I later found out that these solutions contained bacteria such as typhus, cholera or dysentery. In July 1941, I was admitted to the virus growing team. We had to test the reactions on the animals and practice vivisections. Then, in 1942, I was provided with the pass to enter the famous buildings 7 and 8, where the prisoners were being held. We subjected them to the same experiments as animals by exposing them to projectiles laden with bacteria. We analyzed reactions and tested all kinds of vaccines.[65]

Twenty-four documents written by key members of Unit 731, in which information on the experimental work was detailed, were collected in Japan. According to Yang Yan-jun, an associate researcher at the Centre for Studies on Unit 731 of the Academy of Social Sciences in Harbin, experiments on prisoners often went much further: Living people were mummified, they were injected with horse blood, and an arm was torn off so that an animal member could be grafted into it. Sometimes it was vivisection without anesthesia, prolonged exposure to X-rays or intense atmospheric pressure, or even boiling while alive or centrifugation of the patient.[66]

According to work published in 2002 by the International Symposium on the Crimes of Bacteriological Warfare, the number of people who died in China as a result of the experiments and use of bacteriological weapons by the Imperial Japanese Army amounts to many thousands.[67] According to historians, about 300,000 people used as guinea pigs perished from the research of Unit 731.

On March 26, 1945, Allied troops landed on Tokashiki-jima Island, marking the beginning of the invasion of Okinawa. Japanese civilians were ordered by the General Staff to kill themselves in order to avoid torture by American troops. Two days later, the death toll rose to 329. In the same month, 1,200 children were incorporated into the Japanese army defense battalions. These minors were all killed by the enemy or by suicide. Okinawa residents who communicated in local dialect and not in standard Japanese were also executed as spies. By the end of the conflict, an estimated one-third of the local population (between 150,000 and 160,000 people) had died.

On August 9, 1945, the Army General Staff in Tokyo ordered the destruction of the Pingfan bacteriological research center. More than four hundred prisoners died as a result of cyanide poisoning in their food or were shot, so that no survivors could testify. The bodies were burned to erase all traces. Cyanide was distributed to the remaining personnel (estimated at 1,200 people) with the order to commit suicide to avoid being captured by Soviet troops.[68]

On August 9, and 10, 1945, after the invasion of Manchuria and Korea by the Soviet army, the Japanese army of Kwantung, on the orders of its commander, Sadayoshi Yamada, destroyed the archives of Unit 731.[69] All detainees were killed and 600 local Chinese workers were executed with machine guns. Ishii gave direct orders to destroy all the buildings before the arrival of the Russians. A brigade of sappers blew up Pingfang's headquarters in order to erase the evidence of the experiments. Pingfang staff was evacuated to Korea, south of Seoul. Each had received a dose of poison, so that they could commit suicide in case of capture by the Soviets. A plague epidemic after Japanese's departure resulted in the death of about 20,000 Chinese people. In total, about 500,000 people were killed as a result of anthrax, cholera, or plague germs that Unit 731 members had spread over nearby villages.

Reflecting on this, I think the United States made a huge mistake when it waived prosecution of the Japanese scientists who developed and applied biological weapons not only in Wuhan but also earlier at what became known as "Unit 731" in Manchuria during the Second Sino-Japanese War and again during World War II. It seems certain to me that the United States knew that Japanese Surgeon General Shirō Ishii, a microbiologist who was director of Unit 731 from 1937 to 1945, was one of the Imperial army's most notorious war criminals. I believe the officials in Washington knew that Ishii and Unit 731 were engaged for many years in forced human experimentation on civilians and prisoners of war and that they caused the deaths of several thousand captives. Nevertheless, in 1945, the Americans pressed the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to not prosecute Ishii and his team in exchange for information and research that was then used by the United States to develop its own biological weapons.

Thus, the decision not to prosecute, not only allowed Ishii and others of Unit 731 to escape justice, but the resolution encouraged advanced and spread biological weapons research, something that is still active in the world today. Approximately 350,000 chemical munitions were left on Chinese soil by Japan during the Second World War. Seventeen countries actually have had or are currently suspected of having biological weapons programs: Canada, China, Cuba, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, Syria, the United Kingdom, and

the United States. Most recently, and in view of the suspected geographical origin of today's COVID-19 pandemic, authoritative weapons and health monitoring organizations and agencies such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWT) states-parties and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have alerted the international community on the danger of development of chemical and biological weapons. China as an example is widely reported to have active programs related to the development of chemical and biological weapons. In March 1997, Israeli authorities arrested an Israeli businessman, Nahum Manbar, for allegedly selling Chinese chemical weapon components to Iran.[70]

Bataan Death March: Mainly starting in Marivels, on the southern tip of the Bataan Peninsula, the prisoners were forced-marched north to San Fernando until Capas. From there they walked an additional 7 miles (11 kms) to Camp O'Donnell, a former Philippine army training center used by the Japanese to intern Filipino and American prisoners. The total distance was variously 75 to 80 miles. An estimated 500 Americans and thousands of Filipinos prisoners were estimated to have died.

Image retrieved from the National Archives and Records Administration,

cataloged under the National Archives Identifier (NAID) 535564.

Image first published in: A Faithful Record of Atrocity of Japanese Troops, 1938

最早发表在：《日寇暴行实录》. 军事委员会政治部编. 汉口:

1938. 35

Department of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara

The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing

Massacre by Japanese Invaders

Image retrieved from from the collections of the

Imperial War Museums (Photograph K 9923)

Japanese execute Australian commando Leonard Siffleet.

Image retrieved from the Collection Database of the Australian

War Memorial under the ID Number: 101099

As the war turned in favor of the Allies, Japanese troops committed more and more war crimes without making a difference between civilians and soldiers engaged in combat. The finding of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East established that, from the beginning of the war to Japan’s surrender, torture, murder, rape, and other most inhumane and barbaric atrocities, were freely practiced by the Japanese on prisoners of war, and civilians in the occupied territories.

Washington’s Cover-Up

Due to the 1946 pact between MacArthur and Hirohito, the officers of Unit 731 did not appear in court in Tokyo.[71] In exchange, the United States received from Ishii all the results of the tests conducted at Unit 731 for total impunity.[72] However, members of this unit were convicted by the Soviets at a trial in Khabarovsk in 1949.[73] This was not the case for those who had committed war crimes for the use of women as sex slaves.

Comfort Women

The use of women as sex slaves is another page in the history of Japan's war against neighboring countries in the Pacific. A total of two hundred thousand Asians, mostly Korean and Chinese, were used in Japanese military brothels between 1930 and 1945 as what they called "comfort women."[74] These sex slaves, often minors, were victims of a vast network of kidnappings organized across Asia by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Their aim was to ensure the permanent availability of enough prostitutes in the service of Japanese soldiers.[75]

As soon as the war ended, the world was shocked to discover that the Japanese leadership had also sanctioned the use of those women in conquered territories as prostitutes for the gratification of Japanese troops. Women from Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, Burma, and Holland had been taken captive and repeatedly raped by the Japanese soldiers.[76]

"Sometimes twelve soldiers would force me to have sex with them, and then they would allow me to rest for a while, then about twelve soldiers would have sex with me again," a Filipino woman said. "You cannot say no as they will definitely kill you. During the morning, you have a guard. You are free to roam around the garrison, but you cannot get out," confessed the same woman.

Under the orders of Hajime Sugiyama, minister of the army, and Prince Kan'in Kotohito, chief of staff and great-uncle of Hirohito, the army set up houses in occupied areas known as "relaxing centers" or "comfort houses," similar to those established in 1932 during the Shanghai campaign by Gen. Yasuji Okamura. Lt. Gen. Yasuji Okamura called for the creation in Shanghai of the first "comfort station" for naval troops, an initiative immediately taken over by the Imperial Japanese Army.[77] These brothels, run either by the army or navy, or by local governments or private

individuals, were officially named, “comfort stations.” About ten or fifteen women were engaged in forced prostitution at each comfort station.

The Kempeitai, ensured recruitment by generally forcing village chiefs in the occupied territories to group all young women together, and prosecuted those who escaped. The women recruited were generally single and often minors. They came from Japan, Philippines, Indochina, Burma, Netherlands Indies, Singapore, Korea, and China. With conditions of life akin to slavery, women were often beaten, tortured, or even mutilated by soldiers. Some of them were even executed because the soldier was not satisfied. Others who tried to escape were murdered.

The work of Yoshiaki Yoshimi, a professor at the University of Cho, established that from 1938 to 1945, the Japanese army had constituted about 2,000 comfort stations, including 1,000 women’s lament centers in Guangdong, for an army of 100,000 men.[78] A directive of March 4, 1938, issued by the warrant officer of the chiefs of staff of the army of north China and the Expeditionary Force of China on the recruitment of women for military comfort houses, states that “the armies on the ground will control women.” The executives received a share of the price of the passes. Quite often the women received nothing, although remuneration was provided for by the regulations of the Imperial Japanese Army. These regulations also prohibited weapons and alcohol. Japanese leaders set operating rules, such as opening hours from 9:00 a.m. to midnight, daily, except for two days off a month for women during menstruation.

In his book, The Emperor’s Army: Violence and Crimes of Japan at War 1937–1945, French Historian, Jean-Louis Margolin, described the activities in a comfort house: “It was the lines of soldiers waiting their turn, pants already down, the mattresses filthy slaughter in the mobile stations of the front, lack of privacy, military condoms of the brand “Attack” repeated venereal diseases [some soldiers refused the condom, despite the regulations], sometimes abortions, the beatings and threats of some soldiers and, more systematically, brothel bosses...”[79]

Kim Bok-dong was among the young women forced to work as sex slaves. She was collecting tickets donated by the soldiers. She described the situation in which she found herself as a forced prostitute: “We were

promised that they would improve our conditions once Japan won the war, but we received no wages. We were just sometimes provided with clothes, cosmetics and food. On weekdays, we served an average of 15 Japanese soldiers a day. On Saturday, they began to line up from noon. And it lasted until 8:00 p.m. On Sundays, it was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., again, a long line. I didn't get a chance to count them. My vagina was so painful and swollen that they had to put cream on the condom."[80]

Jean-Louis Margolin asked the question: Would comfort women be "forced workers among many others," communes, prostitutes, or even venal women as the Japanese Nationalists protest? According to the historian, "Nanjing massacres should be related to Japanese "war culture."[81] Historian Pierre-François Souyri spoke of a state slavery:

The facts were certainly known at the time of the Tokyo trial, but the case was largely ignored, as this sexual violence against women was not recognized as war crimes. Women of "comfort" were considered Japanese subjects. The Tokyo court and other courts established to try Japanese war criminals ignored their enslavement by Japanese soldiers.[82]

The Tokyo trials considered sexual violence to be ordinary war crimes in the same way as murders and kidnappings. It was not until the mobilization of Korean survivors under the leadership of Kim Hak-soon and those of other Asian countries during the 1990s that an International Opinion Tribunal opened in Tokyo from December 8 to December 12, 2000, a VAWW-NET (Violence against Women in War Network) initiative to try those responsible and consider reparations.[83]

The 1997 conference recognized that the absence of repression of sexual violence in times of war was one of the main causes of its repetition, and that it was therefore essential to put an end to the vicious cycle generated by the denial of these crimes. On February 7, 1994, Kang Duk-kyung and other Korean victims filed a criminal complaint in the Tokyo District Court. The prosecutor, however, refused to represent her. This motivated her to create

VAWW-NET in 1998, which, thanks to the determination of Kang Duk-kyung, proposed the establishment of an International Opinion Tribunal.[84]

The international community, aware of the verdict of this International Opinion Tribunal, particularly recognized that the problem of comfort women was a serious violation of human rights and became aware of the importance of victims to have their dignity restored.[85]

In 1993, the final report presented by Theo Van Boven, special rapporteur of the Subcommittee on Combating Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, provided an essential starting point for citizens' movements in Asia that were searching for solutions to the "comfort women" issue. This report specifies that: each state has an obligation to reparation for the victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The aim of reparation and compensation for victims is to alleviate their suffering, to do them justice by eliminating and correcting as much as possible the consequences of these violations, and to prevent and eradicate these violations. Reparations must meet the needs and wishes of victims and must include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and assurance that these violations will not recur. Reparations for certain gross human rights violations are subject to international laws that propose sanctions. The report then provides guidance on reparations for victims, specifying the content of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and victim satisfaction, in proportion to the severity of the damage suffered.[86]

The World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993, recognized that violations of women's human rights in situations of armed conflict violated the founding principles of human rights and humanitarian law. In 1995, the action plan adopted at the Beijing World Conference on Women specified that violence against women in armed conflict constitutes war crimes, and urged the countries concerned to carry out full investigations in order to compensate victims and apologize properly, and ensure that criminals are prosecuted.[87]

On January 1, 1992, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, said in a press conference:

“Concerning the comfort women, I apologize from the bottom of my heart and feel remorse for those people who had suffered indescribable hardships.”[88]

Two weeks later, on January 17, 1992, at a policy speech on a visit to South Korea, he said:

What we should not forget about the relationship between our nation and your nation is the fact that there was a certain period in the thousands of years of our country when we were the victimizers and you were the victims. I would like to once again express a heartfelt remorse and apology for the unbearable suffering and sorrow that you experienced during this period because of our nation’s actions. Recently the issue of the so-called wartime comfort women’ is being brought up. I think that incidents like this are seriously heartbreaking, and I am truly sorry.[89]

On July 6, 1992, Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato, in a statement on the issue of the “wartime comfort women” from the Korean Peninsula, said:

The Government again would like to express its sincere apology and remorse to all those who have suffered indescribable hardship as so-called “‘wartime comfort women,’” irrespective of their nationality or place of birth. With profound remorse and determination that such a mistake must never be repeated, Japan will maintain its stance as a pacifist nation and will endeavor to build up new future-oriented relations with the Republic of Korea and with other countries and regions in Asia. As I listen to many people, I feel truly grieved for this issue. By listening to the opinions of people from various directions, I would like to consider sincerely in what way we can express our feelings to those who suffered such hardship.[90]

Most significantly, it was the deliberate targeting of the civilian population in China, particularly in Nanking, for murder, rape and terror, which made the Japanese occupation so shocking. A former soldier who took part in the atrocities said, “We took turns raping them. It would be all right if we only raped them. I shouldn’t say all right. But we always stabbed and killed them because dead bodies don’t talk.”[91] The rape crime was a decision to force up to 200,000 women into state-sponsored prostitution, herding them into sordid military brothels where they were treated like disposable chattels and abused relentlessly. [92]

On August 4, 1993, the statement made by Yōhei Kōno, chief cabinet secretary of the Japanese prime minister’s office, on the result of the study on the issue of comfort women, caused a bombshell in Japan and the rest of the world. Kōno said:

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. Although the Japanese government had repeatedly denied responsibility for the Imperial Army, it is time for Japan to accept that the army had been involved in recruiting these women against their will and in the need of the center’s comfort.” We therefore made our sincere apologies and regrets.[93]

On August 31, 1994, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, on the “Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative,” said:

Japan’s actions in a certain period of the past not only claimed numerous victims here in Japan but also left the peoples of neighboring Asia and elsewhere with scars that are painful even today. I am thus taking this

opportunity to state my belief, based on my profound remorse for these acts of aggression, colonial rule, and the caused such unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people, that Japan's future path should be one of making every effort to build world peace in line with my no-war commitment. It is imperative for us Japanese to look squarely at our history with the peoples of neighboring Asia and elsewhere. Only with a solid basis of mutual understanding and confidence that can be built through overcoming the pain on both sides, can we and the peoples of neighboring countries together clear up the future of Asia-Pacific…On the issue of wartime comfort women, which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies. With regard to this issue as well, I believe that one way of demonstrating such feelings of apologies and remorse is to work to further promote mutual understanding with the countries and areas concerned as well as to face squarely to the past and ensure that it is rightly conveyed to future generations. This initiative, in this sense, has been drawn up consistent with such belief.[94]

On July 15, 1998, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in a letter to the Netherlands Prime Minister Willem Kok, said:

The Government of Japan, painfully aware of its moral responsibility concerning the issue of so-called "wartime comfort women," has been sincerely addressing this issue in close cooperation with the Asian Women's Fund which implements the projects to express the national atonement on this issue. Recognizing that the issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women, I would like to convey to Your Excellency my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. By the statement of the Prime Minister in 1995, the Government of Japan renewed the feelings of deep remorse and the heartfelt apology for tremendous damage and suffering caused by Japan to the people of many

countries including the Netherlands during a certain period in the past. My cabinet has not modified this position at all, and I myself laid a wreath to the Indisch Monument with these feelings on my visit to the Netherlands in June last year.[95]

With Tomiichi's government initiative, in 1995, the Japanese government created the "National Fund for Asian Women" to compensate victims from private funds. Many Korean and Taiwanese victims refused the money, saying the private fund was clearing the Japanese state of its legal responsibility for the forced prostitution system. This government fund was dissolved in 2007; however, voices continued to call for justice for the victims.

In 1998, Ms. Gay J. McDougall, special rapporteur of a Working Group on Systematic Rape and Sexual Slavery under the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Protection of Minorities of the Commission on the Rights of Women, presented her "Latest Report on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Similar Practices in Times of Armed Conflict." The report stressed the need to break the vicious cycle of sexual violence committed in wartime. The appendix of the report noted the Japanese government's legal responsibility to "comfort women," and urged the authorities to punish those responsible and compensate the victims.[96]

As Ms. Gay said, to explain the "reasons for being" of an International Opinion Tribunal on legal responsibility for the system of forced prostitution set up by the Japanese army during the war in the Pacific, this "International Tribunal of Opinion on War Crimes against Women" has important significance for victims. First, it responds to the wishes of many survivors to judge by those responsible for the comfort center system. For survivors, meeting this demand is an essential step in restoring the dignity of victims, and, in order to achieve this goal, the comfort center system must be formally and legally recognized as a criminal activity. The complainants themselves told the court, "We are neither women of shame nor women without honor. We are victims of sexual violence. And we want

those who forced us into slavery to be judged." "We came to tell the truth. We came here to get justice!"[97]

In 2001, a letter from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was addressed to the former comfort women:

The Year of 2001

Dear Madam,

On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my feelings as well.

The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.

As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its history and accurately convey it to future generations.

Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.

Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of your lives.

Respectfully yours,

Junichiro Koizumi

Prime Minister of Japan

Apart from the use of women as sex slaves, drug trafficking was another large-scale crime committed by the Japanese authorities during the war.

Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking was another weapon used by the Japanese during the war. The Japanese organized an opium trade throughout Asia to weaken China and other occupied territories. There is tangible evidence that the high dignitaries of the Imperial Japanese court took control of the drug trade and used it as a means of "dumbing down" enemy forces. Indeed, the large-scale opium trade was one of the charges against the defendants at the Tokyo trial. Chinese Deputy Prosecutor, Hsiang Chi-Chun, in his indictment, explained the opium monopoly controlled by the Japanese army in Manchuria.[98] In China, the Japanese empire had established a monopoly on the sale of opium, encouraging the production and consumption of opium with the dual objectives of financing the occupation and weakening the resilience of the Chinese people. Hsiang showed how farmers in Mongolia had been encouraged to grow poppy fields for Japanese services, whose profits were intended to finance the Asia Development Board. According to the prosecutor, as early as December 1932, the Bank of Japan had launched a large loan secured by the profits of the opium monopoly. To encourage this trafficking, Mitsui and Mitsubishi imported large quantities of the drug from Korea and even Iran.[99]

In mainland China, according to the court's ruling, 200 processing plants were operating in Tianjin, under Japanese occupation. The Tokyo judgment reveals that in 1939, 90 percent of the heroin consumed in the world was of Japanese origin. This drug trafficking was in contravention of international commitments to combat drug abuse.[100]

These crimes committed by Hirohito and his army during the Second World War could not be counted because of the destruction of the archives by Japanese soldiers.[101] Unlike the crimes committed by the Nazis on the European continent to terrorize the population of the annexed countries, the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in Asian countries are not well documented. Only now, the archives began to reveal the extent of the crimes committed by Japanese troops in the occupied territories. In addition

to the massacres, the crimes included beheading captured airmen, the death marches, the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway, the torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees (vivisection, inhumane conditions of transport by sea, excessive and illegal punishments, and humiliations), the murder of survivors in ships sank by submarines, and attacking hospital ships during the war.[102]

Concentration Camps

One of the main crimes committed by the Japanese to terrorize their adversaries during the Pacific War was the use of the concentration camps where prisoners were interned until their death.[103] The camps were set up by the Japanese army with the agreement of the government. In these detention centers, all persons who had opposed the emperor or who carried out activities detrimental to the Japanese authorities were imprisoned without trial. With the support of a secret police force, the internment camps eventually became places of organized and methodical extermination, in which millions of internees were murdered.

In the occupied territories, the camps were used to destroy all opposition groups. It was where those arrested by the army military police known as Kempeitai were usually interned. In many cases, these arbitrarily detained persons were sent in convoy, without any care offered; many died on the way. Deportees who reached the camp were subjected to treatment of systematic cruelty. They were forced to do exhausting physical work; food, clothes, housing, everything was insufficient. They were, on an ongoing basis, the victims of a rigorous and mind-numbing regime, as well as the whims of their guards.

The primary purpose of these camps was the organization of forced labor. They were mainly used, through the methods used about prisoners, to suppress human lives. Famine rations, sadistic treatment, inadequate clothing, lack of medical care, illness, beatings, hangings, cold death, forced suicides, executions, etc., played a significant role in achieving this result. Prisoners were murdered for no reason; murders of prisoners out of hatred were frequent, poison injections and executions in the neck were daily; epidemics of typhoid and typhus, which spread freely, were used as a means of eliminating prisoners. Human life meant nothing in these camps. Murder had become an ordinary thing, so ordinary that all these unfortunates wished a quick death. Chinese or Korean prisoners were forced to work in inhumane and degrading conditions. Sick inmates or

those otherwise unable to work were either killed or sent to special infirmaries where they did not receive medical care.[104]

The Tokyo court judgment describes with careful precision the various forms of torture inflicted on prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and in the occupied territories. Page 1062 of the judgment reads:

It ranges from the torment of water to electric burns and shocks, from kneeling on sharp objects, to tearing nails. The whip was the most common cruelty inflicted on prisoners of war and internees in labor camps, Kempeitai centers and prison ships. Special instruments were used such as sticks the size of baseball bats. On some occasions, prisoners have been forced to beat their fellow inmates under the supervision of the guards. The prisoners suffered internal injuries, fractures and lacerations. On several occasions, the victims were beaten to the point of unconsciousness and revived and beaten again to death.[105]

These crimes against prisoners of war are already appalling, but further evidence shows that in the southeast of the Asian continent, notably in China, Korea, Vietnam, Indochina, and Burma cruelties and mass executions were committed against the innocent civilian population to suppress opposition and resistance to Japanese forces. In the occupied territories, these crimes were part of a plan designed to impose Japanese hegemony through expulsion or extermination.

An order prepared by the Imperial Japanese Army high staff stated: “Given the extent of the territories occupied by Japan in the Pacific and the Asian continent, the forces available to ensure security in these territories will only suffice if any resistance is punished, not by legal prosecutions of the guilty, but by sufficient measures of terror to take away from the population any desire to resist. Unit commanders must be able to maintain order by applying appropriate draconian measures.”

The Japanese army had widely used torture against its prisoners. A former Japanese officer who served in China, Uno Shintarō, said:

One of the essential means of obtaining information was the interrogation of prisoners. Torture was an inevitable necessity. Killing the victims and burying them is a natural consequence. You do it because you don't want it to be discovered. I believed and acted that way because I was convinced of what I was doing. We were doing our duty as we had been taught. We have done so for the sake of our country and because of our subsidiary obligations to our ancestors. On the battlefield, we never considered the Chinese to be human beings. When you are the winner, the losers seem miserable. We concluded that the Yamato (i.e. Japanese) ethnic group was superior.[106]

Between the invasion of China in 1937 and the end of World War II in 1945, the Japanese military murdered nearly 30 million people. Those crimes were committed in China, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Indochina including Western prisoners of war. It is regrettable, that the atrocities committed by the Japanese, particularly the serious human rights violations of Unit 731, were not detailed at the Tokyo trial. It had been the same for the crimes of cannibalism.

The Australian corporal Bill Hedges in New Guinea revealed the following: "The Japanese had cannibalized our wounded and dead soldiers. We found them with meat stripped off their legs and half-cooked meat in the Japanese dishes. It was heart disgusted and disappointed to see my good friend lying there, with the flesh stripped off his arms and legs; his uniform torn off him. We found dumps with rice and a lot of timed food. So, they weren't starving and having to eat flesh because they were hungry."

Historian Chalmers Ashby Johnson wrote:

Establishing which of the two Axis aggressors, Germany or Japan, was the most brutal of the peoples they martyred during World War II is meaningless. The Germans killed six million Jews and 20 million Russians (i.e., Soviet citizens); the Japanese massacred as many as 30 million Filipinos, Malays, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians, and Burmese of whom at least 23 million were ethnically Chinese. These two countries plundered the countries they conquered on a monumental scale, even if Japan stole more, and over a longer period, than the Nazis. The two conquerors enslaved millions of people and exploited them as forced labor and, in the case of the Japanese, as prostitutes (by force) for the front-line troops. If you were a Nazi prisoner of war in the hands of the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada (but not Russia), your chances of not surviving the war were 4 percent; in comparison, the death rate for Japanese-held prisoners of war was close to 30 percent.[107]

According to the historians, between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese troops "killed between 3 million and 10 million people, presumably 6 million Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos, and Indochinese among others, including Western prisoners of war." This "democide" was due to a political and military strategy in moral bankruptcy, and it was also military habits as well as military culture. Rudolph Rummel, a professor of political science at Indiana University, Yale University and University of Hawaii, who spent his career studying data on collective violence and war, argued that, in China alone, between 1937 and 1945, approximately 3.9 million Chinese, mostly civilians, were directly exterminated by the policies of the Shōwa regime, and 10.2 million of civilians died from indirect causes of the invasion.

Comparing the war crimes committed by the Nazis in Europe and those committed by the Japanese troops in Asia during World War II is an instructive lesson of history. In Nuremberg, the systematic policy of looting and destruction of the Germans in the annexed territories was recounted in detail. In Tokyo, in order to protect Hirohito, we hid the details. Yet there is a huge similarity in the practice adopted by the Germans in Europe and the

war technique adopted by the Japanese in Asia. The two countries used almost the same formula to plunder the resources of the countries occupied during World War II, and we have seen the exact repetition of the same scenes of abuse and violence in the territories occupied by the two countries, or even worse actions on the part of the Japanese.

Indeed, unlike the Nazis, the criminal actions committed by the Japanese troops were so numerous that it is impossible to list all of them. We decide to list some of them. Confessions of Japanese war criminals published online by the National Archives Office of China to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the end of World War II. The confessions revealed that the Japanese soldiers tortured civilians, for pleasure, during the war. The Chinese Archives Administration published 45 confessions of Japanese war criminals during World War II. Lt. Gen. Nosuke Sasaki arrived in China in September 1932. He confessed to committing horrific crimes and killing countless Chinese soldiers and civilians.

In his confessions, written in March 1945, Sasaki admitted to committing immense crimes in China. He said: his men had killed 3,500 Chinese soldiers during the Battle of Xiangfan, Hubei. He also ordered the massacre of 200 Chinese civilians, and authorized the rape of 50 Chinese women, and the burning of 200 houses. Sasaki also ordered the artillery to send gas-laden shells against the Chongqing Army.

Advanced teams were particularly cruel and killed a lot of people. Many Chinese have been reduced to forced labor. They were abused and beaten. It was not uncommon for the Japanese soldiers to rape Chinese women. As soon as the Japanese soldiers arrived, they plundered the grain like locusts. The arable land was seized; nothing was left to the villagers. It was the result of Japanese politics: “Burn everything, kill everything, and plunder everything.[108]

Commander Sasaki’s troops also published newspapers and established Japanese schools in Hubei Province. Japanese soldiers spread rumors that

Japan would triumph over China, and only those who supported the Nanking government would gain happiness. “It was a fisherman, a cultural invasion. The Propaganda team of the Infantry Regiment created propaganda of total deception. The Japanese military physically mistreated the Chinese people and killed thousands of people. I confess to ordering them to commit these crimes,” confessed Sasaki.

In his written confession, Sasaki admitted in October 1940 to the execution of about six hundred prisoners of war of the Chongqing Army in Zhuji City, Zhejiang Province. Forty were also seriously injured. Sasaki also confessed to enslaving Chinese women into sexual slavery while stationed in Dangyang, Hubei Province. Sasaki was arrested by the Soviet army on August 23, 1945 and tried by a special military court in China. Soichi Nakajima, who participated in the 1932 Japanese Invasion of China War in China’s Heilongjiang Province, said in writing that he had tortured a Russian woman, and, in his admission, he admitted to having found pleasure in doing so.

During the prisoner’s interrogation, he tied her to a bench and forced her to drink the dirty water from her bath until the woman’s stomach was swollen. He then pressed her belly so that she vomited. This is how he repeated his torture.

“I even went to her cell, watched her hold her swollen belly and found pleasure in it,” Sasaki wrote in his confessions.

Another time, when a captured Chinese man was beheaded, Soichi Nakajima took the victim’s brain and burned him, before eating it as a medicine for a venereal disease.

On November 29, 1937, Japanese army doctor Hosaka Akira wrote in his pocket journal:

As soon as we cleaned out the enemy in Chang Chou, at noon, an order was received to kill the residents and eighty of them, men and women of all ages were shot to death. I hope this will be the last time I’ll never witness such a

scene. The people were all gathered in one place. They were all praying, crying, and begging for help. I just couldn't bear watching such a pitiful spectacle. Soon the heavy machine guns opened fire and the sight of those people screaming and falling to the ground is one I could not face even if I had the heart of a monster.[109]

From the comfort women to Unit 731 and the Nanking Massacre, there were million people who were victims of the Japanese army. On the verge of losing the war the Japanese simply lost the map and became out of control. This behavior had long been adopted by the troops but worsened as the war continued. The mass execution of prisoners of war and civilians was an integral part of operations and planning. The 10th Army used gas during the Nanjing invasion and the whole thing was planned as an integral part of the operation. Many Chinese people were burned alive during the siege of the city. In Commander Nakajima's diary, between December 11 and 13, 1937, he states that he had to coordinate the procurement of several trucks to transport the prisoners to graves capable of accommodating seven or eight thousand corpses.

On December 15 of the same year, Japanese troops from the 65th Regiment identified several divisions fleeing the city of Nanking. They were pursued to Mufushan and taken to the T'sao-hsieh-hsia waterfront area, where they were massacred between December 17 and 18. A Japanese soldier reports that his unit killed 13,500 men, but his conversations with the other units led him to believe that about 70,000 men were massacred on the Yangtze.[110] On the Chinese front, between November and December 1943, in the battle for the capture of Changde, Hunan Province, the Japanese army extensively used the toxic gases supplied by Unit 516, after spreading the plague within a radius of thirty-six miles with bacteriological bombs. The Japanese dropped aerial bombs filled with sawdust and plague infected fleas over population centers. This was partly a test of the weapon's effectiveness.

The Chinese government estimated that this one attack may have killed nearly sixty thousand people in the weeks following the drop. Hirohito's first directive authorizing use of chemical weapons was dated July 28, 1937

and transmitted by Chief of the Army General Staff Prince Kan'in. It stated that in mopping up the Peking-Tientsin area, "[Y] ou may use tear gas at suitable times. [111] A second imperial order, dated September 11, 1937, authorized the deployment to Shanghai of certain special chemical warfare units.[112] In the Wuhan offensive, from August to late October 1938; Imperial Headquarters authorized the use of poison gas on 375 separate occasions. In the concurrent offensive against Canton in the far south of China, it authorized the 21st Division commander to use both tear gas and poison gas.[113]

More than 8,000 Chinese soldiers died in clashes between Japanese forces commanded by Isamu Yokoyama, and Chinese troops commanded by Yu Chengwan. According to Witold Urbanowicz, a Polish airman engaged in the fighting, a total of three hundred thousand civilians and soldiers lost their lives during the Battle of Changde. The invasion of Chongqing, in accordance with a directive from Hirohito in 1938, is further evidence of the atrocities of the Imperial Japanese Army against Chinese soldiers and the civilian population. A strategic bombing campaign was conducted by the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service against the industrial and commercial facilities in Chongqing, which became the provisional capital of the Republic of China after the capture of Nanking. The bombardment lasted from February 18, 1938, to August 23, 1943, during which time more than 3,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the city. According to the Chinese government estimates, troops from Japan's Empire carried out about 5,000 raids and dropped 11,500 bombs on the city, mostly using incendiary bombs.

On June 5, 1941, the Japanese carried out more than twenty air sorties, bombing the city for three hours. About four thousand civilians, who had taken refuge in a tunnel, died of asphyxiation. A year earlier, in May 1939, Japanese raids on Chongqing killed some 5,000 Chinese civilians. The plight of Chinese prisoners of war is a huge tragedy. Many of them died of starvation or physical abuse. Several thousand died from typhus or other contagious diseases. The camp commanders had banned prisoners from medical visits. On several occasions, prisoners of war who, exhausted by hunger and fatigue, could no longer walk were shot and their bodies abandoned on the spot. In many prisons, prisoners of war had no cells. They

slept outdoors in the rain or snow. They weren’t given blankets. Some of them were subjected to particularly cruel and inhumane medical experiments. The crimes got worse as Japan was confronted with the reality of defeat.

PART V

JAPAN’S LOST CAUSE

11

EMPIRE'S DEFEAT

S everal months of hard work allowed Captain Rochefort and his team to break the Japan Navy Code No-25 (JN-25). [1] This successful operation facilitated the Americans to decrypt about 5 percent of all Japanese messages. This was a "game-changer." The intelligence HO in Washington was now able to discover where the Japanese fleet would strike next after Pearl Harbor, which had facilitated the Allied forces during the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Americans knew Yamamoto's invasion target and his force dispositions were discovered. [2]

To strengthen their defensive positions in the South Pacific, the Japanese decided to invade and occupy Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands. The plan to accomplish both operations was called Operation MO. It involved several major units of Japan's combined fleet.[3] Through signals intelligence, the United States learned of the Japanese plan. Under the overall command of U.S. Adm. Frank J. Fletcher, the Americans sent two navy carrier task forces and a joint Australian-U.S. cruiser force to oppose the offensive. On May 3 and 4, 1942, aware of the presence of U.S. carriers in the area, the Japanese fleet carriers advanced toward the Coral Sea with the intention of locating and destroying the Allied naval forces. Although the battle was a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of American ships sunk or damaged (Lexington, Yorktown), it marked the first time since the start of the war that the two sides were engaged in airstrikes over two consecutive days. With the United States sinking the Japanese light carrier Shōhō and causing heavy damage to the Japanese fleet carrier Shōkaku; these two Japanese fleet carriers were unable to participate in the Battle of Midway the following month.[4]

Japan suffered its first major losses of the war during the Battle of the Coral Sea off New Guinea, on May 4–8, 1942. However, Japan's first major defeat in the Pacific came with the American naval victory in the Battle of

Midway Island, from June 4 to 7, 1942, which was the turning point for Japanese naval dominance in the Pacific War. Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, despite his large and powerful fleet, was crushed by an inferior United States force under the command of Adm. Chester Nimitz. “At Midway, the Japanese lost or left behind a naval air force that had been the terror of the Pacific–an elite force, an overwhelming force that would never again come back and spread destruction and fear as it had over the first six months of the war,” said Layton. “This was the great meaning of Midway…”[5]

The U.S. Navy had lost USS Lexington at the Coral Sea, and then USS Yorktown at Midway, but at the same time, Japan lost four fleet carriers. Japan’s fleet carrier force, which had taken fourteen years to build up, was reduced by two-thirds in a single morning at Midway. As historian Hedley Paul Willmott has noted: “The ability to concentrate mobile forces to dictate the direction and tempo of future operations was the all-important factor in the conduct of the Pacific War.”[6] Losing the Battle of Midway ended Japan’s strategic dominance of the conflict. The U.S. Naval War College concluded, “Midway put an end to Japanese offensive action…and … [restored] the balance of naval power in the Pacific.”[7]

The severe losses in carriers at Midway prevented the Japanese from reattempting to invade Port Moresby from the ocean. Two months later, the Allies took advantage of Japan’s resulting strategic vulnerability in the South Pacific to launch the Guadalcanal Campaign. This campaign along with the New Guinea Campaign eventually broke Japanese defenses in the South Pacific. It was a significant contributing factor to Japan’s ultimate surrender in World War II. On January 7, 1944, Hirohito sanctioned an offensive from Burma into Assam Province, India, to prevent an Allied drive to recover Burma and possibly bring to power a group of Indian nationalists against British rule. This attempt failed. On July 5, 1944, Hirohito accepted Tōjō’s recommendation. He ordered the end of the disastrous campaign in Burma. By then, approximately 72,000 Japanese troops were killed or wounded.

A few weeks earlier, on June 12, 1944, a few days after the Allies’ Normandy landings in France, U.S. air strikes began to hit the Marianas Islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. Operation Forager had begun.[8] Battle

commenced with a dogfight over Guam in the early afternoon of June 12. During the battle, American submarines torpedoed and sank two of the largest Japanese fleet carriers. To deal with the American navy's power, the Japanese launched their Guam-based aircraft. These were spotted on radar by U.S. ships. A group of thirty Grumman F6F Hellcats designed to replace the earlier F4F Wildcat and to counter the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero were dispatched from USS Belleau Wood to attack the Japanese aircrafts.[9] Eighty-one Zeros were destroyed on the ground and in the air at a cost of eleven Hellcats. After one hour that lasted the clash, some thirty-five Japanese fighters were shot down, and a tanker and four escort destroyers.

The battle of the Philippine Sea, from June 19—20, 1944, was catastrophic for the Japanese. In the first day of the battle, they lost more than two hundred planes and two regular carriers. As their fleet retired northward toward safe harbor at Okinawa, they lost another carrier and nearly one hundred more planes. Of the four hundred and thirty planes sent by Adm. Ozawa Jisaburo, two-thirds of the air force involved was lost. In addition to the material losses, hundreds of excellent pilots trained since the beginning of the war against China had died, gone missing, or were taken prisoner by the enemy. During the two days of battle, U.S. losses totaled one hundred and thirty aircraft and some damage to ships.

Between July 1944 and April 1945, Japan was increasingly losing the war. The Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were forced to make more and more sacrifices. On July 24, 1944, Hirohito sanctioned plans for showdown battles in the Philippines, Taiwan, the southwest Islands, the Ryukyus, and the Japanese home islands, apart from Hokkaido and the Kuriles. On July 26, he told Koiso to not leave the capital and to control whether the imperial headquarters should be moved to another secret location or not. Two weeks later, during an imperial conference, the Army and Navy General Staff updated Hirohito on the new preparations for defense against the forthcoming enemy offensives. Shortly afterward with the emperor's approval, the Koiso cabinet decided to arm virtually the entire nation. All subjects began military training with bamboo spears in workplaces and schools throughout the country.

From April 1, to June 22, 1945, American forces fought at Okinawa in the last major battle of World War II. The plans for the invasion were well prepared. The Japanese had an estimated 120,000 soldiers and 700 aircraft to defend the island. Their defense had been reinforced in June 1944 after the loss of Saipan following two major defeats: The Battle of the Philippine Sea and the defeat in the Marianas. Being concerned about the danger, the Japanese commanders made immediate plans to airlift the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment from Tokyo to Okinawa. It would be supported by Field Marshal Shunroku Hata's 9th Infantry Division which was also moved to Okinawa. As Col. Hiromichi Yahara, senior staff officer in charge of the 32nd Army in Okinawa said: "The Marianas line, also known as the Tōjō line, had been considered impregnable." On October 18, 1944, Hirohito approved a decision of the imperial headquarters that ordered to fight the decisive battle on Leyte and to abandon the defense of Luzon.

The Battle of Okinawa

Admiral Spruance's Task Force 58 provided the usual pre-invasion naval bombardment. Okinawa received six days of bombardment compared to the three days given to Iwo Jima.[10] Spruance's task force included seven fleet carriers (soon to be joined by the repaired USS Randolph) in addition to six light carriers and eight destroyers acting as pickets. The American forces were reinforced by British Task Force 57 that included ships from Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. The combined British and colonies' forces boasted four fleet carriers, six escort carriers with a total of 450 aircrafts. This represented the most powerful fleet assembled in British history.[11]

Spruance's armada brought four full divisions of the 10th Army (7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisions). The Okinawa landings used 90,000 soldiers in addition to 88,000 Marines (the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Divisions). All in all, 183,000 soldiers (not including Seabees and support staff) were brought to the beaches of Okinawa under the command of Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. In addition to artillery, the invasion forces also brought 245 tanks, outnumbering Japan by almost ten to one. Over the first two weeks, the American armada landed some 577,000 tons of supplies around the Hagushi beachhead. By comparison, the Normandy landings brought 156,000 troops to France. Supplies landed on Okinawa were 750,000 tons compared to 250,000 tons in Normandy. In the first two months of the engagement alone, some 9 million barrels (forty-two gallons) of oil were consumed as well as 21 million gallons of aviation fuel. Less obvious items consumed in bulk over the initial months included 2.7 million packs of cigarettes and 1.2 million chocolate bars. Twenty-four million items of mail were delivered.[12]

Japanese troops fought until death during the Battle of Okinawa.[13] On April 7, 1945, the Japanese battleship Yamato, the greatest battleship in the world at this time, was sunk in Japan's struggle to defend the position.[14] Located 350 miles from Japan's southernmost island, Kyushu, Okinawa was the

main island in the Kyuku chain. Home to some 450,000 people, Japan had annexed the island in 1879. On April 1, 1945, after six days of bombardment, the troops of the U.S. 10th Army, commanded by Gen. Simon B. Buckner, began their amphibious invasion of Okinawa. Determined to defend the island, Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, who commanded more than 100,000 Japanese troops, left the shoreline relatively undefended, waiting for the Americans to come. It wasn't until a few days into the invasion that the advancing U.S. soldiers realized the trap. But it was too late for them to retreat. Japanese machine gunners positioned in hidden stone killed thousands of U.S. troops. As the American forces on Okinawa confronted such challenges, Japanese pilots began a barrage of kamikaze attacks on the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, waiting offshore in support of the invasion. The kamikaze tactics used by Japan at Okinawa led the U.S. Navy their worst losses of World War II.

The Okinawa Battle had raged for eighty-two days. While America had air superiority in terms of its fighter aircraft and better-trained pilots, the Japanese used kamikaze tactics to destroy the American's 5th Fleet by a mass of 400 planes (conventional and kamikaze) flying from Kyushu, the south westernmost of Japan's main islands. By the end of Okinawa campaign, some 1,465 kamikaze pilots sank 29 U.S. ships and damaged 120 more, killing more than 3,000 sailors and wounding another 6,000 or so more.[15] Casualties were enormous on both sides. American troops finally took Shuri Castle in late May. The battle was finally won on June 22, 1945, four months after the Battle of Iwo Jima. Almost 21,000 Japanese soldiers died or were missing in action at Okinawa. The approximately three-month battle was the last and the bloodiest confrontation between Japanese and U.S. forces in the Pacific during World War II.[16]

On May 8, 1945, when Adm. Karl Dönitz, the chief of the German state, surrendered to the Allies; in Japan, War Minister Gen. Korechika Anami, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Yoshijirō Umezu, and the rest of the Japanese officials, knew that the war was over. The Japanese were on the retreat everywhere. In the Philippines, the Japanese air force was largely destroyed before MacArthur's invasion of Luzon. Attacks on Iwo Jima and Okinawa authorized by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had been the last step in the U.S. advance toward Tokyo. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita's troops in the

Philippines were pushed back in the mountains of northern Luzon. Dealing with malaria and malnutrition, the Japanese were surrounded everywhere by the enemies. Hundreds of soldiers died every day from hunger and disease. Some began committing suicide.[17]

In Burma, after scoring some defensive successes during 1943, in order to stop Allied offensives, in 1944, the Japanese then attempted to launch an invasion of India (Operation U-Go). This attempt failed with disastrous losses. The Allied crossed the Irrawaddy River and defeated the main Japanese armies led by Gen. Heitarō Kimura, Lt. Gen. Masaki Honda, and Shōzō Sakurai. In a final operation just before the end of the war, Japanese forces isolated in Southern Burma attempted to escape across the Sittang River. They suffered heavy casualties. It was the greatest defeat to that date in Japanese history. As the result of disease, malnutrition, and exhaustion, 50,000 to 60,000 Japanese were killed, and almost 100,000 or more were wounded.[18] Okinawa was the last major battle of World War II. Japan's 32nd Army, some 130,000 men, commanded by Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, defended the island. By the time the Japanese troops were retreated to the southern coast of Okinawa where they made their last stand, casualties were enormous on both sides. By the end of May, the Japanese had lost 50,000 men. In June, another 60,000 fell, and then on the night of June 21, the day Gen. Roy Stanley Geiger declared the American victory on Okinawa, Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima and Lt. Gen. Isamo Cho realized that the end had come. With their ranking officers, they consumed a farewell dinner prepared for them by the commander's cook, Tetsuo Nakamuta. The following day, on June 22, first Ushijima and then Cho bared their bellies to the upward thrust of the ceremonial knives in their hands…"[19]

At the end of June 1945, after taking Okinawa, the American strategy toward Japan had been reevaluated. This strategy evolved from the relationship between the USAAF commander, Gen. Henri Arnold, and the young field commander, Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay. After strategic discussions between the two men at LeMay's HQ at Saipan in mid-June, they signed off on what was known as the EMPIRE Plan. It was decided to focus firebombing attacks on twenty-five second-tier cities (later expanded to 58 cities) with populations of between 60,000 and 325,000 people.[20] These targets were drawn from a list of 171 smaller cities. Niigata, Kokura,

and Hiroshima were excluded because they were on the list of potential atom bomb targets. Kyoto has also been excluded from the list for cultural reasons.

The goal was to choose industrial targets and cities most at risk of incendiary conflagration. Typical of such cities was Kagoshima in southern Kyushu, which was a major port and rail terminus with large oil storage facilities and four electric power plants. Hamamatsu located in western Shizuoka Prefecture, was an important railway repair center as well as producing propellers, ordnance, and machinery. Hamamatsu flourished during the Edo period (1603 to 1868) under a succession of daimyō rulers as a castle town, and as a post town on the Tōkaidō highway connecting Edo with Kyoto. During the Meiji Restoration, Hamamatsu became a short-lived prefecture from 1871 to 1876, after which it was united with Shizuoka Prefecture. Hamamatsu Station opened on the Tōkaidō main line in 1889. The same year, with the establishment of the modern municipalities system, Hamamatsu became a town.[21]

Among other cities in the list, was Yokkaichi, the fourth smaller city targeted on June 17–18. With a population of 102,000 citizens pressed into just 1.5 square miles, Yokkaichi had the largest oil refinery in Japan. Yokkaichi was elevated to city status on August 1, 1897. An imperial decree in July 1899 established Yokkaichi as an open port for trading with the United States and United Kingdom. From 1939, Yokkaichi became a center for the chemical industry, with the Imperial Japanese Navy constructing a large refinery near the port area. Yokkaichi was one of the first cities bombed by the Americans during the war. On April 18, 1942, the city was attacked by aircraft from the Doolittle Raid. During the final stages of World War II, on June 18, 1945, eighty-nine B-29 Super fortress bombers dropped 11,000 incendiary bombs, destroying 35 percent of the urban area and killing 736 people. This attack was followed by another eight air raids until August 8, 1945, killing another 808 people at Yokkaichi.

Then, we end the list with Ōmuta in Kyushu. With 177,000 people, Ōmuta produced chemicals, coke, synthetic oil, and explosives as well as being the biggest coal shipping port. During the Edo period, Ōmuta was a part of the Miike han (Miike Domain), ruled by the Tachinaba clan who also ruled

Yanagawa. In 1871, in a course of the Meiji Restoration, the Han system was abolished, and prefectures were founded. Ōmuta belonged to the Miike (1871), Mizuma (1871—1876), and finally Fukuoka prefectures (1876 to present).[22]

Nine Japanese divisions, a little more than 500,000 men, were deployed to defend the invasion beaches against the American troops. Almost all were stationed at Kyushu's southern beaches. American forces captured Japanese codebooks during the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, allowing intelligence units based in Pearl Harbor to read top secret enemy documents. The acquisition of the codebooks had facilitated the Allied forces in controlling the other territories occupied by Japan, with fewer casualties until the end of the war.

After the United States had taken the key islands of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Formosa, and were ready to invade Tokyo, Hirohito approved the decision from the government to arm every citizen of Japan. Military training was mandatory in all schools and places of employment. Following a decree issued by the government of Prime Minister Suzuki Kantarō, all the schools in Japan were closed. The children were put to work producing foods or munitions. Some were even taught how to operate anti-aircraft guns.

Throughout the Pacific, soldiers of the Japanese army were motivated by the message of their leaders who exhorted them to "crush the enemy." This statement only served to confuse the troops and the Japanese civilians on the issue of the war. On the morning of March 10, 1945, American B-29 bombers dropped 2,000 tons of M-69 napalm bombs on Tokyo. One ton of M-69 could destroy the entire area of a big city. The goal was that Tokyo be "burned down and wiped off the map to shorten the war in order to force Japan to capitulate."

Almost sixteen square miles of Tokyo was destroyed when B-29s swept low over the city, dropping hundreds of tons of incendiary bombs on the streets of one of the most populated regions in the world. Over 250,000 buildings crumbled under flames, which reached an intensity of 2,000 degrees. The entire geisha district, including hospitals, homes, temples, train stations, theaters, hotels, schools, and convents, was destroyed. The civilian population was dying in ever-increasing numbers. LeMay continued to send

hundreds of B-29s up the long path from far to the south of the Home Islands, paralyzing sixty-six metropolitan centers in Japan. Tokyo, Osoka, Kobe, Nagoya, and many other vital centers of Japanese industrial areas were destroyed as M-47 and M-69 canisters fell out the fuselages of B-29s, reaching their targets by radar. This firebombing of Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse, was the most horrific bombing in history, far deadlier than any other bombing during World War II.

What was Hirohito's attitude?

The emperor, instead of adopting an expression of sorrow and regret toward Tokyo citizens, showed no compassion for his subjects trapped inside walls of flames that threw off unimaginably high temperatures. On March 18, 1945, Hirohito toured the burned-out portions of Tokyo. His caravan of vehicles and his own maroon Rolls-Royce passed slowly through rubble sometimes as high as five feet. Despite the sufferings among Tokyo's citizens, he kept the same position: The Japanese will not surrender, and not even when Gen. Curtis LeMay had repeatedly dropped thousands of firebombs on Nagoya, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Kawasaki. Relying more on the help of the Russians, Hirohito refused to end the war.

To negotiate with the Russians, Hirohito sent the sixty-seven-year-old Kōki Hirota to meet with the Soviet ambassador to Japan; Yakov Alexandrovich Malik. Hirota was prime minister of Japan in 1937 shortly before the Second Sino-Japanese War began in July of that year. The meeting between Kōki Hirota and Yakov Malik was scheduled at the Gora Hotel, fifty miles southwest of Tokyo in the town of Hakone. The fall of Okinawa made the Japanese government desperate to find a way to convince Stalin to help Japan seek peace. Malik, a lifelong diplomat and skilled with thirty-nine-years as foreign affairs officer, knew that the Japanese were coming from a position of great weakness. The Soviet ambassador was categorical to Hirota's request: "Russia will not renew its 1941 non-aggression pact with Japan, on the grounds that the Nippon alliance with Germany makes them an enemy of the Soviet Union." Hirohito himself authorized a second round of discussion just hours later. During this second meeting, Hirota adopted a new strategy, offering to enter into a trade agreement with the Soviets:

Japanese rubber from its conquered territories in Southeast Asia in exchange for Soviet oil.

“Russia has no oil to spare,” Malik replied.

A few days before this meeting, LeMay’s pilots dropped five million M-69s on Japan. The “operation bombing” of Tokyo was a complete success for the Americans, who began to enormously hurt Japan’s capacity to continue the war. B-29 aircrafts were, at this point, the unconditional threat to Japan’s officials refusing to surrender and choosing to fight until destruction.

On April 5, 1945, predicting the ultimate defeat of Japan, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso demanded that the military structure be altered so that the premier could share in the decision-making process.[23] The generals and admirals refused to consider his proposal. On the same day, Koiso resigned. And while the fierce and bloody battle for Okinawa was raging 350 miles to the southeast, Retired Adm. Kantarō Suzuki became the new prime minister.

The son of a local government official, Kantarō served in the Sino-Japanese War. He also took part in the Battle of the Japan Sea during the Russo-Japanese War. He successively held military posts as director of the Personnel Bureau at the Navy Ministry, vice navy minister in the second Okuma cabinet, commandant of the Naval Academy, and commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. In 1925, he became chief of the naval general staff office. In 1929, he assumed the concurrent offices of jiju-cho and privy councilor. On February 26, 1936, he was assaulted while he was serving as grand chamberlain. Escaping miraculously from death, he resigned from his post. He was chairman of the Privy Council in 1944 before he became prime minister.[24]

On April 7, 1945, Kuniaki Koiso resigned, and Kantarō Suzuki was appointed at his place as prime minister. Suzuki became premier while precision bombing from American forces continued to target Japanese aircraft production. On April 7, 1945, large-scale attacks on aircraft factories in Tokyo were mostly successful. Although seven Super fortresses were shot down, VII-Fighter pilots shot down one hundred and one

Japanese aircraft. Another attack on the Musashino aircraft plant on April 12 inflicted heavy damage on this facility. Over the next two weeks, precision attacks were made on the Tachikawa aircraft factory at Yamato, the Hiro naval aircraft factory at Kure, the airframe factory at Konan, and the oil storage facilities at Iwakuni, Oshima, and Toyama. By the end of May, 50 percent of Tokyo was destroyed. The capital was so damaged that it was temporarily removed from the list of targets. About 15 percent of Japan's urban housing stock or some 94 square miles of buildings had been destroyed. Tokyo's Imperial Palace was not targeted because of the risk of killing the emperor.[25]

A decree issued by the cabinet of Suzuki had closed all the schools in Japan, which were turned into factories. Japanese students were enlisted to actively help in the war effort.[26] Confronting defeat, the Japanese used another tactic. Their air forces based in Korea, China, and northern Japan, allowed them to launch kamikaze aircraft against the Allied fleet. In addition, the Imperial Japanese Navy's 12th Flotilla based on Kyushu was deployed with a total of 900 hidden planes that would be utilized for suicide flights. Vintage wooden biplanes invisible to American radar, was put in place for nighttime suicide attacks. Hirohito had one hope left. Under the leadership of Gen. Korechika Anami, the Japanese troops might bleed the Americans so badly on the beaches of Kyushu and Honshu that Japan could extract better peace terms from the Allies. Delayed surrender was the strategy.

12

FIGHT TO THE DEATH

T he successive defeats of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy continued toward the Battle of Manila, the Battle of Luzon, the Battle of Iwo Jima, the Battle of the Irrawaddy River, and finally the Battle of Okinawa. After all those defeats, surrender should be the ultimate decision of the Japanese officials in order to avoid the destruction of the homeland. Hirohito, as divine emperor, was the only one who could order the Army General Staff to stop the war. Only the emperor could ask Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki to begin negotiations with the Allies to end the conflict. On the contrary, far from making this wise resolution that would have spared the lives of hundreds of thousands of his subjects, Hirohito decided to support the position of Adm. Osami Nagano, former chief of the Navy General Staff, and from Feb. 1944 to the end of the war, Emperor's Hirohito personal naval advisor, who wanted to continue the war at any cost. [1]

As a result of this senseless calculation, there were several major attacks by the American Air Force on Japan mainland, including the air raid on the city of Tokyo on March 10, 1945, the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, followed by Nagasaki, on August 9, and several other deadly American-led air strikes on Tokuyama, Iwakuni, Osaka, Kamagaya, and Isekai. During the U.S. airstrike on Tokyo, the damages from the incendiary bombs (496,000 in total) damaged 261,000 homes, leaving 1.15 million people homeless. Thirty-two shopping malls were destroyed, and the Japanese government recorded the death of 100,000 people. In Hiroshima, about 80,000 people died and about 40,000 people died in Nagasaki. Some figures have put the number at 200,000 people dead as a result of the use of the two atomic bombs. On June 22, 1945, 383 B-29s attacked industrial areas in five different cities in Japan: Kure, Kakamigahara, Himeji, Mizushima, and Akashi, all in southern Honshu. On June 26, saw factories in the same Shikoku Island area were attacked by 510 B-29s accompanied by 148

fighter jets. The use of incendiary bombs affected the following cities: Hamamatsu, Kagoshima, Omuta, Yokkaichi, Fukuoka, Shizuoka, Toyohashi, Moji, Nobeoka, Okayama, Sasebo, Kumamoto, Kure, Shimonoseki, Ube, Kochi, Takematsu, Tokushima, Akashi, Chiba, Kofu, Shimizu, Gifu, Sakai, Sendai, Wakayama, Ichinomiya, Tsuruga, Utsunomiya, Uwajima, Hiratsuka, Kuwana, Namazu, Oita, Choschi, Fukui, Hitachi, Okazaki, Matsuyama, Aomori, Ichinomiya, and Tokuyama.

The use of incendiaries was extended into the beginning of August. As Japanese air resistance had entirely collapsed, a few days just before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, American pilots launched 836 B-29s against Hachiojima, Mito, Nagaoka, and Toyama.[2] In accordance with the EMPIRE Plan attack, an average of two incendiary attacks a week was scheduled. Improvements in technology with B-29 that began to be fitted with AN/APQ–7 radar allowed significantly more accurate night bombing. Subsequently, precision attacks on oil refineries achieved notable success at Utsube, Kudamatsu, Minoshima and the Maruzen refinery outside Osaka.

Between May and July, American B-29 pilots dropped 60 million propaganda leaflets targeting the Japanese people, “to take action to terminate the war.” Produced by Nimitz’s Psychological Warfare Office, the objective was to encourage the Japanese resistance movements to activate. For example, on July 27–28, leaflets were dropped on eleven cities to warn the inhabitants that they were going to be bombed by incendiaries. This strategy failed because unlike Germany, there were no Japanese citizens who would make a statement or act expressing disapproval of the war. Even Communists volunteered to die as kamikaze pilots.[3]

In addition to the bombing of the Japanese home islands, the navy had decided since March to mine the Japanese coastline. At the end of March, the 313th Bombardment Wing, which had been specially trained for mine laying, began operations in the Shimonoseki Strait, which divided the largest Japanese island of Honshu from the second-most important island of Kyushu. (Truman warned that if Japan failed to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, it could “expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.”[4] The operation was timed to

prevent the possible disruption of the Okinawa invasion by the Japanese navy.[5]

Millions of innocent lives could have been saved if the Japanese leaders had accepted without delay the Potsdam Declaration. While Tokyo and many major cities in Japan were being destroyed daily by fire raids from American attacks using hundreds of B-29, the officials in Tokyo rather than decide on the declaration, wanted to clarify the future status of their emperor. Hirohito and his staff preferred to wait instead of replying to the cable in which the Allies issued a last warning to the Japanese empire.[6]

Tōgō was annoyed at the recommendation of Ambassador Sato in Moscow. On July 20, 1945, Sato wired to Tōgō: "I recommend acceptance of virtually any term."

In response, Tōgō, from a secret channel cable sent this message back to Sato:

July 25, 1945 1900hours

To: Sato

From: Tōgō

No. 944 (urgent, ambassador's code)

…Navy Capt. Ellis Mark Zacharias said on the 21st that Japan had two choices:

It could either accept a dictated peace after its ruin or surrender unconditionally and enjoy the benefits of the Atlantic Charter. We would be wrong to consider such statements trick propaganda. We must admit that they are partly intended to invite us to come to their cause… We, for our part, are desirous to inform the United States through some feasible method that, although we are unable to accept unconditional surrender under any

circumstances, we have no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter.[7]

On July 27, in the Imperial Palace with Hirohito, the Japanese cabinet sat down to study the declaration that was being drafted in Potsdam, Germany:

Point Six: There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest…

Point Seven: …points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

Point Eight: The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.

Point Nine: The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

Point Ten: Stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners…

Point Eleven: The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

The Potsdam Declaration

The Potsdam Declaration was signed on July 26, 1945. Written by Harry Truman and Clement Atlee, it was remotely approved by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The Soviet Union de facto accepted the terms when it declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. On July 26, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, for the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for United Kingdom, and Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of China, issued the document, which outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan, as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference. The ultimatum stated, "If Japan did not surrender; it would face "prompt and utter destruction."[8]

It had been several weeks since the Japanese authorities had been notified of the Potsdam Declaration; Hirohito and his staff instead of recognizing defeat and stopping the casualties from the war, tried to use all political means for avoiding complete defeat or unconditional surrender.

The strategy was to persuade the Soviet Union to continue its neutrality, and, at the same time to make every effort to grow discord between the Americans and the British on one side, and the Russians on the other side. As the situation deteriorates still further, Japan may even make a serious attempt to use the Soviets as a mediator in ending the war."

Knowing the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were objectively defeated, Hirohito was indifferent to the suffering that the war was causing on his own citizens, and on the peoples of Asia, the Pacific, and the West. The leaders of this wartime empire and his war leaders let pass several opportunities to end the war. First, Hirohito and his inner war cabinet, —the Supreme War Leadership Council, — could sue for peace when Prince Konoe and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, in February 1945, warned the emperor that once the war was ending in Europe, the Soviet Union would not hesitate to eschew the Neutrality Treaty and would decide to intervene military in the Far East to occupy Manchuria and other territories in Japan. According to military intelligence officers, the Soviet

Union would enter the war against Japan by midsummer. Hirohito, instead of starting the process to end the war, was determined to fight. He supported the position of the far-right extremists in the army who rejected any act of surrender.[9]

The second opportunity was offered at the beginning of June 1945, when Japanese troops were defeated during the Battle of Okinawa. The invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945, was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Ocean theater of World War II. The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" because of the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of Japanese kamikaze attacks, and the numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle was one of the bloodiest in the Pacific, with approximately 210,000 casualties: at least 85,000 Allies and 125,000 Japanese. The Americans suffered over 82,000 casualties, including non-battle casualties (psychiatric, injuries, illnesses), of whom over 12,500 were killed or missing. Battle deaths were 4,907 of navy, 4,675 army, and 2,938 Marine Corps personnel. The US military estimates that 110,071 Japanese soldiers were killed during the battle. A total of 7,401 Japanese regulars and 3,400 Okinawan conscripts surrendered or were captured during the battle. Both sides lost considerable numbers of ships and aircraft, including the Japanese battleship Yamato. Of the estimated pre-war population of 300,000, an estimated 150,000 Okinawans were killed, committed suicide or went missing. The eighty-two-day battle lasted from April 1 until June 22, 1945.

After the defeat, General Umezu indicated that the war effort could continue no longer, and Umezu unveiled the dramatic situation in China. Foreign Minister Milotov had notified Tokyo on April 5, 1945, that the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact would not be extended, and that the Germans had surrendered unconditionally on May 7–8, leaving Japan completely isolated. Hirohito, once again, instead of listening to Umezu's advice, had refused to surrender in order to allow the imperial structure to survive. The emperor adopted, with his war leaders, two dangerous measures: preparations for a final battle on the homeland, and efforts to gain Soviet assistance in ending the war by offering Stalin limited territorial concessions. Over several weeks, witnessing that the home islands had been bombed on a large scale, and knowing for certain that the bombing of

Tokyo and several major cities in Japan would intensify over time, Hirohito approved the decision of the six constituent members of the council who agreed to return to the situation that had existed prior to the Russo-Japanese War, while retaining Korea as a Japanese territory and making southern Manchuria a neutral zone.

The third opportunity came on July 27–28, when the Potsdam Declaration was signified to the Suzuki cabinet. The Japanese government obtained the declaration and was informed that if it fulfilled certain unilateral obligations, which the victorious powers would impose after the Japanese government had proclaimed "the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces" and furnished "proper and adequate assurance of their good faith in such action," Japan would then be allowed to retain its peace industries and resume participation in world trade on the basis of the principle of equal access to raw materials. "The alternative for Japan," the declaration concluded, "is prompt and utter destruction." Article 12 stated, "The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

Prime Minister Suzuki received the declaration on July 27 and showed no intention of accepting it. On the contrary, the Suzuki cabinet first ordered the press to publish the Dōmei News Service's edited version and to minimize the significance of the declaration by not commenting on it.[10] The next day, on July 28, Hirohito called Prime Minister Suzuki and four other important officials for an audience; among them, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Toyoda Soemu. The five officials came in their limousines. Arriving at the palace, they assembled in the conference room of the imperial library. Hirohito, in uniform, opened the meeting brusquely, by saying: "We have heard enough of this determination of yours to fight to the last soldier. Now we want action. We want you to consider methods of ending this war. Don't be bound by anything you have said before. State your real opinions."

In the afternoon of that meeting, in accord with Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chief of the Naval General Staff Toyoda Soemu, Prime Minister

Suzuki made Japan's rejection explicit by formally declaring, that the Potsdam Declaration was no more than a "rehash" (yakinaoshi) of the Cairo Declaration, and that Japan intended to "ignore" it (mokusatsu).[11] Navy Minister Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai was very comfortable with this position. When his secretary, Rear Adm. Takeo Takagi, asked him why the prime minister had been allowed to make such an absurd statement, Yonai replied: "If one is first to issue a statement, he is always at a disadvantage. Churchill has fallen; America is beginning to be isolated. The government therefore will ignore it. There is no need to rush."[12]

My question here is, why did Japan's top leaders delay so long before finally accepting to end the war? It was Emperor Hirohito's tactic to delay the inevitable capitulation in order to cut a deal on the issue of guaranteeing the dynasty. To do so, he requested Soviet mediation. The Hirota Kōki and Jacob Malik talks, and the secret messages that Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō sent to Ambassador Satō Naotake in Moscow, were part of the strategy. The negotiations between Japan and Russia to gain Soviet assistance to end the war went on through June, July, and early August. Those political meetings could be perceived as a tactic to delay the act of surrender. The future of the throne and the all-important prerogatives of its occupants, by the time of the discussions, would be absolutely guaranteed.

On the morning of August 3, 1945, Suzuki had a meeting with his cabinet advisory council, composed of the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan Consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other business leaders who had profited greatly from the war. Those from the zaibatsu recommended acceptance of the Potsdam terms on the grounds that the United States would allow Japan to retain its military industries and participate in world trade. Suzuki replied to them:

For the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force them also to end the war. That is why they are talking about unconditional surrender. Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, then they will yield before we do. Just because they broadcast their declaration, it is not necessary to stop fighting. You advisers may ask me to reconsider, but I don't think there is any need to stop [the war].[13]

The Atomic Bomb

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. At precisely eight fifteen and seventeen seconds, Col. Paul Tibbets, commander of the 509th Composite Group of the United States Army Forces, who piloted the Boeing B-29 Super fortress Enola Gay, pulled the B-29 over a sixty-degree bank and dropped the “Little Boy” on Hiroshima.[14] A black and orange shape weighting nearly five tons fell down on the 255,000 people living in the city. At an altitude of 1,870 feet, the 9.5 pounds of cordite drove the uranium chunks into each other, and the equivalent of 13,500 tons of TNT exploded in the sky. The explosion wiped out 90 percent of the city and immediately killed 80,000 people; tens of thousands more would later die of radiation exposure.[15]

When the first plutonium device was exploded in New Mexico in July, Admiral Purnell and General Groves had agreed on the strategy of putting a second bomb on target as quickly as possible after the first in order to impress the Japanese with the fact that the United States has more than one atomic bomb, in their arsenal. During a conversation with Groves, Purnell had suggested that it would take two bombs to end the war. President Truman had accepted this proposition. He ordered atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the two cities named after the conversation in Potsdam. The first idea was instead of Nagasaki, to choose the city of Kyoto. Kyoto was replaced by Nagasaki because the U.S. officials considered Kyoto to be mainly a historical, religious, and urban center, and its destruction would lead to a massive destruction of historical heritage. Other cities that were on the list were Yokohama, Niigata, and Kokura, which was home to Japan’s largest ammunition plant. Poor visibility had forced the Americans to abandon Kokura in the morning of August 9. “The winds of destiny seemed to favor certain Japanese cities,” wrote the New York Times reporter William Laurence, a passenger on one of the mission’s B-29s.

On August 9, at 11:02 a.m. local time, at an altitude of 1,540 feet, the Fat Man, carried by the U.S. military plane nicknamed “Bockscar,” was

detonated just over the northeast of the stadium in the Urakami Valley, an area that included industry as well as schools, hospitals and a cathedral. With the equivalent of 22 kilotons of power, the “Fat Man” plutonium bomb was far more powerful than the “Little Boy” used on Hiroshima three days earlier. From 100 miles away, people could hear the explosion of the bomb while an intense bluish-white flash illuminated the sky over Nagasaki. In a few seconds, the city became a graveyard. People by thousands lay on the streets, in the fields, screaming for help.

On February 23, 1945, six U.S. Marines planted an American flag atop a battle-blasted hill on the island of Iwo Jima. This iconic picture taken by photograph Joe Rosenthal captured the moment.

(Monument in Washington: Image retrieved from the

National Register of Historic Places in the United States

of America. Its reference number is 14000146)

From the east bank of the Urakami River, the entire roof of the Chinzei School had caved in. A few miles away from the school, the roof and masonry of the Catholic cathedral fell on the kneeling worshipers. The blast tore through the church, killing Father Saburo Nishida and about 10 parishioners. Between 8,500 and 10,000 Urakami District Catholics died in the blast. The atomic bomb destroyed the Nagasaki Medical College, and some 900 professors, doctors, nurses, faculty members, and students were killed. A total of between 50,000 to 80,000 people in Nagasaki were killed in the explosion and its immediate aftermath.

The same day of Nagasaki's bombing, in a nationwide radio report on the Potsdam Conference, President Truman explained the legitimacy of the bombing:

Having found the bomb, we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.[16]

Despite the massive and mounting death toll from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hirohito, who was considered a deity by his subjects, refused to surrender. Knowing that only unconditional surrender would save Japan from complete destruction and knowing that unconditional surrender would mean the end of the 2,600-year-old imperial dynasty, the emperor persisted.[17]

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union officially declared war on Japan, flooding 1.6 million troops into Manchuria, an area of 600,000 square miles in the northeast of China.[18] As the Russians poured into Manchuria and the Japanese lived in utter fear wondering where the new nuclear bombs would be dropped next, on August 9, 1945, a second atomic bomb nicknamed “Fat Man” was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. Between 35,000 to 45,000 Japanese were killed during the first day of the blast.

Hirohito, as a witness of the sufferings of his people, had to make a hard decision. Very concerned about the future of the war, he finally convoked his supreme council, and invited former Prime Ministers Hiranuma Hirota, Wakatsuki Okada, Fumimaro Konoe, and Hideki Tōjō to come to the Imperial Palace to gather their views on the war. A few hours later, he met with the six high-ranking dignitaries of the empire, the so-called “Big Six,” to decide on surrender, namely: Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, Minister of the Navy, Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai, Minister of War, Gen. Korechika Anami, the Japanese imperial general staff, Gen. Yoshijirō Umezu, and the chief of navy personnel, Adm. Soemu Toyoda.

The crew of the B-29 Enola Gay that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945.

Image from nationalmuseum.af.mil

Image retrieved from newsweek.com

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. At precisely eight fifteen and seventeen seconds, Col. Paul Tibbets, commander of the 509th Composite Group of the United States Army Forces, who piloted the Boeing B-29 Super fortress Enola Gay, pulled the B-29 over a sixty-degree bank and dropped the “Little Boy” on Hiroshima. (dailymail.co.uk)

Three agreed with the position to continue the war, and three voted for surrender. Then, Hirohito intervened:

Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue… under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire’s existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity.[19]

The emperor continued:

I have given a lot of thought to the current situation in the country and outside the territory; I have come to the conclusion that continuing the war would lead to more destruction in the nation and an extension of cruelty and barbarism in the world. Those who want to continue the war have taught me that new battalions will arrive from Kujukurihama in June. Now I realize that these promises cannot be fulfilled even in September. To those who are in favor of one last battle on our own soil, I want to remind them of the difference between their plan presented in the past and the one on the agenda. I don't want to witness any more suffering from my people. Ending the war is the only way to restore peace in the world and lift the country into the distress it is currently facing.

Thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation to continue in the world and that the Japanese nation will suffer severe damage. This is the reason why I order the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.[20]

In a radio address (known as Gyokuon-hsa), on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced the acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The same day, the Japanese government communicated the message to the Allied powers: "Acting by order and on behalf of the emperor, the Japanese government and the Japanese imperial headquarters, we hereby declare that we accept the conditions set out in the declaration issued by the Heads of Governments of the United States, of China and Great Britain, on July 26, 1945, in Potsdam."

On September 2, 1945, Japan's acts of surrender were signed by representatives of the empire of Japan, the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, Canada, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, Kingdom of the Netherlands, and New Zealand, on the deck of the USS

Missouri in Tokyo Bay. This action ended the war against China as well as the Pacific War linked to World War II.

According to Kusayanagi Daizō, author of Nihon Meishoden, in the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than 300 army and 50 navy personnel had committed suicide. Among them were: Gen. Korechika Anami, Adm. Takijirō Onishi, Gen. Seiichi Tanaka, Field Marshal Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, Army Chief of Staff at the time of Pearl Harbor, and Mrs. Sugiyama.[21] Yoichi Nakagawa, ex-professor at Kenkoku University in Manchuria during World War II, author of the book, A Moonflower in Heaven, and Kazuko Tsurumi, Japanese scholar, ex-professor at Princeton University, author of the book, Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II, estimated that between the emperor's broadcast on August 15, 1945 and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat.

The Big Three: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill,

and Joseph Stalin. (Source: nationalww2museum.org)

Image from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

The formal signing of Japan’s surrender was held aboard the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945.

Image by Army Signal Corps photographer LT. Stephen E. Korpanty (Naval Historical Center Photo # SC 213700)

Image retrieved from mirror.co.uk

On September 2, 1945, Japan’s acts of surrender were signed by representatives of the empire of Japan, the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, Canada, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, Kingdom of the Netherlands, and New Zealand, on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. This action ended the war against China as well as the Pacific War linked to World War II. (History.com)

13

AFTERMATH

A s many as 60 million dead, 25 million of them Soviet, hundreds of cities reduced to rubble, World War II caused devastating damages. Much of Europe and Asia lay in ruins. The year 1945 has been called Year Zero. During the war, millions were forced to leave their homes, moving to work in Germany or Japan. In the Soviet Union, there were millions of people displaced or deported as undesirable minorities. In Europe and Asia, there were lots of orphaned children, 300,000 alone in Yugoslavia. In Germany alone some 2 million women had abortions every year between 1945 and 1948. [1] The majority of roads and ports in Europe and Asia had been destroyed or badly damaged; bridges had been blown up; railway locomotives and rolling stock had vanished. [2] Big cities such as Warsaw, Kiev, Berlin, Paris, Manila, Dresden, Stalingrad, Nagasaki, Hiroshima, and Tokyo were piles of rubble and ash. In Germany, it has been estimated, 70 percent of housing had gone, and, in the Soviet Union, 1,700 towns and 70,000 villages. Factories and workshops were in ruins; fields, forests, and vineyards ripped to pieces. Millions of acres in north China were flooded after the Japanese destroyed the dykes. [3]

The end of the war also brought a series of violent attacks against citizens. Collaborators were beaten, lynched, or shot. Women who had fraternized with German soldiers had their heads shaved.[4] In China and Eastern Europe the Communists used the accusation of collaboration with the Japanese or the Nazis to eliminate their political enemies. In the desperate final stages of the war, Japan’s top leaders had chosen to fight a brutal and bloody battle in Okinawa with the hope that it would dissuade the Allies, particularly the Americans, from attempting to invade the mainland.[5] More than 10,000 Americans died during the last months of fighting. Over 110,000 Japanese troops and approximately one-third of the civilian population were killed. In the wake of defeat, approximately 6.5 million Japanese were stranded in Asia, Siberia, and the Pacific Ocean area. Some 2.6 million Japanese were in

China at war's end, and another 1.1 million dispersed through Manchuria. In addition, almost 600,000 troops were prisoners in the Kuril Islands and the Darien-Port Arthur enclave in southern Manchuria. Over 500,000 Japanese were in Formosa (modern-day Taiwan) and 900,000 in Korea. Nine hundred thousand were in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Hundreds of thousands were dispersed across scattered islands in the Pacific.[6]

American and Japanese authorities estimated that between 1.6 and 1.7 million Japanese were prisoners of the Russians. Of this number, more than 300,000 were killed during the Stalinist purges.[7] Scattered in more than a hundred prison camps, the Allied prisoners of war in Japan were malnourished; and some suffered from tuberculosis. A total of 31,617 American POWs were freed and processed through Manila by October 31, 1945. Some 1.35 million Koreans who had been conscripted to perform heavy labor were in Japan at the time of surrender.[8]

In July 1946, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare estimated that there were approximately 400,000 war orphans throughout the country.[9] A February 1948 report put the number of orphaned and homeless children combined at 123,510. Of this number, 28,248 had lost their parents in air raids; 11,351 were orphaned or lost contact with their parents during the repatriation process; 2,640 were identified as "abandoned;" and a total 81,266 were believed to have lost their parents, or have simply become separated from them during the difficult moments that accompanied the end of the war.[10] By war's end, the Japanese people in the cities and villages perished in huge number from malnutrition and disease. Many of them already were malnourished at the beginning of the war. The most common household diet consisted of barley and potatoes, but even these had fallen into short supply.[11] By the government's own standard, an adult needed to consume approximately 2,200 calories a day in order to be able to carry out a light level of activity. In December 1945, rations supplied only a little better than half of this required amount.[12]

As Prof. John W. Dower related in his book, Embracing Defeat —Japan in the Wake of World War II—, the ravages of war can never be accurately quantified. The number of deaths usually cited for the Japanese Armed Forces was 1.74 million up to the time of surrender. However, we should say that this number is not accurate if we take into consideration civilian deaths

in air raids by the Allies. At least 3 million soldiers and civilians died in Japan as a result of the war, roughly 3 to 4 percent of the country's 1941 population of around 74 million. Approximately 4.5 million servicemen demobilized in 1945 were identified as being injured or ill and eventually, some 300,000 were given disability pensions.[13]

It was estimated that the air raids and the bombing campaigns by the Americans against Japan's homeland destroyed one-quarter of the country's wealth. General MacArthur's "SCAP" bureaucracy for the Allied powers placed the overall costs of the war even higher. Early in 1946, Japan had lost one-third of its total wealth and from one-third to one-half of its total potential income. Rural living standards were estimated to have fallen to 65 percent of prewar levels and non-rural living standards to about thirty-five percent.[14]

Sixty-six major cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had been heavily bombed. The catastrophic bombing had destroyed 40 percent of these rural areas overall and rendered around 30 percent of their population homeless. In Tokyo, the largest metropolis, 65 percent of all residences were destroyed. In Osaka and Nagoya, the country's second and third largest cities, the figures were 57 and 89 percent. Close to 9 million people in Japan were homeless after the war. In every major city, families were crowded under broken tents, in hallways, on subway platforms, or on sidewalks. Employees slept in their offices; teachers in their schoolrooms. A severe shortage of food continued for several years. People were walking in the streets with demoralized faces, most of them preoccupied with simply staving off hunger.[15]

Immediately after the war, prices of consumer goods fell suddenly, but within two months prices were on the rise again. The peace brought a brief upsurge in late 1945 and early 1946, but by the end of 1946, it was over. The result of currency confusion, inflation roared out of hand. Japan basically lost all the territory acquired after 1894. In addition, the Kuril Islands were occupied by the Soviet Union, and the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, were controlled by the USA. Japan's armament industries were dismantled. Over 500 military officers committed suicide in the following weeks after Japan surrendered. Over half a million Japanese soldiers were captured in Manchuria by the Soviet Red Army and taken as slave laborers into the

USSR. Between October 1, 1945 and December 31, 1946, over 5.1 million Japanese returned to their homeland on around two hundred Liberty Ships and LSTs loaned by the American military, as well as on the battered remnants of their own once-proud fleet. By October 31, 1945, a total of 31,617 American POWs were freed and processed through Manila, of whom 187 remained hospitalized. By the first week of 1946, 630,000 Koreans had already been repatriated. Repatriation of Asians also involved the return of over 31,000 Chinese POWs and collaborators to China, and roughly the same number of former Formosan colonial subjects to Formosa.[16]

Morale among Japanese troops after the surrender was very low. Over the next three weeks, it disintegrated almost totally. Reports forwarded to the office of Privy Seal Kido from prefectural governors and police officials told of units demanding immediate discharge. The new Prime Minister Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni had to deal with the problem of the burgeoning black markets. In fact, police report in late August and September 1945 indicated a list of thousands Japanese bureaucrats engaging in black-market activities.

Japanese prisoners in USSR after World War II.

(Image from japantimes.2xx.jp)

Queue for rations after the surrender.

(Image from japansociety.org)

Thousands of prisoners of war were dying from starvation.

Image retrieved from echoesofwar.wordpress.com

Image retrieved from histclo.com

Close to 9 million people in Japan were homeless after the war. In every major city, families were crowded under broken tents, in hallways, on subway platforms, or on sidewalks. Employees slept in their offices; teachers in their schoolrooms. A severe shortage of food continued for several years. People were walking in the streets with demoralized faces, most of them preoccupied with simply staving off hunger.

Eight years of total war of Japan (1937–1945) against China had destroyed China's economic development. The process of postwar reconstruction was a difficult task for the Chinese. Millions of acres in the northern part of the country were flooded after the Yellow River flood.[17] It is difficult to estimate the total loss due to Japan's seizure of the richest provinces, the naval and land blockade, and the general disruption of the national economy. However, it is easy to recognize that the war drastically reduced the economic benefits that China had achieved from World War I. The war and the postwar period of 1915–1930 saw the establishment of several modern commercial banks in China. Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation and Chinese commercial

banks financed almost all export trade. When World War II broke out in 1941, within months after the outbreak of hostilities, Western businesses and banks were forced to withdraw both personnel and capital from the Chinese market and relocate them to their home countries. British exports to China dropped by around 60 percent in many sectors over the course of the war, and those from France, Belgium, or the United States fared no better. The only exception to this struggle was Japan, which managed to expand its business operations and political influence on the Chinese homeland.

Difficult conditions that created high transportation costs hampered the development of industry and commerce during the war and postwar years. China's transport system was in shambles. The railway system was heavily damaged. Bridges and tracks had been destroyed by Allied bombing towards the end of the war. The war had left China in chaos. Much of the infrastructure was destroyed. The unoccupied cities had been bombed by Japanese planes in the first years of the war. In the last years of the war, American planes bombed the Japanese-occupied parts of north, east, and south China. Tens of millions of people were refugees, and several parts of China were stalked by famine.

To restore order and discipline, Naruhiko appointed as his second "cabinet counselor," Lt. Gen. Kanji Ishiwara, the leader of a new millenarian movement, —the Tō'A Renmei (East Asia League) —.[18] Kanji was primarily responsible for the Mukden Incident that took place in Manchuria in 1931. He was retired from active duty in 1941, and, after the defeat, he accepted the difficult position of helping the government to win public support for the Kokutai preservation movement. Like Higashikuni, he blamed the defeat on the degeneration of the Japanese people's morale. His message was focused on "The gods had willed Japan's defeat in order to make the nation repent and review its belief in the kokutai." Sharing the point of view of many Japanese intellectuals, he believed the military, the police, and the bureaucracy, by oppressing the people, bore great responsibility for what had happened; and the nation should surprise the enemy by carrying out reforms before occupation rule even began.

Prime Minister Higashikuni shared the same remarks at his first press conference, on August 28:

We have come to this ending because the government's policies were flawed. But another cause [of the defeat] was a decline in the moral behavior of the people. So, at this time I feel the entire nation —the military, the government officials, and the people— must thoroughly reflect and repent. Repentance of the whole nation is the first step in reconstruction, and the first step toward national unity.[19]

Hirohito's post-war behavior was the biggest surprise of all. Instead of an arrogant monarch wearing his military uniforms to review his troops, the Japanese discovered the existence of a resolutely civilian emperor, full of middle-class virtues and gauche affability, which they could stare at and even talk to with impunity.[20]

Hirohito did what he had to do, both to make the occupation acceptable for his people and to ensure the survival of the emperor system in the occupation framework.[21] As the symbol of the entire nation, he had no choice. With the total military defeat and the Soviet Union's obvious desire for conquest, these existential threats placed him in the humiliating position to do what the victors demanded.

Kazuo Kawai, an American political scientist, wrote: "The peaceful beginning of the occupation of Japan will always remain something of a mystery. The United States expected resistance and treachery. To their amazement, both sides discovered that the other was not what they had been to believe."[22]

Hirohito, behind closed doors, was the one who coordinated Higashikuni and Kanji's actions. He received the prime minister in private audiences twice from August 16 to September 2. He recommended that the focus needed to be on the issue that was important for the survival of the empire: controlling the people's reaction to defeat and keeping them obedient and unconcerned with questions of accountability.

Even though the Allies took control of Japan's administration early after the surrender, the Japanese authorities in concert with the Imperial Palace had

enough time to destroy hundreds of thousands of documents related to the war. In the weeks and months following the surrender, vast amounts of secret materials connecting Japanese war crimes to the nation's highest leaders went up in smoke, in accordance with the August 14 decision of the Suzuki cabinet. Did Hirohito ignore this decision? Three days later, with no sense of decency, the cabinet of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, which succeeded Suzuki's on August 17, presented the emperor to the nation "as the benevolent sage and apolitical ruler who had ended the war." The surrender-broadcast "ritual" described Hirohito as the emperor who had saved the Japanese people and the rest of the world from further destruction by atomic bombs.

On September 14, 1945, in Marioka, Iwate Prefecture, Kanji called on the entire nation to "repent" for having lost the war. He shared with his audience the idea that by the end of the twentieth century, the "final global battle [between the United States and the Soviet Union] will be upon us," and that the principle of the hakkō ichiu (the "eight corners of the world under one roof") still lived. Three days later, on September 17, MacArthur finally established his General Headquarters (GHQ) in the Dai Ichi Life Insurance Building in central Tokyo, directly opposite the Imperial Palace. There the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was able to read the first report on the war with the consequences.

About 24.2 percent of Japanese soldiers and 19.7 percent of Japanese sailors died during the Second World War, contrasted with 3.66 percent of U.S. Marines, 2.5 percent of U.S. soldiers, and 1.5 percent of U.S. sailors. Japanese military casualties from 1937 to 1945 have been estimated at 1,834,000, of which 1,740,000 were killed or missing. Some 388,600 of these were incurred in China, another 210,830 in Southeast Asia, and the rest in the Pacific. Of these, some 300,386 were naval fatalities, and some 334 Japanese warships were sunk during the war. The Japanese had suffered over 3 million dead and over 323,700 wounded (including 36,470 permanently disabled). Casualties in China were immense even before war broke out in the Pacific. More than 16 million Chinese people died during the Pacific War.

The total dead or missing were 41,592 for all U.S. Army ground troops in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, with another 145,706 wounded. The Marine

Corps and attached navy corpsmen suffered total casualties of 23,160 killed or missing and 67,199 wounded.[23] On the Asian continent, the war in the Pacific had important and lasting consequences. The first was the destruction of Japan's military and economic power. In 1945, the defeated Japan fell completely into disrepair. Sixty-eight Japanese cities were bombed, and all were partially or destroyed. Japan became a field of ruins with cities like Nagasaki and Hiroshima completely buried under rubble. Two million dead represented almost 3 percent of its pre-war population. The country was militarily occupied and placed under guardianship. Douglas MacArthur became military governor of Japan. The Imperial Japanese Army was dissolved, and a new constitution was established in 1947.

Clinton Hartley Grattan, an historian, wrote in 1949, "Of the material costs [of the war], the largest by all odds came from that most appalling innovation in ruthless destruction, air bombardment – especially area raids which were indiscriminate in that no specific target was aimed at. The assault on dwellings ranks as one of the great horrors of the war…Terror and obliteration air raids were considered successful almost in proportion to the number of people who lost their homes."[24]

According to another historian, William Henry Chamberlin:

About twenty out of every one hundred residences in Germany were destroyed. Two and a quarter million homes were destroyed in Japan and 460,000 in Great Britain. Every fifth Greek was left homeless and 28,000 homes in Rotterdam were obliterated…Ironically, the French suffered more from bombing by their American and British "liberators" than from the air attacks from their German invaders.[25]

The war's direct cost in money terms was $4 trillion (in then-current dollars). In 1950, Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray said that the ultimate monetary cost of a war is four times the direct cost. In the United States, the fiscal effects were immense. The price tag was $350 billion. All the taxes were raised. Five million people were added to the tax rolls during the war.[26]

Emperor Hirohito and General MacArthur.

(Image by U.S. Army photographer Lt. Gaetano Faillace)

The Pacific War 1941-1945

In 1918, Japan was dealing with the Spanish influenza. Of the 1.8 to 2 billion persons in the world, 600 million were affected and 30 to 40 million died from the pandemic. In Japan, 23 million persons were affected, and between 390,000 and 400,000 died. The first wave of the epidemic occurred in the country in August 1918, and many cases were reported in Tokyo in mid-October (10, 11). The second wave came in January 1920.

THE POTSDAM DECLARATION

The so-called “Potsdam Declaration” was signed on July 26, 1945. Written by Harry Truman and Clement Atlee, it was remotely approved by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The Soviet Union de facto accepted the terms when it declared war on August 8, 1945, to Japan. The document, which outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan, as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference. The ultimatum stated that, if Japan did not surrender, it would face “prompt and utter destruction.”

At first, the Japanese government rejected the terms of this declaration, before accepting them two weeks later following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9), and the USSR’s entry into war against the empire Nippon.

The Declaration

Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945

1) We, President of the United States, President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing hundreds of millions of our fellow citizens, we are united and, by mutual agreement, believe that Japan must be seen as an opportunity to put an end to this war.

2) The prodigious land, naval and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and China, repeatedly reinforced by their armies and air fleets on the Western Front, are preparing to deal the final blow to Japan. This

military power is supported and encouraged by the determination of all allied nations to continue the war against Japan until it ceases to resist.

3) The result of Germany's futile and senseless resistance to the standing forces of the free peoples of the world now arises in its terrible clarity to the Japanese people. The forces that are now converging on Japan are immeasurably greater than those that brought, in the face of the resistance of the Nazis, the devastation of the soil, industries and lifestyles of all the German people. The implementation of all our military power, supported by our determination, will involve the complete destruction of the Japanese armies and just as inevitably the total devastation of Japanese soil.

4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether it wants to continue to be led by these stubborn militaristic advisers whose ill-advised calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether it will follow the path of reason.

5) Below, the terms of our terms. We will not deviate from that. There will be no alternative. We will not suffer any delay.

6) The authority and influence of those who deceived and misgoverned the people of Japan by embarking on the conquest of the world must be eliminated forever, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice is impossible as long as irresponsible militarism is not driven out of the world.

7) Pending this new order and until there is proof that the Japanese Warring Power is destroyed, the sites of the Japanese territory designated by the Allies will be occupied in order to achieve the fundamental objectives that the Allies will we establish here.

8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration will be implemented and Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and some small islands that we will determine.

9) Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, will be allowed to return to their homes and will be able to lead peaceful and productive lives there.

10) We do not envisage that the Japanese race should be enslaved or that its nation would be destroyed, but rigorous justice must be applied to all war criminals, including those who abused our prisoners. The Japanese government must remove all obstacles to the renewal and strengthening of democratic currents among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, religion, and thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights, will be instituted.

Potsdam Conference session including Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Joseph Stalin (white uniform), William D. Leahy, Joseph E. Davies, James F. Byrnes, and Harry S. Truman (right). (image retrieved from Wikipedia)

The Potsdam Conference: From the left to the right: Winston Churchill (Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom); Harry S. Truman (33rd President of the United States); Joseph Stalin (Former Premier of the Soviet Union. (image rerieved from iwn.org.uk)



Potsdam Conference: Harry S. Truman, President of the United States. (image from Timetoast)

The meeting room used by Truman, Churchill and Stalin during the Potsdam Conference. (image from photoShelter)

July 1945: Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, during the Potsdam Conference. (image from Wikimedia)

Japan Empire Capitulation Speech

A few days after the atomic bombs exploded on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the beginning of the Soviet intervention in Manchuria, Emperor Hirohito announced to his people, on August 15, the surrender of Japan. The message is broadcast across the country. The surrender was signed on September 2, 1945 aboard the battleship USS Missouri.

(image retrieved from raylemire.com)

“To our good and loyal subjects, After much thought of the general trends prevailing in the world and the conditions that exist today in our empire, we have decided to settle the current situation as an exception. We have directed our Government to let the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union know that our empire accepts the terms of their Joint Declaration. To strive to establish the prosperity and happiness of all nations, as well as the security and well-being of our subjects, is the solemn obligation that has been passed on to us by our Imperial Ancestors and which we carry in our hearts. It is also because of our sincere desire to safeguard Japan and stabilize South East Asia that we

have declared war on America and Great Britain, because the thought of encroaching on the sovereignty of other nations or to expand our territory was far from us. But the war has been going on for almost four years now. Although everyone has done their best – despite valiant fighting by our military and naval forces, the diligence of our servants, and the dedication of our hundred million subjects – the war has evolved, but not necessarily to the Japan, while general trends around the world have all backfired on its interests. In addition, the enemy has implemented a new bomb of extreme cruelty, whose incalculable capacity for destruction has decimated many innocent lives. If we continued to fight, it would not only lead to the collapse and annihilation of the Japanese nation, but also the total extinction of human civilization.

However, how can we save the multitudes of our subjects? How can we atone for ourselves before the spirits of our imperial ancestors? That is why we have ordered the terms of the Joint Declaration of Powers to be accepted. We can only express our deepest regret to our Southeast Asian Allies who have unfailingly cooperated with our Empire to achieve the emancipation of the Asian lands. The thoughts of the officers and soldiers, as well as all the others, who have fallen in the field of honor, of those who died at their posts, of those who have stumbled before the hour and of all their bereaved families, we are heartbroken night and day. The well-being of the wounded and victims of war, and of all those who have lost their homes and livelihoods, is the object of our greatest concern. The evils and sufferings to which our nation will be subjected in the future will certainly be immense. We are fully aware of the most intimate feelings of all of you, our subjects.

Japan will be allowed to maintain the industries that allow it to feed its economy and extract just reparations in kind, excluding those that would give it the ability to rearm for war. To this end, access to raw materials – to be distinguished from their control – will be allowed. Japan’s eventual participation in international trade relations will be permitted.

The Occupying Forces of the Allies will withdraw from Japan as soon as these objectives have been achieved and a peace-oriented and responsible

government has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.

We call on the Japanese government to immediately declare the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide all guarantees of its good faith in this matter. The alternative for Japan is an imminent and complete destruction. However, it is in accordance with the decrees of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for an era of great peace for all generations to come by enduring what cannot be endured and by enduring the unbearable. Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the imperial state, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying on your sincerity and integrity. Keep yourself very strictly from any state of emotion that could lead to unnecessary complications, any fratricidal quarrels and struggles that could create disorder, drag you out of the way and make you lose the trust of the world.

May the whole nation be perpetuated as one family, from generation to generation, always firm in its faith in the imperishability of its divine soil, always bearing in mind the heavy burden of its responsibilities and the thought of the long road it remains to be seen. Use your strengths to dedicate them to building the future. Cultivate the paths of righteousness; nurture the nobility of spirit, and work with resolve, so that you can enhance the inherent glory of the imperial state and keep you at the forefront of progress in the world.

Hirohito, August 15, 1945.

Japan Capitulations Acts

Japan’s acts of surrender were signed by representatives of the Empire of Japan, the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, Canada, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, Kingdom of the Netherlands and New Zealand on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. By signing the acts, the Japanese ended the war against China as well as the Pacific War linked to the Second World War. Associated with the date when Emperor Hirohito announced the acceptance on August 15, 1945, of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, in a radio address (known as Gyokuon-hsa), this day is known as the Allied victory over the Empire of Japan.

Japan’s instrument of Surrender

(image retrieved from awesomestories.com)

Japan’s Surrender : Aboard of the USS Battleship Missouri

(image from USA Today)

“Acting by order and on behalf of the emperor, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, we hereby declare that we accept the conditions set out in the declaration issued by the Heads of Governments of the United States, of China and Great Britain, on July 26, 1945, in Potsdam and subsequently joined by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four Powers are referred to as the Allied Powers.” We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, all Japanese armed forces and all Japanese-controlled armed forces wherever they are located.

We hereby order all Japanese forces, wherever they are, and the Japanese people, to immediately cease hostilities, to preserve and save all ships, aircraft and property, military and civilians, and comply with all requirements that may be imposed by the Supreme Allied Commander; or by Japanese government agencies on his orders.

We herein order the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to immediately order commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control, wherever they are, to surrender unconditionally, with all the forces under their command.

We hereby order all civil servants and all officers of the Army and Fleet to obey and bring effect to all proclamations, orders and instructions that the Supreme Command of the Powers Al will consider the conditions of this surrender, which will be published by him or under his authority, to ensure the effective implementation of the conditions of this surrender, and we order them to remain in their posts and continue to serve as noncombatants, unless they are specially raised by him or by his order.

We hereby commit ourselves, on behalf of the emperor, the Japanese government and those who will succeed him, to execute in good faith the clauses of the Potsdam Declaration and to give all orders and take all measures that may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or any other qualified representative of the Allied Powers to ensure its execution.

We hereby order the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to immediately release all Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees currently under Japanese control and to ensure their protection, maintenance and substance and their immediate transport to the premises that will be fixed. In the direction of the State, the authority of the emperor and the Japanese government will be subordinated to that of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who will take all measures which he deems to ensure the execution of the conditions of surrender.

SIGNED in Tokyo Bay, Japan, at 0904 I on the second day of September 1945.

Mamoru Shigemitsu By order and on behalf of the emperor of Japan and the Japanese government Yoshijir Umezu By order and on behalf of Japan’s Imperial Headquarters.

Accepted in Tokyo Bay, Japan, at 0908 I on the second day of September 1945 for the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the interest of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

Douglas MacArthur Supreme Commander of allied Powers

Chester Nimitz U.S. Representative

Hsu Yung Chang Representative of the Republic of China

Bruce Fraser Uk Representative

Derevyanko Kuzma Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

T. A. Blamey Representative of Australia

Moore Cosgrave Representative of Canada

Philippe Leclerc Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic

D.E.L. Helfrich Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Leonard M. Isitt, New Zealand Representative.

Hirohito’s speech of surrender has shocked

millions of Japanese around the world

(image retrieved from Getty Images)

CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER FINAL

WAR IS OVER, TRUMAN ANNOUNCES; M'ARTHUR PICKED TO RULE JAPAN

PRESIDENT CALLS 2 LEGAL HOLIDAYS

The war is over. MacArthur will rule Japan.

(image retrieved from Cleveland Plain Dealer)

JAPANESE SURRENDER; WORLD WAR II END

Pearl Harbor Is Avenged!

AMERICAN POWE OVERWHELMS

Japanese Surrender : The end of WWII

Arkansas Gazette.
JAPAN SURRENDERS
ALLIED FORCES INSTRUCTED TO SUSPEND ACTION
MACARTHUR TO HEAD ARMY TO OCCUPY JAPAN
REPORTS LOSS OF CRUISER BY ENEMY ACTION
Truman Orders Japs To End War
Army Ready To Move Into Japan
JUBILANT FOLKS TAKE OVER CITY FOR THE NIGHT

Japan Surrenders

After Japan’s surrender in World War II, the country was shocked

(image retieved from Getty Images)

14

PAYING FOR THE WAR

T he Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945, signed by the governments of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom listed the conditions of surrender imposed on Japan. The declaration mentioned the conditions set by the declaration of Cairo which had limited Japanese sovereignty over the islands of Hondo, Hokkaido, Kouilou, Si Kok, and such other small islands that the Allies determined. [1] Japan would be completely disarmed and its forces demobilized. The authority of the emperor and the Japanese government would be subordinated to the supreme command of the Allied powers.

At first, Japan refused the terms of the ultimatum, but finally accepted after the Soviet Union declared war on August 8, 1945.[2] On August 10, 1945, the Japanese government announced that it was ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration issued in Potsdam. On August 14, 1945, Japan accepted the conditions, and Hirohito personally read the surrender order on the radio.[3] On September 2, 1945, Japan's unconditional surrender was signed in Tokyo Bay.[4] Gen. Douglas MacArthur accepted the surrender on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, as well as in the interests of other United Nations states at war with Japan. In total, the act of surrender was signed by representatives of the governments of nine states: United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, Canada, Provisional Government of the Republic Netherlands, and New Zealand.

At the conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, meeting in Moscow, from December 16 to December 26, 1945, it was decided to create two bodies responsible for Japan's problems: (1) a "Far East Commission," including representatives from eleven and then thirteen states (United States, United Kingdom, USSR,

China, France, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Philippines, Burma, and Pakistan) sitting in Washington, but able to meet in other locations, including Tokyo, and (2) an “Allied council for Japan” stationed in Tokyo, composed of the supreme Allied commander (S.C.A.P.) or his deputy, as president and representative of the United States, a representative of the USSR, a representative of China, and a fourth member representing the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

The Far East Commission was responsible for formulating the policy and principles by which Japan’s obligations under its surrender could be fulfilled. It could make its decisions by a majority of its members, but representatives of the “big four” (the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and the USSR) had a veto. Under a directive dated of October 25, 1945, from the supreme Allied commander, Japan had to suspend diplomatic and consular relations with all other states. During the preparatory work of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on July 11, 1947, the United States proposed to the 11 countries represented in the Far East Commission, a preliminary conference on preparing a peace treaty with Japan. The Soviet government objected that the peace treaty should first be the subject of an agreement of the “big four of the Pacific, i.e., the powers with veto power in the Far East Commission (United States, China, the United Kingdom, and the USSR).

The Soviet opposition forced the American authorities to postpone the execution of their project. On September 8, 1950, a Joint Memorandum from the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning the general basis upon which progress should be made looking toward a peace treaty with Japan.[5] The Secretaries of State and Defense have now agreed that the time has come to implement paragraph 5 of that memorandum. A United States political representative will go to Japan to discuss with General MacArthur the proposed treaty and by arrangements through and in cooperation with General MacArthur will discuss the proposed treaty with the Japanese government and also seek a procedure for Japanese participation in the treaty-making process which will assure genuine acceptance by the representatives of all important, non-Communist political group in Japan.[6] On September 14, 1950, the U.S. government announced its intention to expedite the conclusion of the Japanese treaty, using the diplomatic

negotiation procedure, which allowed certain states to be overruled. On October 26, 1950, the State Department issued a brief seven-point memorandum to all member countries of the Far East Commission, laying the groundwork for reconciliation with Japan. John Foster Dulles was quickly appointed President Truman's special representative with a mission to negotiate the peace treaty.[7]

After being communicated to states interested in the Japanese regulation from July 2 to 6, and on July 9 to all states at war with Japan, a joint Anglo-American draft presented on May 3, 1951, was published on July 12, 1951.[8] Based on the submissions received, the draft was slightly revised and republished on July 20, 1951. On the same day, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom invited fifty governments to meet at a conference on September 4, 1951, in San Francisco to conclude and sign a peace treaty with Japan based on being annexed to the convention. On July 30, 1951, subsequent invitations to the associated states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia brought the number of states called to participate in the San Francisco conference (including the United States and Japan) to fifty-five. Because of differences of opinion between the United States and Great Britain, under the proposal of France, it was decided not to invite the Chinese governments.[9]

After discussions and debates between the inviting powers, on August 13, 1951, a revised version of the Anglo-American draft was forwarded to the invited governments except for Burma, India, and Yugoslavia, which had declined the invitation to attend. The new text was published on August 15, 1951, and came into force on April 28, 1952, and officially ended the American-led Allied occupation of Japan. According to Article 11 of the treaty, Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts imposed on Japan both within and outside Japan.

While negotiated and concluded in the midst of the Korean War, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, by Japan and forty-eight of its former enemies.[10] According to Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951), Japan should pay reparations to the Allied powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.[11] At the base of

this treaty, the Japanese empire would sign a set of peace treaties with a set of countries. The resumption of these relations led to the negotiation of reparation agreements with neutral countries that made claims for war damages caused by Japanese forces. Reparation agreements were signed by Japan with Switzerland (Bern, January 21, 1955), Spain (Madrid, January 8, 1957), Sweden (Stockholm, September 20, 1957), and Denmark (Tokyo, May 25, 1959). Neither the Soviet bloc states nor the neutralist states of Asia (India, Burma) wanted to associate with the treaties of San Francisco. These states have sought to restore peace with Japan through bilateral negotiations that have resulted in separate peace treaties or agreements.

Several clauses in the San Francisco peace treaty deal with the economic sanctions to be imposed on Japan after the war. These clauses are of two kinds, some aimed at the liquidation of problems arising from the war, including reparations, restitutions, resumption of the Japanese foreign borrowing service, and the renunciation of Japan's claims arising from the war. The others concern Japan's future economic relations with its former enemies. Some countries that were victims of Japanese aggression were forcefully demanding full reparation for the war damage. At the beginning of the reparation negotiations, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam sought very large compensation, payable not only in services, but mainly in goods and currencies. However, faced with a trade deficit that had reached a record $2 billion since the surrender, Japan was unable to pay full war damages.[12]

The intervention of the U.S. government finally made it possible to find a compromise to this situation. This compromise is enshrined in Article 14 (a) of the treaty, which recognized that Japan should certainly pay the Allied powers compensation for the damage it caused during the war. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that Japan, facing a catastrophic trade deficit, did not have enough resources in the immediate future to ensure the complete repair of all this damage and to meet its other obligations. As a result, Japan agreed to open conciliatory talks with countries whose territories had been occupied by Japanese forces, in order to compensate them for the damage caused during the war. To this end, Japan committed itself to making the services of the Japanese people, in the field of

production and recovery, available to the Allied powers that wanted them, in return, these countries had to supply Japan with raw materials.

Another form of reparation has been provided for in Article 14 (a) 2 of the treaty which grants each Allied power the right to seize, retain, liquidate, or use all property, rights and interests of Japan and its nationals who, upon entry into the treaty, are under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Article 14 (a) of the San Francisco Treaty, which provided for only repairs in the form of services and limited Japan's ability to pay, greatly displeased the Asian states that had been subject to the Japanese occupation. Burma refused to sign the peace treaty. Indonesia, after signing it, refused to ratify it, concluding a bilateral peace treaty in 1958, with the reparations' agreement with Japan. The Philippines postponed ratification of the San Francisco Treaty until an agreement on reparations was reached, which was not signed until May 9, 1956.

A peace treaty and reparations agreement between Japan and Burma were signed on November 5, 1954, in Rangoon. In the case of Burma, peace with Japan was closely subordinated to the solution of the reparations problem. Also, the most developed of the ten articles that make up the peace treaty between Japan and Burma is the one relating to reparations (Art. V). This Article stated that Burma, which unilaterally ended the state of war with Japan in a declaration on April 30, 1952, will receive compensation: (1) Japan will provide Burma with services and products worth a total of 7,200 equivalent to US $200 million over ten years, and (2) Japan will make Japanese products or services available to Burma in the form of loans or participation in joint-ventures.[13]

Between Japan and the Philippines, there was a reparation agreement. This agreement signed in Manila on May 9, 1956, came into force on July 23, 1956. Under the reparation's agreement, Japan paid the Philippines US $550 million in compensation in twenty annuities. Of the US $550 million, US $500 million was in capital goods and US $50 million in services. Capital goods and services have been allocated to specific Philippine projects. However, US $20 million worth of services have been used to manufacture products that Japan exports to the Philippines. The government of Japan facilitated the granting of long-term loans or similar development

loans to the Philippines, up to a maximum of US $250 million, over twenty years. The terms of the loans and credits were agreed to for each transaction.[14]

With Vietnam, Japan signed two agreements, on May 13, 1959. These agreements, signed in Saigon, include a reparation agreement and an agreement on loans, written in Japanese, Vietnamese, and French, with the French text valid in case of differences of interpretation. Under the reparation agreement, Japan has committed to provide Vietnam with US $39 million worth of Japanese goods and services over a five-year period from the day the agreement enters into force. An exchange of notes stated that the total value of the products delivered as repairs should not exceed US $7.5 million. The products to be supplied by Japan were to be, as a rule, capital goods. The agreement also stipulated that Japan would provide the Republic of Vietnam with intergovernmental loans of up to US $7.5 million over a three-year period for the completion of one or more projects to be determined by an agreement signed by the two governments. In addition, an exchange of notes provided that long-term commercial loans or credits of up to US $9.1 million would be granted over a five-year period by Japanese private companies to the Vietnamese government or corporations dependent on the latter.[15]

In résumé, Japan signed the peace treaty with forty-nine nations in 1952 and concluded fifty-four bilateral agreements that included Burma (US $20 million, 1954, 1963), Thailand ¥ (5.4 billion, 1955), Switzerland, Netherlands (US $10 million, 1956), Spain (US $5.5 million, 1957), Indonesia (US $223.08 million, 1958), the Republic of Korea (US $300 million, 1965), the Philippines (US $525 million/¥ 52.94 billion, 1967), and Malaysia (Malaysian US $25 million/¥ 2.94 billion, 1967). Countries such as Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Pakistan, Laos, India, Cambodia, and other parties to the San Francisco Treaty, have given up on seeking reparations from Japan. Following India’s example, Pakistan even agreed on March 31, 1953, to return all Japanese assets seized on its territory. Cambodia and Laos informed the Japanese government that they were waiving their rights to reparations. As a sign of its recognition, Japan entered into agreements with these two states, on October 15, 1958, and March 2, 1959,

respectively, under which it granted, free of charge, ¥ 1,500 million to the first and ¥ 1 billion to the second.

The signing of these various peace treaties and the acceptance of paying damages to its former enemies constituted an admission by the Japanese government that crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were committed by Japanese troops in the Pacific and Southeast Asia during World War II. In the Cairo Declaration, issued on December 1, 1945, the heads of government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom had made known their determination “to remove from Japan all the Pacific Islands it has taken or occupied since the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.”[16] On November 6, 1946, the President of the United States announced that his country was ready to place the Pacific Islands under Japanese mandate under the tutelage of the United Nations, with the United States as an administering power. These are the Marshall, Carolina, and Mariana archipelagos, comprising about ninety-eight islands and groups of islets, with a total area of about 2,160 square kilometers and a population of about 48,000 inhabitants. These islands had been placed under Japanese mandate in a decision dated on December 17, 1920, by the NDS Council, taken under Article 22 of the covenant.

By the secret agreement on the entry into the war of the USSR against Japan, signed in Yalta on February 11, 1945, the heads of government of the United States and the United Kingdom recognized that the following claims of Russia must be met after Japan’s defeat: maintaining the status quo in Outer Mongolia, restoring Russia’s rights violated by the 1904 Japanese attack, including the return of the southern part of Sakhalin and the adjacent transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union. A draft guardianship agreement addressed to the Secretary-General of the organization was submitted to the council for approval in a letter dated on February 17, 1947. On April 2, 1947, the Security Council unanimously approved the text of a guardianship agreement proposed by the United States, after rejecting several amendments proposed by the United Kingdom, the USSR, and Poland. The guardianship agreement, approved on April 2, 1947, found in its preamble that:

Following the Second World War, Japan had ceased to exercise any authority over the formerly German islands north of Ecuador, attributing its administration, as a guardianship, to the United States. These islands are designated as a strategic area under Article 83 of the United Nations Charter. The agreement authorizes the United States, as an administering power to establish naval, military, and air bases to build fortifications, to post and employ armed forces in the territory under tutelage. The administration authority will have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory, and, subject to the provisions of the agreement, may apply all The Laws of the United States that it deems appropriate for the territory's situation.[17]

In the joint communiqué of the government of Japan and the government of the People's Republic of China (1972), China renounced its demand for war reparations from Japan. In the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, the Soviet Union waived its rights to reparations from Japan, and both Japan and the Soviet Union waived all reparations claims arising from the war. The unanimous approval of the draft guardianship agreement dated on April 2, 1947, by the United Nations Council is clear evidence that, under the international community, Japan was guilty of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity during World War II, and, to this end, Emperor Hirohito and the Japanese commanders deserved to be severely punished.

15

HIROHITO: A WARRIOR MONARCH

T he structure of the Meiji constitution placed Hirohito at the top of the state with a wider range of authority and influence that made him the most powerful political figure in Japan. He had the authority to enact constitutional amendments, determine administrative organizations, grant pardons, and determine military organization. Chief priest of the nation, he could issue imperial ordinances without legislative check. He could conclude treaties and no parliamentary consent was required. He was able to declare war and make peace, and the Diet was not allowed to intervene. As stated in, Article 11 of the constitution, the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were under the emperor's direct control. [1] Articles 11 to 13 took away matters from the civilian government and placed them under the responsibility of the emperor. The military was outside of the authority of the civil government, and consequently before any action or operation by military troops, the emperor was to be advised most notably by the Chief of the General Staff Office of the Army and the Chief of the Naval Staff Board. [2]

At the head of an increasingly powerful army, Hirohito drove his country to war and expansionism in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. On August 27, 1928, Japan became a signatory to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, known as Kellogg-Briand Pact. France and the United States presented this treaty to Japan in the spirit of international reconciliation endorsed at the Washington Conference. The fifteen nations that primarily signed the pact at Paris (France, United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, and Japan) renounced war "as an instrument of national policy" and promised to settle all disputes by peaceful means.

In the first of the two articles of the Pact, the signatories pledged "in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." In the second article, they agreed to resolve "by pacific means… all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin…which may arise among them."[3]

The Tanaka cabinet accepted the terms of the treaty and sent Privy Councilor Count Uchida Kōsai to Paris to inform the United States and other powers of Japan's special position in Manchuria. Uchida tried to convince the Western powers to accept that Manchuria would be exempted from the obligations imposed by the treaty. Although Minseitō and Seiyūkai politicians agreed to the ratification of the Pact, Hirohito, advised by Sakutarō Tachi, his teacher of diplomacy and international law, backed off from the treaty. Sakutarō mentioned the problem posed by Article 1, ("assuming the principle of popular rather than monarchical sovereignty, and convincing that the term was inconsistent with the kokutai.") In early 1930, Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi clashed with the navy general staff over the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Three years later, on February 25, 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.

In the early 1930s, in order to spread Japan's hegemony in the Pacific and Southeast Asia and defeat the United States' agenda looking to destabilize the monarchy he had inherited, Hirohito launched his country into war. In 1931, Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria. It has been said that, Hirohito was not aware of the highly complex operation known as the "Mukden Incident." Honjō's diary had shown that the emperor was informed on the incident. On April 18, 1931, Honjō wrote:

When His Majesty found out that the Kwantung Army had crossed the Luan River and was rushing into China proper beyond the borders, he summoned me and asked: "Can the Kwantung Army be ordered to cease its advances?" He seemed to be concerned that Japan's integrity was being undermined by the movement of Japanese troops toward Peking and Tianjin… I requested His Majesty to postpone issuing such an order… I was overwhelmed by his graciousness in readily agreeing to my request.[4]

The question is, if Hirohito was truly hostile to the operation of invading Manchuria, why he did not use his discretionary powers to stop military maneuvers or even punish Col. Kanji Ishiwara who led the attack with several members of the "Cherry Blossom Society"? [5] Japanese forces captured Changchun, north of Mukden, on September 19, 1931, and Kirin on September 21. Japanese planes based in Korea were used from September 19 onwards to bomb Chinese troops. On September 22, 1931, a Japanese brigade, based in Korea, returned to southern Manchuria. The version that indicated that Hirohito was not aware of the "Mukden Incident" is not correct when we look at all the facts. On September 19 a message from the commander of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. Shigeru Honjō, was sent to Lt. Gen. Senjūrō Hayashi of the Chōsen Army of Japan in Korea to send in reinforcements. A detachment of Japanese planes at Pyongyang departed for Mukden. Troops from the 20th Division at Seoul and Pyongyang were ordered to the Korea-Manchuria border to await further instructions. Hayashi wired Tokyo, requesting imperial orders to move into Manchuria. To stop the conflict, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a strong protest to the Japanese government and called for the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese army in Manchuria. The authorities in China appealed to the League of Nations. On September 21, 1931, elements of the Chōsen Army crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria. Gen. Yoshihide Hayashi, Commander of the Korean Army, who became in August 1937, part of the planning team for Operation Chahar in northern China, on his own authority, ordered the troops to cross the border while the cabinet of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō was still meeting.[6]

Nara's diary entry for September 22 related a conversation between Hirohito and the chief of staff, Gen. Hanzō Kanaya:

In the afternoon, when I was summoned by the emperor, he asked me whether I had warned the chief of staff [Kanaya] not to broaden the action. I replied, "Yes, I did warn him, but even without my warning, he understood very clearly both the Cabinet's intention and your Majesty's will, and he is already addressing each part of the problem in turn. Regrettably it is touch-

and-go with the outlying army, and they often go their own way." [Later] At 4:20 P.M. Chief of Staff Kanaya had an audience with the emperor and asked him to approve, post facto, the dispatch of the mixed brigade from the Korean army. I heard the emperor says that although this time it couldn't be helped; [the army] had to be more careful in the future.[7]

As Prof. Herbert P. Bix in his book, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, wrote:

Having now understood the need to reinforce the vastly outnumbered Kwantung Army's forward units, Hirohito accepted the situation as a fait accompli. He was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire. If that involved a brief usurpation of his authority, so be it – so long as the operation was successful.[8]

Not only was Hirohito not indignant by the behavior of the Japanese troops, but he backed up the actions of Gen. Jirō Minami, the Governor-General of Korea, Lt. Gen. Senjūrō Hayashi, the commander of the Chōsen Army, and Lt. Gen. Shigeru Honjō, the commander of the 10th Division of the Kwantung Army. Those three officers to the benefit of their career were rewarded by the emperor for their actions. Hirohito honored or promoted a total of 3,000 military and civilian officials for their deserved services during the occupation of Manchuria and the capture of Shanghai. Kanji was promoted to general. Hirohito called Shigeru to his side in 1933, making him his first aide-de-camp, (from this position, Shigeru became one of the most powerful officers of the Imperial Army). Col. Seishirō Itagaki was promoted to the rank of general and became minister of war in 1939. Shortly after the "Mukden Incident," the commander of the Japanese troops in Korea, Gen. Senjūrō Hayashi, first became minister of war and then, briefly, prime minister of Japan in 1937. Shigeru Honjō, respectively, commander of the Kwantung Army, became later minister of the army,

minister of the navy, and was elevated to the rank of baron by an imperial order.

The “Mukden Incident” was called for duplicity not only by the generals and colonels who were the instigators, but also by Hirohito himself, who, behind the scenes, had encouraged the operations. Indeed, the conspiracy was mounted on such a colossal scale, mobilizing such resources, that it proved impossible that it took place without the consent of the authorities at the highest level in Tokyo, including the Imperial Palace. As Richard Storry noted, it was likely that an imperial proclamation “aimed at restraining the army in Manchuria or later China would have been obeyed by the vast majority of officers.” This imperial proclamation never fell within the emperor’s plan for a rotten situation.[9]

Six years after the invasion of Manchuria, in 1937, with Hirohito’s endorsement, the Second Sino-Japanese War was launched. Japanese troops invaded China on July 7, 1937, and perpetrated atrocities on the people of Nanking. The Second Sino-Japanese War became the largest Asian war in the twentieth century. More than 10 million Chinese civilians and over 4 million Chinese and Japanese military personnel died from war-related violence, famine, and other causes. The war has been called the “Asian holocaust.”

As time passed, Hirohito became more involved in Japanese politics throughout the 1940s.[10] On April 13, 1941, after the short Soviet-Japanese Border War, the Japanese decided to violate the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression pact signed by Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for Japan; and, on the other side, by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov for the Soviet Union. The treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan ensured the neutrality between the two countries during World War II. It allowed them to avoid fighting on multiple fronts. For Stalin, this decision was based on the belief that if Germany had launched an attack against his country, the Soviet Union would be only preoccupied with fighting Germany, and not too worried about fighting at the same time with Japan. For Hirohito, this non-aggression pact would make Japan feel less threatened by any possible Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and would allow Japan to have enough

provisions and capabilities to start a war with the United States and Great Britain.

Personally, Hirohito gave the green light to the plan to attack the Soviet Union after Hitler invaded this country in June 1941. With 134 divisions at full fighting strength and 73 more divisions for deployment behind the front, Germany troops launched a surprise attack against the Soviets on June 22, 1941. Known as Operation Barbarossa, the invasion is considered as one of the largest military operations in the history of modern warfare. Germany and its allies assembled more than 3,000,000 German soldiers, supported by 650,000 troops from Germany's allies (Finland and Romania), and later augmented by units from Italy, Croatia, Slovakia, and Hungary. Soon after the invasion, German military and civilian occupation policies led to the deaths of millions of Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet civilians.

It is often said of Hirohito's intention to normalize Japan's relations with China.[11] This was a complete lie. After the October 1931 plot in which Prince Chichibu was involved, the conspirators plotted a "coup" on the model of the "March Conspiracy," but much more deadly, in order to facilitate the nomination of a government more dedicated to enter into a total war with China. The military involved in the coup not only intended to dissolve parliament and force the emperor to ch oose a military government, but also consider assassinating all the Ministers in place. Dr. Shumei Okawa and Lt.-Col. Kingoro Hashimoto, very active members of the Cherry Blossom Society, were arrested and briefly detained by the Japanese military police. On October 17, 1931, both men were immediately released. Hirohito forced this decision because he knew that his brother, Yasuhito, Prince Chichibu, was among the conspirators. Yasuhito sought to remove the former admiral Tōgō Heihachirō (Russian Japanese war hero, then tutor of the emperor) from his retirement to become prime minister. Having failed in this mission, he then sided with the conspirators.

Hirohito immediately dismissed his brother's idea to replace the government of the day whose prestige was greatly damaged by the blame of the League of Nations after the seizure of power in Manchuria and the March and October plots. On Saionji's advice, he summoned the Seiykai's leader, seventy-five-year-old Tsuyoshi Inukai, to whom he proposed the

post of prime minister. As Inukai was an old friend of Chiang Kai-shek, his presence as prime minister, according to the emperor's calculation, could put an end to the scramble between China and Japan after the "Mukden Incident." Hirohito formally instructed Tsuyoshi to establish a lasting peace with China and restrict the power of the military. "The military's interference in domestic and foreign policy," he told Inukai, "is a situation that we must consider with concern for the good of the nation."

Deep down, Hirohito had no intention of crushing the activists and normalizing relations with China. In secret, he torpedoed the peace negotiations initiated by the Japanese government with Chiang Kai-shek. With the collaboration of Prince Kan'in, his great-uncle, "a member of the Fushimi clan," he made sure to thwart any peace project with China and encouraged another reverse movement to damage the prime minister's efforts for moderation. He left the activists of the Cherry Blossom Society free to conspire at their ease. Worse still, any tendency to reach an agreement with China collapsed in March 1932 with the "Shanghai Incident" still being engineered by the Japanese with the support of the imperial house.

The Shanghai Affair was modeled on the Mukden Incident. It was the basis of a deliberate provocation against the Chinese by Japanese civilians and sailors intended to bring about military intervention. Japanese navy troops attacked Kuomintang's armies on the outskirts of Shanghai. For several weeks, fierce fighting took place, with the two armies face-to-face. Japanese planes bombed Chinese civilians, killing several thousand people. It all started when, on January 8, 1932, a Korean separatist threw a bomb at what he believed to be the emperor's carriage, while Hirohito was on his way to a military magazine. The Korean, unfortunately, attacked the wrong carriage. In the territories occupied by the Japanese on Chinese territory, Japanese troops, in a sign of revenge, passed their rage on the civilian population.

At the same period, on the road to war, naval officers presented Hirohito the plan on how to meet the navy's national defense requirements. Adm. Kanji Kato, the leading opponent of the Washington Naval Treaty, began to pressure him to enlarge the geographic sphere of national defense. Kanji

advised him that “the safety of the empire’s homeland required confronting American naval forces deployed in the Western Pacific rather than in waters closer to home as specified in the 1923 policy.”[12] Hirohito approved Kanji’s report. He accepted the idea to build a big navy with the capacity to win any decisive naval battle against the United States. In terms of the report of the naval chief of staff and vice chief of staff, Adm. Kanji Kato, and Vice Adm. Nobumasa Suetsugu, Japan refused “any limit on the navy’s heavy cruiser tonnage of less than 70 percent of the individual cruiser strengths of the American and British fleets.” Although Washington and London had announced they might form a naval alliance against Japan if it did not comply with the warship ratios worked out at the Washington Conference, the group —Kanji and Suetsugu—getting the support of the emperor refused to accept any limit on the navy’s heavy cruiser tonnage of less than 70 percent of the individual cruiser strengths of the American and British fleets. Using the situation as a pretext, on December 29, 1934, Japan formally renounced the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.

It is impossible to underestimate the significance of this decision. As C. Peter Chen wrote:

The treaty limited Japan to 315,000 in total tonnage of naval strength when the U.S. and Britain were each given a limit of 525,000. The reasons were that the United States had to protect two extended coastlines, and Britain had colonial responsibilities world-wide. Japan refused such reasoning and refused to be treated as a second-rate power. By the end of 1941, Japan would commission the 65,000-ton Yamato… its sister ship Mussahi was by then already being fitted out in the docks.[13]

The action of personally taking command of the division of the imperial guards to quell the revolt on the night of February 26, 1936, was another example on how Hirohito had strong control on the troops. On the night of February 26, with the assent of Prince Chichibu, two units of the 1st Division of the Imperial Guard in Tokyo, which were to be transferred to Manchuria, revolted and launched an assault on several ministers, the

metropolitan police station, as well as, the offices of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper. Although the rebels succeeded in assassinating several leading officials, including two former prime ministers and in occupying the government center of Tokyo, they failed to assassinate Prime Minister Keisuke Okada and take control of the Imperial Palace. On February 28, 1936, Hirohito issued a decree ordering the rebels to "withdraw as soon as possible" from the occupied areas. The following day, he issued an ultimatum. A few hours later, with the help of tanks and planes, he put an end to the rebellion. During a series of closed trials nineteen rebel officers were sentenced to death and were executed for mutiny and another forty imprisoned.[14]

In his book, Japan's Decision in Surrender, regarding the emperor's role, Robert Butow states:

As the years passed, the sovereign was no longer allowed in any way personally to direct the affairs of the state or to meddle with the machinery of government. He could question or caution his ministers and advisers on matters within their competence and jurisdiction, but he could not override policies formulated by the appropriate organs of state. When there was unanimity in the civil administration and the military command, the emperor could do nothing but approve what was obviously the will of the state…Under no circumstances did the emperor ever assume personal direction of the government.[15]

In this monumental work, Butow pointed out the nature of the emperor's power:

Although the trend of the decision should be ascribed to the personal preference of the man himself, the real significance of the role of the emperor lies in the influence of the Throne and not in the authority or personality of its occupant. Despite the wording of the constitution, the

emperor had never possessed the actual power to decide on war or peace. Even under the pressing circumstances of August 1945, the emperor was only the instrument, and not the prime mover of Japan’s momentous decision.[16]

Crown Prince of his father, Taishō Yoshihito, Hirohito ascended the throne in 1926 after five years in the regency. Emperor with a “divine” power, according to article 1 of the Imperial Constitution, he chose the name Shōwa to call his regime. (image retrieved from art.com)



The Emperor and his wife Empress Kojun and their children on 7

December 1941. From « images of Japan » published by Mainichi Shimbun.

On May 22, 1939, along with members of the government and the Army High Staff, Hirohito attending the parade of 22,000 cadets in military uniform. The parade was part of a tour of the Imperial House to mobilize and raise awareness among young people in the preparations for the war. (image retrieved from Getty Images)

Emperor Hirohito visiting Hiroshima in 1947. Unknown author - Japanese book «Asahi Historical Photographs Library: War and People 1940-1949 Vol.4» published by Asahi Shimbun Company. This photograph has already been made public.

Emperor Hirohito’s Japanese surrender speech from August 15, 1945, in which Japan accepted the Allies terms of surrender. (image retrieved from The Atlantic)

In Tojo and the Coming of the War, as with many Western scholars, such as David A. Titus, Stephen S. Large, and Peter Wetzler, Butow believed that Emperor Hirohito was personally against going to war with the United States; but as the symbol of the state, cultural identity, and unity of the Japanese people, he could not reverse the unanimous decision for war by the military and the Tōjō cabinet. He remained the passive, withdrawn monarch-scientist, the marine biologist, who was kept inadequately informed of his government's decisions and was in any case unable to control the military, who, while involving the imperial will, in fact imposed their own.[17]

In the Age of Hirohito, Daikichi Irokawa shared the same idea of an emperor who was not involved directly in the affairs of the state and allowed the military to act.[18] On this occasion, there were several violations of the emperor's supreme command. In accordance with the wishes of Gen. Kanji Ishiwara and other planners, the commander of the Kwantung Army, Shigeru Honjō, ordered a general offensive and occupied all of Manchuria on his own authority. Even though Hirohito had been presented with the plan, he had not specifically approved it… These incidents were serious arrogations of imperial authority.

Irokawa painted Hirohito as an emperor who rarely participated in the personal direction of the government. According to this view, the generals, admirals, and nationalist officials who wielded the real power in the government had dictated the bellicose imperial rescripts that accompanied the progress of Japanese arms at every step. Irokawa states:

At times the emperor exercised his authority, on other occasions he did not, according to Sackett's vigorous questioning followed the course of events such as the Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese War, and finally the war between Japan and the United States. In these cases, the emperor did not exercise his authority and allowed major incidents and acts of aggression. Moreover, rather than punishing those responsible for the crimes of aggression, the emperor repeatedly honored them.[19]

David A. Titus, another scholar, has persuasively demonstrated that the question of the emperor's responsibility in Japan's war engagement is not historically decided, although he is the supreme commander of the army and navy under the Meiji constitution. Titus pointed out several important points that show under the institutional characteristic of imperial Japan, although his role as daigensui (commander in chief) must act as a constitutional monarch whose decision is guided by his advisers. First, starting in 1941, with the lord keeper of the privy seal, Kōichi Kido, as a negotiator between the court and the government, the court "provided the all-important negotiation and ratification mechanism at the apex of the political process;" and second, that the emperor did play a role as the ultimate "unifier" of national policies after his officials reached consensus. In Titus' argument, before the emperor ratified any policy, he made sure that the policy had been "thoroughly discussed and represented a genuine consensus among the policy makers." Titus pointed out that the emperor "was kept from active and direct participation in the consensus-making process by formalities and precedents governing his relations with government leaders, individually and collectively."[20]

General MacArthur said in his memoirs, published in 1964, that Hirohito, by renouncing divinity, had assumed for himself "a leading part in the democratization of his people," and that his subjects, who revered him, who had one been forbidden even to gaze upon him, came to respect and admire him.

Contrary to these arguments, for Professor Herbert P. Bix, "Hirohito was at the center of the political, military, and spiritual life of his country in the broadest and deepest sense, exercising his authority in directions that proved disastrous for his people and for the countries that were invaded." From 1937, Bix declared, "Hirohito gradually became a true warlord, influencing the planning, strategy, and conduct of operations in China." According to the historian:

Hirohito and his key advisers participated directly and decisively as independent forces in policy making. Acting energetically behind the scenes, Hirohito influenced the conduct of his first three prime ministers, hastened the collapse of political party cabinets, and sanctioned opposition to strengthening the peace machinery of the League of Nations. When resistance to his interventions provoked open defiance from the army, he and his advisors drew back and connived at military aggression.[21]

In his book, Hirohito: Behind the Myth, Edward Samuel Behr referred to Hirohito as a “manipulator” capable of decisive and ruthless actions. According to Francis Pike, in Hirohito’s War:

As for his responsibility for Japan’s war crimes in Asia, including mass executions, the use of gas and biological weapons and human experimentation, it seems unlikely that Hirohito was totally unaware of atrocities, particularly in China. However, there is no proof that he was informed about them and certainly no evidence that he was in any way an instigator of policies that in the case of China, where an estimated twenty million civilians died, were in effect genocidal. In international war crimes law, as established at the tribunal at Nuremberg, Tokyo, Shanghai, Darwin, and elsewhere after World War II, guilt for atrocities was determined merely by dint of responsibility. In other words, ignorance of war crimes was no defense for the senior commanders on trial. On this principle, Hirohito, as Japan’s commander-in-chief, would almost certainly have been found guilty and executed if he had been placed before the Tokyo Tribunal.[22]

Prof. Kiyoshi Inoue, a constitutional and legal historian at Kyoto University, in an article Ho no Ronri Rekishi no Ronri (1948), (The Logic of Law and the Logic of History) concluded:

This was a man who, with all power in his hands, made the decision [to go to war] after taking into consideration all opinions and ascertaining all information with great care. It was not at all a decision made by a person whose freedom of action was deprived mentally or physically, or who had lost the ability to think.[23]

Several Japanese historians believed that Hirohito could not be held responsible for any of the steps that led to World War II because he was unaware of what was going on behind the scenes and was, in any case, lacking any real power.[24] This opinion according to the facts pointed out by Bix and others seems incredible. Not only did Hirohito endorse Japan's war against China from 1937 to 1945, but he secretly criticized his generals who had misled him by promising him quick victories and were not winning them fast enough. Another important fact was that no major decision promotion or troop movement could occur without the emperor's seal of approval. No decision of even minor importance was implemented without first being scrutinized by him. His seal was needed on any document promulgating any decision of importance. A member of the imperial family confirmed in an interview that "the emperor always read everything he put his seal to."[25] As Tōjō said during the court proceedings at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), "Hirohito was the ultimate arbiter of the situation. No Japanese subject would go against the will of His Majesty."

Through the imperial household minister, the lord privy seal, the chief aide-de-camp, and the grand chamberlain, Hirohito knew everything that was going on; not only within the privy council, the supreme war command, and the cabinet, but within the many ultranationalist clubs and secret societies as well. In the month following Tanaka's appointment, with his approval, a group of leaders convened to prepare for the Far Eastern Conference, which took place in Tokyo from June 27 to July 7, 1927. The specialists who sat on the preparatory committee included some of the most uncompromising advocates of Japanese expansionism and authoritarian nationalism in the ranks of the military and intelligence establishments. Two of them were particularly close to Hirohito; Viscount Machijiri, a former subordinate of Prince Higashikuni in Paris, and Major Anami, who later became Japan's

last wartime defense minister. Attended also were the Japanese minister in Peking, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, who served as the forty-sixth foreign minister of Japan in 1932, and Shigeru Yoshida, consul in Mukden and later served as prime minister of Japan from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1954. Yoshida was one of the longest-serving Japanese prime ministers, and was the third-longest-serving prime minister of post-occupation Japan.

The Far Eastern Conference was the first open meeting of Japanese officials to discuss the various alternatives open to Japan in her determination to increase her influence in Asia. Entitled the "Tanaka Memorial," it was the text of a formal document submitted by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi to Hirohito in 1927 as an "address to the throne." In this document Tanaka laid out a strategy to take over the world.[26] Based on this agenda, Hirohito allowed the Manchukuo Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to happen. He promoted those responsible for them. Fully aware of the Japanese's plan to attack the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, he did not take any decision that would have prevented the action to happen. He not only was aware in advance of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor; he also knew the plan of the Japanese army to take over French Indochina in 1941. He openly questioned whether this should not also be accompanied by an invasion of Thailand.

In 1975, Inoue Kiyoshi, a doctrinaire communist, and a specialist in modern Japanese history, published Tennō no Sensō Sekinin (The Emperor's War Responsibility). In this book, the author criticized the imperial system. He was also very critical of "Japanese militarism." Yasuaki Onuma, a professor at Tokyo University in Japan, wrote in 1987, 'Saiban Kara Sengo Sekinin no Shiso E' (From the Tokyo Trial to the Concept of Post-war Responsibility). In his writings, Professor Onuma concluded that the victorious nations knowingly overlooked Emperor Hirohito's guilt.

Richard Minear in Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971) argued that the failure to prosecute key war criminals, —particularly the emperor— showed that the trial was merely a political construct of the victor nations. John W. Dower, in Embracing Defeat (1999), wrote that "America, by choosing to ignore Hirohito's guilt and by participating in the

cover-up of this fact, came close to turning the whole issue of ‘war responsibility’ into a joke.” [27]

A few months before the attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō, addressing the emperor, said: “As soon as Your Majesty has decided to open hostilities, we will endeavor to fulfill our “must.” According to the historian, “Having taken this position Hirohito devoted himself entirely to governing and leading the war to victory at all costs.”

Prime Minister Tōjō said later in 1942: “The emperor is the Godhead…and we, no matter how hard we strive as Ministers, are nothing more than human.” Many Japanese kamikazes, in suicidal charges, before the mission, pronounced the last words, “Tenno Heika Banzai! (Long live the emperor!)”

Hirohito’s New Year’s Day message for 1943 was a strong statement made to motivate Japanese troops with a prediction that Japan was closer to victory. The emperor said:

The Darkness is very deep, but dawn is about to break in the Eastern Sky. Today the finest of the Japanese Army, the Japanese Navy and Air Units are gathering. Sooner or later they will head toward the Solomon Islands where a decisive battle is being waged between Japan and America.[28]

A few months before this statement, Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki, in describing Japanese emotions in 1942, noted in his diary:

How brilliant was the first stage operation up to April! And what miserable setbacks since Midway in June! The invasions of Hawaii, Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia [the] liberation of India and destruction of the British Far Eastern Fleet have all scattered like dreams. Meanwhile, not to speak of

capturing Port Moresby, but the recovery of Guadalcanal…turned out to be impossible.[29]

On April 18, 1942, the Americans staged the Doolittle Raid, bombing Tokyo and other places on Honshu. The raid planned and led by Lt. Col. James Doolittle caused negligible material damage to Japan, but had major psychological effects. Hirohito very concerned about the ability of military leaders to defend the home islands, gathered the Army General Staff led by Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama at the Imperial Palace. During the meeting, he bitterly declared to the generals, "When are you going to start striking the enemy on all fronts? Could we not win even one spectacular success against the United States? We cannot continue to retreat in this way."[30]

In mid-February 1943, after the setback suffered by the Japanese troops during the Imperial Navy's landing operation on Savo Island, near Guadalcanal, Hirohito who learned the failure of the Japanese navy air force exposed to the attacks of the American forces under Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, addressing to Admiral Nagano, chief of the Navy General Staff, said:

I wonder if the army and navy are really cooperating. You give me all kinds of excuses, such as thick fog and so on, but it should have been thought of beforehand. I would like to know whether the army and the navy have any dialogue together. We cannot win with a lack of cooperation. If we continue to fight in this way, we will only delight the Chinese, disturb neutral countries, sorry our allies, and weaken the sphere of co-ownership. Is there no way, then, somewhere, in any way, to identify American forces and destroy them? Would the services be able to overcome their jealousies and cooperate in consolidating their newly won positions in the Solomons and in eastern New Guinea, where preparations were underway for launching a ground attack on Port Moresby?[31]

Nagano apologized by acknowledging that everything in the Solomons and Bismarck Sea was in peril. Hirohito asked angrily, “There is no sign of any attacks. Why aren’t you carrying them out?”[32]

Hirohito’s concern over the limitation of naval weapons and the setbacks of German and Italian troops, which formed the Axis powers with Japan, were another example that clearly showed that he was not only acting in the war in the Pacific, but was also closely following the course of the fighting on the European continent. At the very beginning of his reign, when the conflict broke out between “moderates,” the liberal minority (embodied by Prince Saionji Kinmochi), that was resolutely hostile to war and was determined to extend Japan’s traditional friendship with America and Western countries, and on the other side, the supporters of fascism, those who believed in the success of an immediate war, Hirohito did not decide. Far from following the advice of some members in his circle who believed that war was a long-term goal, Japan had every interest in abstaining from fighting for a few years, in order to build a much more overwhelming power, rather, the emperor was tempted by the idea of setting in motion as soon as possible and using the advanced military machine to carry out his expansionist plan. Thus, in his blind ambition to conquer the world, he began the annexation of the territories of Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

According to the “Sugiyama Memo,” as well as the diaries of Fumimaro Konoe and Kido Kōichi, Hirohito had many informal meetings with his chief of staff and his ministers during the Second World War. These documents showed that he was kept informed of all military operations and he frequently asked senior management several questions about the deployment of troops, and sometimes, he gave his opinion on how to conduct the war. In July 1937, he signed the imperial decree that allowed Japan to go to war against China. On September 27, 1940, he approved the agreement of the Japanese government with Rome and Berlin, the Tripartite Pact. Immediately after, with his consent, Japan invaded Indochina on September 22, 1940. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who has pursued a dual policy since 1939, issued an embargo on oil deliveries to Tokyo. Hirohito, sulking at the American threats that demanded of Japan the withdrawal of its troops in China and other occupied territories in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, signed on behalf of the Japanese people, a

neutrality agreement with the Soviet Union on April 13, 1941. At the same period, he endorsed the decision of the Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama and Army Minister Tōjō for the invasion of Malaya and the Philippines.

According to many historians, such as Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito, authorized by specific orders, forwarded to the heads of state-major of the army, Prince Kan'in Kotohito and Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, the use of chemical weapons against civilians and Chinese soldiers. He approved the use of toxic gases several times during the Wuhan invasion in 1938. The use of the same weapons was also allowed during the Changde Invasion.

According to other historians, Akira Fujiwara and Akira Yamada, Hirohito has made direct interventions in several military operations. For example, from January to February 1942, to increase the number of Japanese troops in the Philippines, he pressed Sugiyama several times. He ordered the general to launch an attack on Bataan. In August 1943, he expressed his anger at Sugiyama who was unable to stop the American advance on the Solomon Islands, and asked him to consider other places to attack.

The analysis of the Japanese archives including documents written by Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, (three times prime minister), Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu, (Hirohito's younger brother), and finally, the seal keeper, Marquis Kōichi Kido, confirmed the active role played by Hirohito during the war. According to the monumental work published in five volumes between 1973 and 1974, under the title Daihon'ei senshi, Hirohito proved by his attitudes and actions to be the supreme commander of the Imperial Japanese Army. He led the war in the Pacific that claimed the lives of nearly twenty million people in Asia, three million Japanese, and sixty thousand Allied soldiers. He presided over all important high-staff meetings and controlled the activities of troops on the ground.

He oversaw all troop movements and military promotions, knowing that it is certain that he was fully informed in advance of what the commanders of his army were planning. On February 24, 1933, the Japanese delegation, defying world opinion, withdrew from the League of Nations Assembly after the assembly had adopted a report blaming Japan for events in Manchuria. In March 1933, Hirohito signed the imperial decree of Japan's

withdrawal from the Society of Nations. In 1934, he condoned an attack by his followers on Dr. Minobe, a law professor. Minobe was attacked for challenging the “sacred and inviolable” character of the “imperial will” in the constitution. Minobe was forced to resign from his position in the House of Peers in September 1935. He was later the victim of two attacks.

Most of Hirohito’s imperial interventions were made by direct orders, such as the crushing of the rebellion during the February 26 Incident. The Japanese archives, updated since the nineties, demonstrated that indeed, each order to use chemical weapons must receive the express approval of the emperor. They also showed that the decision to suspend the international rights of civilians was indeed authorized by a specific Hirohito directive to Prince Kan’in in August 1937. Even though Hirohito publicly let his military leaders conduct the war, behind the scenes, he played a key role in the decision made by the high commander of the Imperial Japanese Army to conquer the territories of several countries in the Pacific. In December 1936, the Japanese officials ratified the Anti-Comintern Pact. For several years, Japan was at war with most countries in the Pacific. As commander in chief of the army and navy, Hirohito was involved in a secret program to develop the nation’s air defense network, which was upgraded to prevent attacks by American bombers. As Japan’s emperor, he did everything to prevent the Americans from conquering and defeating Japan. Close to defeat, he approved the launching of thousands of hydrogen balloons carrying incendiary bombs that travel five thousand miles across the Pacific to America.

Marxist historians, Kamei Katsuichirō, Takeyama Michio, Matsuda Michio, Inoue Kiyoshi, Tōyama Shigeki, Toma Seita, Minzoku Ishiri, Suzuki Shirō, Eguchi Bokuro, Matsumoto Shinpachiro, and Ishimoda Shō have traced the inherently “criminogenic” character of the imperial system. These Marxists made the ruling class in Japan particularly Emperor Hirohito as responsible for the war, and they called for a reappraisal of the importance of the “spirit” of the time, its psychological context, and its influence on decisions. For them, “the historical narrative must serve to anchor a true democratic consciousness among the majority of the Japanese, and this justifies that we insist on the historical reconstruction of the Shōwa era, and on the responsibility of the dominant layers of society in the world.”

Other Japanese intellectuals, such as Maruyama Masao, folklorist Wakamori Tarō, Shinohara Hajime, philosopher Matsuzawa Hiroaki, and Nezu Masashi were also at the center of the debates of the historical consciousness of post-war Japan. Many of them have written about the demonic personality of Hirohito, who did not hesitate between January and December 1941 to launch his country into war while recognizing the stakes and risks to which Japan was exposed in taking this direction.

According to historians and experts —Bix, Dower, Kentaro, Pike, Yoshiaki, Yoshida, Kasahara, Ienaga, and Yoshiaki— and some revelations from people close to the Imperial Palace, it emerges that Hirohito was not a toy of the unscrupulous military. He had great influence in the decisions taken by the government and the high commander of the Imperial Japanese Army. Personally, he gave the green light to the plan to attack the Soviet Union after its invasion by Hitler in June 1941. He decided to violate the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty signed on April 13, 1941. A few years earlier, with its endorsement, the Second Sino-Japanese War was launched. This conflict began following Japan's invasion of eastern China in 1937 and lasted until 1945. As commander-in-chief of the Japanese army and the Japanese navy, he put no obstacle to the militarization of Japan in the 1930s and its ultranationalist excesses. The emergence of documents long buried in the personal papers of one of his assistants, Terasaki Hidenari, published in 1990 by his daughter under the title The Monologues of the Emperor, confirmed with more veracity the important role that Hirohito played during the war.

In December 1936, he ratified the Anti-Comintern Pact, an agreement concluded first between Germany and Japan (Nov. 25, 1936) and then between Italy, Germany, and Japan (Nov. 6, 1937), directed against the Communist International (Comintern) but, by implication, specifically against the Soviet Union. In November and December 1937, the "Nanking Rape" occurred. Indeed, after the bitter battle of Shanghai, the Japanese entered Nanking, then the capital of China. The massacres would last for three months killed between 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese in particularly shock conditions. When the three all policy was implemented "kill everything, burn everything, plunder everything," 2.7 million civilians lost

their lives. More than 200,000 women, referred to as “comfort women,” were forced into prostitution.

In Japan, many survivors criticized Hirohito for their sufferings, and in their view the emperor was responsible for the atrocities of the war. Among them, many people in Okinawa who had paid a heavy price in recent times of conflict —more than two hundred thousand civilian and military deaths — were sometimes forced into mass suicides. For example, during the Nanking Massacre, which took place in December 1937, according to the investigation led by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Japanese army had massacred at least two hundred thousand civilians and prisoners of war.

Herbert P. Bix, citing the work of Himeta Mitsuyoshi and Akira Fujiwara, believed that the three all policy, “kill everything, burn everything, plunder everything,” a strategy of the burned earth used by the Japanese in China between 1942 and 1945, and approved by Hirohito, was responsible for the deaths of at least 2.7 million Chinese civilians. War crimes in China also include the Changjiao Massacre in Hunan. Between May 9 and May 12, 1943, more than 30,000 people were massacred in this Chinese region by a Japanese expeditionary force led by Gen. Shunroku Hata.

Like other indirect victims of Japanese expansionist politics under Hirohito’s leadership, we mention the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who witnessed the devastation of these two cities totally ravaged by atomic bombs released by the Americans on August 6 and August 9, 1945. Japan’s persistence in continuing the war despite the capitulation of these two allies in the Axis: Germany and Italy, forced the Americans to bomb the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The mayor of Nagasaki, Mr. Hitoshi Motoshima, nearly succumbed in January 1990 to an attack after publicly mentioning Hirohito’s responsibility during the war.

On September 30, 1943, a conference of Imperial Headquarters was scheduled in Hirohito’s presence. The Privy Council president asked on his behalf Tōjō, Sugiyama, Nagano, the president of the Planning Bureau, and the minister of commerce and industry, several questions in connection with the war. Tōjō’s verbal answer revealed that although the government had planned “to produce 40,000 aircraft” during 1944, only “17,000 to 18,000

planes" will be produced. When Hara asked Nagano if he was "confident of securing the absolute defense perimeter" with forty thousand aircraft, the navy chief of staff replied:

I cannot assure the future of the war situation. At the end of the conference, both chiefs of staff assured the emperor to prevent further depletion of men and materiel by establishing the "absolute defense perimeter," and to rebuild, regroup, and redeploy to meet the coming Allied general offensive. Here is the policy document adopted that day: …We shall establish a strategic posture to cope with the American-British offensive, making mid-1944 our approximate target for full readiness. Whenever the occasion presents, we shall capture and destroy the enemy's offensive forces. To carry out the Empire's war, the strategic area in the Pacific and Indian Oceans that must absolutely be secured is a perimeter that includes the Kuril Islands, Ogasawara, the inner South Pacific (the central and western parts), and the western part of New Guinea, the Sunda Strait, and Burma.[33]

Hirohito, very skeptical, replied, "Being ready to defend isn't enough. We have to do the attacking."[34] And as he did very often, he criticized his generals, whom he accused of not winning the war quickly enough. For him, it was a matter of unleashing the lightning of the Imperial Army throughout the Asian continent to annihilate the growing influence of the Communists in the region, especially in China.

When on November 1, 1943, Nagano reported good results in the second air battle of Bougainville, Hirohito's naval aide, Lt. Comm. Jō Eiichirō, in his diary reported, "The emperor seemed satisfied and joined toasts with his aides-de-camp in their duty office."[35] One month later, in late December, Hirohito was very frustrated when the Japanese navy withdrew from the Solomons. Japanese troops lost control of the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits, the body of water between the island of New Britain and the north coast of New Guinea, forcing Gen. Isoroku Yamamoto to abandon the islands. Approximately 50,000 troops of the Second Army in western New Guinea and another 50,000 of the 18th Army in the eastern part of the island, were

isolated, and went down in defeat.[36] Meanwhile, 11,300 Americans were killed or wounded.

The Japanese occupied these locations and began the construction of several naval and air bases with the goals of protecting the flank of the Japanese offensive in New Guinea, establishing a security barrier for the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain, and providing bases for interdicting supply lines between the Allied powers of the United States and Australia and New Zealand. Although every step has been made to hide the war crimes committed by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II, Hirohito's guilt is not difficult to detect. During the short interval between his decision to capitulate and the arrival of the American occupying forces, he ordered that all confidential documents be burned. In accordance with an ordinance signed by the emperor, the minister of the imperial household ordered the destruction of all the "delicate" papers of the palace shortly before the surrender, and the ministers of foreign affairs, army, and navy, as well as the chiefs of the army and navy staff, did the same.

When Hirohito first met MacArthur at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo on September 27, 1945, he took full responsibility for all the war crimes committed by the Japanese troops during the Pacific War. Answering a question from MacArthur, "How was it that a sovereign powerful enough to end the war would not have been able to prevent it?" Hirohito replied:

It was not clear to me that our policy was unjustified. Even today, I am not sure to whom historians will attribute responsibility for this war. Then, he told the general, "I came to offer myself to the judgment of the powers you represent, as sole responsible for all political and military decisions taken and for all the actions taken by my people in the conduct of the war.[37]

As Kidō points out in his diary, it is likely that the emperor went to war on tiptoe against the United States, but he nevertheless did so with full knowledge of the facts.[38] Several months before Pearl Harbor, Hirohito had

in his possession a detailed schedule of the order of battles and the questions he asked his chiefs of staff showed that he was fully aware of the operation. As the war developed on the ground, he actively looked at every detail. He had not granted any moral scruple, no remorse for the victims, the suffering and personal sacrifices imposed on his people.

On September 5, 1942, on the advice of Prime Minister Konoe, Hirohito summoned the Army Chiefs of Staff. They were subjected to close interrogation, the most direct the emperor has ever had with subordinates:

Hirohito: Did the Chiefs of Staff believe they could “do the South” in the way they set out in their plans for operations?

Sugiyama: The plans have been studied very closely and we think everything will go according to plan.

Hirohito: Are you sure everything will work according to your plans? That is never quite the case. You say it will all be over in five months. But you said we would get rid of Chiang Kai-shek within a year and he’s still there. Shouldn’t we consider all that can happen unexpectedly?

Then the emperor went on:

Hirohito: Do you really think the landing will be so fragile?

Sugiyama: I don’t know if it will be easy, but I think it’s very doable.

Hirohito: During the simulated invasion exercises off Kyushu Island, many ships were “sunk” by enemy aircraft. If the same thing happens for real, what will you do?

Sugiyama: The fleet had acted before its air cover was ready. The error would never happen again.

Hirohito: What would happen if the weather was bad?

Sugiyama: That would complicate the operations, but not compromise them.

Hirohito: How could you be so confident? When you were Minister of War, you said that the “China incident” would be resolved in five months and it is still not.

Sugiyama: The fault was the “special circumstances” in China.

The general then said:

Your Honor, I cannot guarantee you a 100 percent victory, but I would argue that we have a good chance of winning.

Hirohito: I understand.

Hitler controlled the war in Europe by placing at the head of the German government close officials who were loyal to the Nazism ideology, such as Himmler, Goebbels and Goering. Hirohito, for his part, controlled the war in the Pacific by placing at the head of the Japanese Army close relatives, members of the imperial court, such as Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, Prince Chichibu Yasuhito, Prince Higashikuni Morihito, Prince Kan’in Kotohito, Prince Mikasa Takahito, Prince Takamatsu Nobuhito, and Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi.

Having made his close relatives and protégés in all important positions, Hirohito dedicated himself totally to presiding over and guiding the war from the Imperial Palace. He publicly encouraged and praised soldiers, officers, commanders, all the troops deployed on the battlefields. He sent messages and messengers to the fronts to push his troops to victory. He reinforced their belief in the inherent superiority of offense over defense.[39]

He visited bases, battleships, and various army and navy headquarters. He inspected military schools, granted audiences to industrial leaders to encourage production, took a great interest in weapons development, and, everywhere drove home the message of sacrifice for the state. [40]

As an emperor, the supreme commander of the army and navy, many times Hirohito intervened directly in the issue. He criticized command errors and failed attempts to win battles. After July 18, 1944, two months before the battle for Peleliu, he withdrew his support for Tōjō's government. He became the leading sovereign for Japan's tactical and supported the army's strategy of slaughtering innocent civilians and executing prisoners of war. Behind his shy personality, in many occasions, he set up when exceptionally strong leadership was needed to make the final decision and end conflicts between the general staff and their ministries. Since the start of the war, he allowed his generals and admirals to be the face military of the nation. At the beginning of 1945, as the American Army and Navy got closer to the homeland of Japan, he personally took control of the situation. He approved the plan to destroy the enemy by using kamikaze aircraft as a strategy to extend the war. A few years after he took the throne, during a conversation with Japanese generals and admirals in Ibaraki Prefecture, Hirohito showed interest in strengthening the Japanese air force strikes to launch the war all over the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

One of the biggest atrocities of the Japanese army during the war was the use of chemical weapons. In 1936, Hirohito authorized by imperial decree the expansion of Shirō Ishii's bacteriological research unit and its incorporation into the Guangdong Army. As early as July 1937, he authorized the use of poison gas against Chinese soldiers and civilians. These authorizations were given through specific imperial directives, (rinsanmei), transmitted to the generals through the chief of the army staff, Prince Kan'in Kotohito and Gen. Hajime Sugiyama. From September to October 1938, he also authorized the use of toxic gases on hundreds of occasions during the Battle of Wuhan. In 1941, Gen. Yasuji Okamura was authorized to use fifteen thousand canisters of toxic gas in Shandong.[41]

Historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Awaya Kentaro, Seiya Matsuno, and Yuki Tanaka, found in their research that Hirohito authorized the use of chemical

weapons in China by imperial order. During the invasion of Wuhan from August to October 1938, he authorized the use of toxic gases 375 times, in violation of Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles, particularly Article V of the treaty on the use of submarines and asphyxiation gases in times of war, a resolution adopted by the League of Nations on May 14 of that year condemning Japan's use of toxic gases.[42] According to documents found in 2004, by Yoshimi and Tanaka in the Australian National Archives, toxic gases were tested on Australian and Dutch prisoners in November 1944 in the Kai Islands.

In September 1942, Hirohito signed an imperial ordinance sentencing American lieutenants Mark and Farrow, as well as soldiers Spatz and Hite, to death. All these soldiers took part in the Doolittle Raid. George Barr and captured Cpl. Jacob Daniel DeShazer were sentenced to life imprisonment. [43] In the morning of December 7, 1941, Japanese navy forces attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This attack was one of Hirohito's most criminal acts. The Japanese sank or damaged 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, and an anti-mine vessel. They destroyed 180 American aircraft. During the attacks, 2,403 American soldiers were killed while another 1,178 were wounded.

Those positions justified Hirohito's direct responsibility in the war and suggested why he should have been tried in Tokyo.[44] He personally supervised the battle of the Philippine Island of Leyte, which he had ordered Japanese Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita to hold at all costs.[45] He declared himself, deeply satisfied of the issue of this battle, and then he added to the prime minister, the former army intelligence officer, Koiso Kuniaki, that Leyte was Japan's greatest military victory since the Battle of Yamazaki in 1582.[46]

As Francis Pike explained, "It was the war of his Empire, fought under its divine name, and with its approval. As Supreme Commander, he sanctioned the decisions of the High Staff, built a war room under his palace and advised his generals on troop movements in China, where several million people had died.[47] U.S. secretaries of state, Dean Gooderham Acheson and Cordell Hull, were among those who encouraged Hirohito to be charged with war crimes. The two diplomats said that "liquidating the imperial

system was the ultimate way to democratize Japan." In a lengthy report to President Truman in 1946, George Atcheson Jr., the secretary of state's representative in Tokyo, declared that Hirohito is "a war criminal and that the imperial system must disappear in order to the country to become a democratic state."[48]

As one reviewing the history of the Shōwa era, Hirohito was a monster, who had played an effective role in the crimes committed by the Japanese army and the Japanese navy during World War II. For his role in the war, he should have been tried and convicted at the Tokyo trials.[49] His judgment would have been a move to condemn crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The decision made by MacArthur, who led Japan's post-conflict occupation administration, had helped Hirohito to escape justice. MacArthur, using his power, had played all the cards to remove Hirohito's name from the list of defendants. As a basic rule, the American occupants observed a wartime policy of not provoking the enemy by attacking the emperor. The general U.S. war policy had opposed attacks against imperial sites or even condemned any verbal denigration of Emperor Hirohito. Given the intense campaign by MacArthur to present Hirohito as a champion of peace, the high-level evocation of his war responsibility during the Tokyo trials was starting. All the defendants accused of "Class A" war crimes had meticulously avoided saying anything that might seem to implicate their sovereign.

MacArthur told his staff that Hirohito was emperor by birth, and when he met him for the first time at the US embassy in Tokyo, he knew that he had in front of him the first great Lord of Japan by right. He also confided that at first,

I arrived here with the intention of treating the emperor more harshly, but this was not necessary. He is sincere, authentic, and he is a liberal man. I found that ruling via the emperor made my job in running Japan much easier than it otherwise would have been.[50]

According to Kido's diary, MacArthur said that, "Hirohito is best placed to know the important men of his country's political universe. So, I'd like to hear his opinion on different topics."[51] The diary of Ashida Hitoshi, a former member of the Liberal Party, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1947 and became Prime Minister of Japan in 1948, reported on his visit to QHQ on February 21, 1946: "MacArthur, as usual, started on an oration. "I am working from the bottom of my heart for the good of Japan. Ever since my audience with the emperor, I have been telling myself I must insure his safety at all costs."[52] Western leaders, led by the United States for political reasons, did not try Hirohito before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; however, there is no doubt to the emperor's responsibility in the war.

MacArthur's conduct of the occupation had already come under criticism from the Russians and the British at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was preparing to yield to Allied pressure for some form of group supervision of the freewheeling supreme commander. The prime minister of New Zealand had warned the American minister that "these should be no soft peace;" "the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal."[53]

Reluctant at the beginning to the prospect of Japan entering World War II, Hirohito welcomed the success of the Japanese offensive on Pearl Harbor and the victories that followed in Southeast Asia. Based on archives and historical records, Hirohito was a war criminal who must stand trial in Tokyo. On November 13, 1948, Sir William Webb, the president of the tribunal, declared, "This immunity of the emperor is contrasted with the part he played in launching the war in the Pacific, is, I think, a matter which the tribunal should take into consideration in imposing the sentences."[54]

In August 1945, Gen. Bonner Fellers, ordered by General MacArthur to make a list of those to prosecute, had to decide whether Hirohito was a war criminal or not. Fellers noted that the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy had committed millions of crimes, and Hirohito, in

his role as commander-in-chief, could not completely ignore them. In fact, upon his arrival on the throne, like Hitler in Germany, he had used military parades to formalize the militarization of Japan and prepare the Japanese troops in their vast plan to occupy the neighboring territories in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. The guilt of the emperor was evident, but Fellers feared that Japan, as devastated it was, could fall into the orbit of Communism. “Japan’s destiny is at stake. We must maintain the imperial regime,” Fellers concluded.[55]

The question is why wasn’t Hirohito, a “Class” A war criminal, tried during the Tokyo trial when knowing that he had controlled behind the scenes all the operations of the Japanese army during the war? Fellers acknowledged that “as emperor and acknowledged head of state, Hirohito cannot sidestep war guilt. He is part of and must be considered an instigator of the Pacific War.”[56] An internal report by the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) noted in July 1944, “The desirability of eliminating the present emperor is questionable; it is probable that he inclines personally toward the more moderate faction and might prove a useful influence later.”[57]

The O.S.S. and other intelligence agencies believed that Hirohito held the key not only to surrender but also a postwar change.[58] In his memoirs, Yoshida Shigeru praised MacArthur as the “great benefactor of his country.”[59] He praised the commander for the preservation of the throne and protection of its august occupant in a time of unprecedented peril.

16

ANGEL'S FACE AND DEVIL'S SOUL

O n January 7, 1989, Hirohito's death marked the end of his sixty-three-year reign, the longest and most controversial reign in Japan's history. The emperor's death fueled a long and controversial debate about his role and responsibility in Japan's wars between 1931 and 1945. [1] The literature portrays his image as that of a constitutional monarch who passively endorsed the entry into war of his country in order not to go against the generals and admirals in the army. Most of those officers were in favor of wars to establish Japan's long-planned Southeast Asian empire and global expansion.

The subject is still sensitive in Japan even if today's youth deliberately prefer to participate keenly in the "Reiwa Era" initiated in 2019, a hopeful era with the promise of harmony among all beings.[2] In fact, the really expected question to the controversy is, "Why, after the Second World War, did Hirohito escape the lawsuit brought by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East against the Japanese warlords? No clear answer emerges, as the analyses differ among historians, intellectuals, and the official press, including those of the Imperial Household Agency.[3]

Hirohito’s Responsibility

The institutional characteristic of imperial Japan makes it a constitutional monarchy led by an emperor whose decision is guided by his advisers. In addition to be the ruler of the state and the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, his divine status made him, and will make him until his death, the symbol of the state, cultural identity, and unity of the Japanese people.[4]

The question of Hirohito’s responsibility in Japan’s war engagement that began in 1931 with the conquest of Manchuria, and culminated in 1941 with the surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, is not historically decided, although he is the supreme commander of the army and navy under the Meiji constitution. For some, Hirohito was a convinced pacifist who suffered in his soul because of his limited power to put an end to the suffering and ill-treatment endured by civilians and prisoners during the war. Held by the dignity of his “divine emperor” status, he could not intervene openly in public affairs. Although he seems to have rejoiced at the success of the Pearl Harbor offensive in December 1941 and the victories that followed in Southeast Asia; because of his divine essence, many historians have said Hirohito could not be prosecuted in the sense of article 3 of the 1889 constitution.

Those historians have speculated that Hirohito has been manipulated by politicians and the military during that period. According to them the structure of the Meiji constitution placed Hirohito at the top of the state. He is the supreme commander of the army and navy, however, when his approval is sought, the Japanese generals and admirals respect only the constitutional formalism imposed, and his refusal, generally expressed by silence, is considered in certain circumstances as an implicit approval.[5] Conversely, other historians claimed that Hirohito was extremely involved in the preparation and the control of the war. He was a fierce dictator in the lineage of Hitler with the ambition to spread Japan’s hegemony in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

So, what was Hirohito's part of responsibility in the Pacific War that culminated in Japan's empire disaster?

Crown Prince of his father, Taishō Yoshihito, Hirohito ascended the throne in 1926 after five years in the regency. Emperor with a "divine" power, according to article 1 of the Imperial Constitution, he chose the name Shōwa to call his regime. During the first part of his reign, he gave unconditional support to the expansionist policy of the military clan, and gave his approval to the conquest of Manchuria in 1931, the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1933, the military intervention in China in 1937, and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As head of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, he led Japan into World War II in 1941.[6] Despite increasingly concordant information that confirmed his active role during the war, the question of Hirohito's responsibility for war crimes continued to be the subject until today of great debates among historians. What role did he play during the Second World War? For some scholars and historians, Hirohito was certainly, according to the Meiji constitution, the supreme commander of the army and navy, but manipulated by the military, he did not exercise this power.[7] For others, Hirohito carefully and thoughtfully supervised the affairs of the state? He was deeply involved in the governance of the country. All major decisions needed his approval before being executed.

According to Awaya Kentarō, a Japanese historian, Hirohito not only gave advice in all important decisions of the government and the army, but he closely supervised his orders to be sure they have been respected. He favored the coming to power of trusted men, such as Kido, Konoe, and Tōjō, and he followed daily diplomatic, political, and military affairs through the emissaries —Kawai, Makino, Chichibu, Chinda, and Ichiki.— His intervention to end the war despite threats of rebellion from a group of fascists officers in the army and navy, we cite Kosono, Ugaki, Hatanaka, Haga, Ishihara, and Mizutani, proved that he was the only one could stop the war in 1945, and by not making earlier this decision, he caused the destruction of several Japanese cities, including Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki by the American Air Force.

In writings and memoirs that cover his degree of maturity, Hirohito's closest advisers namely, Baron Kumao Harada, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, and Marquis Kōichi Kido, in contrast to the opinion of the venerable Saionji Kinmochi, said they admire "the will of the young monarch who decided to play an important role in the political life of the Japanese empire, especially in the control of the army."

Unlike his father, Yoshihito Taishō, known as an erased monarch, Hirohito gave the last words in the major political decisions that engaged Japan. The emergence of documents long buried in the personal papers of one of his assistants, Terasaki Hidenari, published in 1990 by his daughter under the title The Monologues of the Emperor, confirmed with more veracity the important role that Hirohito played during the war. In these documents, we find the answers that he made in 1946 to the questions of his five closest advisers who prepared him in case that he was summoned as a witness by the International Tribunal for the judgment of Japanese War Criminals in Tokyo.

In regard with all those facts, contrary to what was said, Hirohito was not a puppet.

Under his leadership, the world registered several main attacks of the Japanese troops in the Pacific. Among them, there was the surprise attack on the American Naval Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Hirohito from his palace received daily plans of attacks, reports on casualties in men and armaments, as well as reports on the morale of the troops. He personally dictated the plan to force the Chinese government to acknowledge defeat. He was convinced that only the capture of the Chinese capital could force the nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to acquiesce to an armistice. In this case, he pushed Japanese troops to invade Nanking, the capital of China. On December 1, 1937, he ordered the 10th Army and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force led by Prince Asaka to take command of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. He also ordered General Matsui, the Commander of the Central China Area Army, to attack Chinese troops in Nanking: "The Commander of the Central China Area Army, acting jointly with the navy, will capture and occupy the enemy capital of Nanking."[8]

The latest figures indicated that about 300,000 persons had been killed in order to defeat Chinese troops in Nanking and take control of the capital. The postwar Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal accepted an estimate of 200,000 civilians and prisoners murdered in Nanking and its surroundings during the first six weeks. Japanese soldiers, who responded to the Army General Staff's directive, systematically massacred the inhabitants of the city and raped women and adolescents by the thousands. Foreign witnesses at the scene estimated that approximately 1,000 women and girls were sexually assaulted and raped every day at the early stages of the occupation.

One of the greatest atrocities of the Japanese army during World War II was the use of chemical weapons.[9] In July 1937 Hirohito authorized the use of poison gas against Chinese soldiers and civilians during the invasion of Wuhan in 1938, then in 1939 in Guangzhou, and in 1943 at the Battle of Changde. A doctor on the battlefield described the effects of toxic gases dropped by the Japanese army:

The action of toxic gases on soldiers was manifested by the following series of phenomena: intense tingling in the eyes, nasal pits and incessant coughing, respiratory discomfort, and oppression; very painful throat and trachea, intrathoracic burn, quintus cough, abundant and bloody sputum, and feeling abnormally tired. The soldiers who could not flee in front of the gas wave died, vomiting blood. The others, who managed to drag themselves to the back, were collected exhausted, spitting blood, watery eyes, swollen eyelids, purple lips; their quintal cough was very painful, and they felt very painful side points.[10]

The League of Nations' Far East Advisory Committee for the Bombing of Nanjing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou adopted a resolution to blame Japan.

Apart controlling Japanese military operations against China and other territories in Asia, Hirohito controlled the displacement of Japanese troops. He established a permanent headquarters in Kyuden, whereby he planned to monitor war operations. Less than three months after the invasion of

Manchuria by the Japanese troops, Colonel Itagaki showed up at the Imperial Palace to meet the emperor. Marquis Kido, who mentioned the visit in his diary (dated January 11, 1932), noted that “he and people close to the emperor listened to Itagaki’s description of the new state of affairs in Manchuria, the imminent arrival of the new puppet ruler, Pu Yi, Japan’s formal commitment to defend Manchuria, and the means of controlling the new government without violating international law.”

On May 22, 1939, along with members of the government and the Army High Staff, Hirohito attended the parade of 22,000 cadets in military uniform. The parade was part of a tour of the Imperial House to mobilize and raise awareness among young people in the preparations for the war. In an imperial communiqué, he called on the youth to play an active role in the war, to fulfill their civic obligations, and to make sacrifices in honor of the nation. In 1942, in white navy uniform, he visited the Kasumigaura naval base. This visit took place in the middle of the Battle of Guadalcanal in the Pacific, codenamed “Operation Watchtower,” between American troops led by Gen. Robert L. Ghormley, and Japanese troops led by Isoroku Yamamoto. During a conversation with Japanese commanders and leaders in Ibaraki Prefecture, Hirohito showed interest in strengthening Japanese air force strikes in the Southwest Pacific.

In the fall of 1941, as Japan faced the consequences of the U.S. embargo on petroleum products for its refusal to withdraw from China, Hirohito called for a series of imperial conferences to discuss the possibility of finding a solution to the issue.[11] The first week of July 1941, IJN headquarters informed the Imperial Palace Japan’s reserve bunker oil would be worn out within two years if a new source was not found. On July 10, Army Minister Hata and Chief of Staff Kan’in went to Hayama to report to the emperor on military preparations. The next day, Kido who was in Hayama, recorded Hirohito’s concern that the United States could easily cut off the oil supplies to Japan.[12] His prediction was “Britain will probably reject Japan’s request for closing down the route for supplies to reach Chiang Kai-shek,” and that “we shall then be forced to occupy Hong Kong and might, ultimately, have to declare war.” Hirohito finally said: “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don’t you agree?”[13] Kido reassured him by saying that the nation must “be fully resolved to resist,” to

proceed cautiously, and “not [to] be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies.”[14]

In August 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss the concern of the oil embargo that Washington intended to impose on Japan. Roosevelt replied Japan must leave China before a summit meeting would be scheduled.[15] On September 4, 1941, the Japanese cabinet met to consider the war plans prepared by the Imperial General Headquarters, and decided:

Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defense and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war … [and is] ... resolved to go to war with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands if necessary. Our Empire will undertake all possible diplomatic initiatives vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain, and will thus strive to achieve its objectives... If these diplomatic negotiations do not leave any hope that our demands will be met before the first ten days of October, we will decide on the immediate outbreak of hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and Netherlands.[16]

On September 6, 1941, at the second imperial conference concerning attacks against the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the invasion of several Western colonies in Asia, Japanese leaders met to discuss the attack plan prepared by Imperial General Headquarters. In October 1941, the naval general staff gave final approval to Yamamoto’s plan. It centered around six heavy aircraft carriers accompanied by twenty-four supporting vessels. A separate group of submarines was to sink any American warships that escaped the Japanese carrier force.

On November 5, 1941, Hirohito approved, in imperial conference, the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.[17] The same day, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō cabled the Japanese ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura that an agreement with Washington must be secured no later than

the twenty-fifth of that month. Tōgō's message to Nomura was the following:

Because of various circumstances, it is necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.[18]

The same day, the Combine Japanese Fleet received Top-Secret Order No. 1: In thirty-four days' time, Pearl Harbor is to be bombed, along with Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.[19] Tōjō cabinet made a last effort to arrive at a diplomatic solution to resolve Japan's differences with the United States. Kichisaburō Nomura, the Japanese ambassador in the United States, presented two proposals to the Americans, which included a final settlement of the Sino-Japanese War with a partial withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the withdrawal of Japanese forces from southern Indochina if the United States agreed to end aid to the Nationalist Chinese, freeze military deployments in Southeast Asia, provide Japan with a "required quantity of oil," and assist Japan in acquiring materials from the Dutch East Indies.[20] In the days 21–24 November, Hull submitted copies of the penultimate drafts of State's modus vivendi proposal and Ten-Point Program to service chiefs, and to the emissaries of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China. Admiral Stark and Acting Assistant Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, acting for Marshall, approved of the modus vivendi.[21] General Gerow noted: "The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives —the avoidance of war with Japan.—

However, for the Japanese generals and admirals in the army and navy, declaring war was their focus. On November 25, 1941, (November 26 in Japan) a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers — Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku— departed Hitokappu

Bay in the Kuril Islands to the direction of Pearl Harbor. One day after, on November 26, U.S. secretary of state, Cordell Hull, presented the Japanese ambassador with an official U.S. government memo, in which the United States demanded the complete withdrawal of all Japanese troops in Indochina and China.[22]

At an imperial conference on December 1, 1941, Hirohito approved attacks against the United States, the British Empire, and the Dutch colonial empire. Konoe, more dedicated to peace, argued for more negotiations and possible concessions to deflect war. However, military leaders in Japan such as Minister of War Gen. Hideki Tōjō and chief of the IJN General Staff Fleet Adm. Osami Nagano declared that time had run out and that additional negotiations would be wasted. They recommended military actions against all American and European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. Finally, on December 7, 1941, early in the morning, the Japanese attacked the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor. On December 8, 1941, during simultaneous attacks, Japanese forces attacked the Hong Kong garrison, the Philippines, and began the invasion of Malaya.

On February 9, 1941, Hirohito ordered the Japanese Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, to examine the possibility of an attack on Chungking, leading to a list of known planned Japanese operations carried out during World War II. According to Mr. Kobayashi's diaries, in 1980, Hirohito wanted to convey to Beijing his regrets for the Sino-Japanese War. The Imperial House Agency would have opposed it for fear of the reactions of the nationalist movements. Takahisa Furukawa, a specialist in contemporary Japanese history at Nihon University, declared on the public broadcaster NHK that the emperor "has long assumed responsibility for the war; as we got older, that feeling became strong."

The interrogation of Kido in 1946, by Colonel Sackett, provided clear and obvious evidence of Hirohito's leading role in the war:

Sackett: Isn't it true that the emperor was not so hostile to the idea of acquiring bases in French Indochina without worrying about the negative impact this might have on negotiations with the United States?

Kido: Yes, that was his main concern.

Sackett: So, we can say that the emperor was not really opposed to Japanese expansion in the south, if it could be accomplished without incurring the wrath and hostility of nations such as Great Britain and the United States?

Kido: Because the military ensured that they could resolve the Chinese incident and the emperor, of course, longed for it to be done as soon as possible; he was in a delicate position.

Sackett: In fact, none of the high-ranking people was opposed to the expansion of Japanese influence to the south, if it could be done without provoking a war against the United States and Great Britain?

Kido: Yes.

Sackett: But when it was decided during the imperial conference that Japan would not tolerate any interference by the United States, we already knew that Japan was in danger of sending Japanese troops to French Indochina; yet, in spite of everything, a foreign policy was chosen that required Japan to fight the United States, if necessary, to respect its program and land its soldiers.

Kido: Yes.

Sackett: On July 26, you are referring to anti-aircraft defenses in the Palace Park. Why, then, were we emanating the Palace with anti-aircraft defenses? From whom could Japan fear air strikes on the palace park?

Kido: As the negotiations between Japan and the United States became critical, the construction of anti-aircraft shelters was discussed with the emperor.

Sackett: In other words, it was just one of the plans adopted by Japan in anticipation of a possible conflict with the United States. Is that it?

Kido: Yes.

Sackett: Was the emperor disappointed by Nagano's view that the navy could not win a war against the United States? Would he have liked to see him show more enthusiasm for the possibility of winning the war?

Kido: Upon hearing the Chief of Staff's report, the emperor said that the problem needed to be reconsidered. We should not try to go too far.

Sackett: Who did the emperor belong to, the Navy as a whole or Nagano? Who did he believe or who was he inclined to believe?

Kido: Initially, the emperor did not want a war against the United States. He wanted to be better assured of victory, before willingly launching the nation into war.

Sackett: Was the emperor very worried that the navy claimed to be able to win the war, while his Chief of Staff assured the opposite. Is that correct?

Kido: Since the success of Nagano's plan was so dubious, the emperor was extremely concerned.

Sackett: In other words, the emperor wanted the navy to take a stand on one side or the other. He didn't want two diverging opinions on the possibility of defeat.

Kido: Seeing that Nagano presented a plan whose result was to be victory, while professing serious personal doubts about this victory, the emperor was very perplexed.

Sackett: The emperor asked you to inquire about the amount of rubber and tin that the United States had and its sources of supply in Latin America. Why did he want to know all this?

Kido: I think it was as a result of a press article.

Sackett: Why? Was it not for the purpose of whether Japan could fight a victorious war against the United States?

Kido: I don't think his interest was that deep? Because the emperor is a valuable scientist, he has often made such requests.

Sackett: I suggest to you that the emperor was seeking this information in order to decide whether Japan could go to war with the United States. It was more like that, wasn't it?

Kido: Maybe his thought had something to do with this problem.

On February 26, 1946, the following dialogue took place in Sugano prison:

Sackett: The emperor knew in July 1941 that the country had engaged quite clearly through its foreign policy in the path of expansion to the south, using, if necessary, armed force; and he thought it was an inappropriate time to go to war in the north, against the USSR, when you were looking to get war equipment in the south? Is this information consistent?

Kido: Yes.

Sackett: So, it was necessary to first obtain the emperor's consent before sending troops to a place such as Indonesia?

Kido: Yes.

Sackett: In other words, the Supreme Command would not have sent troops to French Indochina, without appearing before the emperor before him to obtain his consent?

Kido: Yes.

Sackett: Japanese aircraft, starting from bases in Cochinchina, sank two British warships, the Repulse and the "Prince of Wales" off the coast of Malaysia, two days after Pearl Harbor. Was the emperor aware of this attack?

Kido: Yes.

As noted, Charley Granvorka, an expert in the field of sociology, Hirohito was not a puppet. The structure of the Meiji constitution and the de facto divine status inherited by birth placed him at the top of the state. He was the

supreme commander of the army and navy. At the end of the war as at its beginning, and through every stage of its unfolding, he played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name.[23] As Professor Bix said:

Emperor Hirohito was the principal symbol of his people's repression of their wartime past. For as long as they did not pursue his central role in the war, they did not have to question their own.[24]

The analysis of the Japanese archives, including documents written by Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, three times prime minister, Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu, Hirohito's younger brother, and finally, the seal keeper, Marquis Kōichi Kido, confirmed the active role Hirohito played during the war. According to the monumental work published in five volumes between 1973 and 1974, under the title Daihonei senshi, Hirohito proved by his attitudes and actions to be the Supreme Commander of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy. He led the war in the Pacific that claimed the lives of nearly 20 million people in Asia, 3 million Japanese, and 60,000 Allied soldiers. He presided over all important high-staff meetings and controlled the activities of troops on the ground.

Commander-in-chief of the army and navy, he was considered the central pillar of the Hakkō ichiu, the "meeting of the eight corners of the world under one roof." He used the most notable supporters in his regime, including Prince Kan'in Kotohito, chief of staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, and Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso to develop an expansionist policy until he arrived at the almost complete militarization of the Japanese population. One by one, he signed the imperial rescripts that dragged Japan into the spiral of war, from the alliance with Germany and Italy to the attack on Pearl Harbor. He was personally involved behind the scenes to push Japan into war between 1937–1945 by taking most of the territories in the Pacific and East Asia.[25]

Even though Hirohito publicly let his military leaders conduct the war, but behind the scenes, he played a key role in the decision made by the high commander of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Analyzing all the facts, it is fair to say that Hirohito had encouraged all the atrocities committed by the Japanese troops during the war, which started with the Mukden Incident in Manchuria on September 18, 1931, and continued with all the crimes committed by the Japanese troops over the Pacific.[26]

The Supreme Commander

In the Meiji constitution of 1889, the emperor is sovereign and he is at the center of the legitimacy of the state. According to the Constitution, Hirohito exercised the "Supreme Command of the Army and Navy" (Article 11).[27] Starting in 1928, he made several tours and visits to the army and navy academies and their graduation ceremonies. From 1928 to the start of World War II, as supreme commander (daigensui), he made about four to six trips annually in connection with special military reviews and exercises. The goal of each tour was to mobilize the nation and highlight his divine and militaristic emperor images.

Hirohito's primary interest may have been marine biology, but he had a very real interest in military affairs. He frequently wore military uniform. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he had a war room built underneath the Imperial Palace from where he could monitor movements of Japanese forces. Through the Imperial Headquarters, he exercised final command over both armed services, including the field armies that were directly under his orders: the Kwantung Army and the area armies in China.[28] As Yamada Akira pointed out, "Final decisions of the Imperial Headquarters on matters of grave strategic import, like important decisions of the liaison conference, required meetings at the emperor's presence. However, sometimes the two chiefs of staff made decisions of the Imperial Headquarters without ever convening a formal conference. When such a decision was formally submitted to the emperor and approved by him it went into effect automatically.[29] On July 11, 1938, when a border clash with the Soviet Union was provoked by the commander of Nineteenth Division, Baron Kamao Harada records in his diary, that: His Majesty gave Army Minister Itagaki a dressing down, and ordered that "hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission."[30]

In 1932, Hirohito gave direct orders to Gen. Yoshinori Shirakawa to limit hostilities in Shanghai without consulting Prince Kan'in Kotohito, Army Chief of Staff. Under a rescript published in Fujin Gaho, Yoshinori was

rewarded by being made a baron by the emperor. “Your Lordship [Baron Shirakawa] commanded the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces, assiduously accomplished your mission on foreign shores, enhanced our military prestige, and so furthered international trust. We deeply appreciate your labors.” In Dokuhaku Roku, Hirohito described his strategy to solve the fighting arising from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, “I always advocated combining intimidation with peace offers.”

After American’s airstrikes on Tokyo and several other Japanese cities in autumn 1944, Hirohito insisted that Japan’s main infantry divisions deployed for the defense of Luzon, the Philippines main island, must be committed for the defense of Leyte Island. Kenji Tomita, chief cabinet secretary of Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, recorded in those terms Hirohito’s conversation with Prime Minister Konoe after his resignation, on October 16, 1941:

Of course, His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: “You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much.” Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: my prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more. In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and navy high commands.[31]

According to Gen. Shiro Makino, who commanded the 16th Division during the Battle of Leyte, Hirohito’s participation in military exercises was useful for instructing both himself and the emperor in the politics of war expenditures.[32] This view had been shared by navy leaders such as Adm. Kantarō Suzuki and Adm. Keisuke Okada.

In 1941, Japan celebrated with great pomp the feast of the 1,600-year anniversary of the reign of Jimmu, the first and mythical Emperor of Japan. Hirohito took the opportunity to raise Nationalist sentiment even higher in

the population by using the Japanese press. He sought to influence the ongoing negotiations between Japan and the United States. On July 2, 1941, he chaired a meeting of Gozen Kaigi, which was to set Japan's policy in the coming months. This involved the preparation of a war against Britain and the United States. "The emperor was pleased," Sugiyama noted, "He gave his assent on all points."

In 1942, Hirohito, in a white navy uniform, visited the Kasumigaura Naval Base. This visit took place in the middle of the Battle of Guadalcanal in the Pacific, codenamed, "Operation Watchtower," between American troops led by Gen. Robert L. Ghormley and the Japanese troops led by Gen. Isoroku Yamamoto. As Edward Behr stated in his book, Hirohito: The Ambiguous Emperor, "The emperor, in his shy appearance, was not a saint.[33] We had at work a shrewd and skillful manipulator perfectly aware of what was going on. He had demonstrated his ability to act decisively and ruthlessly on February 26, 1936, when he almost single-onset a serious uprising of the army, which was on the verge of overthrowing his regime."

This coup attempt, which took place in Japan from February 26 to 29, 1936, was organized by the ultranationalist faction inside the army, the supporters of the imperial route, inspired by the idea of the restoration of Shōwa. For three days, Central Tokyo fell into the hands of the insurgents, who murdered several politicians. Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, Seal Guard Saitō Makoto, and inspector general for military education, Gen. Jōtarō Watanabe, were all killed.[34] A group of officers stormed the prime minister's residence and tried to kill him. Prime Minister Keisuke Okada narrowly escaped death.[35] The rebels mistakenly killed Col. Denzō Matsuo, Okada's brother-in-law, as well as his personal secretary. The residence of the Great Chamberlain, Adm. Kantar Suzuki, was also targeted, and Suzuki was seriously injured.[36] The insurgents, after their attacks on the homes of the previous Seal Guard, Count Makino Nobuaki, and Duke Saionji Kinmochi, tried to take the Imperial Palace but had to resolve to withdraw in the face of resistance from the imperial guards. [37]

Many high-ranking officials shared the rebels' views and supported their claims, like those expressed by the Blood League assassins behind the May 15, 1932, incident: restoring the imperial omnipotence traditions, and

Japan's independence from abroad. The Tokyo garrison supported the coup attempt. However, the Imperial Japanese Navy sided with the government and in accordance with the order of the Minister of the Army, Yoshiyuki Kawashima, deployed its ships to the Tokyo base and threatened the rebels with their artillery. Hirohito, outraged by the murder of his close advisers, intervened directly to place orders to severely quell the rebellion. When his chief aide-general Shigeru Honjō, at one time known as a supporter of Sadao Araki, the leader of the Kodha, informed him of the revolt, he immediately ordered that it be subdued and called the insurgents "rebels" (bôto). In Honjō, who was defending them, the emperor replied, "Without our orders troops were mobilized.[38] No matter what they are called; they are no longer our troops."[39] He then ordered the minister of the army, Yoshiyuki, to suppress the rebellion within an hour and asked him to go through Honjō to report to him every half hour.

On February 27, 1936, martial law was declared in Tokyo, and troops were called in as reinforcements. On February 28, 1936, Hirohito signed the order allowing the army and navy to quell the revolt and expel the rebels from their positions. On February 29, 1936, exhausted the rebel officers decided to surrender. The coup had failed. Nineteen plotters were sentenced to death by the Japanese court-martial; among them the Far-Right philosopher Ikki Kita and his disciple Mitsugi Nishida.[40] They were executed on August 19, 1937. Seventy other prisoners were sentenced to prison terms. Beginning in 1937, Hirohito supported right-wing extremists and militarists, who convinced him that Japan must play the role to which it was predestined according to the notion of Hakkō Ichiu ("the eight corners of the world under one roof.")[41]

As Francis Pike said:

Whatever the legal and constitutional position of Hirohito, there can be no denying the centrality of his person in the mythology of Japanese exceptionalism. In the post-Meiji Restoration period, the role of the emperor was put at the heart of an all-encompassing state philosophy and in

the Pacific War Hirohito was the idol for which millions of Japanese soldiers died.[42]

Tadashi Wakabayashi has concluded, “Hirohito wielded absolute moral authority in Japan by granting Imperial honors that conveyed incontestable prestige and by issuing imperial rescripts that had coercive power greater than law.”[43]According to the historian, portraying Hirohito as a monarch who had always been peace-minded but helpless is not correct. In fact, as Bix said, “Hirohito was trained from birth to defend his throne in an era when monarchs in the world over were losing theirs.”[44]

To establish his war effort, he adopted the return to the custom of having all ministers of the army and navy selected from the ranks of active-duty officers. This measure has increased the power of the military hierarchy by giving it a veto over all government actions. Thus, the most important positions in the army and navy were held by members of the imperial family, and the emperor placed his trusted men in key positions of government.

17

DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY

U p until 1995, the Japanese government denied Japan's brutal behavior during the Pacific War. The crimes of war committed by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were not mentioned in textbooks in the country. For decades the Japanese officials had refused to apologize for the actions of their troops during World War II. The accusation that Japanese forces murdered hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians during the Nanking Massacre was also denied by many historians and intellectuals in Japan. The massacre in the city of Nanking during the Second Sino-Japanese War is still today a highly controversial episode in Sino-Japanese relations. [1]

Some Japanese historians, journalists, and social scientists, such as Tomio Hora and Katsuichi Honda, accepted the findings of the Tokyo tribunal that revealed that a total of 200,000 people have been killed by the Imperial Japanese Army after the Battle of Nanking.[2] Others such as Shūdō Higashinakano denied the occurrence of mass rape on the part of the Japanese troops. At times Higashinakano ascribed it to Chinese soldiers, and at other times he simply denied its occurrence.[3] He argued that the Nanking Massacre was a fabrication and war-time propaganda spread by the Chinese Nationalists and Communists.[4] He added that the intervention of the Japanese Army in Nanking was in accordance with international law and was humane.[5] Some scholars, notably the revisionists in Japan, have estimated that the actual death toll in Nanking Massacre is less than 10,000, and others declared that the event was entirely fabricated and never occurred at all.[6]

In his book, The Fabrication of the "Nanjing Massacre," Masaaki Tanaka argued that there was no indiscriminate killing at all in Nanjing, and that the massacre was a fabrication manufactured by the (IMTFE) and the Chinese government for the purpose of propaganda. Less than 2,000 people were

murdered in the city of Nanking and most of them were killed by the Chinese military.[7] Higashinakano has denied there was execution of POWs in uniform. He claimed that the executed POWs were illegitimate combatants, and so their execution was legitimate under international law. This assumption was arbitrary based on the fact it cannot be proven. The execution of prisoners of war is against the articles of the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907, which was ratified by Japanese and China. By committing those crimes, Japanese troops violated the spirits and the statements of laws of war.

Many historical currents in Japan, clearly revisionist, had denied the extent of the crimes committed by the Japanese during World War II. Some Japanese historians and intellectuals go so far as to hold the condemned of the Tokyo trials as martyrs. Many Japanese prime ministers, as same as Emperor Hirohito, have visited on several occasions the Yasukuni Shrine where the memories of the Japanese who gave their lives for the nation are honored, including fourteen war criminals convicted by the judges during the Tokyo trial. In 1985, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone had visited the shrine. The visit had provoked hostile reactions from Asian countries, particularly among Chinese and Korean leaders.[8] In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, who held the position of prime minister in Japan, from 2001 to 2006, had visited the shrine. His visit sparked a wave of outrage both inside and outside the country. Faced with the decision of Koizumi who renewed this pilgrimage every year until August 15, 2006, China and South Korea had threatened to sever their diplomatic relations with Japan. These two countries, which have suffered in the past from Japan’s military expansionism, also protested that the Japanese prime minister’s visit took place on the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in 1945. This decision, in their views, was a provocation that confirmed how Japan continued to deny its responsibilities in the war.

By the year of 2002, Germany had paid out 102 billion deutschmarks in restitution and compensation to the victims of the Nazi regime. Germany has largely faced up to its legal and moral obligations and admitted its guilt, but not so Japan.[9] For more than seventy years, Japan had denied its abuses of human rights and refused to pay compensation to its victims, especially the survivors of its 250,000 sex slave programs, as well as to survivors or

families of those killed in experiments conducted by Japanese doctors particularly those engaged by Unit 731.[10] At the start of the twenty-first century, Japan had paid to Asian countries a total of 1/40th of the amount paid by Germany as damages of war.

In April 2002, a Japanese judge dismissed the complaints of 180 Chinese victims of Unit 731. The complainants sought an apology and damages of ¥ 10 million, (74,188 Euros), each from the Japanese state for the atrocities they accused Unit 731 of, including the "bombing" of cities with the bubonic plague bacilli or germs of other diseases. In August 2002, in accordance with local jurisprudence, the Tokyo District Court rejected the same request while admitting that the Japanese Army had practiced bacteriological warfare.[11] The Tokyo Court of Appeal on July 19, 2005, rejected the request for reparations made by the Chinese complainants who claimed to be survivors or relatives of victims of bacteriological attacks by the Japanese in Zhejiang and Hunan provinces from 1940 to 1942.

On December 26, 2013, Shinzō Abe, who was appointed prime minister for the second time, visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a pilgrimage that no Japanese head of government in office had dared since 2006. The prime minister said:

I have chosen this day to witness, before the souls of the dead, the achievements since the establishment of the government, to promise that no one will suffer from war anymore. This visit was not intended to affect the feelings of the Chinese and Koreans. I look forward to explaining to China and Korea that improving ties is in the national interest of the three countries.[11]

Indignant at the visit, and reacting on behalf of the Korean people, Korean president Park Geun-hye refused to attend the summit. He said: "Japan sincerely investigated its past." China officials called it an "absolutely unacceptable act for the Chinese people whose consequences Japan will have to take care of." Beijing's Foreign Ministry called the visit a "gross

violation of the feelings of Chinese people and people from other Asian countries who were harmed during World War II."[12]

The United States Embassy in Tokyo said in a statement: "Japan is a valued ally and friend. Nevertheless, the United States is disappointed that Japan's leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions in the region." Jeff Kingston, a professor of Asian studies at Temple University in Tokyo said, "I think he wants to show the Japanese people that he's a leader who will stand up to pressure from the neighbors. No more masochistic history to please the neighbors. Japan is, in a sense, deciding unilaterally to turn the page on history."

If in Germany, any apologies for Nazism are punished by law, there is no law prohibiting the glorifying of Japan's actions in the Asian continent during World War II, a war that began in 1937, with the Japanese invasion of China and ending on August 15, 1945, with the surrender of the Japanese Empire. Until now, the majority of Japanese believe that, while the Japanese's actions between 1937 and 1945 were morally reprehensible, they were not legally reprehensible.[13] We find the same tradition of denial of responsibility among the Japanese leaders. Those refused to admit that by launching the war against China and other countries in the Pacific, Japan had violated international laws. Some nationalists even argued that Japan had signed the Geneva Convention, but it had not ratified it. Hence, their country could not technically have violated its laws.

Seven-five years after the end of World War II, the Japanese authorities had still not officially expressed their profound regrets —not apologizing by making political statements but by offering sincere repentance— about their Asian neighbors, which continue until today to lead to tensions between Japan and China, and also between Japan and South Korea. Even though many millions of people perished during the war, many Japanese continued to ignore the reality of the crimes committed by their armies in China, Korea, and throughout the Pacific and East Asia. Most of them, who followed the policies of their governments, consider them victims.[14] They took as an alibi the bombing of Japanese cities and especially the bombings of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to make us understand that they are

not executioners, but martyrs. They denied the conspiracy of their country with the Nazis.

18

APOLOGIZING FOR THE WAR

T he political issue that roiled the Japanese political scene during the middle and end of the 1950s was to renew amicable relations with China, Korea, and other countries in the Pacific that Japan had invaded during World War II. Starting in the early and mid-1950s, several efforts had been made to maintain strong diplomatic relations between Japan and its neighboring countries affected by the war. The first major decision came out when Hirohito had stopped visiting Yasukuni after 1975, and the museum removed all Shōwa-era exhibits. [1] All objects connected to the wars of the late 1930s and early 1940s were taken away. Visitors could come and depart the museum without ever seeing a trace that Hirohito had been the leader of the war. [2] Following that decision, officials in Japan continued more and more to apologize for the war.

This is a list of war apology statements issued by Japan regarding the war crimes committed by its troops during World War II.

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke said to the people of Burma:

We view with deep regret the vexation we caused to the people of Burma in the war just passed. In a desire to atone, if only partially, for the pain suffered, Japan is prepared to meet fully and with goodwill its obligation for war reparations. The Japan of today is not the Japan of the past, but, as its Constitution indicates, is a peace-loving nation.[3]

The same year, Kishi said to the people of Australia: “It is my official duty, and my personal desire, to express to you and through you to the people of Australia, our heartfelt sorrow for what occurred in the war.”[4]

Kishi made those statements in 1957 during a visit in Burma (now Myanmar), and Australia. Within a year of becoming prime minister in 1957, Kishi made two trips to fifteen Asian and Pacific countries to bring messages of reconciliation, thereby making it possible for Japan to secure a revision of Japan's security treaty with America. The first journey included Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Thailand, and Taiwan. The second one included South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines. During these visits, Kishi presented a plan for a Japanese-dominated Asian Development Fund (ADF), which was to operate under the slogan "Economic Development for Asia by Asia," calling for Japan to invest millions of yen in Southeast Asia.

During the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shiina Etsusaburō, a career bureaucrat, said to the people of South Korea: "In our two countries' long history there have been unfortunate times, it is truly regrettable, and we are deeply remorseful."[5]

Etsusaburō was foreign minister of Japan from 1964 to 1966. He played a pivotal role in diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. As Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, he made this statement on June 22, 1965.

In a joint communiqué of the government of Japan and the government of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka said to the people of China:

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding 'the three principles for the restoration of relations' put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.[6]

This declaration was made on September 29, 1972, when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka met with Zhou Enlai of the People's Republic of China to discuss the normalization of relations between the two countries. The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials. Just two months after taking office, Tanaka met Mao Zedong.

During a press conference regarding the use of school textbooks, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki said:

I am painfully aware of Japan's responsibility for inflicting serious damages [on Asian nations] during the past war. We need to recognize that there are criticisms that condemn [Japan's occupation] as invasion.[7]

Suzuki held this conference on August 24, 1982.

Two days later, the chief cabinet secretary, Kiichi Miyazawa, said to the people of the Republic of Korea:

The Japanese government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, and have followed the path of a pacifist state with remorse and determination that such acts must never be repeated.[8]

Kiichi Miyazawa, who was a member of the National Diet of Japan for over fifty years, made this statement in South Korea on August 26, 1982. His

government passed a law allowing Japan to send its forces overseas for peacekeeping missions as well as negotiating a trade agreement with the United States.

On September 6, 1984, during a meeting with Pres. Chun Doo-hwan, Emperor Hirohito said: “It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century and I believe that it should not be repeated.”[9]

The emperor made the statement at a banquet for South Korean President Chun who arrived for a historic state visit in Japan. The visit by Chun, a fifty-three-year-old former army general who seized power in 1980, was opposed by both Japanese leftists and ultra-rightists, as well as by dissidents in Korea and pro-North Korea residents in Japan. It was the first visit by a South Korean head of state since the country’s liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 at the end of World War II.

In 1982, Yasuhiro Nakasone became prime minister. Known for having a nationalist attitude, he was an adherent to the nihonjinron theory that claims Japan is incomparably different from the rest of the world. Along with Minister of Foreign Affairs Shintaro Abe, he improved Japanese relations with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. On September 7, 1984, Nakasone visited China on the twelfth anniversary of Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic, and said:

There was a period in t his century when Japan brought to bear great sufferings upon your country and its people. I would like to state here that the government and people of Japan feel a deep regret for this error.[10]

On October 23, 1985, in another speech to the United Nations, he said:

On June 6, 1945, when the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco, Japan was still fighting a senseless war with 40 nations. Since the end of the war, Japan has profoundly regretted the unleashing of rampant ultra-nationalism and militarism and the war that brought great devastation to the people of many countries around the world and to our country as well.[11]

On November 6, 1987, Noboru Takeshita was appointed prime minister. Replacing Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru led the largest faction at the time in the Liberal Democratic Party. He was one of the first officials in Japan to acknowledge that his country had been an aggressor during World War II. This statement was part of a speech he made in 1989 in the Japanese Diet:

As we have made clear previously at repeated opportunities, the Japanese government and the Japanese people are deeply conscious of the fact that the actions of our country in the past caused suffering and loss to many people in neighboring countries. Starting from our regret and resolve not to repeat such things a second time, we have followed a course as a “Peace Nation” since then. This awareness and regret should be emphasized especially in the relationship between our countries and the Korean Peninsula, our nearest neighbors both geographically and historically. At this opportunity as we face a new situation in the Korean Peninsula, again, to all peoples of the globe, concerning the relationship of the past, we want to express our deep regret and sorrow.[12]

During the 188th National Diet Session Lower House Committee of Foreign Affairs, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Nakayama, said to the people of South Korea: “Japan is deeply sorry for the tragedy in which these (Korean) people were moved to Sakhalin not of their own free will but by the design of the Japanese government and had to remain there after the conclusion of the war.”[13]

On May 24, 1990, during a meeting with Korean President Roh Tae Woo, Emperor Akihito said: “Reflecting upon the suffering that your people underwent during this unfortunate period, which was brought about by our nation, I cannot but feel the deepest remorse.”[14]

In response to Akihito’s apology, Roh said South Koreans should put past problems behind them and build friendly relations. The visit was the first by a Korean chief of state to Japan since 1984.

The following morning Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu during a summit meeting with Roh Tae Woo, said:

I would like to take the opportunity here to humbly reflect upon how the people of the Korean Peninsula went through unbearable pain and sorrow as a result of our country’s actions during a certain period in the past and to express that we are sorry.[15]

Prime Minister Kaifu was too young at the time of the war to have been involved. However, on behalf of the Japanese people, he apologized on behalf of the throne to the Chinese and the Koreans and others who had been mistreated by Japan during 1932–45. In 1991 the North Koreans demanded apologies and reparations from Japan for the treatment of their half of Korea during the Japanese occupation that began in 1910 and lasted until 1945. The Japanese gave the apologies but refused the reparations.[16]

On August 11, 1993, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, at the first press conference after his inauguration, said: “I myself believe it was a war of aggression, a war that was wrong.”[17]

Hosokawa made several unprecedented statements during his term as prime minister. In his first news conference in office, he made an unprecedented statement acknowledging that Japan waged a war of aggression in World War II.

A few days later, on August 23, 1993, he said in a speech at the 127th National Diet Session:

After 48 years from then, our nation has become one of nations that enjoy prosperity, and peace. We must not forget that it is founded on the ultimate sacrifices in the last war, and a product of the achievements of the people of the previous generations. We would like to take this opportunity to clearly express our remorse for the past and a new determination to the world. Firstly, at this occasion, we would like to express our deep remorse and apology for the fact that invasion and colonial rule by our nation in the past brought to bear great sufferings and sorrow upon many people. [18]

On September 21, 1993, Morihiro said at the 128th National Diet Session:

I used the expression war of aggression and act of aggression which is the same as the one that the act of our nation in the past brought to bear unbearable sufferings and sorrow upon many people, and to express once again deep remorse and apology.[19]

On June 9, 1995, the House of Representatives, National Diet of Japan, passed a resolution to renew the determination for peace based on lessons learned from history. The resolution said:

On the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, this House offers its sincere condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over the world. Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world and recognizing that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting pain

and suffering upon the people of other countries, especially in Asia. The Members of this House express a sense of deep remorse. [20]

The same year, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a formal apology. He announced that Japan has paid more than $27 billion in compensation to about 27 other governments. “It was a war of invasion and I believe an apology was right,” said Murayama.[21]

On September 6, 1997, during a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said to the People’s Republic of China:

In 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Government of Japan expressed its resolution through the statement by the prime minister, which states that during a certain period in the past, Japan’s conduct caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, including China, and the prime minister expressed his feeling of deep remorse and stated his heartfelt apology, while giving his word to make efforts for peace. I myself was one of the ministers who were involved in drafting this statement. I would like to repeat that this is the official position of the Government of Japan.[22]

On October 8, 1998, during the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration on —a New Japan-South Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-First Century— Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi said:

Looking back on the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea during this century, I regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and

suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.[23]

One month later, on November 26 during the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, Prime Minister Keizō in an apologizing statement to President Jiang Zemin of China for Japan's World War II conduct, said:

Both sides believe that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China. The Japanese side observes the 1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China a nd the August 15, 1995, Statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this. The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the history and adhere to the path of peace and development Based on this, both sides will develop long-standing relations of friendship.[24]

This statement had been judged insufficient for Mr. Jiang who wanted two concessions from Mr. Obuchi: a clear-cut written apology to the Chinese people for World War II behavior by Japan, and a pledge about relations with Taiwan. Japan rebuffed Mr. Jiang on both accounts, instead offering an oral apology for the war. "For the Japan-China relationship to develop further in the future, it is necessary to face up to the past squarely," Mr. Obuchi told Mr. Jiang.

Mr. Jiang was the first Chinese head of state to visit Japan in a move to discuss the Asian economic crisis and the risks of war on the Korean Peninsula. Despite the divergences, after the summit, both leaders agreed on

a wide range of important issues ranging from environmental cooperation to youth exchanges.

When Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko, on August 28, 1945, called for a repentance of one hundred million individuals, he was not referring to the countries attacked, but to the fact that he had not had enough morality to defeat. Higashikuni told foreign correspondents on September 18, 1945, that his cabinet intended to investigate and punish those who had committed atrocities against POWs and other war crimes.[25] Between September 1945 and March 1946, the government only brought eight low-ranking individuals to trial for conventional war crimes in four separate trials, be fore SCAP decided to abolish such proceedings. The presumption apparently was that once tried and sentenced, such individuals could not be subjected to double jeopardy and retried by the Allies.[26]

Abroad, particularly in China and Korea, the two governments severely criticized Hirohito for his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. The question is, why, after the defeat of 1945, even when Yasukuni Shrine was forced to adopt the status of private religious association, independent of the state, Hirohito, as a symbol of the nation, had continued to visit this shrine where the souls of some two million five hundred thousand soldiers killed in the war are honored, among them Tōjō and the thirteen other principals, such as Iwane Matsui, who organized the Rape of Nanking, and Heitaro Kimura, who brutalized Allied prisoners of war. All those Japanese dignitaries were executed in the context of the Tokyo trial. Of around 2,500,000 people contained in the shrine's book of souls, 1,068 were convicted of war crimes, 14 are convicted Class A war criminals.

Several members of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan such as former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and current Prime Minister Shinzō Abe have visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi made annual personal (non-governmental) visits from 2001 to 2006. (It was only in 1975, at the end of his life, after an eighth and last visit to Yasukuni, that Hirohito stopped going there. The notes of Tomita Tomohiko, director of the Imperial Affairs Office, informed that Hirohito had stopped his visits to Yasukuni because he felt uncomfortable with the idea that Class "A" criminals are worshipped there. On February 2, 1973, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was asked by a

Communist Diet member “whether he taught the Japan-China war had been a war of aggression.” Tanaka replied without hesitation:

It is true that Japan once sent troops to the Chinese continent; this is a historical fact. But when you ask me whether that constituted, as you say, a war of aggression, it is very hard for me to answer. This is a question for future historians to evaluate.[27]

In 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of World War II in Asia provoked highly political and ideological debates. The issue of Japanese “war responsibility,” a subject that has been quite widely debated in Japan as in the United States for many years, was at the center of the discussion. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, who led the Japanese Socialist Party and was responsible for changing its name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan in 1996, delivered a statement on August 15, 1945, in which he expressed his “heartfelt apology” for the damage and suffering caused by Japan during the war in the Pacific and East Asia. The statement before it has been accepted as an official document was drastically challenged by the members of the Liberal Democratic Party that governed Japan from 1955 to 1993. The way the resolution has been voted in the lower house in Tokyo illustrates the political tumult that has accompanied this issue. Of 502 representatives, only 251 participated in the vote, of who 230 supported the resolution. Opposition votes included fourteen members of the Japan Communist Party, who desired a much stronger statement of Japan’s war responsibility. Some 241 members of the House abstained from voting, including seventy representatives who were affiliated with one of the three parties that sponsored the resolution. Over fifty of these dissenting coalition members belonged to the conservative Liberal Democratic Party who said that the resolution still went too far. Fourteen Socialists abstained to vote on the grounds that the resolution did not go far enough. One hundred forty-one members of the Shin Shinto (New Frontier Party) did not vote because they desired a stronger statement.

The final resolution as passed contains many changes from the initial document that has been submitted in the House of Representatives by Murayama's cabinet. Japanese colonialism and aggression are placed in the larger context of "modern" colonialism and aggression by other powers (implicitly "the West"). The word "apology" (shazi or owabi) is absent from the final statement. And the "deep remorse" (fukai hansei) expressed for the suffering Imperial Japan caused other people is explicitly identified as referring primarily to Japan's Asian neighbors.

An editorial from the Sankei newspaper on June 10, 1945, condemned the resolution. Sankei's editorial attacked the Socialists and other Japanese who condemn Japan's war behavior without qualification. According to the newspaper those who supported the resolution generally trace Japanese aggression back to the First Sino-Japanese War in the mid-1890s, by embracing an "anti-national" or "anti-Japanese" (hankokumin) ideology. Two days before the Sankei published this editorial, on June 8, 1945, a critique of the Diet resolution from Akahata (Red Flag), the newspaper of the Japan Communist Party, condemned the resolution for not being strong enough when it addressed Japan's war responsibility during World War II.

The petition conveys two different sentiments in Japan. From the conservative group, there is a resistance to any statement suggesting that Japan has been an aggressive country during the long period from the colonization of Korea in 1910 to the end of World War II in 1945. There is also a deep patriotic concern that condemning Japan for launching the war in the Pacific and Southeast Asia would blaspheme the memory of approximately two million Japanese "heroes" (eiri) who bravely and loyally gave their lives for their country.

The position of Abe Shinzō, who became Prime Minister in 2006, after his maternal grandfather Kishi Nobusuke, former prime minister (1957–1960), was convicted as a "Class A" war criminal, represented a clear example of how the officials in Japan chose the position of denial instead of recognizing the responsibility of their country in starting the war. As his grandfather's political view, Abe is openly on the side of amnesia and denial. On March 1, 2007, he stated that there was no evidence that the Japanese government had kept sex slaves. On October 18, 2013, he added:

“Japan inflicted tremendous damage and suffering on people in many countries, especially in Asia. The Abe cabinet will take the same stance as that of past cabinets.”[28]

Although we encourage those apology statements issued by Japanese officials with regard to the war crimes committed by the empire of Japan during World War II, it is right to say that amnesia and denial have always been the position of most post-war Japanese governments that have so far refused to acknowledge the war crimes perpetrated by Japan during World War II. That Japan had nothing to be ashamed of during the war is the message of several prominent ruling-party Liberal Democratic politicians. On April 22, 1988, Land Agency Minister Seisuko Okuno told assembled veterans’ representatives at a ceremony at the Yasukuni Shrine that Japan’s war with China was not “a war of aggression. Japan fought in order to secure its safety.” He went on, saying that “the white races had turned Asia into a colony…Japan was by no means the aggressor nation.”

Apart from rare mentions of the 1945 atrocities in Manila, the Japanese do not appear to have been particularly sensitive to the victimization of peoples of Southeast Asia. [29] The two most serious crimes of war in which Japanese troops were involved during the Pacific War, the Nanking Massacre and the crimes committed by Unit 731, were relatively rarely mentioned in Japan. Most of the members of the Liberal Democratic Party have denied some of the atrocities such as government involvement in abducting women to serve as “comfort women” (sex slaves).

The Mainichi Shimbun, Japan’s oldest newspaper with an archive that stretches back over 100 years through the Meiji, Shōwa and Taisei eras, has in its archives a rich documentation on the Nanking Massacre. The question is why it took so long for one of the most blatant “hidden war crimes” —the sexual enslavement of non-Japanese “comfort women”— to be recognized by Japanese officials who sometimes denied the facts. Why did it take so long for Japanese women to call attention to these crimes? Why does most of Japanese history textbooks only offer brief references to the various war crimes committed by Japanese troops during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II? Any Japanese textbook attempting to tell the unvarnished truth about Japan from the thirties onward is liable to heavy

rewriting, and since the Textbook Certification Commission vets all textbooks for middle schools, headmasters have no real choice. Some of the Education Ministry alterations imposed on history-book writers were exposed in the Japan Law Review.[30]

Despite the efforts of the nationalist textbook reformers, by the late 1990s, the most common Japanese schoolbooks contained limited references to the Nanking Massacre, Unit 731 and the comfort women of World War II. In 1953, the Japanese Ministry of Education published a textbook by Japanese historian Saburō lenaga but censored several parts related to Japanese war crimes. Saburō undertook a series of lawsuits against the ministry for violation of his freedom of speech.

At the first trial filed by the historian on January 1, 1984, at Tokyo District Court, Judge Kato ruled on October 3, 1989, that "while the authorization system itself was constitutional, there was a certain abuse of discretion on the part of the Ministry regarding the unconstitutional censoring of the description of sōmōtai," and ordered the state to compensate Saburō ¥ 100,000. At the second trial filed by the state on October 13, 1989, at Tokyo High Court, Judge Kawakami ruled on October 20, 1993, "There was a certain abuse of discretion on the part of the Ministry regarding the unconstitutional censoring of the descriptions of Nanking Massacre and sexual assaults by the military in addition to sōmōtai," and ordered the state to compensate the defendant ¥ 300,000. At the third trial filed on October 25, 1993, at Tokyo Supreme Court, Judge Ono ruled on August 29, 1997, that "while the authorization system itself was constitutional, there was a certain abuse of discretion on the part of the Ministry regarding the unconstitutional censoring of the descriptions of Unit 731, sexual assaults at Nanking in addition to sōmōtai," and ordered the state to pay Saburō ¥ 400,000 as compensation.

The postwar progressive scholars and activists in Japan are certainly committed to exposing more and more the extent of Japan's World War II atrocities. But the primary focus of this group has tended to be on, first, Japan's Chinese victims, and second, its Korean victims. These two peoples, Chinese and Koreans, had unquestionably suffered most at Japanese hands. Nearly two million Koreans were serving in factories and

mines in Japan during the war. The war crimes involved the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy in China was responsible for the deaths of millions. Historical documents estimate the number of deaths that resulted from Japanese war crimes in China range from 5 to 6 million through massacre, human experimentation, starvation, and forced labor. The Imperial Japanese Army air service took part in conducting chemical and biological attacks during the Second Sino-Japanese War, knowing the use of such weapons in warfare was generally prohibited by international agreements signed by Japan, including the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907), which banned the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in warfare.

Although those efforts need to be appreciated, we must recognize that the postwar progressive scholars and activists in Japan did not focus too much on the suffering of peoples from Formosa, Burma, Philippines, Malaysia, Indochina, Indonesia, and other countries in Asia under Japan's rules. It is a fact that Japanese people are hardworking, courageous, intelligent, and highly disciplined. However, it must be admitted that Japanese wealth was the basis of looting in the territories occupied by Japan during World War II. This wealth also comes from the fruits of the work of millions of Chinese, Koreans, Malaysians, Filipinos, Indochinese, and other nations enslaved by the Japanese between 1910 and 1945.

On November 1, 2008, Gen. Tomogami Toshio was removed from his position as chief of the Aeronautical Forces Staff, the highest rank in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Air Force. The general was accused of taking the opposite view of the opinion officially supported by the current government, which legitimized the armed conflicts led by Japan, as well as the undertaking of colonization of the countries of the Asian region. Until the present time, Japan had continued to deny its responsibility in the war in the Pacific and East Asia. The Japanese educational system is intent on perpetuating a version of events that not only absolves Japan from any blame for the horrors of World War II but also promotes the concept of Japan as victim.[31] Despite this denial we must say that revenge is not the solution.

Revenge is not the Solution

When the war ended there were those among us, who advocate slaughter of all Japanese, a virtual extermination of the race because the Asiatic War has brought so much suffering and taken so many lives. But it is right to say that the more Japanese who would be killed by revenge, the more the bad feeling of those who survive. After Japan was defeated, international justice was the way and light for the peace to be restored. Therefore, I would say, justice must prevail to avoid revenge. The only question is simple: Was Hirohito not responsible for war crimes as those from the gangster militarists who provoked the conflict? Fellers at one point acknowledged that "as Emperor and acknowledged head of State, Hirohito cannot sidestep war guilt. He is a part of and must be considered an instigator of the Pacific War." However, in the memorandum to his "Answer to Japan," Fellers indicated:

That the emperor would be indispensable not only for effecting a surrender of the enemy's fighting forces but also as the spiritual core of a peacefully inclined postwar government that, it was assumed, would be made up of the new elderly conservative elites including titled actions of the high mobility, who had controlled the country before the militarists gained ascendancy.[32]

In March 1946, Shigeru Nambara, a Christian educator who became president of Tokyo Imperial University, had been chosen to conduct a memorial service for students and staff killed in the war. The text of the service was published by the popular newspaper Bungei Shunjū under the title "A Report to Students Who Fell in Battle." In this memorial's speech, Nanbara recognized that "Japan had been led into war by ignorant, reckless militarists and ultranationalists; that people, including those from the university, had followed along believing that they were fighting for truth and justice; that unfortunately, truth and justice had been on the side of the

United States and Britain." At the end of his speech, Nanbara said, "The dead had been spared from witnessing the day of defeat and the hardship and spiritual pain that had followed. They should know, however, that the grievances the Japanese now felt were not against the wartime enemy, but against themselves.[33]

One year after Shigeru's memorial service, as the Cold War intensified, after the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, that marked the formal start of the Cold War in Europe, U.S.-Japan policy shifted emphasis from reformation and democratization to reconstruction and economic development. MacArthur told Conservative Diet members and local politicians that the United States had no intention of destroying Japan's industrial capability. Following the second postwar election on April 25, 1947, MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida ordering him to prepare a comprehensive plan to restart the economy. He said in this letter "Japan must become economically self-sufficient, able to take its place in a reconstructed world."[34]

On May 6, 1947, three days after the promulgation of the new constitution, in the Dai-Ichi Seimei Sogo Building, in which Douglas MacArthur had his headquarters during the occupation of Japan following World War II, Hirohito again met with the supreme commander for the Allied powers. With the help of former diplomat Matsui Akira, who was his interpreter, Hirohito asked MacArthur, "After the United States leaves, who is going to protect Japan?" MacArthur, through the translator answered, "Just as the United States protects California, so shall we protect Japan."[35]

Under the United States' leadership and with a new constitution enacted on May 3, 1947, Japan at the beginning of the 1950s became a real democracy. The 1946 constitution redefined the Japanese people as citizens, rather than "eternally loyal subjects." The constitution's greatest merit was to have renounced war totally, without reservation, and also strengthened the position of the prime minister, stipulated that he and other ministers of state "must be civilians," guaranteed civil liberties, and enfranchised women.[36] Thought not without flaws, it at least upheld the values of democracy and peace.[37] On April 28, 1952, the end of the occupation came into effect, formally ending all occupation powers of the Allied troops and restoring

full sovereignty to Japan, except for the island chains of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which the United States continued to occupy. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and the administrative agreement granting American military forces in Japan special privileges all ended simultaneously.

19

JAPAN'S EMPIRE DISASTER

A t the end of the 1800s, the internal fight for political and economic power in Japan took an ugly turn, including riots and tax revolts, and even plots to assassinate high government officials. [1] From 1881 to 1888, corporate moguls quarreled among themselves, jockeyed for personal gain, and maneuvered to achieve their political and moral goals. On February 11, 1889, at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Emperor Meiji proclaimed the new Constitution called the Meiji constitution. It was a despotic charter that vested absolute power in the emperor. [2] The people's right to vote was limited to property owners, approximately 500,000 men, thus only slightly more than 1 percent of the population at the time. The legislature limited personal freedom by voting special laws. For example, the courts considered a man guilty if arrested, unless he could prove his innocence. [3]

From the adoption of the Meiji constitution in 1889 and the first period of the Shōwa era (1927–1945), the military controlled the new Japanese constitutional government. The result was years of political instability, more internal conflicts, violence, murders, assassinations, overseas aggression, and war crimes in occupied territories. In 1900, in one of those internal quarrels with Prince Itō Hirobumi, Gen. Aritomo Yamagata persuaded the emperor to order that only generals and admirals on active duty could hold office in Japan as ministers of war and navy.[4] By this ruling, the army and navy obtained more and more power to decide on the future of the nation.

In October 1903, Admiral Seiichi Itō, chief of the Naval General Staff, informed Vice-Adm. Tōgō Heihachirō that he would command the Imperial Navy Fleet as soon as war would break out between Japan and Russia.[5] Four months later, on February 8, 1904, the Japanese launched a sudden, surprise attack on the Russian naval base of Port Arthur, on the coast of Manchuria, without the formality of declaring war. They fired their torpedoes and hit two Russian battleships, The Tsarevich and The Retvizan,

and the cruiser Pallada. On the same day, the Japanese army took control of Seoul, the capital of Korea, and on the 10th, Japan officially declared war against Russia. Port Arthur surrendered in January 1905. Not till February 1905, Japanese and Russian's troops fought the war. Finally, Tōgō defeated the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima Straits on 27–28 May 1905. Under Field Marshall Iwao Oyama, the Japanese destroyed Gen. Aleksey Kuropatkin's forces, inflicting 70,000 casualties including 20,000 killed or missing at a cost of 16,000 Japanese killed and 60,000 wounded.[6] A peace treaty was signed on September 5, 1905, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, United States.[7]

Despite Japan's victory over Russia, the "Treaty of Portsmouth" was so unpopular that it immediately set off violent anti-American reactions among Japanese who wanted more generous terms from Russia. The Hibiya Incendiary Incident in Tokyo (September 5–7, 1905) was one of the protests against the treaty.[8] Many Japanese believed that Japan's gains were far less than what public opinion had expected.[9] The rioting killed seventeen people. The police arrested more than two thousand rioters with one hundred and four being tried, eighty-seven judged guilty, and sentenced to prison. This violent episode contributed to the government led by Katsura Tarō to collapse.[10]

At the beginning of 1905, Japan's total population was approximately 46 million. Due to the decline of agricultural productivity, many farmers abandoned their regions, and moved to cities and towns. In 1907, Japan signed two important treaties. The Franco-Japanese Treaty of June 10, 1907, and the Japan-Korea Treaty of July 24, 1907. The Franco-Japanese Treaty (Nichi-futsu, Kyotei) was signed in Paris by Japanese Ambassador Baron Shin'ichiro Kurino and French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon. The treaty denoted respective spheres of influence in Asia. In the treaty, France and Japan stated their commitments to the territorial integrity of China, as well as their support of the Open-Door Policy. It also stated that both governments have a "special interest" in maintaining peace and order in areas of China adjacent to territories where both parties have rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation. The non-public supplement of the agreement defined these areas as Manchuria, Mongolia, the province of Fukien for Japan; and the provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong

for France. The treaty implicitly recognized France's position in French Indochina.[11]

Meanwhile, the negotiations of the Japan-Korea Treaty were concluded on July 24, 1907. The treaty noted that Korea should act under the guidance of a Japanese Resident General. The administration of internal affairs in Korea was turned over to Japan.[12] Provisions in the treaty gave the Japanese resident-general the right to appoint and dismiss high-ranking officials (Article 4). The treaty stipulated that all high-ranking officials appointed to the Korean government must be Japanese (Article 5). The treaty placed the Korean army under Japanese leadership and handed over judicial and policing powers. Driving to disaster, on August 22, 1910, Japan annexed Korea. The Japan-Korea Treaty of annexation was signed by Ye Wanyong, Prime Minister of Korea, and Terauchi Masatake, who became the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea. Two years later, on July 30, 1912, Emperor Meiji died. The Taishō Period began with the ascension of Yoshihito who became Emperor Taishō.

The Taishō Period

The ascension of Crown Prince Yoshihito on the throne after the death of his father, Emperor Meiji, drove Japan with full speed into disaster. The new emperor, having suffered from various neurological problems throughout his life, was kept out of view of the public as much as possible. His disabilities led to an increase in incidents of lèse majesté. As his condition deteriorated, Emperor Yoshihito had less and less interest in daily political affairs. The ability of the genrō, keeper of the privy seal and imperial household minister to manipulate the imperial decisions, came to be a matter of common knowledge.[13] In December 1912, Adm. Yamamoto Gonbei told genrō Matsukata Masayoshi that when it came to recommending a successor prime minister, Emperor Yoshihito "is not [of the same caliber] as the previous emperor. In my view it is loyal not to obey the [Taishō] emperor's word if we deem it to be disadvantageous to the state."[14]

When World War I broke in Europe in the summer of 1914, Japan was constrained by its alliance with Britain to take the side of the Triple Entente.[15] The Japanese took the opportunity to seize the German colony of Kiaochaow in China's Shandong Province.[16] They invaded Germany's Pacific colonies, the Mariana Islands, the Marshalls Islands, and the Caroline Islands. Having achieved that, Japanese expansionists began to cultivate a taste for China. In 1915, Japanese officials presented an outrageous set of "Twenty-One Demands" to the Chinese government. Among the demands were a ninety-nine-year lease of southern Manchuria railroads, economic control of Manchuria, economic control of bauxite mines at Hankow, and the hiring of Japanese in China's civil service and other agencies. Together, the demands would have made China a colony of Japan.[17]

The Chinese refused. Japanese troops invaded Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Japan now had Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, the Kuriles, Ryukyus, Shanghai, several islands in the Central and South Pacific that its navy

could use as naval bases. The Japanese plan to expand Japan's territories in the Pacific and Southeast Asia became a reality. Being allied with the victors of WWI gave Japan additional prestige and power, and it wanted the West (Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States) to treat it as an equal superpower. Further, America's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles offered Japan an open door to get what it asked.[18]

More on disaster…

Concentrating as it did on war production, Japanese agriculture after World War I lost its pride of place in the national economy. The number of farm workers declined due to the recruitment and conscription of hundreds of thousands of young peasants into the army. Already, by the end of the first war against China (1894-1895), the Japanese could not feed themselves without imports. Thus, it became a net importer of rice soon after 1895. By 1914, Japan was importing as much as ten million koku a year in addition to other food stuffs. With the years passed, this dependency worsened. At the end of the First World War in 1918, rice cost the Japanese consumer four times as much as it had at the beginning of the century. Despite direct government intervention and support, many farmers were in difficulties. Farmers used to account for more than 40 percent of the working population of Japan; but they have dropped to less than 30 percent after World War I.

In November 1918, after four years of war between the Central Powers and the Allied Powers, the ceasefire came. The same year, Japan was dealing with the Spanish influenza.[19] Of the 1.8 to 2 billion persons in the world, 600 million were affected and 30 to 40 million died from the pandemic. In Japan, 23 million persons were affected, and between 390,000 and 400,000 died. The first wave of the epidemic occurred in the country in August 1918, and many cases were reported in Tokyo in mid-October (10, 11). The second wave came in January 1920. Most of the patients first affected were soldiers in the Japanese army. Given those facts, after millions of people died in Japan, it is obvious to ask: How could Japanese expansionism and conquest be justified by arguments of overpopulation and growing need for resources that could simply be acquired from trade in regard with several

trade agreements that Japan signed with several countries in the region and outside Asia?[20]

Following World War I, more violent protests occurred across Japan. Rural Japanese were infuriated at the government's failure to control inflation. Urban Japanese joined the protests opposing increases in rent. People also denounced the high prices of consumer goods including Japan's essential grain, the rice. The "Rice Riots of 1918" caused the government led by Terauchi Masatake to collapse.[21] Early 1920s Japan was still facing the reality of a bad economic crisis. Japanese officers who came from the farms, for the most part, discovered through the stories of their parents the conditions of misery of those living in the countryside. Those officers began to rebel against political rule.[22]

The request for social changes became more violent after the Great Kantō Earthquake, which was considered the worst natural disaster ever to strike Japan. The tsunami that struck Yokohama and Tokyo traumatized the nation and unleashed historic consequences. The death toll was about one hundred forty thousand including forty-four thousand who had sought refuge near Tokyo's Sumida River. Those, in the first few hours, were immolated by a freak pillar of fire known as a "dragon twist."[21] Japan in 1923 was dealing with more political and economic crises. Despite a hard time in the history of the nation, the army and navy continued to spend huge sums of money in the process of building divisions and ships. The Kwantung Army by 1920 to 1923 became the strongest and most powerful military forces of Japan.[24] The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia in 1922 became another problem to manage by Japanese officials. Japan had more troops than could be profitably employed, and with the necessary evacuation of northern Sakhalin, the problem had increased. The whole situation worried many generals and admirals who had no intention of allowing the army building to be reversed.[25]

On May 10, 1924, there was general election in Japan. No party won a majority of seats. The Kenseikai, the Rikken Seiyuūkai, and the Kakushin Party under the leadership of Katō Takaaki, formed the first coalition government in Japan. Seven months later, on December 27, 1924, dynamite exploded during logistic handling work in Temiya Station, Otaru,

Hokkaido. The death toll was 94 persons. The following year, on March 7, 1925, the Public Security Preservation Law of 1925 (Chian Iji Hō) was passed in the Diet. This law had been in effect since 1887 and had been revised several times. The Japanese used the law to quell riots, put down demonstrations, and control labor union activity and radical political activity.[26] The local police were everywhere. The koban (police box) was visible in every district. The government could throw anyone into jail and keep this person there indefinitely without explanation. The police were part of the Ministry of Home Affairs that also enforced censorship. Any materials the ministry deemed subversive were censored. [27] The Public Security Preservation Law of 1925 forbade conspiracy and revolt, and criminalized socialism and communism. In application of the law, several members of the Japan Communist Party were arrested during the March 15 Incident in 1928. These arrests occurred throughout Japan. A total of 1,652 people were apprehended. Five hundred of those arrested were prosecuted by the Tokyo District Court. The defendants in the trials were all found guilty and sentenced to several years of jail terms. Because of these trials, Prime Minister Tanaka was able to pass legislation that added the provision for the death penalty to the authoritarian Peace Preservation Law.

Japan's economy suffered a lot when American stock market crashed in October 1929. WPI fell about 30 percent, agricultural prices fell 40 percent, and textile prices fell nearly 50 percent. Around 1930, rural poverty became severe. The countryside was hit by famine. In some provinces such as Tohoku (northeastern) region of Japan, there was a big increase in numbers of undernourished children, and some farmers were forced to sell their daughters into prostitution. This economic crisis resulted in imports exceeding exports by ¥1 billion. Making things worse, the war production effort had a direct repercussion on several sectors of the Japanese economy. When Ishiwara Kanji and Miyazaki Masayoshi came in the early twentieth century with the Five-Year Plans; this program created in Manchuria and north China an industrial complex, which was a large contributor to Japan's military industry.[28] Thus, began the creation of a range of "'special'" and "'semi-special'" companies each dominating one field of industrial activity under the overall supervision of the South Manchuria Railway Company, in which the Japanese government held half the stock. More than that Japan

brought from Russia the Chinese Eastern Railway in order to ensure fuller control movement of supplies.[29]

By the beginning of 1931, the military still dominated the Japanese government. The officers in the army became more and more authoritarian. Japan's political environment was polluted with murders, assassinations, violence, coup attempts, political instability, and war crimes.[30] The Planning Board (kikakuin) was created. The military in command pushed the country further to disaster. The Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. They declared war on China in 1937.[31]

Starting in 1937, following its second invasion of China, a large part of Japan national budget was allocated to war. The consequences were that, in many parts of the country, the population became extremely impoverished and unemployed. In desperation, farmers became soldiers, and millions of rural Japanese fled to the cities. The trend was unsustainable. Human overpopulation in dozens of major cities became a huge problem for the Japanese government. For example, at the beginning of 1905, Japan's total population was approximately 46 million; in 1920, it had risen another 10 million; by the first national census in 1940, it was more than 73 million. Due to the decline of agricultural productivity, many farmers abandoned their regions and moved to cities and towns. By 1920, a little over 30 percent of Japanese people lived in communities of at least 100,000 inhabitants. In 1940, the largest cities in Japan held almost one quarter of the Japanese population. Tokyo in 1930 had a population of 2.2 million in its central districts, and 1.2 million in its suburbs. By 1940, it had almost 7 million people (+227.33 percent). Osaka had 3 million and half residents (+32.53 percent), second only to Tokyo. Most other important cities such as Nagoya, Kyoto, Yokohama, Kobe, had each of them almost one million people. While other small cities like Hiroshima, Kawasaki, Fukuoka, Yahata, and Nagasaki had between 400,000 to 300,000 people.

Life within these cities was difficult for the poorest who found themselves condemned to industrial slums, "unless they stayed in the narrow, dark shop-dwellings of the old commercial districts."[32] For those poor men and women in the cities, conditions at work were harsh, often because harmful exploitation and abuses in the workplaces. Back in the countryside, mining

had an especially bad record for brutality and low safety standards, contributing to thousand deaths a year in the 1940s. During this period of time, Japan had a workforce of approximately 27 million people, of who a little over one-sixth were engaged in manufacturing. About 1.6 million worked in factories (740,000 men and 870,000 women), another 400,000 in mining. Wages were very low on the grounds that only in this way could Japan compete with the technologically advanced and capital-intensive industries of the West.[33] Male factory workers received an average 190 sen a day (100 sen = 1 yen). Women received about half as much.

In occupied territories things were also bleak. Records of an imperial Japanese workforce survey before 1940, and made public in 2017, showed a total of 1.16 million Koreans were “eligible” for forced labor. Among them, 80,000 to 290,000 Koreans annually were forced to work for Japan. Korean women workers were primarily those in their teens drafting as forced prostitutes for Japanese soldiers. Altogether, the Governor-General of Korea’s “Regarding the Labor Resource Survey” revealed on October 31, 2017, the number of Korean male workers aged 20 to 45 tallied for Japanese war mobilization in 1940 was calculated at 927,536, while the number of female workers aged 12 to 19 was listed at 232,641 for a total of 1,160,177. This number represented approximately 5 percent of Korean population of 23,547,465 at the time.

The National Archives of Korea (NAK) explained that the survey was conducted by imperial Japan between the time of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the beginning of World War II to meet its perceived need for foreign forced labor, in this case Koreans.[34] In 1938, the Planning Board issued the Resource Mobilization Plan (first economic plan). Separately, the National Mobilization Law was approved.[35] The Military Needs Company was adopted. For economic planners, the primary objective was to maximize military production under limited domestic resources and availability of imports. Key military products were ships and warplanes. Toward the end of the war, airplane production became the only priority. With considerable resources coming from the “Yen Bloc” (Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and the rest of occupied China), Japan was quickly building a powerful army that allowed it from 1937 to 1942 to invade a wide area in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

In December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy invaded Thailand and attacked the United States military and naval bases in Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines. Before invading those territories, Japan's empire consisted of the Japanese home islands, Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan. In addition, by 1942, Japan had seized Singapore and Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma, the Netherlands' Indonesian colonies. In just over ten years, Japan had achieved a remarkable expansion of its empire from 243,500 square miles to 2.9 million square miles. Five years of war with China had drained Japan and required a standing army of 120 divisions (1.5 million troops) just to maintain its hold over half of the country. With its sweeping victories over America, Great Britain, Holland, and Australia, Japan had additional 1.25 million square miles to administer and garrison. Japan's empire at its peak in June 1942 stretched from the Russian borders in the north, the barren wastes of Kamchatka, and the islands of Alaska in the northeast, to Jakarta in the southwest and Timor in the south, and from the borders of Burma/India in the west to the Marshall Islands in the east and Guadalcanal in the southeast.[36] Japan had possession of roughly 25 percent of China's enormous territory and more than a third of its entire population.

From this large territory, Japanese companies gained a colossal fortune in trade and commercial activities. They fully exploited those countries that Japan forcibly occupied in north and central China.[37] Despite the economic benefits in north China, Korea, Burma, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaya, the achievements in building schools, hospitals, and infrastructures by the Japanese government in order to improve the quality of people's life from the occupied territories were not considerable. In Guam, for example, during the occupation period, Chamorros were forced to endure the hardships of the military occupation. All the schools were closed for the first four months of the occupation. The island was controlled by the Japanese troops who were housed in schools and government buildings. As at other places under control of Japanese forces, Chamorros were required to learn the Japanese custom of bowing, Japanese yen became the island's currency, and civilian affairs were handled by a branch of the army called the Minseibu. Cars, houses, were confiscated and food was rationed until supplies became exhausted. Social activities other than Japanese movies and sports competitions were not allowed. In occupied

territories, children at schools were required to learn Japanese language and customs. English was forbidden. Adults and children were taught reading, writing, playing Japanese games and songs.

Before their occupation by Japan, most of the territories in the Pacific and East Asia were if not self-sufficient but semi-self-enough. Guam's economy was semi-self-enough through the exportation of copra. The economy of several islands, such as Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, was deeply impacted by the war. The occupation caused further damage through setting a low exchange rate of U.S. dollars to the Japanese yen. Japanese forces committed all sorts of exactions such as illegal seizure of assets, destruction of homes, shortage of food, and other necessities for the locals. They also occupied land that was essential to the agriculture and the economy of those overseas territories.

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) caused an estimate of between 15 million and 20 million dead. More than 90 million Chinese became refugees in their own country. In the north and east China, Japanese forces conquered large areas, where they installed puppet regimes. Puyi (the last emperor of China) became from 1934 to 1945 a puppet emperor of the Japanese-controlled state of Manchukuo. In Nanjing, Chiang's former colleague Wang Jingwei set up a rival nationalist government under Japanese supervision in 1940.

Following the Manchurian incident of 1931, the curriculum of the national educational system became increasingly nationalistic. Beginning in 1937, the school curriculum became increasingly militaristic and was influenced by ultranationalist Education Minister Sadao Araki. In 1941, elementary schools in Japan were renamed National People's Schools (Kokumin Gakkō) and students were required to attend Youth Schools (Seinen Gakkō) vocational training schools on graduation, which mixed vocational and basic military training (for boys) and home economics (for girls). Normal schools were renamed Specialized Schools (Sennon Gakkō). The goal of the Sennon Gakkō was to produce a professional class rather than intellectual elite. In the pre-war period, nationalistic and militaristic indoctrination were further strengthened. Textbooks such as Kokutai no Hongi became required reading.[38] The principal educational objective was

teaching to the Japanese students the traditional political values, religion, and morality that had prevailed from the Meiji period. The education department of the Japanese government by force imposed the same curriculum to the children who lived in the territories that Japan occupied.

In addition to getting by force resources such as oil, gold, bauxite, coal, nephrite, and phosphate; the political discrimination based on race, religion, and sex weighed a lot in Japan's arsenal of building an empire.[39] The Japanese disregard for the Chinese as racial inferiors is well-known.[40] Belief in their own racial and cultural superiority, and the influence of the Bushido code of conduct, allowed Japanese to justify their treatment of Chinese people."[41] The early and mid-1930s witnessed not only Japan formal withdrawal from the League of Nations and preparations for war; but also characterized Japanese's attempts elites to reconstruct the national identity.

The desire for geographical expansion came from the Japanese who believed in the superiority of their civilization over all others. Japanese believed they were superior to the Chinese from whom they borrowed literature, art, and a written language, and from Western society, particularly the Americans, from whom they borrowed technology.[42] They believed that Japan had a special mission to dominate the world. They also believed they were descended from gods, their emperor was divine, and they had a heaven-inspired mission to rule the world. For more than 2,600 years, their society consumed and believed the propaganda supposedly originated by their first emperors —Jimmu, Suizei, Annei, Itoku, Kōshō, Kōan, Kōrei— and propagated by those who came after, namely, "Eight corners of the world under one roof."[43]

The Japanese believed in their mind they must dominate about a billion people in Asia and eventually the world. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a preeminent daimyō, warrior, general, samurai, and politician of the Sengoku period, was regarded as Japan's second "great unifier." Toyotomi made the same prediction as Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte, when he said: "All military leaders who shall render successful vanguard service in the coming campaign in China will be liberally rewarded with grants of extensive states

near India, with the privilege of conquering India and extending their domains in that vast empire."

Annexing Korea in 1910, invading Manchuria in 1931, and occupying from 1942 to 1945 several territories in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, allowed Japan to rival Britain as an Asian colonial power. However, the whole concept acquiring an empire by warring with neighbors was faulty and costly. Many decades of this had brought Japan to the verge of bankruptcy. The country's daily life was completely deteriorated during the years of the war. Everything was in short supply: food, booze, fuel, medicine, cloth, and metal. Life was still better in the countryside than in the cities, but hunger was everywhere. Government-enforced daily food rations were reduced during the war until they declined to barely 1,680 calories per adult per day. This is very significant when we know an average man needs 2500 calories to maintain functions, at 2000 calories, a person loses one pound of weight per week.[44] The majority of the men aged 18 were drafted to go to the war. Secret police were everywhere. Every city block had a warden who was monitoring behavior and reporting to the secret police. Beginning in the summer of 1944, Japan was intensively bombed. Forty-one Japanese cities were destroyed by bombing prior to Hiroshima. Military training has caused more disaster. Beginning in March 1945, most schools were closed. Students 12 years old and older were given military training to fight the upcoming invasion.

Japan mainland's invasion resulted in immense loss of human life. On the Japanese side, over 100,000 soldiers and 300,000 civilians died. Between soldiers and civilians, during the invasion the Allies lost more than 20,000 people. Of the 120,000 Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima at the beginning of the battle, only 216 were taken prisoner. Most of the remainder was killed in action. Hundreds of raids by the United States on several Japanese cities caused devastating material damage. On April 18, 1942, the Doolittle Raid had major psychological effects on the citizens in Tokyo. Starting in 1943, Japan began to retreat under allied counterattacks. Japanese ships and planes were massively lost while Americans built more and more of them. From late 1944, U.S. aerial bombing (mainly incendiary bombs) destroyed virtually all cities in Japan (except Kyoto). The Operation Meetinghouse firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9–10 March 1945 claimed an

estimated one hundred thousand lives. This was the single deadliest air raid in history with a greater area of fire damage and loss of life than either of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[45]

On June 22, 1945, the Allied personnel and military killed during the Battle of Okinawa exceeded 60,000. The count of Japanese military and civilian deaths had ranged from 100,000 to 250,000. As the Allies approached victory, Japan's leaders ordered their soldiers and sailors to continue fighting. It was an inhumane and immoral sacrifice of all combatants, far beyond the conventions of war, the common sense of survival, and the risks and rewards of empire-building. The Battle of Okinawa killed more than 30,000 Americans, approximately one-third of Japan's forces of 100,000 there, and possibly as many as 150,000 Okinawan civilian men, women and children.[46] In the aftermath, the Japanese military discipline collapsed. Their soldiers at home and abroad began deserting their posts. In Manchuria alone, following Japanese surrender, an estimated 60,000 Japanese soldiers and 100,000 Japanese civilians perished in the confusion of defeat or in the harsh winter that followed capitulation.[47] Hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians in Manchuria and elsewhere in Northern China had to abandon the places where they lived bringing with them only some clothes and personal documents. Many of these Japanese refugees left their youngest children with poor Chinese peasant families in the desperate hope that at least the children might survive.[48]

The Japanese government has subjected its population to decades' propaganda about racial superiority, the destiny and rewards of foreign conquest and occupation. On August 6, 1945, a total of 90,000 to 120,000 Japanese were killed after the first U.S. atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Three days later, on August 9, the second U.S. atomic bomb on Nagasaki caused 150,000 to 200,000 Japanese deaths. The Japanese were shocked when Hirohito had announced Japan's capitulation to the Allies. In his speech accepting the Terms of Surrender, 14 August 1945, Hirohito began:

To our good and loyal subjects, after pondering deeply, the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our Empire today, we have

decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that our Empire accepts the provision of their Joint Declaration…[49]

Japanese listeners were shocked. Hirohito and his adherents had "lost the reins" after twenty-six centuries. In Japan, the fighting made hundreds of thousands of Japanese homeless, including thousands of orphaned children. Abroad, huge numbers of Japanese troops perished from malnutrition and disease. Starvation became a major cause of death.[50] Until 1949, with a government burdened by reparations, political and economic reconstruction, Japanese civilians were hard-pressed to obtain the essentials. "Simply putting food on the table became an obsessive undertaking. Hunger and scarcity defined each passing day."[51] By the end of the war the food shortage was already so acute that even bombed-out areas in downtown Tokyo had been turned into vegetable gardens.[52] In Japan itself, following the capitulation, thousands of Japanese were killed themselves rather than live with surrender. As Professor Herbert P. Bix said:

Morale among troops stationed on the home islands was low before August 15; over the next three weeks it disintegrated. Reports forwarded to the office of Privy Seal Kido from prefectural governors and police officials told of units demanding immediate discharge, of kamikaze pilots loading their planes with food and other supplies and flying off to their home villages; of army doctors and nurses in a hospital in Kagoshima competing with one another to flee their posts, leaving their patients behind. As scenes of military disorder, theft of military stocks and general unruliness within the armed forces multiplied, civilian respect for the military collapsed. Men in uniform quickly found themselves objects of widespread civilian contempt.[53]

Most Japanese already were malnourished from the war years with their government's emphasis on military spending rather than on domestic needs. Almost half of the national budget in Japan was allocated to the army and navy.[54] The country's industrial giants such as Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, Manshū, Kawanishi, Yokosuka, Tachikawa, etc. received large sums to weaponize the armed forces. Germany also provided weapons technology and samples for mass-manufacture. Additionally, Japan had its own special weapons development agency, called "Japanese Secret and Special Weapons," whose mission included making and testing weapons of mass destruction. Beginning in 1937, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, a covert biological and chemical warfare research and development unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, under the name "Unit 731," conducted lethal experimentation on humans. Under the command of Gen. Shirō Ishii, this unit committed some of the most heinous war crimes of the era, if not in all history. These included biological warfare on Chinese cities and towns. Such programs caused an estimated 500,000 deaths and were fully approved and supported by Hirohito. [55]

Having mobilized several millions of troops from different nations, and killed an estimated 25 million people, the Pacific War remained one of the deadliest armed conflicts in the history. About 24.5 percent of Japanese soldiers and 19.8 percent of Japanese sailors died during the war. In total, Japanese military casualties from 1937–1945 have been estimated at 3,390,000, of which 3,240,000 were killed or missing. According to a report compiled by the Relief Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare 800,000 Japanese civilians and over 2 million Japanese soldiers died during the war. In China, soldier and civilian casualties are difficult to quantify. An estimate 10 million Chinese died. The war in China also produced an estimated 95 million refugees. In the American army, the total dead or missing were 41,592 for all U.S. ground troops in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, with another 145,706 wounded. The U.S. Navy lost 31,157 killed in action out of a total of 62,858 combat casualties. The U.S. Army Air Forces lost 15,694 dead and missing out of a total of 24,230 casualties. In the Pacific, the United Kingdom had 600,000 dead or missing and 12,840 wounded, Dutch Indies 4,000,000 dead, the Soviet Union 800,000, the Australians 9,470 dead or missing and 13,997 wounded, and India 3,070,000 dead with several thousands wounded.[56] The IJN lost over 341

warships, including 11 battleships, 25 aircraft carriers, 39 cruisers, 135 destroyers, and 131 submarines. The IJN and IJA together lost some 45,125 aircraft. Japan's ally Germany lost 10 submarines and 4 auxiliary cruisers (Thor, Michel, Pinguin, and Kormoran). The Pacific War led to the signing of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, establishing the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, with the task of trying Japanese officials (civilians and military) for war crimes.

Total casualties in Asia and the Pacific by nation and type

Nation	Killed or missing	Wounded	Prisoners of war	
China	10,000,000	3,000,000		
Dutch Indies	4,000,000	3,000,000		
Japan	3,240,000	94,000	41,440	
India	3, 070,000	24,200	68,890	
French Indochina	2,000,000		37,000	
Soviet Union	800,000			
United States	960,000	253,142	21,580	
United Kingdom	600,000	12,840	50,016	
British Commonwealth	500,000			

Destabilizing the Pacific

Being responsible for causing war-ravaged in the Pacific during the period from 1937 to 1945, Japan's empire was a disaster because its army and navy had opened the road to more instability through armed conflicts in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. On June 25, 1950, five years after Japan's surrender by accepting its defeat in World War II, the Soviet-backed North Korean People's Army invaded South Korea following clashes along the border and insurrection in the south. The United Nations Security Council condemned the move as an invasion, and authorized the formation of the United Nations Command and the dispatch of forces to Korea to repel it.[57] Twenty-one countries of the United Nations contributed to the UN force with the United States taking the lead of the coalition. On the other side, North Korea with the support of China and Russia fought the war. The Korean War was among the most destructive conflicts of the modern era.[58] As many as 4 million people died in the three-year conflict, including the mass killing of tens of thousands of suspected communists by the South Korean government and the torture and starvation of thousands of prisoners of war by the North Korean command. Almost all of Korea's major cities were destroyed. The fighting ended on July 27, 1953. The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed between the United Nations, China, and North Korea.

One year later, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis started. President Dwight Eisenhower facilitated Chiang Kai-shek to deploy thousands of troops to the Quemoy and Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Straits. Mainland China's People Liberation Army decided to attack the islands. Washington signed a mutual defense treaty with Chiang's Nationalists. To avoid a direct armed conflict with the U.S., which in the spring of 1955 threatened a nuclear attack on China, the Chinese government agreed to negotiate. However, its position on Taiwan until now has never changed. China views Taiwan as a "breakaway province which will one day be reunited with the mainland."

On November 1, 1955, the Vietnam War was officially started between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. North Vietnam was heavily backed by the USSR and the People's Republic of China. China's support for North Vietnam included both financial aid and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of military personnel in support roles. By the spring of 1965, China sent 320,000 troops and annual arms shipments with $180 million.[59] China claimed that its military and economic aid to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong totaled $20 billion during the Vietnam War.

On the other side, South Vietnam forces were supported by the United States under the supervision of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. American forces rose from 16,000 during 1964 to more than 553,000 by 1969. Under the ANZUS Pact troops from Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines joined the U.S. forces on the ground. On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon declared that if the United States and its allies wanted to neutralize North Vietnamese and NLF forces, U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam would have to be increased from 120,000 to 400,000.[60] On April 30, 1975, NVA tanks entered in Saigon, effectively ending the war. Approximately 1 million to 3.8 million Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were killed. Some 300,000 Cambodians, 60,000 Laotians, and 60,000 U.S. service members also died in the conflict. Millions of refugees left Indochina (mainly Southern Vietnam), with an estimated 250,000 of whom perished at sea.

Conventions

Convention on the Imprescriptibly of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.

Adopted and open to signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly in its resolution 2391 (XXIII) November 26, 1968.

Coming into force: November 11, 1970, in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII preamble States parties to this Convention.

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3 (I) and 170 (II), dated February 13, 1946 and October 31, 1947, relating to the extradition and punishment of war criminals, and Resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946, confirming the principles of international law recognized by the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the judgment of that tribunal, as well as resolutions 2184 (XXI) of December 12, 1966 and 2202 (XXI) of December 16, 1966, by which the General Assembly expressly condemned as crimes against humanity, on the one hand, the violation of the economic and political rights of indigenous peoples and, on the other hand, the policy of apartheid.

Recalling Resolutions 1074 D (XXXIX) and 1158 (XLI) of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, dated on July 28, 1965 and August 5, 1966, concerning the punishment of war criminals and individuals guilty of crimes against humanity.

Noting that in none of the solemn declarations, acts and conventions aimed at the prosecution and repression of war crimes and crimes against humanity there were no time limits.

Considering that war crimes and crimes against humanity are among the most serious crimes under international law.

Convinced that effective repression of war crimes and crimes against humanity is an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which will encourage trust and stimulate cooperation between peoples and to promote international peace and security.

Noting that the application of domestic law rules relating to the prescribing of ordinary crimes to war crimes and crimes against humanity is of deep concern to the world’s public opinion as it prevents those responsible for these crimes are prosecuted and punished.

Recognizing that it is necessary and timely to affirm in international law, through this Convention, the principle of the imprescriptibly of war crimes and crimes against humanity and to ensure its universal application.

Agreed on: Article I The following crimes are imprescriptible, regardless of when they were committed: (a) War crimes, as defined in the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945 and confirmed by Resolutions 3 (I) and 95 (I) of the United Nations General Assembly, dated on February 13, 1946 and December 11, 1946, including the serious offences enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the protection of victims of war; (b) Crimes against humanity, whether committed in times of war or in peace, as defined in the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945 and confirmed by General Assembly Resolutions 3 (I) and 95 (I) February 13, 1946 and December 11, 1946, the expulsion by armed attack or the occupation and inhumane acts arising from the policy of apartheid, as well as the crime of genocide, as defined in the 1948 Convention for the prevention and repression of the crime of genocide, even if these acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country where they were committed.

Article II If any of the crimes mentioned in Article 1 are committed, the provisions of this Convention will apply to representatives of the authority of the state and individuals who would participate in it as perpetrators or accomplices, or who would be guilty of direct incitement to the commission of any of these crimes, or who would participate in an agreement to commit it, regardless of its degree of execution, as well as to representatives of the state authority who would tolerate its commission.

Article III State parties to this Convention undertake to adopt all internal measures, legislative or otherwise, that would be necessary to permit the extradition, in accordance with international law, of persons covered by Article II of the Convention.

Article IV State parties to this Convention undertake to take, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, any legislative or other measures that would be necessary to ensure the imprescriptibly of the crimes covered by Articles 1 and II Convention, both in terms of prosecution and sentencing;

where a statute of limitations would exist, either by law or otherwise, it will be abolished.

Article V This Convention will be open until December 31, 1969 for the signature of any Member State of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized institutions or member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of any State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as well as any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to this Convention.

Article VI This Convention is subject to ratification and the instruments for ratification will be tabled with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article VII This Convention will be open to the accession of any Article V state. The accession instruments will be tabled with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article VIII 1. This Convention will enter into force on the 90th day following the date of the filing with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the tenth instrument for ratification or accession. For each of the States that will ratify or adhere to this Convention after the tabling of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention will enter into force on the 90th day after the date of the filing by that State of its ratification or accession instrument.

Article IX 1. After the expiry of a ten-year period from the date on which this Convention enters into force, a request for revision of the Convention may be made, at any time, by any Contracting Party, by means of written notification Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2. The General Assembly of the United Nations will decide on the measures to be taken, if any, on this request.

Article X 1. This Convention will be tabled with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will have a certified copy of this Convention kept to all Article V States. 3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will inform all States covered by the Article v: (a) Signatures on this Convention and ratification and accession instruments filed in accordance with Articles V, VI and VII; (b)

From the date on which this Convention will enter into force in accordance with Article VIII; (c) Communications received pursuant to Article IX.

Article XI This Convention, which also bear the English, Chinese, Spanish, French, and Russian texts, will bear the date of November 26, 1968. On the basis of this, the undersigned, duly authorized for this purpose, have signed this Convention.

February 1946: Hirohito inspected war-damaged areas in Kanagawa prefecture. (Mainichi shinbunsha)

(Image retrieved from Kyodo News)

PART VI

EMPEROR’S ESCAPE, EMPIRE’S DEMISE

20

THE TOKYO TRIAL

T he trial of the twenty-eight senior Japanese officers before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, known as the “Tokyo Trial,” was the second attempt after Nuremberg at an international response to the crimes committed during World War II. As early as 1942, by the St. James’ Palace Declaration, the representatives of the eighteen nations that formed the Allied group had affirmed their willingness to prosecute war criminals in international jurisdiction. But this declaration, in principle, had in mind only the crimes committed by the Nazi troops on the European continent. On October 30, 1943, the Moscow Declaration was signed by the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. It established the jurisdiction under which persons who committed war crimes will be tried. It stipulated that whether or not the abuses were perpetrated in a single country, they will be tried in it; if, on the other hand, the acts took place in several territories, they will be condemned by a joint decision of the Allies.

U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, at the Tehran conference in 1943, wanted the Nazi and the Japanese defendants to be executed without appearing before a court. Joseph Stalin, the president of the Soviet Union, refused the proposal. The idea of an international trial was then decided. Charles de Gaulle, the French president, was in favor. However, the crimes perpetrated by the Japanese armies were not considered. A United Nations War Crimes Commission was set up at that time to list war crimes in Asia; but it was not until the spring of 1944 that the commission, specially dedicated to the Far East and the Pacific, began to draw up the list of suspects.

Finally, in the proclamation of Potsdam of July 26, 1945, the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and China specifically announced their intention to bring Japanese war criminals to justice. The

Soviet Union, still bound to Japan by a non-aggression treaty, had refrained from taking part in this decision.

On August 6, it was the bombing of Hiroshima and, on August 9, the bombing of Nagasaki, as well as the entry into war of the Soviet Union against Japan. On August 10, Japan announced that it accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration except for the provisions that would target the emperor. On August 14, Japan announced its full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. The following day, Emperor Hirohito via the radio addressed the Japanese nation. On August 25, 1945, the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) published its recommendations on the prosecution of Japanese war criminals in a document entitled "Draft Summary of Recommendations on Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities." Within the UNWCC, a subcommittee on the prosecution of Japanese war criminals was established in May 1944. This subcommittee was established in Chungking/Chongqing and in Nanjing on October 11, 1944. The subcommittee drew up a list of suspects covering a total of 3,147 World War II suspects in Asia and the Pacific.

While the first contingents of American forces arrived in Japan, on August 29, 1945, the State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) discussed the prosecution of war criminals in a document defining general policy of the United States to Japan. This document – SWNCC 150/4 – will be approved by Truman on September 6 and made public on September 22, twenty days after the surrender of Japan was signed on September 2 on the USS Missouri (BB-63). In the act of surrender, the issue of war crimes was found.

On September 11, 1945, the supreme Allied commander, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, ordered the dissolution of the Japanese army headquarters. On the same day, he arrested thirty-nine suspects, including Gen. Hideki Tōjō. On October 6, 1945, the Interarms Committee called on MacArthur to put in place the means to try the most important war criminals, and those suspected of planning the war, violating treaties, or participating in a conspiracy aimed at carrying out these same crimes. The directive specified that the facts examined for the trial could go back to the date of the

assassination of Chang Zolin, the president of the Republic of China, killed on June 4, 1928, in Shenyang.

On November 12 and 14, 1945, the War Crimes Commission compiled a list of suspects. On November 19, MacArthur ordered a series of arrests. On November 30, 1945, Joseph Keenan was appointed chief prosecutor by Pres. Harry Truman. Keenan arrived in Tokyo on December 6 accompanied by 39 employees. He quickly collected documents and testimony and developed the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The following days, Keenan published the rules governing the trial of those accused of war crimes. Soon after that, several Japanese officials were arrested by MacArthur including members of the imperial court. On December 27, 1945, a statement by the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, recognized the SCAP's full authority to carry out the provisions of the surrender. On January 19, 1946, the charter was promulgated by the Supreme Allied Command. It said:

I, Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander, under the powers vested in me to apply the terms of the surrender that calls for harsh justice for war criminals, order that a Tribunal be established for the Far East for the trial of individuals prosecuted, individually or as members of organizations, for crimes that will include crimes against peace.[1]

Created on January 19, 1946, on MacArthur's orders to try crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by Japanese leaders between January 1, 1928, to September 1, 1945, and inaugurated in accordance with Point 10 of the Potsdam's request of July 26, 1945, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East indicted Japanese war criminals of the Second World War. It is made up of eleven countries, one for each victorious country of Japan. The charter specifies, in Article 8, that all nations at war with Japan could design an assistant prosecutor. Thirty-nine Americans are in the group of prosecutors known as the International Prosecution Section and a multinational group of five hundred people (lawyers, stenographers, and employees combined). MacArthur asked each

member of the Far East Commission to propose the name of a judge and an assistant prosecutor before January 5, 1946.

The International College of Judges includes Australia, the Netherlands, China, the Soviet Union, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, the Philippines, and India. The presiding judge is Australian judge William Webb. The chief prosecutor is the American lawyer Joseph Keenan. These judges' rule by majority, with the president having a casting vote in the event of a split (Articles 2 and 3).

Staged by the Americans, the Tokyo Tribunal will try three categories of crimes:

1. Crimes against peace —Acts planned and directed by political and military power.

2. War crimes— the destruction of towns and villages, unjustified devastation.

3. Crimes against humanity— Deportations, massacres, exterminations, and persecution.

Composition of the Tribunal

On February 15, 1946, the nine signatories to the surrender proposed the names of the judges they communicated to MacArthur.

The court is made up of the following judges and prosecutors:

• Sir William Webb, president of the Supreme Court of Queensland, represents Australia.[2]

• Judge Henri Bernard represents France.[3]

• Prof. Bert Röling, thirty-nine-years-old, was the youngest of all the judges. He represents the Netherlands.[4]

• The Chinese Nationalist authorities had appointed General Shih Mei Ho, chairman of the Japanese war crimes tribunal in China replaced by Mei Ju Ao.[5]

• Maj. Gen. Ivan Mikhailovich Zarayanov, appointed by Stalin, represents the Soviet Union.[6]

• Harvey Northcroft, a member of the Supreme Court represents New Zealand.[7]

• William Donald Patrick, Lord Patrick, was the representative of Great Britain.[8]

• Maj. Gen. Myron Cramer, general counsel at the military court represented the United States.[9]

• Stuart McDougall, an expert in labor law, represents Canada.

• Radhabinod Pal represents India.[10]

• Delfín Jaranilla represents the Philippines.[11]

• Joseph B. Keenan, appointed by Truman as chief prosecutor, oversaw carrying out the charges against the Japanese authorities.[12]

Officially, the trial began on May 3, 1946, with the indictment of twenty-eight Japanese personalities.

• Four prime ministers: Kiichirō Hiranuma, Koki Hirota, Kuniaki Koiso, and Hideki Tōjō;

• Three foreign ministers: Yōsuke Matsuoka, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Shigenori Tōgō;

• Four ministers of war: Sadao Araki, Shunroku Hata, Shieshiro Itagaki, and Jirō Minami;

• Two ministers of the navy: Osami Nagano and Shigerato Shimada;

• Six generals: Kenji Doihara, Heitaro Kimura, Iwane Matsui, Akira Muto, Kenryō Satō, Yoshijirō Umezu.

• Two ambassadors: Hiroshi Ōshima and Toshio Shiratori;

• Two officials: Okinori Kaya, (Minister of Finance), and Naoki Hoshino (Chief Cabinet Secretary).

The emperor’s adviser, Marquis Koichi Kidō, Adm. Takasumi Oka, ideologue Shūmei Ōkawa, Col. Tatakeyama Hikoichi, and Col. Kingorō Hashimoto, were also charged.

The tribunal targets three different categories of persons: senior officials, military officers, and lower-ranking officers. The accused are entitled to a personal lawyer or, failing that, to a lawyer appointed by the court. The defense receives disclosure of all the exhibits of the trial. The trial is held in English and Japanese, and the judgment is based on procedural rules modelled on those of Nuremberg and intended to guarantee the rights of the defense. The charter states: “Reading of the indictment, asking each of the accused to plead or not to plead guilty, prior statements of the prosecution and defense, presentation of evidence and prosecution and defense witnesses, cross-examination of the defense, defense arguments, prosecution requisitions, and court judgment with the authority to pronounce the death penalty.”[13]

On June 3, 1946, the U.S. attorney general, Joseph Keenan, issued the introductory indictment that opened the trial on the merits:

Mr. President, Mr. Members of the International Military Tribunal,” exclaimed the prosecutor, “it could be that the eleven nations represented by this tribunal and which themselves represent nations containing more than half of the inhabitants of Earth, and who have suffered, as a result of the aggression they have suffered, the loss of a significant part of their resources and a considerable amount of blood, are not able to prosecute and condemn those responsible for these calamities.[14]

His advocacy spans seventeen years of Japan’s turbulent political and military history from 1928 to 1945. In his lengthy introductory indictment, Keenan responded to the defense’s reproaches about the composition of the tribunal. According to him, this trial is a historical fact, “episode of a battle of civilization designed to preserve the whole world from its destruction.”

This threat, he said:

Is the result of the concerted efforts of individuals, either alone or in groups, to plunge the world into war in the name of their ambition to dominate the world?" And turning to the accused, after a dramatic pause, he added, "They have declared war on civilization! It is not a matter for this court to exercise the revenge of the victors, but to apply the recognized rule that individuals who have organized a war of aggression are common criminals and deserve ... the reserved punishment . . . universally to murderers, robbers, pirates and looters.[15]

The logistical resources deployed to carry out the trial were considerable: eleven judges, twenty-eight defendants, eleven prosecutors, more than one hundred American and Japanese lawyers, not counting translators, clerks, and assistants. Att. Gen. Joseph Keenan issued the final indictment on April 16, 1948. After 818 sessions, 48,500 pages of minutes, and more than 4,000 exhibits, the court delivered its verdict on November 12, 1948. In total, it will take more than six months for the judges to draft the 1,200 pages of the decision read publicly by President Webb during eight hearings.

In addition to Shūmei Ōkawa, two other defendants escaped conviction: Yōsuke Matsuoka, a former foreign minister, and Adm. Osami Nagano, who died from tuberculosis during the proceedings. Twenty-five defendants heard the court's decision.[16] The seven-month deliberation judgment did not find the unanimous consent of the magistrates. Knowing in advance that there will be colleagues to speak out against the decision, the judges formed a "majority drafting committee" that prepared a draft judgment submitted for minority approval. This majority committee was chaired by U.S. judge Cramer and included representatives from Great Britain, the USSR, China, the Philippines, Canada, and New Zealand. The representatives of Australia, India, Holland, and France were excluded from this committee because the disagreement of these four judges with their colleagues was visible. Minority judges only had the opportunity to make written submissions on the text submitted for approval. However, the final drafting of the judgment had never been the subject of collective deliberation. Here is a resume of the trial timeline:

May 3, 1946: Preliminary hearing and reading of the indictment.

May 6, 1946: Findings of defense incidents.

May 17, 1946: Judgment of reference to the substance of the incidents.

June 3, 1946: Introductory indictment.

June 13, 1946 – January 24, 1947: Requisitions of prosecutors (fifteen phases):

1. Description of the Japanese government system: the emperor, the cabinet, and the councils;

2. The takeover by the government army and the indoctrination of the population;

3. Aggression against Manchuria and the rest of China;

4. The policy of domination of the Chinese mainland and the testimonies gathered;

5. The use of drugs as a means of domination of China;

6. China’s domination and economic exploitation;

7. The military alliance with Germany and Italy;

8. Japan’s preparation for wars of aggression – the war economy;

9. Attack plans against the United States, Singapore and the USSR;

10. The aggression against France;

11. Aggression against the United States and the Commonwealth;

12. Aggression against Holland;

13. Atrocities against the civilian population and prisoners of war;

14. Individual responsibilities.

January 27, 1947: Defense incidents concluded.

January 30, 1947: Replica of the charge on the incidents.

February 3, 1947: Judgment of reference to the substance of the incidents.

February 24, 1947–January 12, 1948: Defense Intervention:

1. Preliminary presentation;

2. General party;

3. Manchuria;

4. China;

5. The USSR;

6. The Pacific;

7. Western powers;

8. War crimes and crimes against humanity;

9. Individual defenses;

10. Personal appearance of sixteen accused;

11. Cross-examination of comparing defendants;

12. Pleas.

January 19, 1948: Replicas of the charge.

March 2, 1948: Defense duplicates.

April 6, 1948: Debate closes.

November 4—12, 1948: Judgment reading.

November 21, 1948: Defense appeal to General MacArthur.

November 24, 1948: General MacArthur's confirmation of judgment.

December 20, 1948: Dismissal of the U.S. Supreme Court's appeal by defendants.

December 23, 1948: Execution of death-row inmates.

Of the eighty "Class A" war criminal suspects detained in the Sugamo prison after 1945, twenty-eight defendants were brought to trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The accused included nine civilians and nineteen professional military men. Seven sentenced to death were found to be guilty for their implication in mass-scale atrocities.

• Hideki Tōjō, general of the Imperial Japanese Army.[17]

• Kōki Hirota was a career diplomat and former Prime Minister of Japan from 1936 to 1937.[18]

• Seishirō Itagaki, General of the Imperial Japanese Army and Minister of War between 1938 and 1939.[19]

• Iwane Matsui, General of the Imperial Japanese Army.[20]

• Kenji Doihara, General of the Imperial Japanese Army.[21]

• Heitaro Kimura, General of the Imperial Japanese Army.[22]

• Akira Muto, General of the Imperial Japanese Army.[23]

Sixteen other defendants were sentenced to life in prison. Three of the sixteen died in prison between 1949 and 1950. Yosuke Matsuoka and Osami Nagano died in detention during the trial. The remaining thirteen were paroled between 1954 and 1956.[24]A U.S. military document titled "Execution of Prisoners" mentioned how the sentences should be conducted. The executions were to occur soon after midnight, be "private" with no photographs or motion pictures, and those in attendance were expected to offer no unseemly conduct of any kind.

Five thousand seven hundred accused "B/C" war criminals were brought to trial in a total of 2,244 tribunals in Asia. Although the war was fought in his name, Emperor Hirohito was not prosecuted. Many members of the imperial family, officers and dignitaries of the regime, have been preserved also from trial.

A Great Absent

Hirohito, under the name the war was fought, was preserved from the indictment, and the royal family, such as Prince Chichibu, Prince Asaka, Prince Takeda, and Prince Higashikuni, was exonerated in the proceedings. Only Prince Konoe and the Guard of the Seals Kōichi Kido were arrested during the trial. The issue has been the subject of much debate to date. What was Hirohito's role in Japan's war in the Pacific and Southeast Asia? Was the emperor only the providential monarch who put an end to hostilities at the war, that is, a monarch who could not violate the recommendations of the high command of the Japanese army and government? Or was he a devious manipulator who has been the architect of successive plots since the 1930s, facilitating the emergence of fascism and engaging Japan in the path of militarism and expansionism like Germany and Italy?

For some, Hirohito was a convinced pacifist who suffered in his soul because of his limited power to put an end to the suffering and ill-treatment endured by civilians and prisoners during the war. Held by the dignity of his "divine emperor" status, he could not intervene openly in public affairs. For other observers, often foreigners, Hirohito was a fierce dictator in the lineage of Hitler, who had the ambition to occupy the countries in the Pacific and Southeast Asia to spread Japan's hegemony in the region, and, to get there, he encouraged his generals and admirals in their decisions to launch the war.

This question has long been a subject of debate among historians and other military experts on the Pacific War? Based on an agreement between the prosecution and the defense, Hirohito was not present in the dock at the Tokyo trial. His name was forbidden to be invoked in the proceedings.[21] But was the emperor unaware of the war crimes committed by Japanese soldiers in the occupied territories? The answer is no. He was commander-in-chief of the Japanese army and the Japanese navy. He appointed the Japanese prime ministers who were designated by the National Diet. It is inconceivable that he was not responsible for the deaths of millions of

civilians and soldiers during the Pacific War. From the Imperial Headquarters, he dictated his orders to the Army General Staff. He supported the Japanese expansionist policy that led to the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the declaration of war with China in 1937, the invasion of French Indochina in 1940. He accepted Japan's entry into World War II alongside Hitler from a political and military alliance with Germany. On September 27, 1940, Japan became allies with Germany, and Saburō Kurusu, Japan's ambassador to Germany, signed the Tripartite Pact in Berlin. The Japanese leaders felt that an alliance with Germany would isolate the aggression from America, and would facilitate Japan in its ambitions for expansion in Asia. More than that, Hirohito secretly fomented the Imperial Japanese Navy's attack on the American Pacific fleet on December 7, 1941. The following day, he received reports of the successful Japanese surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and other strategic sites in the Pacific, and he spent the day in meetings with his prime minister, privy council, and senior military leaders.

Interviewed on the war by journalist Kase Hideaki from the popular journal Bungei shunjū, Prince Takamatsu, the young brother of Hirohito, implied that he had been a dove, and Hirohito a reckless hawk. Talking to the incident on November 30, 1941, he said, he had spoken to his brother for five minutes, warning him that the navy high command could feel confident only if the war lasted no longer than two years. Takamatsu also recalled warning his brother to end the war right after the Battle of Midway. Four Japanese and three American aircraft carriers participated in this Battle. The four Japanese fleet carriers —Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū, part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor— were sunk, as was the heavy cruiser Mikuma. "After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's capacity to replace its losses in material (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well-trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace. The Battle of Midway, along with the Guadalcanal campaign, is widely considered a turning point in the Pacific war." Takamatsu revealed that he and Prince Konoe had considered asking the emperor to abdicate prior to surrender.

In his plan to play repentant and avoid being tried and convicted, Hirohito in his proclamation of the New Year to the Japanese people, three months after his first meeting with MacArthur, officially renounced his “divinity.” In a carefully prepared text, which he addressed to the nation, he declared:

The bond between us and you, the people, is constantly reconnected by mutual trust, love and respect. It’s not just mythology and legends that create it. Never has such a connection been based on the chimerical perception that makes the emperor a living god and which, moreover, considers the Japanese race as superior to all other human races and thus destined to rule the world.[25]

Hirohito later sent a photographer dedicated in English to Gen. Bonner Frank Fellers, who had greeted him when he entered the embassy. Empress Nagako, shortly after the interview on September 27, sent Jean MacArthur, the wife of the American general and commander-in-chief of the occupying forces, a gigantic basket of flowers. Hirohito, a second time, sent MacArthur a lacing and gold writing board, dated to the Tokugawa era, in the nineteenth century. These are calculated actions of the emperor to buy the sympathy of American superior officers in order to escape the justice of the Allies.

The Tokyo Tribunal: A view of the courtroom.

Image from archweb.archives.gov, ID # NRE-338-FTL(EF)-3161(12)

Image retrieved from tante2.com

Allied victory in the Pacific led to the indictment and trial of twenty-eight senior Japanese dignitaries responsible for the deaths of between 20 and 30 million people during World War II. These high dignitaries, charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. (law2.umkc.edu)

Image retrieved from tante2.com

The crew of the B-29 Enola Gay that dropped the first

atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945.

Image retrieved from geocities.jp

The Tokyo War Crimes Trials lasted two and a half years, from May 1946 to November 1948. Of the eighty “Class A” war criminal suspects detained in the Sugamo prison after 1945, twenty-eight defendants were brought to trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The accused included nine civilians and nineteen professional military men. Seven sentenced to death were found to be guilty for their implication in mass-scale atrocities. (archives.gov)

On February 1947, MacArthur, during a press conference dedicated to “clearing the air” over Hirohito’s trial rumors, told the Japanese press and a group of visiting American newspaper and magazine editors, “The role of the emperor is most important and underscores the intelligence of the thinking embodied in the Potsdam Declaration.” Retaining the emperor, he concluded, “was one of the wisest decisions the Allies could have made.” The benefits of that decision involved “the very cooperation of the Japanese people,” he explained; and it was time to “move on.”[26]

A few days after the verdicts were announced, Hirohito wrote a letter to General MacArthur reassuring him that he had no intention of abdicating.[27]A week after, Keenan reaffirmed that the decision for trying the emperor is not on the table because there is no evidence that he had participated in the crimes committed by the army during the war.[28]According to Keenan, Hirohito was not a war criminal. With the emperor very pleased with this opinion, Keenan had been invited to a private lunch with the emperor at the Imperial Palace. Sonni Efron, a journalist of the Los Angeles Times, on September 5, 2000, in an article “New book shows Hirohito was not whipping boy,” said:

The U.S. decision to spare Hirohito from prosecution was intended first to ensure an orderly and disciplined Japanese surrender and cooperation with

the occupation, and then, as the Cold War deepened to facilitate the speedy rebuilding of Japan as a constitutional monarchy that would provide an anti-Communist bulwark in Asia.[29]

Analyzing the Trial

The Allied victory in the Pacific led to the indictment and trial of twenty-eight senior Japanese dignitaries responsible for the deaths of between 20 and 30 million people during World War II. These high dignitaries, charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.[30] The Tokyo tribunal, established on April 29, 1946, is made up of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, supreme Allied commander in Japan. He was charged with trying Japanese war criminals in the same way that German war criminals had been tried in Nuremberg.

The investigation opened in May 1946, and the court examined the roles assumed by the accused during the operations of the Imperial Japanese Army in Korea, Burma, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indochina, and China. In China, particularly in the city of Nanjing, there was the brutal massacre of civilians and the rape of tens of thousands of women and children by Japanese soldiers at the end of 1937. According to official Chinese figures, 250,000 people died in the carnage, and survivors summoned to court spoke of thousands of civilians buried alive, bayoneted, or beheaded with swords.

On November 12, 1948, the president of the court, Australian William Webb, declared the death sentence by hanging of seven defendants, including two former prime ministers, Hideki Tōjō and Kori Hirota, as well as a former Minister of War and four Generals. Many historians have criticized the Tokyo Trial as biased because Hirohito, commander-in-chief of the Japanese army and navy, was exonerated of all liability. Allied prosecutors mounted an important case against him that demonstrated his direct involvement in the planning and the conducting of the war. However, the emperor, who received unwavering support from MacArthur, was not charged. “Washington did not want to destabilize the country by touching its national symbol.”

In the eyes of many observers, the trial in Tokyo had the appearance of revenge of the Western powers over Japan, especially a revenge of the United States, which did not forgive the surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The winners of World War II also want to punish Japan, which had signed a pact of understanding with Germany and Italy to annex other territories in the Pacific and East Asia. During that period, the Japanese took the opportunity to massacre millions of people, both military and civilian, to establish their hegemony.

On June 18, 1946, U.S. attorney general Joseph Berry Keenan, in charge of the prosecution, indicated that Hirohito would not be tried. This policy of "saving the emperor's head so as not to undermine the monarchical institution" seriously undermines the legitimacy of the trial. The French representative in court, Judge Henri Bernard, criticized the decision as not in accordance with the rules of impartiality that characterize the criminal trial because of Hirohito's absence from the bench. How, in such a case, can we credit the organization of a trial with the absence of the main protagonist? This is the question posed by many experts who wonder why the question of the emperor's impeachment was not addressed during the preparations for the "Tokyo Trial" in the spring of 1946.

The first arrest orders issued in the autumn of 1945 against Prince Nashimoto Morimasa, Fumimaro Konoe, and Kōichi Kido suggested that an indictment of the emperor was inevitable. But while many voices in the United States and several countries called for the punishment of Hirohito for war crimes; on the other side, many others behind the scenes wanted to absolve the emperor. They formulated a list of reasons to justify their claim to offer a pardon to Hirohito, namely: the Japanese's attachment to the maintenance of the monarchy, fear of anarchy opening the flank to a Communist revolution, the need to drive the policy of occupation through the political and administrative structures in place, and U.S. economic and strategic interests at the beginning of the Cold War. Japan is in Asia a necessary bulwark against Communism in general and Soviet territorial ambitions, they said.

According to the deputy head of MacArthur's "Japanese Affairs" section, Col. C.L. Kades, MacArthur believed that Hirohito had atoned for all his

mistakes by his unconditional support for the occupation. Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's first aide-de-camp, told the press of his commander's thoughts on Hirohito: "I would have the impression of grossly breaching our commitments if the emperor were to go on trial as a criminal of war after all the service he rendered to the Allies."[31]

In the early days of August 1937, Hirohito met with the Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in Kotohito and the chief of the Imperial Navy staff Fushimi Hiroyasu. He asked them to avoid the extensive deployment of troops and concentrate forces at a few strategic points. The emperor received a plan proposing bombing and occupation of strategic points, such as Shanghai and Nanjing, as well as the naval blockade of the coasts. He validated this strategy. On August 13, 1937, the Japanese army invaded Shanghai. On September 4, Hirohito issued a statement to the diet:

While we are constantly concerned about ensuring peace in Asia by cooperating with China, China does not really understand the real intentions of our Empire. To our deep regret, the Chinese caused constant difficulties and problems that led to the current incident. Our troops, demonstrating loyalty and bravery, endure trials only in order to quickly establish peace in East Asia and to get China to reflect on its actions. [32]

The Tokyo trial has been criticized both in Japan and outside the country.[33] Initially, there are profound differences of opinion among judges who sit on the court. Indeed, on the very day of the judgment, no less than five judges —out of eleven— expressed separate judgments. Indian Judge Radhabinod Pal said all defendants should be acquitted.[34] In a thousand-page brief, which he would publish on his return to India, he states that no member of the accused group is guilty of war crimes.[35] According to him, the acts of aggression alleged against the Japanese are justified by those committed against their country by the imperialist powers of the West. For this, he refused to put his signature on the judgment, unlike all his colleagues.[36]

The Dutch judge, Bert Röling, the presiding judge, William Webb, and the French judge, Henri Bernard, had different opinions on the trial. For Röling, holding individual leaders personally responsible for egregious acts of state constituted a “milestone in legal development” that seemed crucial in the nuclear age. The Australian judge, Webb, who was leading the proceedings, decried questions that would have led the accused to provide an explanation of the policies they were aware of. When he inaugurated proceedings, Sir William Webb started with the observation that “there has been no more important criminal trial in all history.”[37] The French judge, Henri Bernard, who showed remarkable independence in drafting one of the three dissenting judgments on purely legal grounds, explained:

Considering that the defendants had already been sorted by MacArthur’s government, the presiding judge in advance held them guilty. He was only looking for the degrees that would weigh the verdicts. For example, he restricted interrogations to the evidence of innocence.” For Bernard, procedural irregularities made the judgment unfair. “A verdict rendered by a court after an irregular procedure cannot be valid.[38]

Twenty-eight Japanese were indicted for “Class A” war crimes, of whom two died during the course of the trial and one was excused on grounds of mental incompetence.[39] Judge Röling dissociated himself from the convictions of Hirota, who he said had opposed the expansionist will of the Japanese military as best as he could and should have been acquitted. Other defendants, he said, were sentenced too harshly, with no death penalty to punish crimes against peace. Several convicts who were released on parole at the Tokyo trials quickly returned to office at the highest level. Mamoru Shigemitsu, who was released in 1950, and four years later became minister of affairs in the government of Ichirō Hatoyama.[40]

On February 1, 1950, the Soviets called on the United States and its allies to establish an exceptional court to try Hirohito and four Japanese generals, including Gen. Shiro Ishii, the commander of Unit 731, as authors of crime against humanity. The Soviet Union, through its foreign minister,

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, was conducting an increased diplomatic campaign in favor of prosecuting the emperor and the leaders of the zaibatsu (financial cartels). Russia was joined in this battle by the Australian government, and both countries solemnly proposed that Hirohito be brought to justice. The Australian government sought indictment of the Japanese emperor for closing his eyes to summary executions of Australian prisoners of war, as well as systematic ill-treatment of tens of thousands of prisoners in defiance of the Geneva Conventions. New Zealand later joined the Soviet Union, China, and Australia in this battle. But the request was rejected by Washington after a tacit agreement between the Japanese ruling class and the U.S. administration. A refusal signed by MacArthur, on behalf of President Truman, was notified to the Russians and Australians in a press release on February 3, 1946.[41]

By deciding to not prosecute Hirohito, the Americans had a well-calculated political objective. They wanted to protect the emperor as an ally in order to make Japan a bastion of anti-Communism in Asia.[42] To do so, there was an agreement between the prosecutor and the defense that Hirohito's name will not be mentioned during the hearings. When General Tōjō inadvertently challenged this agreement, saying, "No one would have dared to go against emperor will," U.S. Attorney General Joseph Keenan suspended the meeting. In the aftermath of the surrender, the first Japanese government considered holding special courts to try the leaders responsible for the war, but the Americans banned the initiative. The Treaty of San Francisco (1951), by which Japan regained its sovereignty, was conditional on the proposal to accept the verdict of the Tokyo court. But it also had the condition of granting a "no-suit" to those who did not appear before this court, diverting the country from a critical examination of its past by encouraging the impunity that continues to denounce the victims and their families who have endured so much directly or indirectly in the persecutions during the war years.

Beyond the total exemption granted to Hirohito, the decision to release those arrested for war crimes after a few years is criticized.[43] This led to the rebirth of the right and extremist group that would soon return to power. According to Herbert P. Bix, "MacArthur's truly extraordinary steps to save Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a persistent and profoundly

distorting impact on the Japanese understanding of the lost war." For his part, John W. Dower said:

Even Japanese activists who endorsed the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters and worked to document and publicize the atrocities of the Shōwa regime cannot defend the American decision to exonerate the emperor's responsibility for the war and then, at the height of the Cold War, free and then link to Far-Right war criminals defendants like the future Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi.[44]

On May 5, 2006, on Le Monde, a French newspaper, Philippe Pons said:

The Tokyo Tribunal has not remained in the annals of international justice as an ideal of fairness, and the judgment of December 1948 [death sentence of 7 of the 28 accused, among which Gen. Tōjō Hideki, a supporter of the excessive struggle against the United States] is fraught with ambiguities. Arbitrary charges, insufficient evidence, and lack of respect for the rights of the defense have made this trial a denial of justice. Henri Bernard, the French judge, criticized the verdict, following a flawed procedure. Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge said, "If crimes against humanity were judged, we also had to rule on those perpetrated by the United States against civilians, starting with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[45]

According to Awaya Kentarō, professor of modern history at Rikyyo University, the Tokyo trial, where twenty-eight senior Japanese dignitaries were tried from May 3, 1946, to November 12, 1948, contained serious flaws. In a paper published in Le Monde on September 26, 2005, Kentarō stated:

At the Tokyo court, the prosecution detailed, with supporting evidence and witnesses, the conduct of the Japanese invasions, from the Manchurian incident to the Pacific War to the Sino-Japanese War. In the expectations of the judgment, the court essentially took up the prosecution's arguments. However, as soon as his work is analyzed in detail, another process, leading to immunity, was closely involved in the proceedings of the indictment. Compared to Nuremberg, many military leaders escaped prosecution. Some crimes were not even examined. Of course, the conditions of the period made careful verification difficult. But the reason is mainly because several cases were deliberately overlooked by the judges. In Tokyo, the United States took the lead role: most of the prosecutors were Americans. The Supreme Allied Commander, General MacArthur, had absolute decision-making power over the issues being dealt with, and if we sometimes preferred to turn a blind eye, we must see the effect of American political will.[46]

The biological and chemical experiments conducted by the Japanese troops were not discussed during the trial, for example, those conducted by Unit 731.[47]

Another major problem, which came under severe criticism at the Tokyo Trial, was the overly flexible procedure used to receive evidence in court. The question of admissibility of evidence is one of the foundations of the U.S. criminal proceedings. No hearsay evidence, no documents or witnesses who cannot be cross-examined. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East has ruled out the application of these principles, leaving it to the court to assess sovereignly the "probative value" of the elements produced by the parties (Article 13). The charter specifies that certificates, diaries, and documents not received under oath would be considered admissible. The court accepts that the prosecution uses press clippings, conversations with deceased people, and citizen letters about the abuses and crimes of Japanese soldiers during the war in Tokyo. These documents submitted by the prosecution are accepted as evidence without cross-examination, a principle contrary to the American criminal procedure.

The principle of non-retroactivity of the law was one of the reproaches made by the defense that the facts alleged against the accused took place before January 19, 1946, when the charter to try Japanese war criminals was promulgated by the Supreme Allied Command. This argument of non-retroactivity of the law is opposed by prosecutor Keenan who stated that the charges against the accused were considered criminal well before the period of the charge. Indeed, The Hague Conventions of 1907, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, signed by Japan, made the war of aggression an international crime. Invading the territories of other neighboring countries, by starting a war of aggression, is not only a crime, but the main war crime.

Defense counsel also pointed to the inadmissibility of the charges against their clients.[48] For example, for defense, the battles of Lake Khasan and Nomonhan were simple border incidents that had been the subject of negotiated agreements on June 9 and August 19, 1940, and had led to the 1941 Non-Aggression Treaty. How could the Tokyo court take over incidents that the parties themselves had permanently terminated? The Indian judge considered that these were mere border incidents, but the court concluded otherwise. He decided that these operations constituted a war of aggression by Japan against the Soviet Union and Mongolia. For the agreements negotiated between the two countries, defense lawyers stressed that they had not provided any immunity, and that there had been no question of liability, whether criminal or otherwise. The court's view is that these agreements do not constitute a defense to the criminal charge before it. The judges stated on page 841 of the judgment: "It would be for the court contrary to the public interest to consider that there may have been a pardon of crimes, formally or by implication."

Listing the various crimes against peace committed by Japanese leaders, especially the surprise and deadly attack of the Imperial Japanese Army on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Nanking Massacre, the Bataan Death March, the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway, and the abuses of Japanese troops committed on the civilian populations of the occupied territories, the prosecutor said: "All these excesses were by no means isolated acts resulting from the misbehavior but were planned in the

execution of a deliberate policy for which the accused are personally responsible."

The Tokyo Trial has also been criticized as "incomplete justice" by many experts.[49]Allied nations that had judged and condemned Japan's top leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity had not come to the table with their own hands. The Soviet Union participated in the invasion and occupation of Poland by Germany, and was involved in the massacre of about 22,000 Polish military officers and intelligentsia during the Katyn Massacre, in April and May 1940.[50] Katyn bombings by the United States and Britain during World War II killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in cities such as Dresden, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima. President Roosevelt had set up a resettlement program for more than 100,000 Japanese Americans by confining them to concentration camps in the United States.

Judging Hirohito for war crimes before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East would perhaps have a negative impact on Japan, which could fall into serious political and institutional instability, or could even trigger a bloody popular uprising against the American occupying forces in the country.[51] However, such a trial would have made history and would have served as an example to apprentice dictators who would think of using the weapon of war in the future as a strategy to invade other territories and spread their power outside their border.

Critics on the Trial

Analyzing the trial, it is undeniable that the Allied lawsuit against the Japanese dignitaries in Tokyo marked an important starting point for the establishment of a new international order at the end of the Second World War. However, it is interesting to note that both Nuremberg and Tokyo are not brought with the intention of achieving social justice for victims persecuted by the Nazis in Europe and the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, but rather for closing the chapter of the Second World War.[52]

The message through these two suspicious trials was that with the war over, it was necessary to choose a few “heads” and give them all the responsibilities in triggering conflicts. To do this, international tribunals were set up, the two most important of which were the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal to try German war criminals and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to try Japanese war criminals. As the sociologist Jacques Arnaud Démézier said, “Go mad or wise, how the Nazi regime, which had been built on the principle of deprivation of psychological, ideological and social enjoyments, was represented in Nuremberg by only twenty-four Accused. While in the Tokyo trial, only a group of twenty-eight senior Japanese dignitaries faced justice.”[53]

Was justice served in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials? This question has been debated since 1948 by many jurists, historians, journalists, and many other experts who had analyzed the verdict. According to Tim Maga, in Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials: “The answers depended upon a variety of factors, most of them political.” For some, speed and justice had always been contradictory partners. For others, trial length was considered irrelevant.” The Catholic Church position on the trial was especially surprising. “Japan was in trial” in the IMTFE and the Allies had been too eager to convict a defecting enemy,” said the Vatican in an official statement. Some had criticized Keenan’s specific methods and tactics that were more connected to political interests than effective prosecution work.

“They are plain, ordinary murderers,” cried Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan. As a result, Japanese officers and soldiers who conducted war crimes, engaged in unethical medical experiments, or practiced cannibalism were found guilty of the charge of murder. The verdict effectively shows that good law was practiced at the Japanese War crimes trial in Tokyo.

However, many historical works, both in Japan and in the United States, have highlighted procedural weaknesses and political negotiations in the work of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. As historian Awaya Kentarō, professor of modern history at Rikkyo University, one of the world’s leading experts on the issue, pointed out, “Researchers now agree that the US authorities have introduced a number of political objectives in the preparations and conduct of the trial.”

The Tokyo Charter, which formalized the jurisdiction of the court, was prepared by the International Prosecution Section, a so-called international body but, at the orders of the American occupying authorities. The other ten participating countries, each of which provided a judge, had arrived very late in the process of preparing the trial and had hardly weighed on its progress. The charge was led by a single team, led by a U.S. attorney, Joseph B. Keenan, who worked closely with the head of the occupation authorities, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Although Keenan was assisted by ten associate prosecutors, one from each of the other ten countries represented on the tribunal, the American entirely had controlled the prosecution policy and the strategy for the trials.

In Tokyo, two languages were used —English and Japanese— at least six other languages had to be accommodated. Simultaneous interpretation proved extremely difficult in Tokyo and, therefore, statements by witnesses or counsel were stopped at the end of each sentence until translations had been made. The eleven justices in Tokyo, contrary to the four presiding judges in Nuremberg, had no replacement. This resulted on more than two or three occasions in absenteeism on the bench.

For many historians, lawyers and analysts, the Tokyo trials had a revenge on Japan. In an article published in Le Monde on May 5, 2006, Philippe Pons said:

The Tokyo Tribunal has not remained in the annals of international justice as an ideal of fairness, and the judgment of December 1948 (death sentence of 7 of the 28 accused, among which Gen. Tōjō Hideki, a supporter of the excessive struggle against the United States) is fraught with ambiguities. Arbitrary charges, insufficient evidence, and lack of respect for the rights of the defense, had made the trials a denial of justice. The French judge, Henri Bernard, had criticized the verdict, he said, following a flawed procedure. The Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal, said: “If crimes against humanity were judged, we also had to rule on those perpetrated by the United States against civilians, starting with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[54]

Biological and chemical experiments conducted by Japanese troops were not discussed during the trial, such as those conducted by Unit 731. It is estimated that at least 3,000 people had been used for human experiments by Unit 731, and more than 300,000 people had been killed in China by Japanese biological weapons.

Analyzing the Tokyo Trial several questions deserve an answer. For example, two people convicted of being “Class A” war criminals, Shigemitsu Mamoru and Kaya Okinori, played an important role in post-war Japanese governments. Not only were these two Japanese leaders not charged with war crimes, but also no foreign government objected when they took office.

The other decision that many historians criticized was the fact that Hirohito and the majority of the imperial family members involved in the war were exonerated of criminal prosecution. Indeed, when it came to establish the list of war criminals, MacArthur recommended to the American government that the emperor should be granted immunity while maintaining the imperial system necessary for the proper functioning of the occupation of Japan. Britain, with a similar monarchical system, approved this decision. According to the British government, prosecuting Hirohito for war crimes would be a serious political mistake. His presence on the throne

could only prevent Communist infiltration into Japan. Aristides George Lazarus, who served as defense attorney for former general Hata Shunroku, claimed out that midway through the trial, he was asked by an unnamed, high-ranking representative of President Truman to arrange, through Hata, that all the defendants be coached to "go out of their way during their testimony to include the fact that Hirohito was only a benign presence when military actions were discussed at meetings that, by protocol, he had to attend."[55]

In addition to the total exemption granted to Hirohito, there is criticism of the decision to release only after a few years those sentenced for war crimes. Until now, there are major controversies surrounding the release from prison of several officers and officials condemned during the trial in Tokyo. Those individuals found to be war criminals by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East received early paroles. On March 7, 1950, Douglas MacArthur, the American commander, issued Circular 5 Clemency for War Criminals providing for the early release of prisoners who had demonstrated good conduct. Several of the sixteen war criminals given life sentences received early parole.[56] Col. Kingoro Hashimoto, a propaganda spokesman and a participant in controversial military actions ranging from Mukden in Manchuria to the Nanking massacre, received parole in 1954. Field Marshal Hata Shunroku of the Supreme War Council, found guilty of committing atrocities against Chinese civilians, was also paroled in 1954. Adm. Oka Takasumi, who ordered the shooting of both military and civilian survivors of torpedoed Allied ships, was paroled in 1954. Gen. Araki Sadao, a former war minister and education Minister who had rebuilt the Japanese education system along strong militarist lines, was paroled in 1955. Naoki Hoshino, the chief cabinet secretary throughout World War II and the former chief of financial affairs in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, won parole in 1955. Kaya Okinori, the minister of finance and an advocate of selling narcotics to Chinese civilians, was paroled in 1955. Kido Koichi, the guard of the seals and Private Secretary of Hirohito, was paroled in 1955. Gen. Hiroshi Oshima, the military representative to Berlin who helped Japan in signing the military alliance with Germany, was paroled in 1955. Gen. Sato Kenryo, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and former commander of occupied Indochina, won parole in 1956, along with the architect of slave-labor policies in China, Gen. Suzuki Teiichi. Some of

those criminals, who had been former influential figures of the Shōwa era, such as Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi, had returned to power.

One defendant, Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had helped sign the surrender document to the Allies in 1945, and who was a former ambassador to China and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sentenced to seven years in prison but was released in 1950. Shigemitsu returned to the diplomacy position and was appointed Foreign Minister in 1954.

In 1978, the "souls" of fourteen people executed as "Class A" war criminals were "welcomed" to the Yasukuni Shrine. They were: Tōjō Hideki, Kenji Doihara, Matsui Iwane, Kimura Heitaro, Koki Hirota, Itagaki Seishino, Muto Akira, Matsuoka Yōsuke, Nagano Osami, Shiratori Toshio, Hiranuma Kiichiro, Koiso Kuniaki, and Umezu Yoshijirō.

As the Chinese historian Cheng Kai pointed out, the Tokyo trial resolved the conflict between Japan and the United States but did not carry any prospect of reconciliation with the Asian countries that had suffered the most during the war. The compromise reached reflected the advent of a new international order based on the fight against the Communist enemy represented by China and the Soviet Union.

The violation of the principle of non-retroactivity is, an essential principle of criminal law: No crimes without a text that prohibits them at the very moment they were committed, was one of the reproaches made by the defense, which considers that the alleged crimes committed by the accused took place during 1931–1945 and the charter to try Japanese war criminals was promulgated by the Supreme Allied Command, on January 19, 1946. It was in the name of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law, as said in Latin: Nullum crimen, Nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali that defense lawyers pointed out that the charges brought against their clients were inadmissible.

Several generals had tried, in their defense, to refer to orders from their superiors, since the charter of the court prevented them from claiming such an excuse. Those officers claimed that they had not been informed of the excesses committed by the orders they had given, and their orders had been carried out contrary to the plan. According to Prosecutor Keenan, all

defendants are guilty of crimes against peace for contributing to the preparation and inset of wars of aggression against Manchuria, China, the United States, and other Asian countries represented in court. These are by no means retroactively sanctioned crimes, Keenan said. To affirm his arguments, the chief prosecutor mentioned in his introductory indictment, several previous international treaties that sanctioned the war of aggression, the 1907 Hague Conventions, which required states to settle their differences peacefully, the Treaty of Versailles, which had specified as early as 1918, that the war of aggression constituted an international crime, and, finally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928, which solemnly condemned the use of war for the settlement of disputes, “which will have to be settled peacefully.” Fifteen countries, including Japan, have signed the treaty, to which more than sixty states have joined. According to the U.S. prosecutor, Japanese leaders are guilty of violating the commitment made in signing the pact. As such, they deserve to be condemned without the argument of non-retroactivity of the criminal law being validly accepted.

Some historians insist that convictions are too limited. According to them, the trial’s findings should have been broadened to extend guilt to the entire Japanese ruling class, including not only the emperor and his court, but also the military elites, the leading political and economic leaders in Japan. Indeed, many military leaders and high-ranking political leaders had escaped prosecution. Some crimes were not even examined. For example, the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers throughout the 1930s and early 1940s were rarely mentioned. Several cases were deliberately overlooked by the judges. Japan’s conservative ruling class was never worried about its responsibilities in the war in exchange for its cooperation in the anti-Communist policies of the United States.

Another question that arises is why the atrocities committed by the Japanese, particularly the serious human rights violations of Unit 731, were not detailed during the trial? Reading the testimonies on Unit 731 from several witnesses, why did the high staff of this unit, such as Ishii, Wakamatsu, and Kitano escape punishment when evidence had shown they were war criminals? The reality was that Americans and Soviets were deeply interested in acquiring Japanese research results in order to further their own extensive biological warfare program. The fact that the Japanese

were able to conduct their research from testing humans without their consent; and American researchers were prohibited by law for using humans for testing purposes, the scientists in America wanted from Ishii's team their valuable human research, and they made a deal.

After the war, delegations of American scientists were sent from Fort Detrick, in Frederick, Maryland, where the United States had inaugurated its BW program in 1942, to Tokyo, in order to negotiate with Ishii and other leading Japanese BW specialists on their research. The first delegation led by Lt. Col. Murray Sanders arrived in Tokyo in autumn 1945; a second delegation led by Lt. Col. Arvo Thompson traveled to Japan in 1946; a third one led by Dr. Norbert H. Fell, Division Chief of Planning Pilot-Engineering Section, arrived in Tokyo in 1947; and finally a fourth delegation led by Dr. Edwin V. Hill, Chief of Basic Sciences, went to Japan in 1948 to negotiate with Japanese BW specialists.

In the Tokyo Trials, the court found several Japanese commanders and leaders guilty of war crimes, but crimes against humanity were not mentioned in the verdict. Those crimes committed by the Japanese soldiers in the Far East were nothing like the Holocaust of Jews and Gypsies in Europe, the judges said. This difference was emphasized by Justice Pal, who declared that "the case of the present accused before us cannot in any way be likened to the case …of Hitler."

In Tokyo, there were no organizational counterparts to the Nazi Party and its affiliated criminal organs, such as the gestapo and the SS, which made the charge of conspiracy easier to argue in the German case. In 1944, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and his aides had concluded that adding conspiracy to the list of war crimes would expedite prosecution of Nazi leaders as well as lower-level members of Nazi organizations.

The more technical criticism of the conspiracy charge in Tokyo was that it did not exist in international law prior to 1945. Justice Webb was unambiguous on this point. "International law, unlike the national laws of many countries," he observed, "does not expressly include a crime of naked conspiracy … So too, the laws and customs of war to not make mere naked conspiracy a crime." By that fact, the tribunal in Tokyo has no authority to create a crime of naked conspiracy based on the Anglo-American concept.

However, three of the fifty-five charges brought by Prosecutor Keenan against the accused amounted to war crimes with conspiracy. Charge 54 stated that nineteen defendants had “ordered, authorized or permitted” the commission of war crimes by their subordinates in violation of the laws of war. It was a direct criminal responsibility. Charge 55 showed responsibility for failing to ensure that their subordinates complied with these customary rules.

However, supporting the war crimes thesis was not an easy task for the prosecutors who did not have documents in their possession to support their charges. In the absence of direct evidence, the court relied on witness testimony to convict the accused. In the judgment, we can read: “For several months, the court heard testimony and gathered testimonies from witnesses who reported in detail the atrocities committed in all theatres of war on such a large scale and in a process so similar that only one conclusion is required: these atrocities were secretly ordered or authorized knowingly by the Japanese government or some of its members and by the leaders of the armed forces.”[57]

The judges in Tokyo had convicted all the defendants who appeared before them, unlike the Nuremberg judges, who had acquitted three defendants: Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Fritzsche, and Franz von Papen. Only two defendants in Tokyo were sentenced to temporary prison terms (Tōgō and Shigemitsu), while all those who were not sentenced to death were sentenced to life imprisonment. Very little in mind under Article 5 of the charter, which stated that for the three crimes under the jurisdiction of the court (crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity), judges should establish “individual responsibilities;” the Tokyo judges ruled that all civilian and military leaders who had helped to start or participate in wars to aggression were considered criminals. It was not necessary for the court to determine the share of responsibility for each of them. The atrocities committed by Japanese troops on prisoners of war and civilians in the occupied territories were certainly abominable; and most of the accused had held command functions. However, some defendants, even though they held important positions in the regime, had not personally given orders to massacre, starve, torture and rape the victims in the occupied territories. It

was fair for the court to consider the personal responsibility of each of them, and beyond deciding on the condition necessary for his conviction.

That was the view of some of the judges who sat on the court. The issue of the death penalty against almost all the accused was one of the main areas of disagreement among the magistrates. The Australian judge, William Webb, who had led the proceedings as chair, wrote a “concurring opinion” in which he expressed his opposition to the principle of capital punishment, which he considered unjustified when the principal emperor of Japan, had enjoyed immunity. Webb went on to discuss the conduct of the trial and the facts of the individual cases. Though the tribunal found the Japanese army guilty of usurping power by intimidation and assassination, it exonerated the Japanese people for the behavior of their armed forces. It also greatly reduced the number of counts in the original indictment that were considered to have been proved.

Of the twenty-two defendants in Nuremberg, three were acquitted and twelve were sentenced to death (one in absentia). In comparison, there were no acquittals in the Tokyo tribunal, where twenty-three of the twenty-five defendants were found guilty of participating in the “overall conspiracy” against peace (count 1). Tōjō received the death sentence, along with five other generals: Itagaki Seishirō, Kimura Heitarō, Kenji Doihara, Matsui Iwane, and Mutō Akira. Two civil officials, former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Kōki Hirota, were also sentenced to die. Of the seven men sentenced to death, two were judged guilty of authorizing or permitting atrocities (count 54) as well as of failing to prevent such breaches of the laws of war (count 55), and three were found guilty of the first but not the second of these atrocity charges. One defendant, the former general Matsui Iwane, was given the death penalty on “negative responsibility” grounds for not preventing atrocities by troops under his command during the Nanking Massacre. Kōki Hirota was found guilty of three charges, including overall conspiracy and having failed to prevent atrocities in China. The former prime minister was sentenced to die based on the vote of only six of the eleven judges.

MacArthur had dismissed all appeals for a stay of execution that the condemned brought in front of him. After this decision, seven of the

defense lawyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. They declared that the Tokyo Tribunal was an American court established without the consent of congress and had been conducted entirely based on President Truman's executive powers. On December 15, the day before the case was argued at the Supreme Court, the Far Eastern Commission promptly announced that the tribunal "is an international court appointed and acting under international authority." Five days later, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it had no power or authority to revoke the sentences.

The defense lawyers sought to highlight the political nature of the Tokyo Tribunal. In their appeal to General MacArthur in the aftermath of the judgment, they stated as a means of appealing the judgment, "The death penalty would have been imposed by a vote of six to five in some cases and seven to four others." For the French judge, Henri Bernard, it is the entire judgment that he disapproved by considering that "a judgment rendered at the end of an irregular procedure cannot be valid." Bernard believed that the prosecution had been too selective in creating the "Class A" list. He was convinced there was more than enough reason to try Hirohito. However, according to his opinion, the IMTFE had a "natural" right to exist, he argued, and he was against anyone who attacked the credibility of the court.

In a very long 1,235–page "opinion" that he had published at his own expense upon his return to Bengal, Indian judge Pal was the most vocal in his criticism.[58] In his regard, there is no evidence that the accused were the perpetrators of crimes against peace. It considers that Japanese military operations against China were justified by Chiang Kai-shek's support for the boycott of Japanese trade operations decreed by the Western powers, mainly of the embargo imposed by the United States on Japan's import of oil. According to Pal, Japanese attacks on neighboring territories were justified to protect the Japanese empire from the aggressive environment it was subjected to by Western powers and some neighboring countries in the area, especially the Soviet Union.[59] These were self-defense operations that could not be considered criminal. "The real culprits are not before us," said the Indian magistrate. "Only a lost war is an international crime," he concluded.[60]

Judge Delfín Jaranilla from the Philippines, for his part, considered that the sentence had been too lenient and "was not in proportion to the seriousness of the wrongdoings committed." The dissenting Dutch judge, for his part, considered that three of the defendants sentenced to life imprisonment should have been sentenced to death and that four other convicts should have been acquitted (Hata, Kido, Shigemitsu, and Tōgō). Chinese judge Mei threatened to commit suicide if the death penalty was not imposed on the guiltiest.

Also, when the verdicts were announced on November 12, 1948, the most surprising thing was when the general public learned by the media the entirely unexpected submission of four separate opinions that were in one way or another critical of the tribunal's conduct and conclusions. Justice Pal had acquitted all defendants, while Justice Röling had found five (including Hirota) not guilty.[61] Two justices, Webb and Bernard, had found the tribunal flawed and compromised by the decision not to bring the emperor to trial. Emperor Hirohito was, in fact, the only person in Japan who had been at the center of power during the entire course of the war.

Some of the shortcomings mentioned in the trial were recognized by Attorney General, Joseph Keenan, who was responsible for presenting the elements of the prosecution on behalf of the war-winning Allied countries. "Such trials are unprecedented," he said in his introductory indictment. "We are aware of the dangers of such procedures in the absence of precedents, but it is essential to realize that if we waited for such precedents and remained paralyzed by their absence, the result would be serious consequences without any justification. Today we are faced with brutal realities that somehow call into question the very existence of civilization."

However, for most of the judges, the death sentences against the accused were justified when one considers the damning testimony gathered on war crimes and crimes against peace committed by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. At the Tokyo court, witnesses described the abuses committed by Japanese soldiers on prisoners of war and in civilians in Japanese-dominated Asia. They talked about how the fallen airmen were shot or beheaded with swords in retaliation for the bombing of Japanese cities. They recounted cases of excessive punishment,

torture, and inhumane treatment, which were inflicted on prisoners of war in contravention of the Geneva Conventions, and in accordance with the instructions of Japanese army commanders who ordered to maintain strict discipline among prisoners of war. They talked about corporal punishment, the torture that was inflicted at the slightest case of insubordination. As noted in the judgment on page 1089:

Thousands of victims were beaten to death, others exposed to the tropical sun for hours without protection, others still hung by their arms until they disjointed, or locked in cages or underground cells for weeks without food. Torturing prisoners for information are a serious war crime according to the Geneva Convention; and the Japanese Army used this practice throughout the war to annihilate its enemies.[62]

The Tokyo trial was marked by Cold War priorities. In contrast to Nuremberg, the efforts made to bring to justice several members of the Japanese officials for war crimes received little attention by the Western press. The judgment at Tokyo is considered by many experts as a justice of the victors and revenge for Pearl Harbor. For traditional critics, the Tokyo trial was the site of a compromise where, as historian Marukawa Tetsushi pointed out in his contribution to the Gendai Shiso case, “the victor was able to enshrine the vanquished in international order dominated by United States, offering him in exchange the emperor’s decommissioning.” Thus, the Treaty of San Francisco, which restored Japan’s sovereignty, provided for the recognition by the Japanese government of the Tokyo trial and, at the same time, the security treaty that was signed on that occasion permanently established American bases on its territory.

Zaibatsu in Japan....

In Tokyo, the patrons of “zaibatsu” were not brought to justice. The three zaibatsu who had been arrested (Ayukawa, Nakajima, and Fujiwara) were not indicted. These Japanese industrialists formed the backbone of Japan’s military-industrial complex during the expansion of the empire of Japan

during World War II. “Zaibatsu” such as Mitsubishi and Nissan were involved in the manufacture of weapons and military aircraft, as well as in the establishment of factories in the colonies, where they used forced labor. The main “zaibatsu” were Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Nissan, Suzuki, Kuhara, Furukawa, Fujita, Okura, Asano, Toshiba, Marubeni, Itochu, Kanematsu, Nuchimen, and Riken.[63]

The bosses of these companies should be held accountable for their active role in World War II. However, far from being worried, the “zaibatsu” pin resisted the dismantling desired by Washington during the American occupation of Japan between 1945 and 1950. All their leaders were exonerated of criminal prosecution following the intervention of the commander-in-chief of the occupation forces, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, with the U.S. administration.[64] Forgotten in the indictment prepared by Prosecutor Keenan, during the trial of the twenty-eight Japanese dignitaries in Tokyo; the group has taken another structure under the new name of “Keiretsu.”

The Nuremberg trial is considered by many critics to be the trial of the victors. The Tokyo trial was the subject of the same reproaches among many jurists and historians. According to the lawyers of the Japanese defendants, the nations before the representatives of whom the high-ranking Japanese dignitaries appear are guilty of the same crimes, they accuse the accused. The question is how Att. Gen., Joseph B. Keenan, who represented the United States in the trial, can prosecute Japanese defendants for war crimes while the same prosecutor represents the U.S. administration responsible for the incendiary bombings of Tokyo, the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? How could Soviet judges, chosen by a state that has violated the treaty signed with Japan to militarily invade Manchuria and commit atrocities, convict Japanese officials for crimes against peace committed on nations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia?

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials are far from perfect works in terms of the notion of neutral and fair justice. However, despite identified weaknesses and notable shortcomings, both trials have historical successes. They are the result of the formation of the first two international tribunals to establish the responsibility of political leaders who use war as a weapon to oppress their

neighbors and conquer their territories. As the judges in Tokyo said, “Individuals are, for the first time in history, brought to justice to personally answer for the crimes they committed in their official capacity as heads of state.” Thus, both trials have unquestionably shaped the birth of international justice with the task of prosecuting in the future warring dictators who will commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.[65]

EPILOGUE

A fter both world wars, the victors created new institutions to prevent monitoring and reducing aggression between and among countries. Post-WWI, there was the League of Nations, and post-WWII, the United Nations. Today, were it not for the United Nations, there may already have been World War III.

While World War III has not occurred, the world has nevertheless been chronically on the brink of many regional wars, primarily due to the spawning of new tyrants, their enablers and profiteers, who are obsessed with empire-destiny and all that means —repression, bullying, uniformity, obedience, exploitation, impunity, insatiable materialism, militarism, puppet governing, authoritarianism, answering prejudice, and subjugation,— etc.

As many viewed Japan as a case in point more than a century ago, today many view China as another case in point. And as it takes at least two to make a war, the world's eyes have turned to the chain of events —begun in the 1970s— between China and the United States. Broadly put, it is an asymmetric tension. As Japan at the beginning of 1940s, China's goal seems to be world territorial domination through state-sponsored "mergers and acquisitions" along the paths of least resistance into other continents; America's goal is self-centered money-making and accumulation of material wealth, with only a token of regard to who buys (and uses) what it has to sell. The core of the former is a belief system; the core of the latter is a business plan. As they are both superpowers in terms of mutually assured destruction, such asymmetry is dangerous. No WWI-style assassination attempt and no WWII-style sneak attack come close to alluding how World War III could begin (and even end the same day). No one has the slightest grasp of how sudden and total it would be. Nevertheless, for at least fifty years, the potential combatants continue to behave as if historical convention is sufficient to regulate the chain of events…a treaty here, a treaty there, a military feint here, a daring takeover of Tibet there, a pipeline there, and on and on.

Since the beginning of 2016 newspapers around the world have repeatedly proclaimed that “U.S.-China Tensions are Increasing; Relations are Worsening.” These two largest economies have been embroiled in costly and failed trade relations. The two largest navies have begun testing each other in the so-called “South China Sea,” many of whose islands China claims for its own and much of whose waters have historically been shared by several nations. According to data, an estimated US $3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade.[1] 80 percent of China’s energy imports and 39.5 percent of China’s total trade passes through the South China Sea.[2]

Since 2013, China has been building artificial islands (military bases) in the region of the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. Many countries have verbally condemned these actions. Since 2015, the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region.[3] In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the China’s maritime claims in Philippines v. China.[4] The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries.”[5] Either China or Taiwan accepted the tribunal verdict and instead insisted that the contentions should be resolved through bilateral negotiation.[6]

The historical background to all this is quite relevant. During World War II, Japan forcibly occupied islands in the South China Sea and used them for military bases.[7] After the war, the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco ordered Japan to withdraw without specifying any new ownership.[8] China began claiming the islands even during the 1951 treaty negotiations between Japan and 48 other states, and then again during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958.[9]

In September 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement that sought to contain their dispute in the region. When India objected to the accord, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, replied:

China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the islands. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed during history and this position has been held by Chinese government for a long time. Based on this, China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so, as to positively contribute to peace and tranquility in the South China Sea area.

We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries to not get involved in South China Sea dispute.[10]

From 2013 to the beginning of 2018, China completed artificially building up above sea level several locations in the South China Sea. Three of them —Meiji Reef, Zhubi Reef, and Yongshu Reef— now have airfields. The government-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. plans to spend 200 billion RMB (US $30 billion) over twenty years to find, capture, and extract fossil fuel from the region. It estimates that within the next five years, it will be able to produce 25 million metric tons a year of crude oil and natural gas from a depth of 2000 meters.[11] The Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of China estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil, whereas the oil rich country of Kuwait has 13 billion tons.[12]

On July 20, 2020, American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States rejected most of China's claims over the South China Sea. The same day, China announced it was sanctioning three prominent Republicans for interfering in China's internal affairs.[13] A few hours later, President Donald Trump issued an executive order removing favored status for Hong Kong —anticipating that it will soon be adversely absorbed by

China— and also considering a broad ban on members of the Chinese Community Party from entering the United States. In reply, President Xi Jinping of China aggressively replied. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs via foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian accused the U.S. of oppressing and bullying China. As of this writing, in July 2020, the United States has forced China to close and abandon one of its consulates in the United States, and China has likewise forced the U.S. to close and abandon one of its consulates in China.[14]

There is no doubt the tensions between the United States and China are about China's attempt to build an empire. China's model is quite different to Britain, France, Germany, and Japan's empire building in the past. Those countries have built their empire on the model of state-control, while Chinese model is a blend between national control and ownership of resources and economic activities dominated by private entrepreneurs.[15] As one said, what's distinctive about China's bid is that it doesn't (so far) involve much spilled blood. However, another would say, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, had driven the U.S. and Japan countries to war in 1941; an armed conflict between the United States and China is today a real concern. As Professor Bix pointed out:

Unwilling to accept China's construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Archipelago to bolster its claim to most of the South China Sea, the policy-makers in Washington challenged Beijing by sending warships to cruise nearby the Chinese-built islands and flying B-52 strategic bombers near them. Then they rationalized these actions by claiming to be impartial defenders of the rules that they laid down unilaterally at the end of World War II. In effect, the United States is telling China that it will react strongly to any state that challenges its so-called right to enforce maritime law. China responds by deploying anti-aircraft missile launchers not on one of the Spratly Islands but on an island in the disputed Paracel chain that for the past forty-two years it controlled and had defense facilities on. Domestic politics on both sides make this situation doubly dangerous.[16]

Flash Back

Stuart was very emotive in his comments. I silently listened to his history. Imagine seventy-five years after the end of World War II, more than 3 million Japanese died or still missing according to a report from the Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; Japan's empire was effectively a disaster.[17] Japan imperial ambitions to go to war with Great Britain, China, and the United States at the same time by the late 1930s and the beginning 1940s were an illusionist and a suicidal decision-making. How did the Japanese expect to win a war against the United States when Japan simply did not have the resources to police Korea, conquer China, invade Southeast Asia, and secure Manchuria against Russia and the National Revolutionary Army (Kuomintang Army) led by Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang?

As Jeffrey Record, a well-known defense policy critic and teacher of strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, said: "Was the Japanese decision for war in 1941 just a matter of stupidity?"[18] New York Congressman Hamilton Fish declared the day after Pearl Harbor, a "stark, raving mad "people who, by attacking the United States had committed military, naval, and national suicide?"[19] John Mueller, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, has called the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a "military inconvenience" for the United States and a "political and strategic disaster" for Japan because its instantly galvanized American public opinion behind a total war effort that led to Japan's destruction.[20]

Japan's aggression in China, military alliance with Hitler, its attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and proclamation of a "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" that included the invasion of several neighboring territories in the Pacific and East Asia constituted a list of suicidal aventures that drove its empire to disaster. Japan's empire was a disaster, I would say, because the imperial system particularly from Meiji and continuing up to Hirohito was built on fear, rivalry, intrigues, violence, brute force, cultural ignorance and racial arrogance, and finally based on a total devotion to the emperor who

was considered as a living god before his status was removed by the Allies shortly after the end of World War II. During the Pacific War, the cult of personality enforced by the militaristic era of the 1930s and 1940s directly resulted in suicide attacks, (the famous kamikaze strikes) and other atrocities in the name of the emperor. The terminology “subjects” used by Hirohito during his speech on August 14, 1945, when he accepted the Terms of Surrender, implied a special type of relation between the emperor and his citizens: absolute loyalty and service to the emperor who considered the whole nation as his “children.”[21]

An official cult of the emperor was also firmly in place at Hirohito’s birth. Repressive laws governing speech and writing critical of the emperor had been enacted in 1893, 1898, and 1900. Restrictive publication and newspaper laws soon followed. The mass media reported on the emperor and his family in a uniform way, using special terms of respect. Police regulations also governed the taking of his picture.[22]

Japan’s empire was a disaster because the Japanese leaders and commanders in power during the Pacific War prioritized imperialism, militarism, authoritarianism, vandalism, and insatiable materialism over the spiritual development of the entire Japanese nation. The Japanese under Hirohito’s leadership emphasized material force and aggression abroad over promoting the spiritual mobilization for the establishment of a society built on love, friendship, human dignity, respect of law, and more.

In terms of strategic doctrine, the Imperial Way faction or Kōdō-ha, comprised Gens. Araki Sadao, Mazaki Jinzaburo, and Obata Toshihirō and the “young officers” who supported them, labeled their neighbors as slave, second-class citizens, weak nations created to be occupied and dominated. As a result, the Japanese were very brutal to the prisoners of war and the citizens under their dominance. In terms of treatment, prisoners of war endured gruesome tortures with rats and ate grasshoppers for nourishment. Some were used for medical experiments and target practice. About 50,000 Allied prisoners of war died, many from brutal treatment. The death rate

among Japanese POWs was 27 percent, compared to 4 percent for Allied prisoners held in German and Italian camps.

Japan's empire was a disaster because during the years leading up to World War II and throughout the war those in power from the beginning 1930s until the Japanese surrender in August 1945 had built their power on hate, rejection, violence, suppression of liberty, destruction of the environment, violations of international laws, dehumanization of Japan's empire armed forces, and persecution of others. In order to impose their dominance on other nations, the Japanese had committed such abominable crimes. Those crimes, which are estimated to have resulted in the deaths of more than 20 million people, were perpetrated under the principle of a ridiculous policy, "The divine right for Japanese to dominate Asia and the entire world." "Eight corners of the World under one roof."[23]

Building their empire on the concept of nationalistic racism and militarism, the Japanese's sense of racial superiority became a dominant factor in Japanese society. The Japanese believed before and during the Pacific War that their nation was superior to all others with a special mission to dominate and rule the rest of the world. They believed they were descendants of the gods, and their emperor was divine. Under this concept, it was widely believed in Japan that the Japanese "race" was of a higher order than any other race or ethnic group. The Japanese accepted a concept of a divine origin as a "select people."[24] It was in this atmosphere of arrogance or self-importance that the Americans came and destroyed Japan's ambition to dominate Asia first, and the rest of the world after. As Prof. John W. Dower said:

The Co-Prosperity Sphere was but a chimera; the euphoria of the first half-year of the Pacific War but a dream within a dream, soon dismissed by Japanese themselves as the "victory disease… Long after it had become obvious that Japan was doomed; its leaders all the way up to the emperor remained unable to contemplate surrender. They were psychologically blocked, capable only of stumbling forward.[25]

APPENDIX

TESTIMONIES

J apan's Empire Disaster , by Judge Jean Sénat Fleury, has a moral: civilizations are without the shadow of a doubt less moral than Paul Valéry has thought. And a few decades spent wriggling out Native Americans and two separate droppings of atomic bombs are surely not enough to give rise to one.

Dr. Jacques R. Georges,

University of New Hampshire

Author of Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, Thomas de Quincey considered murder to be one of the Fine Arts, and yet it is not of predatory behaviors of a State that Japan's Empire Disaster of judge Jean Sénat Fleury leads us to think. Indeed, this masterful book brings readers back to the savage bombings of Pearl Harbor by the air and naval forces of the Empire of Japan on December 6 and 7, 1941, on the one hand, and the American atomic bombings which pulverized Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, on the other hand. The two bombings were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of human beings. Even at such a price, these ordinary men will leave no trace of their existence in history. This indecent cliché says nothing other than their final anonymity.

Indeed, the beauty of a crime is not proportional to the name of the victims, but to the dream that this crime fosters. Let's simply evoke the difference between these highly decorated veterans and the famous prisoner of the Bastille, Le Marquis de Sade. The latter's name goes around the world because the crimes of this man question us about who we are. The names of the former group remain and will remain unknown despite all the commemorations. For, they only embody, whatever the infinite power of death of which they have a moment disposed and made use of, the dreary

docility of the soldier to the orders received, and the innate aptitude of certain individuals to be only instruments.

“There are dead,” said old Sema Tsien, “light as feathers and others heavy as Mount Taichan.” The same is true of criminals: some hide an unfathomable mystery, others, strangely while alive, already reveal a flat electroencephalogram, or as the professionals would put it a flat EEG. Let’s remember Landru’s last words at the foot of the guillotine to prosecutors who questioned him about what he did with the bodies of some of his victims. “It’s my little secret,” replied the mischievous rentier.

From his adventure, Sir Charles Spencer Chaplin, better known as Charlie Chaplin, makes a masterpiece as there are few. I want to believe that it is for this reason that —wanting to pay a tribute to the dead of Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki— Judge Fleury chose to write this book which he divided into six parts that are divided into twenty chapters that can be read as smoothly as one would quench a chilled Prestige (a Haitian beer) after a Marathon in the Savane Désolée, in the Artibonite department of Haiti.

There is no doubt, by writing this book, Judge Jean Sénat Fleury hopes to give to the dead of Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, a more universal heartfelt cry than if he was speaking to himself in the solitude and the secret silence of his Judge’s office during his leisure hours.

While, the author is very careful to distance himself from his masterpiece however, that would not prevent those schooled during “l’Âge d’or” of Haitian education to jump for joy as they find themselves in the rhythm, the turn of the sentences, and the stylistic elegance of the writer.

Japan’s Empire Disaster of Judge Jean Sénat Fleury is not recommended to those who suffer from acrophobia. In his book, the author walks his readers atop the most dizzying heights of History. My favorite chapters revolve around the famous Unit 731, the parallel between Doctor Mengele and the obscure Japanese bacteriologist, Shiro Ishii, and the analysis of the Tokyo trials that the readers will take pleasure reading at the end of the book.

From 1935 to 1945, in Manchuria occupied by the troops of his Imperial Majesty, Gen. Shirō Ishii and his team inside secret laboratories in Unit 731

conducted experiments on prisoners. In order to manufacture chemical weapons, a certain number of particularly virulent pathogenic germs such as typhus, cholera, and dysentery, were injected in human bodies without their consent. Japanese troops used these weapons in 1939 at the Mongolian border, during the battle of Momanhan against the Russian troops. Success was mixed, said former member of Unit 731, Yoshio Shinozuka. Ironically, today the Coronavirus had struggled to choose sides. However, according to the same witness, researches continued particularly through vivisection on human guinea pigs. At the same time, Unit 731 was developing combat gases that were used soon during the invasion of China. In total, according to Professor Keiichi Tsuneishi, of the University of Kanazawa, Unit 731 would have used 3,000 Korean, Chinese or Russian prisoners to test these bacteriological weapons. The approximate number of these murdered by chemical weapons is over 200,000.

After 1945, many of the collaborators at Unit 731 were offered impunity by the United States in exchange for the results of their research. A secret report kept in the Pentagon archives, and found by Professor Tsneishi, confirmed the existence and activities of Unit 731, as well as, the name of the scientists who directed the crimes in Wuchang, in Manchuria. I would say with a sardonic smile worthy of Voltaire: this wicked scientist was not Iranian. Of course, no United Nation Monitoring Commission ensured that Ishii would not continue his research in the United States for war purposes on the proliferation of Anthrax and Botulism.

Prosecution had never been brought against Ishii. Time marches on! An international trial like those that took place in Nuremberg or in Tokyo is only conceivable when the victors occupy the country of the vanquished. Winning Vietnam did not occupy the United States nor did the Soviet Union occupy Poland. The first International Tribunal, since the trials of Nuremberg and Tokyo, has its seat in The Hague. In Nuremberg, the twenty-two main leaders of the Third Reich were tried, except for Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler: all three committed suicide. In Tokyo, the main leaders of the war faced their judges, with the exception of His Majesty Hirohito. He was untouchable.

This Court, in The Hague, continues today to try African heads of State for crimes against humanity. History doesn't repeat itself, said Karl Marx. Indeed, today in The Hague, Herodotus' brainchild stutters. The magistrates of this operetta court are White Europeans who can never judge their fellow citizens, upholders of Apartheid. There is a good reason for that: they were pardoned. Nor will they have to judge the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the British, the French etc., who committed far worse crimes in their former colonies than those of African leaders such as Charles Taylor, Laurent and Simone Gbagbo, Bahr Abu Garda to mention only those names. How would they do it since they were granted full amnesty as Soviet murderers of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn were absolved?

All in all, Judge Jean Sénat Fleury's book Japan's Empire Disaster is a little masterpiece of literature that has the potential of making Ernest Hemmingway's soul jealous. Reading this book, as the pages slip through your fingers, would bring you to think of that photo –shot at the end of the final encounter in Geneva prior to the launch of the Gulf War–of James Baker, the American Foreign Affairs Minister, conversing with his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz. The former future winner of the Gulf War had a defeated face while the latter harbored a winner's smile.

Mr. Tariq Aziz, to whom one day, French lawyer, Jacques Verges, recalled these ambiguous moments reported to him the content of the words exchanged with the American diplomat a few minutes before this photo was taken: "You underestimate our power," said Mr. Becker. "We are able to bring you back in fifteen days to the Stone Age."

- "We do not underestimate your capacity to harm," replied Mr. Tariq Aziz. "But I think you forget that we have behind us five thousand years of history."

The lesson: Civilizations are without the shadow of a doubt less moral than Paul Valéry has thought. A few decades spent wriggling out chase to Native Americans and two separate droppings of atomic bombs are surely not enough to give rise to one.

Dr. Jacques R. Georges

Japan’s Empire Disaster

Charley Granvorka, Economist

June 2020

Why Japan’s empire a disaster? The sentence immediately sounds as an affirmation; however, it could also be interpreted as an implicit question. Affirmation or question, one could replace Japan’s name by any other European countries one involved in war at any moment through time. So, I’ll recontextualize Japan for this very time span to finally let the reader have his or her own opinion after the book reading.

From 1894 to the end of World War II in 1945, Japan has always been battling against supposed or declared enemies. Fights began with the first Sino-Japanese War (July 1894–April 1895) followed by many other local armed conflicts until the country’s surrender in 1945 in front of the U.S. winners. In preamble, it is critical to define what an empire is. That is not a so simple and obvious matter as empire is a polysemic concept whose definition varies over time and space. In the meantime, it may refer to sovereignty, single command power, or world order.

According to Madeline, (2008) the empire’s concept may be viewed through three approaches: Intellectual, within the frame of a sociohistorical postcolonialism approach, and as the analysis of a political system overflowing a given state single territorial frame. This last view is the one most popularized among political scientists and legal practitioners. On the other hand, the definition of empire has been set up through time from Tacite to many contemporary researchers. For the curious-minded, Madeline (2008) is probably the more enriched source.

Wars conducted by Japan against its neighbors were mainly motivated by an expansionism, methodically conducted step-by-step. This type of empire construction reverberates how the continental European empires of

Germany and Russia built themselves for the XVIII century. According to Vié (2015), such an expansion translates Japan's obsession for security fearing China's invasion after a forced port opening to the United States in 1853 followed by European powers some years later.

Fifteen years later, 1868, this date is considered as the entry of Japan in modernism. For Japanese officials, it was the critical path to unify the empire in order to become a superpower in the region, and be able to face and commercially compete with the Occident. From that vision, the Japanese decided to annex all the neighboring countries liable to provide their empire with the economic factors to sustain the development: arable lands, sub-soil natural resources, latex, oil, minerals, manpower…. Self-sufficiency for autarky was also the subsequent argument to justify expansion.

Industrialization for the 1880s, followed by the first Japanese constitution in 1889, comes as the finalization of the country's transformation. However, internal and external problems made expansionism necessary. The war against China and Russia, the occupation of Manchuria, interpositions in Korea and Formosa heighten the National solidarity to help Japan in its industrial revolution. By the end of the First World War 1914–1918, despite strong control and civil liberty violations, the Japanese system has been able to enter capitalism, favor cultural revival, and build a quality Education system at the primary, secondary, and higher levels (Vié, 2005).

For the arguments exposed supra the reflection imposed by the title cannot be unilaterally responded to Japan's political history, headed by an imperial representation half-witnessing and half-acting, is rich and controversial enough for not to adopt a unique analytical angle. It requires the reading and the comprehension of many and different linkages. Among others are the relationship between domestic and foreign policies, Shintoism, the Bushido rules and the Samurais' role, or the relationship between civil society and army; likewise the initial condition of the national construction. All these relationships are many comprehensive standpoints mention by Eddy Dufourmont in his book, Histoire Politique du Japon 1853–2011, published in 2012.

KEY FIGURES

Allied

• Abe, Spitzer	Radio operator during the Hiroshima bombing
• Albert, W. Winchell	Machinist at Midway
• Alexander, Gen. Vandegrift A.	Commandant in the U.S. Marine Corps
• Alexander, Gen. M. Patch	Commandant in the U.S. Army
• Archibald, Wavell	Commander for Allied forces in Southeast Asia
• Bai, Chongxi	Chinese Nationalist leader
• Brockman, Lt. Cmdr. William H., Jr.	Captain, Nautilus
• Buckmaster, Capt. Elliott	Captain, Yorktown
• Burford, Lt. Cmdr. William P.	Captain, Monaghan
• Charles, Sweeney	Pilot who flew Bockscar carrying Fat Man
• Charles, Col. Tench	Member of MacArthur's staff
• Chen, Cheng	Commander of the National Revolutionary Army
• Cheng, Qian	Chinese military general and revolutionary
• Cheng-ShiWu	Chinese Major
• Chiang, Kai-skek	Head of the Nationalist government in China
• Claire, Lee Chennault	Commander China Air Task Force
• Cleo, J. Dobson	Officer of Enterprise
• Collins, Capt. James F., Jr.	Leader, B-26s at Midway
• Curtis, Gen. E. LeMay	Resp. of the strategic bombing in the Pacific
• David, Whitehead	Brigadier Australian Forces
• Davidson, Brig. Gen. Howard C.	CG, Seventh Fighter Command
• Delany, Lt. Cmdr. John F.	Engineering officer, Yorktown
• Dobson, Lt. (j.g) Cleo J.	USN reconnaissance pilot
• Charles, D. Albury	Navig. of the plane that dropped the atomic bomb
• Doolittle, Lt. Col. James H.	Leader, air raid on Japan

• Douglas, Gen. MacArthur	Chief of staff of the United States Army
• Draemel, RADM Milo F.	Chief of staff, Pacific Fleet
• Duane, L. Withlock	Officer cryptanalysis during the Pacific War
• Eliot, Olsen	Lt. Cmdr. At Midway
• Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C.	Commanding general, Hawaiian Dept.
• Fletcher, RADM Frank Jack	Commander, Task Force 17
• Floyt, D. Adkins	Pilot at Midway
• Frank, Knox	Secretary of the US Navy
• Frank, Gen. Fletcher J.	Commandant in the U.S. Navy
• Fred, Olivi	Crew member who dropped the atomic bomb
• Franklin, D. Roosevelt	President of the United States
• Fu, Zuoyi	Chinese military leader
• Gallaher, Lt. W. Earl	Commander, VS-6
• George, Marshall	Secretary of State and Defense under Truman
• George, Moore	Commander of the Manila Bay
• Gray, Lt. James S.	Commander, VG-6
• Gu, Zhutong	Chief of the general staff
• He, Yingqin	Gen. in China’s Nationalist Army
• Henderson, Maj. Lofton R.	Commander, VMSB-241
• Henry, Lewis Stimson	Secretary of War (1940-1945)
• Holmberg, Lt. (j.g.) Paul A.	SBD pilot, Yorktown
• Husband, E. Kimmel	Commander of the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor
• James, Byrnes	American Secretary of State
• James, Maj. Hennessy	Combat doctor during the Pacific War
• Jim, Van Pelt	Navig. of the plane that dropped the atomic bomb
• John, D. Kuharek	Pilot engineer and flew in the mission to Hiroshima
• John, C. Waldron	Lieutenant Commander at Midway
• John, Hull	Brig. Gen., a planner in the Pacific theater
• John, Singlaub	Commander during the Pacific War
• Johnson, Lt. Cmdr. Robert R.	Commander, VB-8
• Jonathan, Wainwright	Commander of Allied forces in the Philippines

• Joseph, R. Redman	A naval communications officer
• Karel, Admiral Doorman	Commander in the Battle of the Java Sea
• Kermit, K. Beahan	Pilot of the plane that dropped the atomic bomb
• Kimes, Lt. Col. Ira E.	Commander, MAG-22
• Layton, Capt. Edwin T.	Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet
• Li, Zongren	Kuomintang military commander
• Mao, Zedong	Chairman of the Communist Party in China
• Marcus, Lt. McDilda	Pilot to the 46th Fighter Squadron
• Merritt, Gen. Edson A.	Commandant in the U.S. Marine Corps
• Miles, Capt. Browning	Aviator in the Pacific War
• Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
• Parks, Maj. Floyd B.	Commander, VMF-221
• Pederson, Lt. Cmdr. Oscar	Commander, Air Group, Yorktown
• Peng, Dehuai	Red Army Commander in the Sino-Japanese War
• Rainsford, Stark	Officer in the U.S. Navy during World War I/II
• Ray, Gallagher	Crew in the plane that dropped the atomic bomb
• Richmond, Gen. Turner K.	Commandant in the U.S. Navy
• Richmond, Kelley	Commanding of the Amphibious
• Ring, Cmdr. Stanhope C.	Commander Air Group Hornet
• Robert, Gen. Ghormley L.	Commandant in the U.S. Navy
• Robert, Lt. R. Johnson	Commandant at Midway
• Russell, R. Waesche	Leader in the U.S. Coast Guard
• Short, Lt. Wallace C.	Commander, VS-5
• Sidney, Col. Mashbir	Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS)
• Simard, Capt. Cyril T.	Commander, Midway NAS
• Spruance, RADM Raymond A.	Commander, Task Force 16
• Stalin, Joseph	Soviet leader, Sec. Gen. of the Communist Party
• Stephen, Gen. Chamberlin J.	Aide-de-Camp to Major Gen. David C. Shanks
• Stilwell, Gen. Joseph	Commander in the China Burma India Theater
• Sweeney, Lt. Col. Walter C., Jr.	Leader, B-17s on Midway
• Theobald, RADM Robert A.	Commander, Task Force 8

• Thach, Lt. Cmdr. John S.	Commander, VF-3
• Thomas, Blamey (Australian Gen.)	• Commander Allied Land Forces South West Pacific
• Truman, Harry S.	President of the United States
• Vasily, Ivanovich Chuikov	Soviet Commander of the 26th Army
• Waldron, Lt. Cmdr. John C.	Commander, VT-8
• Warner, Major Jo K.	USAAF liaison officer, Midway
• Wei, Lihuang	Chinese general
• William, Gen. Halsey F.	Commandant in the U.S. Navy
• Xue, Yue	Chinese Nationalist military general
• Yan, Xishan	Chinese warlord
• Zhang, Fakui	Chinese Nationalist General
• Zhu, De	Chinese general
•	

Japan

• Anami, Korechika	Minister of the Army, – commander in China
• Araki, Sadao	Minister of the Army, – minister of Education
• Akira, Muto	Lieutenant General in the Imperial Japanese Army
• Asaka, Prince Yasuhiko	Commander of the Imperial Guard
• Asaka, Prince Takahito	Head of Operation Golden Lily
• Chen, Gongbo	Chinese politician collaborationist
• Chichibu, Prince Yasuhito	Commander of Operation Golden Lily
• Demchugdongrub, Chairman	Pro-Japanese Mongol Military Government
• Doïhara, Kenji	Inspector general of aviation
• Eiichiro, Jō	Naval Camp aide to the emperor
• Fuchida, Cmdr. Mitsuo	Flight leader, Akagi
• Fujita, Lt. Iyozo	Zero pilot, Soryu
• Fujita, RADM Ruitaro	Commander, Seaplane Tender Group
• Fujita, Adm. Hisanori	Great Chamberlain, – Guard of the Seals
• Fumimaro, Prince Konoe	Prime minister
• Fushimi, Prince Hiroyasu	Chief of the Navy staff
• Gunichi, Mikawa	Commandant of the Imperial Japanese Navy

• Hashimoto, Lt. Toshio	Bomber pilot, Hiryu
• Hajime, Gen. Sugiyama	Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army
• Hara, Lt. Cmdr. Tameichi	Commander, Amatsukaze
• Hara, Yoshimichi	President of the Imperial Privy Council
• Hasunuma, Shigeru	Chief Camp Aide of Hirohito
• Hayao, Gen. Tada	Commander of the 18th Artillery Regiment
• Hayashi, Gen. Senjurō	Minister of War, – prime minister
• Harukichi, Hyakutake	Commandant in the Imperial Japanese Army
• Heitaro, Kimura	General in the Imperial Japanese Army
• Hideo, Yano	Nagato’s skipper
• Higashikuni, Prince Morihito	Major and captain in the Japanese Army
• Hiranuma, Kiichirō	President of the privy council, – prime minister
• Hiroabi, Abe	Commandant in the Japanese Imperial Navy
• Hiroshi, Baron Oshima	Japanese ambassador to Germany
• Hirota, Koki	Minister of Foreign Affairs, – Prime Minister
• Hisashi, Ohara	Commander at Midway
• Hisaichi, Terauchi	Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army
• Hitoshi, Imamura	Commandant in the Imperial Japanese Army
• Hosogaya, VADM Moshiro	Commander in Chief, Northern Force
• Inukai, Tsuyochi	Prime minister
• Irei, Sukemasa	Chamberlain of the emperor
• Joichi, Lt. Tomonaga	Comd. of Hiryu during the Battle of Midway
• Junichi, Kusaka	Commandant of the Imperial Japanese Navy
• Kakuta, RADM Kakuji	Commander in Chief, 2d Carrier Striking Force
• Kanji, Adm. Katō	Leader of the Washington Naval Treaty
• Kan’in, Prince Kotohito	Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army
• Kantarō, Suzuki	Prime Minister
• Kawashima, Yoshiyuki	Minister of the Army
• Keisuke, Okada	Prime minister
• Kenji, Hitanaka	Major (Imperial Japanese Army)
• Kenechi, Ishikawa	Third Class Fireman

• Kenryō, Satō	Chief of the Military Affairs Section
• Kijurō, Shidehara	Prime minister, – minister of Foreign Affairs
• Kinoshita, Michio	Chamberlain of the emperor
• Kiyosumi, Tanikawa	Arashi’s torpedo officer
• Ko, Nagasawa	Takagi’s chief of staff
• Koichi, Marquis Kido	Seal keeper
• Konoe, Fumimaro	Prime minister
• Koseku, Ariga	Commander of DesDiv 4
• Kuniaki, Koiso	Prime minister
• Kurita, RDAM Takeo	Commander in Chief, Close Support Group
• Masahiko, Takeshita	Head of the Military Affairs Bureau
• Masataka, Chihaya	Japanese commander at Midway
• Matsui, Iwane	Commander of the Central China Army
• Matsuoka, Yōsuke	Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Mikasa, Prince Takahito	Member of the Central China Army Staff
• Mitsuo, Capt. Fuchida	Bomber aviator in the Japanese Navy
• Nagano, Osami	Minister of the Navy
• Nakino, Nobuaki	Minister of the Imperial House, – Guard of Seals
• Naozaburo, Gen. Okabe	Commander of the Japanese 6th Area Army
• Nishizo, Tsukahara	Commandant in the Imperial Japanese Navy
• Nobuhito, Prince Takamatsu	Prime Minister, – Member of the Naval Staff
• Nobutake, Kondo	Commandant in the Imperial Japanese Navy
• Okada, Capt. Jisaku	Captain, Kaga
• Okamura, Yasuji	Commander of the North China Army
• Okumiya, Lt. Cmdr. Masatake	Air staff officer, 2d Carrier Striking Force
• Raiz, Tanaka	Commandant in the Imperial Japanese Navy
• Ryusaku, Yanagimoto	Naval Commander at midway
• Sadao, Chigusa	Gunnery officer of the light cruiser Jintsu
• Saitō, Makoto	Prime minister, – guard of seals
• Saionji, Kinmochi	Prime minister, – head of delegation at Versailles
• Shiji, Nishimura	Commandant of the Imperial Japanese Navy

• Shigemitsu, Mamoru	Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Shigenori, Tōgō	Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Shigeru, Honjō	Commander of the Army in Kwantung
• Shunroku, Hata	Minister of War
• Shimada, Shigetarō	Minister of the Navy/ Comdr. of the China Fleet
• Shiro, Ishii	Commander of UNIT 731
• Soji, Capt. Akira	Captain, Mogami
• Sumuru, Kimura	Commanding DesRon 10
• Takagi, VADM Takeo	Commander, CruDiv 5
• Takasu, VADM Shiro	Commander in Chief, Guard Force
• Takeda, Prince Tsuneyoshi	Commander of Operation Lily
• Takeo, Kurita	Commandant in the Imperial Japanese Navy
• Takeo, Kyuma	Engineering staff officer
• Tanabe, Lt. Cmdr. Yahachi	Commander, I-168
• Tanaka, RADM Raizo	Commander, Transport Group
• Tinker, Maj. Gen. Clarence L.	Commanding General, Seventh Air Force
• Tōjō, Hideki	Prime minister
• Tomonaga, Lt. Joichi	Leader, air attack on Midway
• Tomoyuki, Gen. Yamashita	Leader during the invasion of Malaya/Singapore
• Toshio, Shiratori	Japanese ambassador to Italy
• Toshizō, Gen. Nishio	Inspectorate general of military training
• True, Cmdr. Arnold E.	Captain, Hamann
• Wang, Jingwei	Collaborationist Chinese Army
• Ugaki, RADM Matome	Chief of Staff Combined Fleet
• Watanabe, Capt. Yasuji	Plans officer, Combined Fleet
• Yamamoto, Admiral Isoruku	Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
• Yanagimoto, Capt. Ryusaku	Captain, Soryu
• Yoshijirō, Umezu	Chief of the Army general staff
• Zhou, Fohai	Chinese politician collaborationist

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

AANS	Australian Army Nursing Service.
ADF	Asian Development Fund.
BOJ	Bank of Japan.
CEMMER	Center for Multilingual Education and Research.
ECB	Earthquake Casualty Bills.
FAA	Fleet Air Armament.
FEAF	Far East Air Force.
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States. The official series of declassified historical: U.S. State Departmer
GDP	Gross Domestic Product.
GNP	Gross National Product.
HYPO	Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence Unit.
IBM	International Business Machines Corporation.
IG	Inspector General.
IJA	The Imperial Japanese Army.
IMTFE	International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
ITT	International Telephone & Telegraph.
MNN	Makino Nobuaki nikki.
NAS	Naval Air Station.
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyodai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei commonly referred to in English as the Nazi Party.
OIGMA	Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training.
RNFAA	Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm.
SWNCC	State War Navy Coordinating Committee.
TWCT	The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military T
UNWCC	The United Nations War Crimes Commission.
USN	United States Navy.
USSBS	U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.
VAWW	Violence Against Women in War.
WPI	Wholesale Price Index.
USAAF	United States Army Air Forces.

SOME JAPANESE TERMS

BAKUFU: The central administration of Japan under a Shogun. The term is used for a shogun's office or governm
DAIMYO: A feudal lord (vassal-in-chief) of the Tokugawa period whose domain was estimated to yield an annual
KOKU: Measure of capacity, especially of rice. 1 koku = 4.96 bushels.
KOKUTAI A concept in the Japanese language that means "national body/structure of state;" the word was used du
RŌJŪ: A member of the Shogun's Council of State in the Tokugawa period. The Rōjū was one of the highest-r
SAMURAI: A member of Japan's feudal ruling class before 1870. In Japanese, they are usually referred to as bushi,
SHOGUN: Normally appointed by the emperor, as theoretically his military deputy, Shogun was the title of the mil
YEN: Monetary unit of Japan. First minted in 1869, after the Meiji Restoration, the yen was officially adopte
ZAIBATSU: ("Financial clique") is a Japanese term referring to industrial and financial business conglomerates in th

INTRODUCTION

1.Codename for the Battle of Normandy. The operation was launched on June 6, 1944, with the Normandy landings. See William F. Buckingham, D-Day: The First 72 hours, (Stroad, Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2004(. See also, Ford, Ken; Zaloga, Steven J., Overlord: The D-Day Landings, (Oxford, New York: Osprey, 2009).

2.The JAPAN NAVY Code No. 25 (JN-25) had ascribed 45,000 randomly selected five-digit numbers to different phrases and words that were then mixed with five-digit numbers from a second book.

3.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 390.

4.On Japanese's worst war crimes during the Pacific War, see Leonard George Siffleet's execution. Leonard George Siffleet, an Australian commando of World War II, was executed in New Guinea on October 24, 1943. Vice-Admiral Michiaki Kamada, the commander of the Japanese Naval Forces at Aitape, who ordered the execution, stands up and says to the prisoner, "We are going to kill you. Officer Yasuno Chikao, who carried out the beheadings, had drawn his favorite sword. He taps the prisoner neck slightly with the back of the blade, then rises above his head with both arms and brings it down with a powerful sweep. The head, detached from the trunk, rolls forward on the ground. The photograph of Siffleet's execution was discovered on the body of a dead Japanese major near Hollandia by American troops in April 1944. The photo was published in Australian newspapers and in Life magazine but was thought to depict Flight Lieutenant Bill Newton, who had been captured in Salamaua, Papua New Guinea, and beheaded on March 29, 1943. See Adam-Smith Patsy, Prisoners of War: From Gallipoli to Korea, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1992). See also Eric Feldt, The Coastwatchers, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1946).

5.Of the 27,000 Americans taken prisoner by the Japanese, 40 percent died in captivity, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service. That compares with just one percent of American prisoners who died in German POW camps. More than 60 Japanese companies used POW labor during the war, usually paying Japan's Imperial Army a fee for the privilege.

6.During the war some 16 million Americans served in the United States Armed Forces, with 405,399 killed and 671,278 wounded. There were also 130,201 American prisoners of war, of whom 116,129 returned home after the war.

7.See Jean Sénat Fleury, Adolf Hitler – Hirohito on Trials, (Xlibris, 2019).

8.Ibid., 190.

9.See Natasha Frost, Hitler's Teeth Reveal Nazi Dictator's Cause of Death.

10.During World War II, Fellers served as military secretary for Gen. Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of the Allied powers. Tasked with investigating the Emperor's war responsibility, Fellers concluded hearings on Japanese government officials and advised MacArthur to leave the emperor in place, saying that it would be in the interest of the United States to use Hirohito's charisma while occupying Japan. In a memo to MacArthur, he wrote that the emperor had no authority and that if he was convicted as a war criminal, a general uprising would be inevitable. The emperor's name was subsequently stricken from the list of men to be charged as war criminals." Chunichi Shimbun, "Was Fellers friend of Japan or master manipulator?" (The Japan Times, August 23, 2013).

11.As United States secretary of states in the administration of President Harry S. Truman from 1949 to 1953, Acheson played a central role in defining American foreign policy during the Cold War. Acheson helped design the Marshall Plan and was a key player in the development of the Truman Doctrine and creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See David S. McClellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, 1976. See also Oscar William Perlmutter, "Acheson and the Diplomacy of World War II," The Western Political Quarterly, 1961.

12.Atcheson, while serving as Gen. Douglas MacArthur's political adviser and Allied council chairman, died after the military flight he was on crashed en route to Washington, DC. He was heading there to discuss plans for a Japanese treaty. "ARMY CRAFT CRASHED IN OCEAN: Ambassador Atcheson Dies in Plane Crash Near Hawaii Isle, (California Digital Newspaper Collection), Retrieved 6 November 2019.

13.General MacArthur said in his memoirs, published in 1964, that Hirohito, by renouncing divinity, had assumed for himself, "a leading part in the democratization of his people," and that his subjects, who revered him, who had one been forbidden even to gaze upon him, came to respect and admire him." Cited by Robert Trumbull, "A Leader Who Took Japan to War, to Surrender, and Finally to Peace, (The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1989).

14.On E.T. Imparato, General MacArthur: Speeches and Reports 1908–1964, (Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Pub, 2000). See John F. Day III, An Officer in MacArthur's Court: A Memoir of the First Headquarters, (Robertson Publishing, 2016). See also Richard B. Frank, MacArthur: Great Generals Series, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

15.The diaries of Koichi Kidō, the lord keeper of the privy seal from June 1940 to November 1945, were submitted as evidence to the International Prosecution Section (IPS), established by General MacArthur on December 8, 1945. Testimony of Koichi Kidō in International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings (mimeo), 31185–31186; See Barton J. Bernstein, "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb," vol. 46, Issue I (University of California Press, 1977).

16.A report from the Guardian cited by Sean Cunningham in "Did Japan's Emperor Deserve to be Convicted as a War Criminal"? (Insidehook.com, November 12, 2018).

17.Based on the history, I wrote the book Hirohito: The Trial of the Emperor. The book provides an understanding of the atrocities of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II, particularly the crimes of Unit 731.

18.Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947, (Princeton University Press, 1981).

19.In this place, we find both a military museum with dozens of exhibit tanks, helicopters, aircraft and ships; and somber memorial to the events. Thirteen thousand items are displayed in six halls under different themes: Memorial Hall, War History, Korean War, Expeditionary Forces, ROK Armed Forces, and Large Equipment. About 100 large weapons are displayed in the outside exhibition area on the lawns around the building.

20.Joel Lee, "Former Prison Lives with Vestiges of Korea's Patriotic Past," (The Korea Herald, August 2, 2018).

21.Sim Hun's Poem: "Letter to My Mother"

Thought I was handcuffed and wore a mask

I was escorted by the police.

Mother!

When the sun was blazing, the cell was like a fumace.

At night, while I could not stretch my legs, fleas bit me.

So, I had to couch to spend a night for a month.

Even in this hell, more regretted and suffered.

But their eyes are shining bright.

22.The execution building was only built in 1923, and many freedom fights were executed here by hanging. This building is now classified as National Historical Site No. 324.

23.On the Fukushima Daiichi Incident, the nuclear accident happened on March 11, 2011, following a major earthquake, a fifteen-meter tsunami that disabled the power supply and cooling of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors. The accident was rated 7 on the INES scale, due to high radioactive releases over days 4 to 6, eventually a total of some 940 PBq (I–131 eq). There have been no deaths of cases of radiation sickness from the nuclear accident, but over 100,000 people were evacuated from their homes." See Fukushima Daiichi Accident from the World Nuclear Association website, (world-nuclear.org.), updated May 2020.

24.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), XIX.

25.Jean Sénat Fleury, Hirohito: Guilty or Innocent: The Trial of the Emperor, (Xlibris, 2019).

26.Established in 1925 by imperial mandate, Unit 731 was a military bacteriological research unit of the Imperial Japanese Army. Under the command of Gen. Shirō Ishii, this special army unit conducted bacteriological warfare experiments and vivisections of death-row inmates and prisoners of war near Harbin, Manchuria. Bacteriological weapons produced by this unit in Beyince, Wuhan Municipality, in China, were used against the Soviets in 1939 and especially against the Chinese from 1940 to 1945. The laboratory specializing in bacteriological research disease and biological weapons was led by Japanese bacteriologist, who began their experiments on humans, including women and children, provided by the Kempeitai, the Japanese military police. "Disease strains are implanted in a patient to see what reactions his body will adopt. The plague is injected into his body, and if by some miracle he survives, we will inject leprosy, then cholera, until death comes to deliver him." (From Yoshi Shinozuka, a Japanese army doctor enlisted in Unit 731).

27.In 1939 the Japanese army established the Unit 731 germ-warfare research center in Harbin, where Japanese medical experts experimented on Chinese, Soviet, Korean, British and other prisoners. After World War II, the occupying U.S. government granted political immunity to military personnel who had engaged in human experimentation and other crimes against humanity, predominantly in mainland China. Among them were Unit 731's commanding officers General Shirō Ishii and General Masaji Kitano, who were overseen by General MacArthur in September 1945. While a series of war tribunals and trials was organized, many of the high-ranking officials and doctors who performed the experiments were pardoned and never brought to justice.

28.Tsuneishi K. The Germ Warfare Unit That Disappeared: Kwantung Army's 731st Unit, (Tokyo: Kai-mei-sha Publishers, 1981): 105–110. See also Walter Reed Army Medical Center Borden Institute, Military Medical Ethics, vol. 2, (Department of the Army, 2004), 466.

29.Gold H., Unit 731 Testimony, (Tokyo: Yen Books, 1996).

30.Sheldon H. Harris, Japanese Biomedical Experimentation During the World-War-II Era, (Falls Church, 2003), 482. See also Sidu H., The Bamboo Fortress: True Singapore War Stories, (Singapore: Native Publications, 1991).

31.Han Xiao, "Compilation of Camp 731 savage fascist acts," (Unforgettable History, Harbin, 1985).

32."Unethical human experimentation is human experimentation that violates the principles of medical ethics. Despite the Nuremberg Code developed after the war in response to the Nazi experiments, countries have carried out brutal experiments on marginalized populations. Canada has carried out unethical medical experiments on indigenous populations in concert with its policies of forced cultural assimilation. From 1946 to 1948 U.S. scientific researchers in Guatemala infected hundreds of mental patients with sexually transmitted diseases (STD). De-classified documents of the National Archives in Britain revealed that during the 1930s and 1940s, the British army used hundreds of British and native British Indian army soldiers as "guinea pigs" in their experiments to determine if mustard gas inflicted greater damage on Indian skin compared to British skin. In the 1920s and 1930s, Aboriginal Australians were subject to medical experiments. The experiments were carried out by researchers from the University of Adelaide. In 2002, the vice chancellor of the university described the experiments as "degrading and in some cases barbarous" and the school issued a formal apology to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups." See University of Adelaide (2002– 02–08), "Apology For Past Experiments on Aboriginal People." See also Leslie Young (2016–02–08), "What happened to Jim? Experiments on Canada's indigenous populations,"

(Global News. Retrieved 2018–08–04); Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race, (United States: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2004).

33.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury, 2016), 180–235.

34.See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 339.

35.Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth, (Random House, 1989), 71.

CHAPTER 1

FROM SAMURAIS TO SOLDIERS

1.Born in Newport, Rhode Island, Matthew C. Perry was a Commodore of the United States Navy who commanded ships in several wars, including the War of 1812 and the Mexican American War. With the advent of the steam engine, he became a leading advocate of modernizing the U.S. Navy and came to be considered "The Father of the Steam Navy" in the United States. He played a leading role in the opening of Japan to the West with the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854. On Commodore Perry see Jean M. Copes, "The Perry Family: A Newport Naval Dynasty of the Early Republic." (Newport History: Bulletin of the Newport Historical Society, Newport, RI: Newport Historical Society, Fall 1994) 66, Part 2 (227): 49–77. Also see David Curtis Skaggs, "Olivier Hazard Perry: Honor, Courage, and Patriotism in the Early U.S. Navy." (US Naval Institute Press, 2006), 4.

2.When Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay in 1854, Japan had been a military dictatorship, known as the Tokugawa Shogunate, closed to the outside world for 250 years. President Fillmore sent Perry to Japan to protect the rights of American whalers, set up navy coaling stations, and opens the country for trade. Perry managed to gain the first two objectives in the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854, and in 1858, the U.S. Consul to Tokyo completed negotiations of the commercial treaty. These treaties with the United States were the catalyst to a chain of events that ten years later led to the Meiji Restoration, 1866–1869. The Japanese emperor retook power and began the industrial revolution, which was to transform Japan to a world-class industrial and military power by the end of the century. Cited by Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge: Standing Strong Against the Military, Economic, and Political Threats that Imperil America, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 8.

3.Perry was aware of the difficulties involving attempting to establish relations with Japan, and initially protested that he would prefer to command the Mediterranean squadron of the US Navy instead of being assigned to yet another doomed attempt to "open" Japan. These precedents included: In 1846, Commander James Biddle, anchored in Edo Bay on an official mission with two ships, including one warship armed with seventy-two cannons, asking for ports to be opened for trade, but his requests for a trade agreement remained unsuccessful. In 1849, Captain James Glynn sailed to Nagasaki, leading at last to the first successful negotiation by an American with Japan. James Glynn recommended to the United States Congress that negotiations to open Japan be backed up by a demonstration of force, thus paving the way for Perry's expedition. See Chang-su Houchins, Artifacts of diplomacy: Smithsonian collections from Commodore Matthew Perry's Japan Expedition (1853–1854), (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995). See also Samuel Eliot Morison, Old Bruin: Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry 1794–1858, (Boston: Little Brown, 1967).

4.Tokugawa Ieyoshi was the twelfth shōgun of the Tokugawa shogunate of Japan. He was the 121st emperor of Japan. On Eras of Ieyoshi's bakufu, see Harold Bolitho, Treasures Among Men: The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). Also see Conrad Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa bakufu, (1600–1843), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

5.On the treaty, see this article on (weaponandwarfare.com, May 14, 2017), "Commodore Perry Anchors in Tokyo Bay" Also see Rhoda Blumberg, Commodore Perry in the Land of the Shogun, (HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1985), 18; John H. Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry: antebellum Sailor and Diplomat, (Booksgoogle.com), 286.

6.See Harold Bolitho, Abe Masahiro and the New Japan, in the Bakufu in Japanese History, edited by Jeffrey P. Mass and William Hauser, (Stanford California Press, 1985). Review by Mary Elizabeth Berry, The Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter, 1987), 186–194. See also Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); S. Well Williams, A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan (1853–1854), (F.W. Williams, 1910).

7.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 9.

8."In 1639, Japan closed itself to all Western powers except the Netherlands. In 1854, following the visit of U.S. warships Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry in 1853, Japan reopened its doors to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. The following year, France was included by the Treaty of Amity." Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success," (Naval War College Review, spring 2005, vol. 58, no. 2.

9.Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 13.

10.Shogunate, Japanese bakufu or shōgunshoku, government of the shogun: The shogunate was the hereditary military dictatorship of Japan (1192–1867). Legally, the shogun was under the control of the emperor who remained in his palace in Kyōto as a symbol of power behind the shogun. The shogun's authority was limited to control of the military forces of the country. The samurai leader Minamoto Yoritomo gained military hegemony over Japan in 1185. Seven years later he assumed the title of shogun and established the first shogunate or bakufu at his Kamakura headquarters. The Kamakura shogunate possessed military, administrative, and judicial functions although the imperial government remained the recognized loyal authority. See Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Commanders (940–1576), (Osprey Publishing, 2005). See also James Mudoch, A History of Japan: 1652–1868, (Routledge, 1996); Dorothy Perkins, The Samurai of Japan: A Chronology from their Origin in the Heian Era (794–1185) to the Modern Era, (Diane Publishing, 1998).

11.Alexander McKay, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan (1834–1858), 1993, 30.

12.By June 1863, the Chōshū domain, in response to a general order to repulse foreigners that was forced upon the Edo government by the conservative court in Kyoto, attacked Western ships. In 1864, the United States and United Kingdom, in retaliation, bombarded Shimonoseki and landed troops. A peace agreement was signed, and Chōshū moved from anti-foreign policies to opposing bakufu that tried to reinforce the general order to expel foreigners. See John Denney, Respect and Consideration; Britain in Japan 1853–1868 and Beyond, (Radiance Press, 2011). See also see Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime, (Harvard University Press, 1971).

13.Marius Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 314–315.

14.The Tokugawa shogunate, (Tokugawa bakufu), also known as the Edo Bakufu, was the feudal military government of Japan during the Edo period from 1600 to 1868. The Tokugawa Shogunate was established by Tokugawa leyasu after victory at the Battle of Sekigahara (October 21, 1600), ending the civil wars of the Sengoku period following the collapse of the Ashikaga Shogunate. The Tokugawa shonugate organized Japanese society under the strict Tokugawa class system and banned most foreigners under the isolationist policies of Sakotu to promote political stability. While Choshu was one of the three clans that were instrumental in bringing down the Tokugawa (1604–1867) that had governed Japan's closed agriculture-based feudal system for nearly 300 years. The Chōshū clan vision for a unified and powerful Japan. See Louis-Fréderic Nussbaum, and Käthe Roth, Japan Encyclopedia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

15.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 13–14.

16.Ibid., 15.

17.In 1867, the shogunate family and anti-shogun daimyō united for a common cause to overthrow the pro-western government and established the restoration of imperial rule. The shogunate supports and places the Emperor of Japan as its highest authority, and has its own armed force, the Imperial Japanese Royal Guard, to ensure the security of the Shogunate and the emperor. The shogunate draws its candidates for the position of shogun from the

Five Regent Houses of Koubuin, Ikaruga, Saionji, Kujou, and Takatsukasa. The Regent Houses are the highest-ranking nobles of Imperial Japan, superseded only by the Emperor of Japan. Their rank color is blue, with the appointed shogun donning purple. Under the Regent Houses are the fudai, hereditary vassals with many generations of direct service to the shogun. Fudai daimyō and their descendants filled the ranks of the Tokugawa administration in opposition to the tozama daimyō and held most of the power in Japan during the Edo period. The fudai wear yellow as their rank color. One rank under the fudai is the samurai who wear white as their rank color. The samurai were the hereditary military nobility and officer caste of medieval and early modern Japan from the 12th century to their abolition in the 1870s. At that time, they were 5 percent of the population. They had high prestige and special privileges such as wearing two swords. They cultivated the bushido codes of martial virtues, indifference to pain and engaging in many local battles. Most serve under the fudai as their direct subordinates. The Meiji Restoration ended their feudal roles and they moved into professional and entrepreneurial roles. The last rank of those serving in the Royal Guard and Shogunate are those not related to the samurai families, and thus do not have any actual status or nobility within the Shogunate. They wear grey as their rank color. See Kenjirō Yamakawa, Aizu Boshin Senshi, (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1933). See also Harold Bolitho, Treasures among Men: The Fudai Daimyō in Tokugawa Japan, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Harry D. Harootunian, “The Progress of Japan and the Samurai Class, 1868–1882.” (Pacific Historical Review, 1959) 28 # 3: 255–266; Stephen Turnbull, “Samurai: The Story of Japan’s Great Warriors,” (London: Prc Publishing Ltd, 2004).

18.Henry Kissinger, On China, (Penguin, 2011), 79.

19.“The Charter Oath (Gokajō no Goseimon, more literally, the Oath in Five Articles) was promulgated at the enthronement of Emperor Meiji on April 6, 1868, in Kyoto Palace. The Oath outlined the main aims and the course of action to be followed during Emperor Meiji’s reign, setting the legal stage for Japan’s modernization. This also set up a process of urbanization as people of all classes were free to move jobs, so people went to the city for better work. The Charter Oath can be considered the first constitution of modern Japan.” See Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). See also Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

20.Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century, (Ronald Press, 1955), chapter 2.

21.Okazaki Tetsuji, “Lessons from the Japanese Miracle: Building the Foundations for a New Growth Paradigm,” (nippon.com, Feb. 9, 2015).

22.Edwin Hoyt, Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986), 17.

23.Kōichi Hagiwara Illustrated life of Saigō Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi, (Kawade Shobō Shinsya, 2004).

24.Margarey Earl David, “Saigō Takamori, Japanese Samurai,” Encyclopedia Britannica).

25.See Mark Ravina, The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigō Takamori (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley, 2004). See also Charles Yates, “Saigō Takamori: The Man behind the Myth,” (New York, NY: Kegan Paul International, 1995).

26.On the punitive expedition to Taiwan, see Edward H. House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, (Forgotten Books, 2018).

27.In 1876, Korea established a trade treaty with Japan after Japanese ships approached Ganghwado and threatened to fire on the Korean capital city. Treaty negotiations with several Western countries were made possible by the completion of this initial Japanese overture. See Kim Chun-gil, The History of Korea, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2005). See also Yŏng-ho Ch’oe, William Theodore De Bary, Martina Deuchler and Peter Hacksoo Lee, Sources of Korean Tradition: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, (New York; Columbia University Press, 2000).

28.In 1876, Japan forced the hermit Kingdom of Korea, over which China’s emperor claimed suzerainty for the previous two hundred years, to open trade with Japan and to declare independence from China in its foreign relations. Although the treaty was forced on the king, it was Korea’s first modern treaty and the first time that

Korea was treated as an equal in international negotiations. See Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge: Standing Strong against the Military, Economic, and Political Threats that Imperil America, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 9.

29.During the Boshin War, Kirino also known as Nakamura Hanjirō was a senior commander of Satsuma forces. He became a high-ranking officer of the new Imperial army. Shinohara was a prominent military commander in Bakumatsu and early Meiji period Kagoshima.

30.Seppuku sometimes referred to as hara-kiri is a form of Japanese ritual suicide by disembowelment; it was originally reserved for samurai but was also practiced by other Japanese in the belief that they were restoring their personal or family honor. See Toyomasa Fusé, "Suicide and Culture in Japan: A Study of seppuku as an Institutionalized Form of Suicide," (Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 1979) 57–63. See also Stephan R. Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1977), 47.

31.Michael J. Seth, A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 234.

32.Ibid., 234–235.

33.Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict, (New York: Indiana University Press, 2012), 287. See also Seth Michael J., A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

34.Ibid., 288.

35.Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 49.

36.Ibid., 51.

37.Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 372.

38.Gojong was the last king of Joseon and the first Emperor of Korea. Japan, after the Meiji Restoration forced Joseon to sign the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876. Japan established a strong economic presence in the peninsula, heralding the beginning of Japanese Imperial Expansion in East Asia. See Lee Jae-min, "Treaty as prelude to annexation," (The Korea Herald, 8 September 2010.)

39.Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 373.

40.Ibid., 373.

41.Ibid., 373.

42.Ibid., 237.

43.Ibid., 374.

44.See Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 236. See also Michael, J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

45.Ibid., 237.

46.The Chinese had three reasons they wanted to remove the Daewongun: First, he attempted to overthrow the pro-Chinese Min faction. Second, "he created a situation which invited the Japanese troops to Korea, thus precipitating the danger of a military conflict between Japan on the one hand and Korea and China on the other." And third, "the Taewongun [Daewongun]-inspired disturbance threatened the foundation of a lawfully constituted

government in a dependent nation." Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict, (New York: Indiana University Press, 2012), 293. See also C.I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism: 1876–1910, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

47.Seth 2011, 236.

48.Kim 2012, 293.

49.Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 54.

50.The China-Korea Treaty of 1882 was negotiated between representatives of the Qing Dynasty and the Joseon Dynasty in October 1882. This agreement has been described as the Joseon-Qing communication and Commerce Rules; and it has been called the Sino-Korean Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade. The treaty remained in effect until 1895. After 1895, China lost its influence over Korea because of the First Sino-Japanese War. See Samuel C., Chu, "Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization," (Armonk, New York: Sharpte, 1994). See also Chun-gil Kim, The History of Korea, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2005).

51.Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 237.

52.Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict, (New York: Indiana University Press, 2012), 295.

53.Ibid., 295.

54.Ibid., 295.

55.The "Nagasaki Incident" was a riot involving Chinese Beiyang Fleet sailors in Nagasaki. The Beiyang Fleet was one of the four modernized Chinese navies in the late Qing dynasty. It was the largest fleet in Asia and the 8th in the world during the late 1830s in terms of tonnage.

56.Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, McGraw-Hill, 1986), 23–24.

57.Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 19.

58.Ōkuma retired from politics at that time. He was the co-founder of the Constitutional Progressive Party (Rikken Kaishintō), which soon attracted several other leaders, including Ozaki Yukio and Inukai Tsuyoshi. He returned to politics in 1896 by reorganizing the Rikken Kaishintō into the Shimpotō (Progressive Party), and later became Prime Minister of Japan in 1898 and from 1914 to 1916. Oka Yoshitake, et al. Five Political Leaders of Modern Japan: Ito Hirobumi, Okuma Shigenobu, Hara Takashi, Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Saionji Kimmochi, (University of Tokyo Press, 1984).

59.Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 24.

60."To the Meiji leaders, political dissent was seditious, because it weakened the state. In Ito's words, 'the onslaught of extremely democratic ideas' had to be resisted, because 'in a country such as ours, it was evident that it would be necessary to compensate for its smallness of size and population by a compact solidity of organization." To frame the constitution Ito and Iwakura had worked out an outline of the constitutional provisions they thought to be acceptable, including a cabinet clearly responsible to the emperor. In consequence of this approach, much of the philosophical framework derived from Lorenz von Stein's concept of 'social monarchy.' See W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, (St. Martin's Press, 2000), 76–77, 307. Ito, 'Some reminiscences,' in Okuma, Fifty Years, I, 127. The text of the constitution had been published many times in official translation: see, for example, Beckmann, Making, 151–6, and Ishii, Japanese Legislation, 725–33

61.Ibid., 22.

62.See Hackett Roger F., Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan 1838–1922, (Harvard University Press, 1971). See also Craig Albert M., Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration, (Harvard University Press, 1961); Jansen Marius B., The Making of Modern Japan, (Harvard University Press, 2000); Dupuy Trevor, on Yamagata, the "father" of militarism.

63.The name given by the Chinese to a series of treaties signed between the Qing dynasty and various Western powers and the empire of Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

64.Gordon, A Modern History, 95.

65.Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji And His World, 1852–1912, (Columbia University Press, 2002).

66.Milton Walter Meyer, Japan: A Concise History, (Rowman & Littlefield, 1992).

67.On May 14, 1878, Ōkubo was assassinated by Shimada Ichirō and six Kaga Domain samurai on his way to the Imperial Palace, only a few minutes' walk from the Sakurada gate where li Naosuke had been assassinated eighteen years earlier.

68.The New York Times: The New Treaty with Japan, 1894–10–03.

69.Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 376.

CHAPTER 2

BAD-NEIGHBOR SYNDROME

1.The First Sino-Japanese War marked the emergence of Japan as a major world power and demonstrated the weakness of the Chinese empire. The war grew out of conflict between the two countries for supremacy in Korea. In 1875, Japan forced Korea to open to foreign trade, especially Japanese, and to declare independent from China in its foreign relations.

"A new balance of power had emerged. China's millennia-long dominance had abruptly ended. Japan had become the pre-eminent power of Asia, a position it would retain throughout the twentieth century." C. S. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82, 266, 293. See also Paine, The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

2.J.A.G. Roberts, A History of China, (Macmillan International Higher Education, Jul 13, 2011), 192: "In March, Kim Ok-Kyun, the leader of the pro-Japanese group, was murdered in Shanghai by the son of a victim of the 1884 coup. His body was returned to Korea in a Chinese warship, an arrangement which was found offensive by the increasingly vociferous proponents of expansionism in Japan. Meanwhile, the threat of a popular movement, the Tonghak insurrection led the Korean government to appeal to China for assistance. These events gave Japan a pretext for sending troops to Korea. Li Hongzhang attempted to negotiate a settlement, but when the Japanese navy sank the Kowshing, a Chinese troopship bringing reinforcement to Korea, war became inevitable." Also see Judith Fröhlich, War in History, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2014, 214–250); Lone Stewart, Japan's First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894–1895, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994), 222.

3.The war is commonly known in China as the War of Jiawu (Chinese: pinyin: Jiǎwǔ Zhànzhēng), referring to the year (1894) as named under the traditional sexagenarian system of years. In Japan, it is called the Japan-Qing War (Japanese: Hepburn: Nisshin sensō). In Korea, where much of the war took place, it is called the Qing-Japan War (Korean: Hanja).

4.Frederick R. Dickinson, University of Pennsylvania, Book Reviews, The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, by S. C. M. Paine, (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 275.

5.See Peter S. Michie, The life and letters of Emory Upton, 290–8, 309–10.

6.John King Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 266– 267.

7.David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 12.

8.Ibid., 36.

9.In 1975, Hirohito told an American reporter, concerning Nogi's influence: "I particularly recall this episode when I was a small boy: I met him at a certain place and he asked me, '"How do you come to school when it rains?"' And I was just a small boy, so I answered off-hand, "'I come by horse-drawn carriage.'" And Nogi said, "'when it rains, you must come here on foot wearing an overcoat.'" So, he was advocating a very frugal, strenuous, self-disciplined life. That made a profound impression on me.'" See Helmar Schramm, Ludger Schwarte and Jan Lazardzig, Collection, Laboratory, Theater: Scenes of Knowledge in the 17th Century, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005. See also Claude Emerson Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries," (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).

10.Paul Leopold Eduard Heinrich Anton Bronsart Schellendorff, Duties of the General Staff, translated by William Aldworth Home Hare, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

11.Yamagata Aritomo, "The Japanese army," in Shigenobu Ōkuma, ed. Fifty Years of New Japan, 2009. Richard J. Smith, "Reflections on the comparative study of modernization in China and Japan: military aspects," (Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1976), 11–23.

12.Olender Piotr, Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894–1895, (MMP Books, 2014), 39.

13.Frederick R. Dickinson, University of Pennsylvania, Book Reviews, The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, by S. C. M. Paine, (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 275.

14.The treaty of Shimonoseki, also known as Treaty of Bakan in China, was a treaty signed at the Shunpanrō hotel, Shimonoseki, Japan on April 17, 1895, between the Empire of Japan and the Qing dynasty, ending the First Sino-Japanese War. While the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905, after negotiations lasting from August 6 to August 30, at the Portsmouth naval shipyard in Kittery, Maine, United States. See De Martens, F., "The Portsmouth Peace Conference," 1905. The North American Review, 181 (558). Also see Trani, Eugene P. The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969).

15.The Joseon dynasty was a Korean dynastic kingdom that lasted for approximately five centuries. Joseon was founded by Yi Seong-gye in July 1392 and was replaced by the Korean Empire in October 1897. See for details Jae-eun Kang, The Land of Scholars: Two Thousand Years of Korean Confucianism, (Homa & Sekey Books, 2006). "Yi Seong-gye issued a royal edict to proclaim the name of the new dynasty to "Joseon" and issued amnesty to all criminals who opposed the transition in the dynasty. The statement by Taizu about "only the name of Joseon is beautiful and "old" naturally refers to Giya Joseon."

16.…Japan was at the forefront of hegemonic wars in a quest to extend the Japanese hegemony over Korea to the entire Asia-Pacific region–the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 to gain dominance in Korea," Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.

17.The Russo-Japanese War was fought during 1904 and 1905 between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan over rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres of operations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden in Southern Manchuria and the seas around Korea, Japan and the Yellow Sea. See Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy, (University of Kentucky Press, 1969). See alsoYoji Koda, The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success, (Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, 58 (2) – via Questra Online Library.

18.Country Studies, “Transformation of Russia in the Nineteenth Century,” (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998).

19.Country Studies, “Transformation of Russia in the Nineteenth Century,” (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998).

20.19. Sheldon H. Harris, Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-up, (Routledge, 2002), 5.

21.S.C.M. Paine, The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, (Review by Frederick R. Dickinson, Monumenta Nipponica, volume 73, number 2, 2018, 274–288).

22.The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905, after negotiations lasting from August 6 to August 30, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, United States. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in the negotiations and won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. The Japanese delegation to the Portsmouth Peace Conference was led by Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, assisted by former Ambassador to Washington, Takahira Kogorō. The Russian delegation was led by former Finance Minister Sergei Witte, assisted by former ambassador to Japan Roman Rosen and international law and arbitration specialist Friedrich Martens. A total of twelve sessions were held between August 9 and August 30. The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5. The treaty was ratified by the privy council of Japan on October 10 and in Russia on October 14, 1905. See Text of Treaty; Signed by the emperor of Japan and Tsar of Russia, The New York Times, October 17, 1905. See also Richard Harding Davis, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Russo-Japanese War; a photographic and descriptive review of the great conflict in the Far East, gathered from the reports, records, cable dispatched, photographs, etc. of Collier’s war correspondents, (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1905).

23.On the issue of the Russo-Japanese War, S.C.M. Paine, Professor of Strategy and Policy at the United States Naval War College, the author of Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development (2010), The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier (1996). In his book: The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, Paine wrote an instructive analysis. The historian said: “Few Japanese civilian or military leaders in early 1904 had any confidence that they could defeat Russia’s military. In fact, aside from the conquest of 203-Meter Hill at Lüshun in November 1894 and the Battle of Tsushima Strait in May 1905, the Russo-Japanese War was an operational disaster for Japan. Admiral Tōgō’s surprise attack on Russia’s Port Arthur Squadron in February 1904 left five of seven Russian battleships intact while putting four of Japan’s six first-class battleships out of commission. Until the Battle of the Yellow Sea six months later, the Port Arthur Squadron remained unscathed and the Vladivostok Squadron continued to menace Japanese merchantmen and troop transports. On the ground, Japan suffered more casualties and expended more ammunition in the May 1904 Battle of Nanshan (Manchuria) that it did during the entire First Sino-Japanese War.

In the same month, two of its six battleships sank after hitting mines in the Yellow Sea. In the August-September 1904 Battle of Liaoyang (Manchuria), Russian forces outnumbered the Japanese by 33,000, and Japan suffered 24,000 casualties to Russia’s 18,000. In the October 1904 Battle of Shade, Japanese supplies verged on collapse. General Nogi Maresuke conquered 203–Meter Hill on his fourth try in November 1904 and at cost of 64,000 Japanese lives, more than triple Russian losses. Japan deployed 125,000 fewer troops than Russian in the Battle of Shenyang (Mukden, February-March 1905), suffering 75,000 casualties to Russia’s 70,000.” Cited also by Frederick R. Dickinson, “Review of Paine’s Book,” in (Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 73, number 2, 2018), 274–280.

24.Fifty-six islands and minor rocks formed the Kuril Islands. It consists of the Greater Kuril Chain and the Lesser Kuril Chain. The total land area is 10,503.2 square kilometers (4,055.3 square miles), and the total population is 19,434). During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Gunji, a retired Japanese military man and local settler in Shinshu, led an invading party to the Kamchatka coast. Russia sent reinforcements to the area to capture and intern this group. After the war was over, Japan received fishing rights in Russian waters as part of the Russo-Japanese Fisheries Agreement until 1945. See John Stephan, The Kuril Islands, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 50–56. See also David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles, (New York: Praeger, 1985).

25.The Taft-Katsura Agreement also known as the Taft Katsura Memorandum was a 1905 discussion between officials of Japan and the United States regarding the position of the two nations in greater East Asian Affairs, especially regarding the status of Korea and Philippines in the aftermath of Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War. See Raymond A. Esthus, "The Taft-Katsura Agreement: Reality or Myth?" (Journal of Modern History, 1959), 46–51.

26.In this treaty, Japan formally annexed Korea following the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 by which Korea became a protectorate of Japan and Japan-Korea Treaty of 1907 by which Korea was deprived of the administration affairs. The treaty became effective on August 22, 1910. The treaty had eight articles, the first being: "His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes the complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole Korea." See Mark Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945, (University of Washington Press, 2009), 82–83. See also Alexis Dudden, Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power, (University of Hawaii Press, 2006); Kazahiko Tōgō, Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945—2009: The Quest for a Proactive Policy, (BRILL, 2010), 159.

27.See Jae-min Lee, "Treaty as prelude to annexation, (The Korea Herald, 8 September 2010.)

28.Asian Women's Fund, 10–11; Argibay 2003, 376, 377; (Gamble & Watanabe, 2004), 309.

29.H.B. Hulbert, History of Korea, (Routledge, 1999); Mizuno, Naoki. [Colonial control and "human control"]. (Kyoto University, January 3, 2007).

30."The South Seas Mandate, officially the Mandate for the German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator, was a League of Nations mandate in the "South Seas" given to the empire of Japan by the League of Nations following World War I. The mandate consisted of islands in the North Pacific Ocean that had been part of German New Guinea within the German colonial empire until they were occupied by Japan during World War II. Japan governed the islands under the mandate as part of the Japanese colonial empire until World War II, when the United States captured the islands. The islands then became the United Nations-established Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands governed by the United States. The islands are now part of Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Marshall Islands. In Japan, the territory known as "Japanese mandate for the South Seas Islands" (Nihon, Inin Tōchi-ryō Nan'yō Guntō). Duncan H. Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), 307. See also Richard Ponsonby-Fane, Sovereign and Subject, (Ponsonby Memorial Society, 1962), 346–353; Mark Peattie, Nan'Yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945, Pacific Islands Monograph Series, vol.4, (University of Hawaii Press, 1988).

CHAPTER 3

TRAINING A TYRANT

1.Every Japanese emperor has two names, one for his lifetime, and the other one for posterity. Until their deaths, Emperor Mutsuhito had been known as Emperor Meiji, Yoshihito as Emperor Taisho, and Hirohito as Emperor Shōwa.

2.A leading scholar of the concept of the kokutai, Motoori Norinaga wrote in 1771: "Japan is the birthplace of the sublime ancestral deity Amaterasu Ōmikami. From this, it is especially clear why Japan is so distinguished compared to all other countries. After all, there is no country that is not touched by the power of this sublime goddess. Naobi no mitama = KGS 10:3, Stolte 1939: 193.

3.The Seventeen-Article Constitution written by Crown Prince Shôtoku in the year 604 determined the principles according to which the transformation of Japan occurred from a loose group of dynasties into a centralized state according to the Chinese model. The foundation of the new state in the 7th century, just as later in the 19th century,

was the institution of the divine ruler: the emperor. Cited by Klaus Antoni, Kokutai–Political Shintô From Early-Modern to Contemporary Japan, (Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, 2016).

4.The so-called Meiji Restoration was the era in which Hirohito was born, which theoretically was a meaning of the return of authority to the emperor from the military dictators, called shoguns, and for Japan's amazing progress from feudalism and isolation to the front rank of world powers. See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), Chapter 1, "The Boy, The Family, And the Meiji Legacies," 21. See also Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth, (New York: Villard, 1989).

5.After Japan's defeat in World War II, under the 1947 Constitution, the emperor of Japan became the head of the Imperial Family and the head of the state. He is defined in the new constitution as "the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people." He is also the highest authority of the Shinto religion. In Japanese, the emperor is called tennō, literally "heavenly sovereign." See Charles Holcombe (2001), The Genesis of East Asia: 221-BC – A.D. 907, University of Hawaii Press, 198. Also read Legacy of Hirohito, (The Times, May 3, 1989).

6.See Robert Trumbull, A Leader Who Took Japan to War, to Surrender, and Finally to Peace, (The New York Times, January 7, 1989).

7.A third brother, Mikasa-no-miya Takahito, was born ten years later, on December 2, 1915.

8."Emperor Meiji, in consultation with Yoshihito and Sadako, had decided that his grandson Hirohito should be reared in the approved modern manner by a military man. His first choice, Gen. Ōyama Iwao, declined to undertake this heavy responsibility. They then turned to the elderly Count Kawamura Sumiyoshi, a retired vice admiral and ex-navy minister from the Satsuma domain and asked him to rear the child just as though he were his own grandson." "The Boy, the Family, and the Meiji Legacies," See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 22, 23. Other lectures of the young Crown Prince Hirohito during the 1920s included Hirohito's teacher of Japanese literature, Professor Haga Yaichi; Professor Toribe, who taught Chinese literature; Professor Katō Shigeru, who lectured on Chinese history and philosophy; Yamamoto Shinjirō, Hirohito's translator and teacher of French; and the right-wing constitutional scholar Kakei Katsuhiko.

9.Count Nogi Maresuke also known as Kitten, Count Nogi, was a Japanese general in the Imperial Japanese Army and a governor-general of Taiwan. He was a prominent figure in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, as commander of the forces which captured Port Arthur from the Russians.

10.Bushido is a feudal-military code of chivalry that valued honor above life.

11.On Nogi's instructions, Hirohito and his young brother were made to walk to school every morning, escorted by a medical attendant and two employees of the Imperial Household Ministry. On rainy days, they were allowed to ride in carriages; Hirohito rode alone while his brothers rode together and behind – the only exception being when one was sick. Cited by Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan, (Routledge, 2013).

12.See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), "The Boy, The Family, And the Meiji Legacies," 36. See also Takamatsu no miya Nobuhito shinnō, 68.

13.William Stewart, Time Bureau Chief, "The World: Hirohito: A Happy Experience," Hirohito's interview inside the Imperial Palace, Tokyo, Japan, published on October 6, 1975.

14.Hirohito graduated two months before his twentieth birthday. Three years before the graduation, and a few weeks before his seventeenth birthday, he became engaged to Princess Nagako, daughter of Prince Kuniyoshi Kuni. They were to have been married in 1923, but the ceremony was postponed until the following January because of the Great Kantō Earthquake in Tokyo on September 1, 1923.

15.In his Lectures on Evolutionary Theory (1904), Asajirō explained Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in plain simple language. He dealt with human problems from the point of view of an evolutionist; in his famous work From the Group of Monkis to the Republic, he compared the modern political system with ape society. He also criticized the absolutism and one-sided ethical education of Japanese society at that time and emphasized the necessity of an objective education oriented to scientific study.

16.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 58.

17.In an interview that appeared in the Sandē Mainichi magazine on October 2, 1949, Hattori offered his opinion on Hirohito's scientific contribution to marine biology. Asked whether the emperor's studies should be viewed as genuine scientific research rather than the work of an amateur, Hattori replied, "Recently Professor Satō Tadao [of Nagoya University] wrote in the Nagoya newspaper that it belonged to the category of an amateur's research. Indeed, depending on how one looks at the matter, I think that is true. He never published anything under his own name and ended up furnishing raw data to various specialists. Therefore, from one point of view he is, in the final analysis, probably a mere collector. But I don't think so. He did not just hand them material he had collected. Rather, he first thoroughly investigated that material himself, and on that point, he is no amateur."

According to a 1987 interview with Grand Chamberlain Yoshihiro Tokugawa, who served the emperor for fifty years at the imperial palace, Hirohito's affinity for the biological sciences began in the sixth grade, when he saw his first collection of marine specimens. In this interview, published in the journal Oceanus Tokugawa said that this youthful interest marked for Hirohito the beginning of a lifetime of scientific investigations and contributions to the field of marine biology.

18.Throughout his entire life, Hirohito continued to pursue his interest in marine biology, and, in his later age, became a fellow of the British Royal Society in 1971. He visited the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 1974. An American publication reported that the emperor devoted "each Monday and Thursday afternoon" to marine biology. In 1928, during the second year of his reign, Hirohito built the Imperial Biological Research Institute, consisting of a greenhouse and two large laboratories. On the marine biology question see Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 60.

19.See Yves Samyn, ""Return to Sender: Hydrozoa Collected by Emperor Hirohito of Japan in the 1930s and Studied in Brussels,"" Archives of Natural History, vol. 41, Issue 1, (2004), 17–24. See also E. J. H. Corner, "His Majesty Emperor Hirohito of Japan, K.G., April 29, 1901–January 9, 1989," Biographical Memoirs of the Fellows of the Royal Society, vol. 36 (Dec., 1990), 243; Stephen Large, Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography, (New York: Routledge, 1992).

20.See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 61.

21.See Suzanne Geisler, God and Sea Power: The Influence of Religion on Alfred Thayer Mahan, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015). See also Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," Kenneth Bourne and Carl Boyd, "Captain Mahan's War with Great Britain," (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 94:7 (1968), 71–78.

22.In 1923, Ugaki became vice minister of the army. While Baron Takeji Nara graduated from the eleventh class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1889 as a second lieutenant in artillery. He participated in the First Sino-Japanese War from 1894–1895, served in Germany, commanded the Japanese garrison at Tianjin, and worked in the Bureau of Military Affairs.

23.See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 45.

24.Ibid., 49.

25.See Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan, The Nissan Institute/Routledge, 1992. See also Takashi Ōtake, Phonological Structure and Language Processing, (De Gruyter Mouton 1996), 265.

26.Tsunoda R., et al., 1960, 644.

27.Yamamoto, 1989: 251–2.

28.See Jun, Uchida, "From Island Nation to Oceanic Empire: A Vision of Japanese Expansion from the Periphery, The Journal of Japanese Studies, February 2016.

29."On Crown Prince Hirohito's Tour of Europe, 1921," Frederick R. Dickinson, World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930. See also Noriko Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, (University of

Washington Press, 2015), 28–29.

30.The Kobe strike was a protest the injustice of the way in which Japanese labor has been treated by the employer class. While the Kobe strike was the most importan t that has occurred in Japan in many years, it is not the only one inspired by the same general cause – inadequate pay and excessive living expenses. Since January 1 there have been sixty-three strikes, each affecting more than two thousand men, the largest number of strikes in any one trade being 16,000 before the Kobe out-break. 1905–1918 in Japan was called the Era of Popular Violence (minshu sôjô ki). This began with the Hibiya Incendiary Incident, a huge demonstration of hundred thousand people against the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty which ended the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905. There were also several strikes and riots in 1911 in Tokyo, and a three-day riot in Nagoya, against which a large contingent of troops was required to suppress it. As a response to wartime inflation, low wages and commodity speculation, several strikes occurred in Japan in 1918. The rise in prices, particularly a rice shortage, gave rise to a major social revolution. Strikes increased from 49 strikes by 5,763 workers in 1914 to 108 strikes by 8,413 workers in 1916 to 417 strikes by 66,457 workers in 1918.

31.The right of women to vote was not affirmed by Japan until 1946 after it lost World War II.

32.See Taisho Democracy in Japan: 1912–1926, in the website of the non-profit organization, Facing History and Ourselves.

33.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 63.

34.Yoshino Sakuzō, “On the Meaning of Constitutional Government and the Methods by Which It Can Be Perfected” (Kensei No Hongi O Toite Sono Yūshū No Bi O Seisu No To O Ronzu), 1916, in Sources of Japanese Tradition, Abridged: Part 2: 1868 to 2000, compiled by Wm. Theodore DeBary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann, 2nd edition (New Yrok: Columbia University Press, 2006), 168–169.

35.Suzuki Kindai no tennō, 52. See also Herbert P. Bix, “The Politics of Good Intentions,” Chapter 4, 162, in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016).

36.From 1918–1922 and 1924–1930 the military did not yet utilize its prerogative to control the formation of the Cabinet, so in the Taishō period, most of the administrations in Japan operated largely free from military intervention. See Banjo, Junji, The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System, (Routledge, 2002). Also see Sims Richard, Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation (1868–2000), (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Young, A. Morgan, Imperial Japan 1926–1938, (Borah Press, 2007); Julia Adney Thomas, Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology (Twentieth–Century Japan), (University of California Press, 2002).

37.See Bredon Piers, The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s, (Vintage, 2002). Also see Frank Richard B., Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, (Penguin, 2001).

38.See Taisho Democracy in Japan: 1912–1926, published in Facing History and Ourselves.

39.See Masato Shizume, The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: Instability in the Financial System and the Impact of the World Depression, (Institute for Money and Economic Studies, 2009).

40.Masuda Bill Broker Bank was headquartered in Osaka and had branches in the national and regional commercial centers of Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Moji. See Tsurumi, Masayoshi [2000] “Senzen-ki ni okeru Kin’yu Kiki to Intaabanku Shijo no Henbo (Financial Crises and Changes in the Interbank Money Market during the Prewar Period),” Itoh Masanao, Masayoshi Tsurumi, and Yoshio Asai, eds., Kin’yu Kiki to Kakushin: Rekishi kara Gendai e (Financial Crises and Innovation: From History to Present), Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, Tokyo, 67–107; and Ehiro Akira [2000], “Kin’yu Kiki eno Taiou (Financial Crises and the Injection of Public Funds: Policy Responses to the Financial Crises of the 1920s), Itoh, Tsurumi, and Asai, eds., 67–107.

41.“Special loans” refer to various kinds of loans extended by the BOJ with special arrangements. They include loans exceeding a credit line per borrower, loans with extended coverage of collateral, and loans to borrowers who have no present ties to BOJ as clients. See Masato Shizume, “The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period:

Instability in the Financial System and the Impact of the World Depression," (Institute for Money and Economic Studies, 2009).

42.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 140–141. Also see Nish, Ian, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, (Praeger Publishers, 2002).

43.The High Treason Incident also known as the Kōtoku Incident was a socialist-anarchist plot to assassinate the Japanese Emperor Meiji in 1910, leading to a mass arrest of leftists, and the execution of twelve alleged conspirators in 1911. See Victoria, Brian, Zen at War, Weather hill, Inc., 1997, 38. See also Raddeker, Helen Bowen, Treacherous Women of Imperial Japan, (Routledge, 1997), 6.

CHAPTER 4

MAKE-BELIEVE GOVERNMENT

1.Shimichi Kitaoka, Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan, (MIT Press, 1990).

2.Tessa Morris-Suzuki, A History of Japan Economic Thought, (Routledge, 1998).

3.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 128.

4.Ibid., 128.

5.Ibid., 128.

6.Ibid., 148.

7.William G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945, (Oxford University Press, 1987).

8.Hirohito was considered a living god forged from a dynastic line that extended back twenty-six centuries. Children were cautioned from looking at his face as they would be blinded, and mentioning his name was considered a taboo. Herbert Bix's article "The Shōwa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility" states, "It is permissible to say that the idea that the Japanese are descendants of the gods is a false conception; but it is absolutely impermissible to call chimerical the idea that the emperor is a descendant of the gods." The emperor reinforces the notion that he is a descendant of the gods. This notion was aligned with the emperor's role as not only the "head of state" but also the highest authority of the Japanese religion, Shintoism. The emperor's prewar legitimacy rested on the notion of his descent from the sun goddess. See Patrick H. Choi, The Ambiguous Emperor: Hirohito's Role in Engaging in and Ending the Pacific War, (Harvard University Extension School, 2017), 4. Also see Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War: The Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii's Press, 1998), 3.

9.It was a fiction that he was supreme commander of the army and navy. True, he held the title, but when he attempted to exercise control, he was hamstrung, or his wishes were politely ignored. Of course, it was nothing personal. The mechanism was so rigged that the military could easily block efforts they disapproved. See Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 98.

10.See Shizume Masato, "The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: Instability in the Financial System and the Impact of the World Depression", (Institute for Money and Economic Studies, May 2009), 3.

11.Under the gold standard, the parity of one yen was equivalent to 49.845 U.S. cents and 2.0291 shillings. In November 1932, the yen hit 20 cents and 1.14 shillings. See Hugh T. Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," Morley, James William, eds., Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, (Princeton University Press, 1971),

211–266. See also Michael D. Bordo, and Hugh Rockoff, “The Gold Standard as a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,” (Journal of Economic History, 56–2, 1996), 389–428. Others, such as Nakamura, call the 1920s an “era of unbalanced growth,” for Japan, emphasizing the surge of urbanization and industrialization supported by public investment. See Takafusa Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan, (Yale University Press, 1983).

12.Minsei Party (full name: Rikken Minsei to) was originally called Kenseikai, later merged with another party to become Minsei Party in 1927. Its main policies were (i) economic austerity and industrial streamlining (free economy and small government); (ii) return to prewar gold parity; (iii) international cooperation and peaceful diplomacy especially with the United States Its support base consisted of intellectuals and urban population. Minsei means “people’s politics.”

13.Seiyukai (full name: Rikken Seiyukai) was established in 1900 by the union of leading politician (Hirobumi Ito) and a former opposition party who decided to cooperate with the government. Its main policies were (i) fiscal activism with an emphasis on public investment in rural and industrial infrastructure; (ii) acceptance of military buildup and expansion; and (iii) pleasing a narrow voter base (rural landlords and urban rich). It was a party supportive of big government allocating public money and subsidies. Seiyukai literally means “political friend society.”

14.See Gerald Iguchi, Nichirenism as Modernism: Imperialism, Fascism, and Buddhism in Modern Japan, (University of California, San Diego, 2006.) See also Edwin Lee, “Nichiren and Nationalism: The Religious Patriotism of Tanaka Chigaku,” in Monumenta Nipponica 30:1 (1975); Murakami Shigeyoshi, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1908), 19–32.

15.Tanaka (1935–36), 74–75, 82, 90, 158.

16.Christina Naylor, “Nichiren, Imperialism, and the Peace Movement,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 51

17.Tōa renmei, (1941), quoted by Nakano (1972), 85.

18.Hayashima (1965), 267

19.Quoted in Tokoro (1966), 79

20.Nakano (1972), 87).

21.Christina Naylor, “Nichiren, Imperialism, and the Peace Movement”, (Japanese Journal of Religious Studies), 53–54.

22.Beers, 686.

23.The Russian Revolution of 1917 was one of the most explosive political events of the twentieth century. The violent revolution marked the end of the Romanov dynasty and centuries of Russian imperial rule. The leftist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin seized power in Russia and destroyed the tradition of tsarist rule. The Bolsheviks would later become the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

24.Mao’s vision of Communism differed from Lenin in the following sense: while Lenin held that urban workers should form the revolutionary vanguard, Mao Zedong, on the other hand, believed that Communist revolutions should gestate among the rural peasantry, who would later join with their proletariat comrades in the cities to form classless paradises.

CHAPTER 5

EMPEROR’S CLOTHES

1.See Edwin P. Hoyt, Hirohito: The Emperor and the Man, (NY: Praeger, 1992), 158.

2.Subject theoretically to the Emperor, the Supreme Command acted outside the administrative authority of the cabinet, including that of its Army and Navy minister members. Military strategies, plans, and operations were the sole prerogative of the chiefs of staff, and they need not be disclosed to anyone save the Emperor, to whom they had direct access. Cited by Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, (Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 73–74.

3.The Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, is an international conference called by the United States to limit the naval arms race and to work out security agreements in the Pacific area. It was signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. It limited the construction of battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft carriers by the signatories. See Erik Goldstein, and John H. Mauer, eds., The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor, (Taylor & Francis, 1994).

4.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 263).

5.Carl E. Dorris, Nationalists and The Nanking Incident, 1927: Sources and Impact On United States China Policy, (Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1966), 2.

6.Ibid., 2.

7.The Shōwa Financial Crisis was a financial panic in 1927, during the first year of the reign of Emperor Hirohito. It brought down the government of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō and led to the domination of the zaibatsu over the Japanese banking industry. During the crisis, thirty-seven banks throughout Japan, including the Bank of Taiwan, and the second-tier zaibatsu Suzuki Shoten, would go bankrupt. Prime Minister Wakatsuki attempted to have an emergency decree issued to allow the Bank of Japan to extend emergency loans to save these banks, but his request was denied by the Privy Council and he was forced to resign. See Michael Smitka, The Interwar Economy of Japan: Colonialism, Depression, and Recovery, 1910–1940, (Routledge, 1998). See also Kozo Yamamura, The Economic Emergence of Modern Japan, (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

8.On December 28, 1928, Shirakawa reported to the emperor that the army would investigate Zhang Zuolin death but made no mention of a court-martial. See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 216.

9.Ibid., 216.

10.Ibid., 2016, 217.

11.Hamaguchi joined the Rikken Dōshikai political party led by Katō Takaaki in 1915, which became the Kenseikai in 1916. In 1927, Hamaguchi became the chairman of the new Rikken Minseitō political party formed by the merger of the Kenseikai and the Seiyūhontō. See Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). See also Buruma, Ian, “Inventing Japan: 1853–1964”, rep. ed. (Modern Library, 2004).

12.As with many modern-day troubled societies, scrutiny might reveal these military-patriotic value linkages as contrivances, bolstered by fake reasoning, benefiting the narrow interests of elites, not the population. Even closer scrutiny might reveal the early signs of empire doom.

13.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill Book, 1986), 101–102.

14.Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, (Princeton University Press, 1987). See also William Finch Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980).

15.Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

16.The Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, commonly known as the London Naval Treaty, was an agreement between Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy and the United States, signed on 22 April 1930. It regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. The terms of the treaty were an extension of

the conditions agreed in the Washington Naval Treaty, an effort to prevent a naval arms race after World War I. Under the treaty, the standard displacement of submarines was restricted to 2,000 tons, with each major power being allowed to keep three submarines of up to 2,800 tons and France one. The number of heavy cruisers was limited: Britain was permitted 15 with a total tonnage of 147,000, the U.S. 18 totaling 180,000, and the Japanese 12 totaling 108,000 tons. For light cruisers, no numbers were specified but tonnage limits were 143,500 tons for the U.S., 192,200 tons for the British, and 100,450 tons for the Japanese. (See John Maurer and Christopher Bell, At the Crossroads between Peace and War: the London Naval Conference in 1930, (Naval Institute Press, 2014).

17.While in the opposition during the Minseitō-dominated cabinet of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, the Seiyūkai attacked the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 as against Article 11 of the Meiji constitution, which stipulated the independence of the military from civilian control. See David S. Spencer, “Some Thoughts on the Political Development of the Japanese People,” The Journal of International Relations, January 1920, 325.

18.Treaty Series, vol. 25, 202–227. Bix, “The Politics of Good Intentions,” Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 208; Gordon M. Berger, “Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945” in Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 6, The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 105–6.

19.Herbert P. Bix, “A Political Monarch Emerges,” (HarperCollins, 2016), 209.

20.Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan, (University of California Press, 2006).

21.“Though the Hamaguchi Cabinet successfully managed to get the Privy Council to deliberate on and approve the London Naval Treaty, a young right winger named Sagoya Tomeo, who was enraged over the alleged usurpation of the Emperor’s prerogative of supreme command, shot Hamaguchi on November 14, 1930. The Prime Minister survived the shooting but was wounded seriously, so the Cabinet participated in the 59th session sans Hamaguchi, with Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro chosen as acting Prime Minister. The Seiyukai, however, condemned the Government on the grounds that Prime Minister Hamaguchi was absent from the Diet proceedings and that Shidehara was not in fact a party member.” From Modern Japan in archives: Political history from the opening of the country to post-war, 3–18, “Shooting of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi,” March 18, 1931 (Shōwa 6) Papers of OKI Misao, #183 National Diet Library. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, 2016), 210—211.

22.Ibid., 209.

23.“The lack of exchange rate stability constitutes an impediment to trade. But the lack of enough gold reserves leaves government intervention as the only means of stabilizing exchange rates at low levels. Thus, in July 1932, the Japanese government enacted the Capital Flight Prevention Law, restricting inflows and outflows of capital, and began in November 1932 to impose measures to prevent the yen’s further depreciation, placing exchange transactions under nearly total control of the government.” See Akita Shigeru and Nicholas J. White, The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s, (Routledge, 2010).

24.After the Wanpaoshan Incident and the execution of Capt. Shintaro Nakamura in the Hinganling mountain range by Chinese soldiers, came the shocking incident called the Mukden Incident that occurred on the night of September 18, 1931. Japanese troops in the Kwantung Army invaded south Manchuria. On October 8, 1931, the Kwantung Army bombed Chinchow, the headquarters of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. At the end of 1932, the staff of the Kwantung Army planned further moves into the Chinese provinces, invading south of Manchukuo. In the first few weeks of 1933, they added Jehol to Manchukuo. The Chinese authorities intervened near the League of Nations and requested the help of the international community. The League of Nations demanded withdrawal of Japanese troops. The Kwantung Army ignored the League. See Yamamuro Shinichi, Manchria Under Japanese Dominion, Translated by Joshua A. Fogel, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 10–13, 21–23. See also Leslie Alan Horvitz & Christopher Catherwood, Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide, (Facts on File, 2011), 128.

CHAPTER 6

INTO MANCHURIA

1.The Treaty of Portsmouth ended the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905 after negotiations lasting from August 6 to August 30, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, United States. See De Martens, F., "The Portsmouth Peace Conference, 1905," The North American Review, 181—558. Also see Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy, (Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1969).

2."… Japan was at the forefront of hegemonic wars in a quest to extend the Japanese hegemony over Korea to the entire Asia-Pacific region – the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to gain dominance in Korea." The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2; "A new balance of power had emerged. China's millennia-long regional dominance had abruptly ended. Japan had become the pre-eminent power of Asia, a position it would retain throughout the twentieth century." S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy, (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

3.A warlord of Manchuria from 1916 to 1928 who rose from banditry to power and influence. Backed by Japan, Zhang Zuolin successfully influenced politics in the Republic of China during the early 1920s. He invaded China proper in October 1924 during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War and gained control of Peking. See Chi Man Kwan g, War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria, (Bill, 2017), 83. Also see Nathan Carl F. Plague prevention and politics in Manchuria 1910–1931, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 66.

4.Zhang was defeated by the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek in May 1928. Leaving Beijing in early June to return to Manchuria, he was killed by a bomb planted by infuriated Kwantung officers on June 4, 1928. See Death of Chang Tso-lin, Manchuria War Lord, Rumored in Peking: Once a Bandit Chief, (The New York Times, 1925-08-17).

5.Zhang Xueliang was the effective ruler of Northeast China and much of Northern China after the assassination of his father, Zhang Zuolin, on June 4, 1928. An instigator of the 1936 Xi'an Incident, he spent over 50 years under house arrest, first in mainland China and then in Taiwan. He is regarded by the Chinese Communist Party as a patriotic hero for his role in the Xi'an Incident. Chang died in Hawaii in 2001 at the age of 100. See Itoh Mayumi, The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang, Springer, 2016. See also Shai Aron, Zhang Xueliang: The General Who Never Fought, Springer, 2012.

6.See Yoshihisa Tak, Matsusaka. The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932, (Harvard University Asia Center, 2003). See also Shin'ichi Yamamuro, "Manshūkoku no Hou to Seiji: Josetsu," The Zinbun Gakuhō: Journal of Humanities, 1991; Sin'ichi Yamamuro, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, Translated by Joshua A. (Fogel University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 10–13, 21–23.

7.The Mukden Incident, or Manchurian Incident, was an event staged by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion in 1931 of northeastern China, known as Manchuria. Invading Manchuria represented an economic "opportunity" to save Japan from the effects of the Great Depression. See Roger J. Spiller, An Instinct for War: Scenes from the battlefields of history, Harvard University Press, 315. Also see Ferrell, Robert H., "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19–1931." Journal of Modern History, (University of Chicago Press, March 1955), 27 (1): 66–72.

8.See Guide to a Microfilm edition of the Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson in the Yale University Library. The diaries are most detailed during those years that Stimson held public office, as secretary of war under President William Howard Taft (1911–1913), colonel of field artillery with the American Expeditionary Force in France (1917–1918), special envoy of President Calvin Coolidge to Nicaragua (1927), governor general of the Philippine Islands (1928–1929), secretary of state under President Herbert Hoover (1929–1933), and secretary of war under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (1940–1945).

9.Leslie Alan Horvitz and Christopher Catherwood, Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide. Facts on File (2011), 128; Shin'ichi Yamamuri, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, translate by Joshua A. Fogel, (University of Pennsylvania, Press, 2006), 10–13, 21–23; Robert H. Ferrel, "The Mukden Incident," (September 18–19, 1931), March 1955.

10.James Weland, "Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931," 1994, 445–460.

11.Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 235. See also Eguchi Keiichi, Jūgonen sensō shōshi, shinpan (Aoki Shoten, 1991), 36–37.

12.In 1930, Stimson was the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930. He was also the chairman of the U.S. delegation to World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. In 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, Stimson, as secretary of state, proclaimed the "Stimson Doctrine". It said no fruits of illegal aggression would ever be recognized by the United States. See Henry Lewis Stimson, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Retrieved January 5, 2017. See also Henry L. Stimson, The First Wise Man. (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc. 2001).

13.See Nish Ian Hill, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, (Greenwood Publishing Group), 75.

14.In October 1931, Shidehara was featured on the cover of Time with the caption "Japan's Man of Peace and War."

15.Hatano, "Manshū jihen to 'kyūchū seiryoku,"114, citing "Nara nikki," Sept. 21, 1931. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 239.

16.Ibid., 239–240.

17."Nara Takeji jijūbukanchō nikki (shō)," in Chūō kōron (Sept. 1990), 340–41. See also Bix, 239.

18.See William Christopher James, Conflict in the Far East, (Brill Archive), 274–275.

19.Ostrower, Collective Insecurity, 94–96. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 242.

20.Edwin P. Hoyt's Notes in Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 469, secretary of state Henry Stimson's recollection of the Manchurian crisis shows that at least this one American official was under no illusions about the direction in which Japan had begun to move. As the Mukden incident was developing, he and the Japanese ambassador, Katsuji Debuchi, were congratulating each other on the betterment of relations that had occurred in recent months, and Stimson was indicating his hope that in the new atmosphere of friendliness he could bring about U.S. repudiation of its harsh anti-Japanese immigration laws. The chances looked good. But after Mukden, there was no hope. The Stimson recollections indicate how hard he tried to show the Japanese the full extent and probable future of American disapproval of the Manchurian grab. They show how little long-range effect the disapproval by one nation of another's policy has had; just as the United States did not "lose China" at the end of World War II, so U.S. diplomacy had no real influence in stopping Japan's militarists in the 1930s. Even then, force would have been the only stopper.

21.The last Qing emperor, Henry Puyi, was brought out of retirement and made Manchukuo's ruler, but the state was controlled by the Japanese, who used it as their base for expansion into Asia. See Power Brian, Puppet Emperor: The Life of Pu Yi, Last Emperor of China, 1988.

22.The draft report presented to the Special Assembly is published in League of Nations Documents, A (Extr.) 22. 1933. VII. The report has been published by the World Peace Foundation, as "The Verdict of the League, China and Japan in Manchuria." On the Report of the Assembly of the League of Nations on the Sino-Japanese Dispute, see also Manley O. Hudson, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 2, 300–305, published by (Cambridge University Press, Apr. 1933). (The League suggested economic sanctions, but nothing was done because many countries, particularly Britain, had important trading links with Japan and did not want the League to take sanctions against this country. The League did not even stop arms sales, because it feared that this would

make Japan declare war. On Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, see Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army, (Random House, 1992), 163.

23.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill Book Company 2001), 111.

24.Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 25, 1932.

25.See Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 112, "This invitation to families to watch their sons and brothers inducted was not just a polite gesture. It was a part of General Araki's plan for the nation. The army was the vanguard; the target was the nation of Japan; the goal was to build a nation of people dedicated to denial of self, with such ardent loyalty to the Imperial Way, that the citizen would feel that dying for the emperor was a privilege."

26.These bloodthirsty statements were created by the officer corps to teach the men that death was to be expected, that there could be no honorable surrender in battle under any conditions. Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 113. See also Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters: The Army in Japanese Life, 40.

27.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 112.

28.Ibid., 113.

CHAPTER 7

INTO CHINA AGAIN

1.Manchukuo, officially the State of Manchuria prior to 1934 and the Empire of Manchuria after 1934, was a puppet state of the Empire of Japan in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia from 1932 until 1945. In 1931, the region was seized by Japan following the Mukden Incident. The Japanese initially installed Puyi as Head of State in 1932, and two years later he was declared Emperor of Manchukuo with the era name of Kangde. See Encyclopedia Britannica article on Manchukuo, Archived December 21, 2007 at the Wayback Machine. See also Yamamuro, Shinichi, Manchuria under Japanese domination: Translated by Fogel, Joshua A., (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 116–117.

2.William Stewart, Yarnell Harry Ervin (1857–1959), Admirals of the World: A Biographical Dictionary, 1500 to the Present (McFarland, 2009).

3.Japan left the League of Nations over the Mukden Incident. The Japanese claimed that at Mukden the Chinese had blown up a railway in Manchuria they had been building and invaded China. In December 1932, the League of Nations' Assembly had adopted a unanimous report (42—1, with only Japan opposing) blaming Japan for the Invasion of Manchuria. Six months later, after rounds of negotiations between the League and Japan had failed; Japan's formal resignation from the League was filed. Two nations (Costa Rica in 1925, and Brazil in 1926) had previously withdrawn from the League but Japan's departure was a major blow to the League as it was the first major power to do so. See Alex Selwyn-Holmes, "Japan withdraws from the League of Nations," June 7, 2009.

4.Marquis Kido served as Emperor Hirohito's closest advisor during Japanese Aggression into China and the waging of World War II. During the war, he kept a private diary that was subsequently used as one of the definitive sources for the prosecution against Japanese defendants. Kido claimed after the war that Hirohito was never aware of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor.

5.In September 1931, the Japanese controlled the Manchurian railway. They claimed that Chinese soldiers had sabotaged the railway and attacked the Chinese Army. In January—May 1932, they attacked and captured the city of Shanghai. After a few months, the Japanese had conquered the whole of Manchuria, and set up a Japanese-controlled state called Manchukuo, run by the former emperor of China. China appealed to the League of Nations,

which recommended that Manchuria be returned to China. Instead of pulling out of Manchuria, Japan walked out of the League. In 1933, the Japanese troops invaded Jehol, the Chinese province next to Manchuria.

6.“In acknowledging receipt of this telegram, Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, recited the paragraph of the Covenant referred to and promised “to communicate immediately the telegram from the Japanese government together with his reply to the members of the League. Since it was by no means certain that Japan had fulfilled “all its international obligations and all its obligations under the Covenant” by March 27, 1935, it could not be assumed that Japan ceased to be a member of the League on that date,” Cited by Quincy Wright, Professor of International Law in the University of Chicago, in an article: “The Effect of Withdrawal from the League Upon a Mandate.” See on this question Josephine J. Burns, “Conditions of Withdrawal from the League of Nations,” American Journal of International Law, vol. XXIX (1925), 40–50. See also League of Nations, Monthly Summary, March 1933, Vol. XIII, 84–85.

7.The Great Wall built by different dynasties represented a series of fortification systems to protect and consolidate territories of China against various nomadic groups. The most well-known sections of the wall were built by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The entire wall with all its branch’s measures 21,196 km (13,171 mi). The Great Wall is generally recognized “as one of the most impressive architectural feats in history.” See William Lindesay, The Great Wall Revisited: From the Jade Gate to Old Dragon’s Head, (Harvard University Press, 2008).

8.Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919–1933, (Oxford University Press, 2005).

9.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 279.

10.Ibid., 312.

11.The Anti-Comintern Pact was an agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan, that they would work together to stop the spread of Communism around the globe. On November 1, 1936, a week after Hitler and Mussolini signed a treaty of friendship, the two dictators announced a Rome-Berlin Axis, showing their common interest in destabilizing the European order. Almost three weeks later, on November 25, 1936, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan signed the “Anti-Comintern Pact” against the Soviet Union. Italy joined the pact on November 6, 1937. The agreement would become known as the Axis Alliance or Axis Powers. See William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (Simon & Schuster, 1960); Carl Boyd, “The Role of Hiroshi Ōshima in the Preparation of the Anti-Comintern Pact,” Journal of Asian History, (1977). 11 (1): 49–71; Ken Ishida, Japan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite Alliance, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940, (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

12.The Pacific War Council was formed in Washington on April 1, 1942, with a membership consisting of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, his key adviser, Harry Hopkins, and representatives from Britain, China, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Canada. Representatives from India and the Philippines were later added. See Pacific War Council Documents at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Museum and Library.

13.John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. (Pantheon, 1987). See also McLynn, The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945, 1.

14.Kobayashi Hideo, “Ryūjokō jiken o megutte: Ryūjokō jiken rokujussūnen ni yosete,” in Rekishigaku kenkyū 699 (July 1997), 30–35. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 318.

15.Ibid., 239.

16.Nine days after the incident, on July 16, 1937, Lt. Gen. Kanichirō Tashiro was hospitalized for heart illness and died in Tianjin.

17.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 319.

18.Harada nikki, dai rokkan, 30. Cited by Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarpersCollins, 319).

19.Ibid., 319.

20.The rules protecting prisoners of war (POWs) are specific and were first detailed in the 1929 Geneva Convention. They were refined in the third 1949 Geneva Convention that provides a wide range of protection for prisoners of war. Both conventions define the rights of prisoners of war and set down detailed rules for their treatment and eventual release. See Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, July 27, 1929. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (1929).

21.While Asians, the Japanese saw themselves as less representatives of Asia than Asian's champion. They sought to liberate Asian colonies from the Westerners, whom they disdained. But although the Japanese were initially welcomed in some Asian colonies by the indigenous populations whom they "liberated" from European domination, the arrogance and racial prejudice displayed by the Japanese military governments in these nations created great resentment. This resentment is still evident in some Southeast Asian nations. From the article: "Japan's Quest for Power and World War II in Asia," (Columbia University, 2009). See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 280. "Although racial intolerance and bigotry never became a state policy as in Nazified, anti-Semitic Germany, racial discrimination against other Asians was habitual for many twentieth-centuries Japanese, having begun around the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, with the start of Japanese colonialism."

22.Andrew C. Isenberg, Thomas Richards, Jr. "Alternative Wests Rethinking Manifest Destiny", (Pacific Historical Review, vol. 86 no. 1, February 2017), 4–17.

23.Harries M, Harries S. Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Army, (New York: Random House, 1991), 142–154.

24.SL. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan, A Political Biography, (London: Routledge, 1992), 50–52, 60–75. See also Sheldon H. Harris, "Japanese Biomedical Experimentation during the World-War-II Era," (OAC, Online Archive of California).

25.The Shōwa era is a period of Japanese history that refers to Emperor Hirohito's reign from 1926 to his death in 1989. It was preceded by the Taishō period. The Shōwa era was longer than the reign of any previous Japanese emperor. On January 7, 1989, Crown Prince Akihito succeeded to the Chrysanthemum Throne upon the death of his father Hirohito. See Louis-Frederic Nussbaum, "Shōwa in Japan Encyclopedia," (2005), 188.

26.The Battle of Taiyan was a major battle fought in 1937 between China and Japan named for Taiyan (the capital of Shanxi province). See Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-Kai, History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), 1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung, Chung Wu Publishing, 33, (140th Lane Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China, 2005), 195—200.

27.Gen. Li Tsung-jen was chief leader of the "Kwangsi clique," victorious at Taierzhuang in 1938 during the Sino-Japanese War, elected vice-president of the Republic of China on April 29, 1948, acting president from January 24, 1949 to March 1, 1950. On Li Tsung-jen, see The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jeng, by TE-KONG TONG and LI TSUNG-JEN. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; Folkestone: Dawson, 1997).

28.From 1936 to 1937, Doihara was the commander of the 1st Depot Division in Japan until the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. He served in the Beiping-Hankou Railway Operation and the campaign of Northern and Eastern Henan, where his division opposed the Chinese counterattack in the Battle of Lanfeng. After the Battle of Lanfeng, he was attached to the army general staff as head of the Doihara Special Agency until 1939 when he was given command of the Japanese 5th Army, in Manchukuo under the overall control of the Kwantung Army. After the occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese secret service, under his supervision, soon turned Manchukuo into a vast criminal enterprise in which rape, child molestation, sexual humiliation, sadism, assault, and murder became an institutionalized means of terrorizing and controlling Manchuria's Chinese and Russian populations. In 1940, he became a member of the Supreme War Council that shifted its military policy in China to what was called the Three Alls ("Kill all, –burn all, – loot all"). On November 4, 1941, as a general in the Japanese Army Air Force and a member of the Supreme War Council, he voted the approval of the attack on Pearl Harbor. From 1940 to 1941, he was appointed commandant of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy. He then became head of the Army

Aeronautical Department of the Ministry of War, and Inspector-General of Army Aviation until 1943. In 1943, Doihara was nominated Commander in chief of the Eastern District Army. In 1944, he was appointed the governor of Johor State, Malaya, and commander in chief of the Japanese Seventh Area Army in Singapore until 1945. At the time of the surrender of Japan in 1945, Doihara was commander in chief of the First General Army. After the surrender of Japan, he was arrested and tried before the International Military Tribunal of the Far East as a class A war criminal with other members of the Manchurian administration responsible for the Japanese policies there. He was found guilty on counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, and 54 and was sentenced to death. He was hanged on December 23, 1948, at Sugamo Prison. On criminal enterprise by Doihara, see Ronald Sydney Seth, Encyclopedia of Espionage, (Doubleday, 1974), 313, 315. See also Leslie Alan Horvitz and Christopher Catherwood, Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide, 127, 128.

29.The last Qing emperor, Henry Puyi, was brought out of retirement and made Manchukuo's ruler, but the state was controlled by the Japanese, who used it as their base for expansion into Asia. See Brian Power, Puppet Emperor: The Life of PuYi, Last Emperor of China, (Universe Pub, 1988).

30.In late 1937, over a period of six weeks, the Imperial Japanese Army forces brutally murdered hundreds of thousands of people in the Chinese city of Nanking (Nanjing). The horrific events are known as the Nanking Massacre or the Rape of Nanking where between 50,000 to 80,000 women were sexually assaulted. There are no official numbers for the death toll in the Nanking Massacre, though estimates range from 200,000 to 300,000 people. Soon after the end of the war, Matsui and his lieutenant Hisao Tani, were tried and convicted for war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and were executed. See Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 6. Also, see Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, 2000, 46–48. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the "Rape of Nanking," (Oxford University Press, 2006), 157–158.

31.Herald [NSW: 1842–1954], page 12, /JAPANESE PLAN.

32.Dōmei News Agency was the official news agency of the Empire of Japan. During World War II, Dōmei News Agency came under the control of the Ministry of Communications. The agency collected news and information from various sources to pass on to the government and military and produced various works of propaganda aimed at foreign countries. Under the Allied occupation of Japan Dōmei was disbanded, and its functions divided split between Kyodo News and Jiji Press in 1945 following the end of World War II.

33.Millard was the Shanghai correspondent for the New York Times from 1925. See John Maxwell Hamilton, Edgar Snow: A Biography (LSU Press, 2003): xvi. See also French Paul and Carl Crow: A Tough Old China Hand: The Life, Times and Adventures of an American in Shanghai (Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 18.

34.Australian Associated Press (AAP) is an Australian news agency. It was established by Keith Murdoch in 1935.

35.Eric Pace, "Tillman Durdin, 91, Reporter in China during World War II, (The New York Times, 1998–07–09).

36.Gaimushō hensan, Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi shuyō bunsho, ge (Hara Shobō, 1969), 366.

37.U.S. Department, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1939—1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), 44–52.

38.Ibid., 44–52.

39.U.S. Department, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1939–1941, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), 44–52.

40.Ibid., 44-52.

41.Ibid., 44–52.

42.Lyman van Slyke, The China White Paper, (Stanford University Press, 1967), 10. See also "Japanese Attack on China," (Mount Holyoke University, 2011).

43.Quoted on U.S. Department, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1939–1941.

44.Ibid., 44–52.

45.Ibid., 44–52.

46.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 334.

47.TWCT, vol. 20: Judgment and Annexes, transcript 49, 608. See also Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials, (The University Press of Kentucky, 2001); and Tanaka Yuki, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II, 1996.

48.Kasahara, Nankin jiken, 164, citing the Nankin senshi shiryōshū II. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 739.

49.Kasahara, Nitchū zenmen sensō to Kaigun, 302; see also Bix, 340.

50.Cited in Herbert P. Bix note (68), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 739, “The USS Panay, built in Shanghai in 1928 and named after the island of Panay in the American colony of the Philippines, was one of three gun boats of the American Asiatic Fleet’s “Yangtze Patrol.” Its “right” to navigate the river and protect American lives and property derived from the 1860 Treaty of Peking, which ended the second Opium War. For details, see Kasahara, Nitchū zenmen sensō to kaigun, 22.”

51.Francis Pike, Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury Publishers, 2016), 89.

52.Hiroshi Saitō was the Japanese ambassador to the United States from 1934 to 1939. He took part in Japan’s 1934 renunciation of the Washington Naval Treaty. He was a partisan to maintain good relations with the U.S., even as further international condemnation of Japan for the invasion of Manchuria. He was the interlocutor of Prime Minister Konoe during the negotiation based on the USS Panay incident. For more information see Sterling Fisher, Jr., “JAPAN’S ‘AMERICAN DIPLOMAT’ IN ACTION; Hiroshi Saito, Trained in the Ways of This Country, Has Taken the Initiative in Clearing Up Many Old Issues, (The New York Times Magazine, March 4, 1934).

53.Ibid., 739, 344.

54.Yamada, Daigensui Shōwa tennō, 84, citing Harada nikki, dai rokkan, 207. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi shinbun (evening edition), Jan. 12, 1938, carried the banner headlines: HISTORICAL IMPERIAL CONFERENCE HELD, EMPIRE’S UNSHAKEABLE POLICY DECIDED, HOPE TO ERADICATE ANTI-JAPANESE REGIME AND STRIVE TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE ORIENT. The Tokyo Asahi shinbun’s announcement described the seating arrangements and the layout of the conference room.

55.Fujiwara, Shōwa tennō nojugonen senso, 97; cited also by Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 345.

56.Ibid., 345.

57.Courtney Browne, Tojo the Last Banzai, (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1998), 28.

58.The Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, is an international conference called by the United States to limit the naval arms race and to work out security agreements in the Pacific area. It was signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. It limited the construction of battlefields, battlecruisers, and aircrafts carriers by the signatories. The treaty was concluded on February 6, 1922. Ratifications of that treaty were exchanged in Washington on August 17, 1923, and it was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on April 16, 1924. See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 25, 202–227.

59.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 349.

60.Ibid., 349

61.Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Kusa no ne fuashizumu: Nihon minshū no sensō taiken (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai), 1991), 27. Tacked on to the three principles was a statement that Japan would not insist on territory or reparations, would respect China's sovereignty, abolish extraterritoriality, and give positive consideration to returning its concessions in China. Cited by Bix, in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, notes 98, 740.

62.Edwin P. Hoyt, Hirohito: The Emperor and The Man, (Praeger Publishers, 1992), 115.

63.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 350.

64.On May 22, 1939, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany represented by foreign ministers Galeazzo Ciano and von Ribbentrop signed the Pact of Steel. The Pact of Steel, known formally as the Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy, was a military and political alliance between Italy and Germany. The pact consisted of two parts. The first section was an open declaration of continuing trust and cooperation between Germany and Italy while the second, a "Secret Supplementary Protocol," encouraged a union of policies concerning the military and economy. See Santi Cowaja, Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings, (Enigma Books, 2013).

65.U.S. Department, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1939–1941, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), 87–97.

66.Gordon M. Berger, Japan Young Prince, Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career 1916–1931, (Monumenta Nipponica, 1974), 29 (4): 475.

67.Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to infamy (New York: Vintage Book, 2013), 124.

68.Edwin P. Hoyt, Hirohito The Emperor and The Man, (Praeger Publishers, 1992), 122.

69.Hakkō ichiu, "eight crown cords, one roof" i.e. "all the world under one roof" was a Japanese political slogan that became popular from the Second Sino-Japanese War to World War II, and was popularized in a speech by Prime Minister of Japan Fumimaro Konoe on January 8, 1940. See Edwards Walter, "Forging Tradition for a Holy War: The Hakkō Ichiu Tower in Miyazaki and Japanese Wartime Ideology." Journal of Japanese Studies 29:2, 2003. See also Brownlee John, Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600-1945: The Age of the Gods and Emperor Jimmu, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997).

70.Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to infamy (New York: Vintage Book, 2013), 54.

71.Ibid., 26.

72.Ibid., 27–28.

73.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 445.

74.Ibid., 320.

75.Before becoming prime minister, Tōjō was among the most popular voice for preventive war against the United States during deliberations leading to the Attack on Pearl Harbor. He served as Prime Minister of Japan and President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for most of the World War II. See Browne Courtney, Tojo: The Last Banzai, (Angus & Robertson, 1967), 170–171.

76.In 1941, Great Britain had 425 tankers (aggregate 3 million tons), the United States had 389 tankers (aggregate 2.8 million tons), while Japan had just 49 tankers with an aggregate tonnage of 0.6 million tons. At the start of 1941, Japan needed to import 85 percent of its crude oil with the remainder accounted for by lower quality synthetic production. Most of Japan's imported oil came from Standard Oil of California (SOCAL, later renamed Chevron). See Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2015), 147.

77.The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) broke out after Japanese troops invaded the Chinese mainland. Almost a half million Japanese troops moved against Shanghai, Nanjing, and other locations in China. In late 1937, the nationalist government was forced to retreat from its capital, Nanjing, to Chongqing in Western China. The war came to an end in August 1945, after the United States detonated nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. Russian troops invaded from the north and suppressed Japanese forces in Manchuria. See Hsu Long-hsuen, “History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945),” (Taipei, 1972). See also Michael Clodfelter, “Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference,” vol. 2, 956.

CHAPTER 8

SNEAK ATTACK

1.Ugaki Matome, Facing Victory: The Dairy of Ugaki Matome, 1941–1945, (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991).

2.Francis Pike, Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War, 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), in Plan Orange and MacArthur’s Philippines Debacle, 208–216.

3.David Black, In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, (Perth: Paradigm, Books, Curtin University, 1995).

4.John Brown, “Holding New Guinea: A First Defeat for Japan’s Land Forces,” (Warfare History Network).

5.As naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison said: “The oil embargo and assets-freezing order of July 26, 1941, made war with Japan inevitable unless one of the two things happened, and neither was humanly possible. The United States might reverse its foreign policy, restore trade relations and acquiesce in further Japanese conquests; or the Japanese government might persuade its army at least to prepare to evacuate China and renounce the southward advance [which would surely] have been disregard by an Army which, as the facts show, would accept no compromise that did not place America in the ignominious role of collaborating with conquest.” See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 3, (Naval Institute Press, 2010), 63.

6.In November 1939, the Japanese landed on the coast of Guangxi and captured Nanning. The Japanese successfully cut off Chongqing from the ocean, blocking Indochina, the Burma Road and The Hump the only ways to send aid to China. By November 1940, Japanese forces had evacuated from Guangxi. See Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) Second ed., Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung, (Chung Wu Publishing, 1971), Taiwan, 311–318.

7.The “Axis powers” formally took the name after the Tripartite Pact was signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan on September 27, 1940, in Berlin. The pact was subsequently joined by Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Slovakia (November 24, 1940), and Bulgaria (March 1, 1941. See Holger H. Herwig, “Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II, 2002. Also see R. L. DiNardo “The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II, (The Journal of Military History, 1996).

8.The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed between the Soviet Union and Japan two years after the war between USSR and Japan in China. The treaty called for the two nations to observe neutrality when any one of the two signing nations was invaded by a third nation. See Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy,” 365. Also, see Boris Nikolaevich Slavinsky, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941–1945, (Psychology Press, 2004), 103.

9.Before becoming Japan’s prime minister, Tōjō was among the most outspoken proponents for preventive war against the United States during deliberations leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite saying he favored peace, Tōjō had often declared at cabinet meetings that any withdrawal from French Indochina and/or China would be damaging to military morale and might threaten the kokutai; the “China Incident” could not be resolved via diplomacy and required a military solution; and attempting to compromise with the Americans would be seen as weakness by them. The emperor would one day, down the long bloody road of World War II, praise Tōjō for

serving him loyally while saying of Konoe, who had tried to prevent war with the United States, that he lacked "firm beliefs and courage." See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 419, 420. See also Youli Sun, China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–1941 (St Martin Press, 1993), 92–95.

10.Pearl Harbor has become one of the most exhaustively examined and debated single events in the United States history –more so than the assassination of President John F. Kennedy or the Watergate political scandal. – The documents from eight official commissions, courts, boards, inquiries, or investigations conducted from December 1941 through May 1946 fill 23 volumes, 40 parts, and 25,000 closely printed pages. The personal archive of Adm. Husband E. Kimmel amounts to another 35,000 pages in typescript, some of it duplicative. More than 140 books and innumerable articles have been written on the subject. "Defeat cries out for explanation; whereas success, like charity, covers a multiple of sins." Alfred Thayer Mahan. See also notes in Michael Gannon's book, "Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack, (Henry Holt and Company, Publishers, 2001), 283."

11.In a newly released memo written in 1941 by Japanese vice Interior Minister Michio Yuzawa, we can read: Early on the morning of December 7, just hours before the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor, I (Yuzawa) attended a meeting with Tōjō and his top aides. Tōjō has just briefed the emperor, and he seemed quite happy with the results. The emperor had heard the plans for the attack and approved. "The emperor seemed at ease and unshakable once he had made a decision," Yuzawa quotes Tōjō as saying: "If His Majesty had any regret over negotiations with Britain and the U.S., he would have looked somewhat grim." But that hadn't happened. "There was no such indication, which must be a result of his determination," Tōjō says in the Yuzawa memo." "I'm completely relieved. Given the current conditions, I could say we have practically won already." Quoted on "Launching the War? Hirohito and Pearl Harbor," (The National WWII Museum, December 6, 2008), by Robert Citino, Executive Director of the Institute for the Study of War and Democracy and the Samuel Zemurray Stone Senior Historian.

12.Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack, (Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 111.

13.Togo was appointed ambassador in Nazi Germany, in 1937. The following year he was transferred to become ambassador in the Soviet Union. See Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan (Translation of Jidai No Ichimen) (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956). Translated by Ben Bruce Blakeney and Fumihiko Togo. Togo's memoirs.

14.NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 5, Statement of Evidence, (Japanese Diplomatic Dispatches), 332–33. Neither of these two messages was sent to Kimmel or Short. Also cited by Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack, (Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 111.

15.Quoted in Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 276.

16.Quoted in ibid., 277.

17.Tanaka, Dokyumento Shōwa tennō, dai nikan, kaisen, (Ryokufū Shuppan, 1988), 265. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 424.

18.Ike Nobutake, trans. and ed., Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford University Press, 1967), 204; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), 155; Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 425.

19.The Hull note (named after Secretary of State Cordell Hull) was described by Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo as "obnoxious," unreasonable," a "marked retrogression from earlier understanding," and wholly in disregard of the negotiations that had been carried out over the preceding six months. The note was delivered on November 26, 1941. It was considered as an ultimatum for Japan to withdraw from China and other occupied territories and was perceived by the Japanese government as a casus belli (literally, "an occasion of war."). See William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940–1941, highly detailed semi-official US government history, 871–901. Also see Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981); Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986); and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988).

This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.

20.See Capt. Taussig Jr. Joseph., U.S. Navy (Ret.), "A Tactical View of Pearl Harbor," Paul Stillwell, ed., Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1981). See also Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Capt. Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello, "And I was There:" Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985).

21.Yoshida, Nihonjin no sensōkan, 178–79; Senshi sōsho: Rikukaigun nenpyō, fu-heigo, yōgo no kaisetsu (1980) 85.

22.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 426.

23.On January 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku wrote a letter to his nation's Navy Minister, Admiral Oikawa Koshiro. Yamamoto divided the scheme of his text into five sections, entitled: "Preparations for War," "Training," "Operational Policy," "A Plan of Operations to Be Followed at the Outset of Hostilities," and "Personnel." On the margin of the first page, in red ink, he brushed: "For the eyes of the Minister alone: to be burned without showing to anyone else." See Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, translated by John Bester (Tokyo, New York: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979), 220. Oikawa may have burned Yamamoto's letter, as requested. But a copy, in a sealed envelope, was left by Yamamoto with an academy classmate, Vice Admiral Hori Teikichi, who made the document public on November 9, 1949. See Professor Jun Tsunoda, (Kokushikan University, Tokyo), and Admiral Kazutomi Uchida, JMSDF (Ret.). "The Pearl Harbor Attack: Admiral Yamamoto's Fundamental Concept," Naval War College Review, vol. XXXI, no. 2 (fall 1978), 83–88. See also Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, (Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 38.

24.Even though he was opposed to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo was in command of the carrier-centered Mobile Force (Kido de Butai). The task force was made up of six carriers, two battlefields, three cruisers, and nine destroyers. From 1937 to 1938, Nagumo was in command of the Torpedo School, and from 1938 to 1939; he was commander of the Third Cruiser Division. Nagumo was promoted to vice admiral on November 15, 1939. There were 1,178 people wounded in the attack. See Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, IJN, (1886–1944; Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945, (Naval Institute Press, 1978). See also Hatsue Shinohara, "An Intellectual Foundation for the Road to Pearl Harbor: Quincy Wright and Tachi Sakutarō." Paper presented at the Conference on the United States and Japan in World War II, (Hofstra University, December 1991).

25.On Admiral Yamamoto, see Mark Stille, Yamamoto Isoroku, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012).

26.Did the Japanese bombers reach Pearl Harbor undetected? "The Japanese Carrier Fleet set sail in secrecy; radio silence; and flags signal are to be used between our fleet in order to avoid detection and sail north to the Aleutian Islands, then south to Pearl Harbor." There were the orders given to the Japanese fleet. However, according to the facts and documents, they were detected. At the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point. This post had been in training mode for months but was not yet operational. The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard, reported a target. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. More than that, the Japanese fleet traveled from northern Japan by a route used by commercial ships and benefited from bad weather along the way, reducing their odds of been seen and reported. On December 20, 1941, at Hickam Field, Lt. Col. Mollison gave an affidavit that included this language: "As this [sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake] would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans officer, which was substantially as follows: Admiral Kimmel: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu. Captain McMorris: I should say no Admiral [emphasis in the original]." In 1981, Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton (Ret.), a (lieutenant commander in 1941), gave a more extended version of McMorris's reply: "Kimmel then sent for Captain Charles H. McMorris, his head of war plans, and I can still almost quote what he said: 'Soc…, Layton here and I have been discussing the chances of the Japanese making an attack on us here.' And McMorris replied, 'What's that?' We were discussing something that was written in Japanese about a Japanese carrier task force making a strike on Pearl Harbor. Do you think there would be a chance of that?" McMorris answered him, "Well, maybe they would; maybe they would, but I don't think so. Nope. Based on my studies, it is my considered opinion that there are too many risks involved for

the Japanese to involve themselves in this kind of an operation.' "Layton, "Admiral Kimmel Deserved a Better Fate," Paul Stillwell, ed., Air Raid: Pearl Harbor, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 279.

27.Samuel E. Morison, Rising Sun, 63, n. 37. In placing on oil exports Roosevelt intended to permit low-grade gasoline for civilian and commercial purposes to continue flowing at 1936 levels, and so informed Ambassador Nomura. However, Secretary Ickes and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson enveloped the flow in so much red tape that the embargo became total. See John Costello, Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill – The Shocking Truth Revealed (New York: Pocket Books, 1994), 57.

28.See Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Boston Little Brown & Co., 1890. Also see Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, The True Story of a Man and A Nation Under Attack, (Henry Holt and Company, LLC Publishers, 2001). According to Gannon notes, in Pearl Harbor Betrayed, 283, Pearl Harbor has become one of the most exhaustively examined and debated single events in United States history – more than the assassination of President John F. Kennedy or the Watergate political scandal. The documents from eight official commissions, courts, boards, inquiries, or investigations conducted from December 1941 through May 1946 fill 23 volumes, 40 parts, and 25,000 closely printed pages. The personal archive of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel amounts to another 35,000 pages in typescript, some of it duplicative. More than 140 books and innumerable articles have been written on the subject.

29.Though Hideki Tōjō wasn't the man who orchestrated the attack on Pearl Harbor, and still required the emperor's approval before going ahead with the plan, he's often credited as the official who ordered it. See Courtney Browne, Tōjō: The Last Banzai, (Angus & Robertson, 1967), 170–171. Also, see Edwin Palmer Hoyt, Warlord: Tōjō against the World, (Scarborough House, 1933); Ben Ani Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, (Oxford University Press, 1981), 62–63.

30.By December 7, 1941, the U.S. Pacific Fleet consisted of nine battleships, three aircraft carriers, twelve heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, sixty-seven destroyers, and twenty-seven submarines. An advance force named the Asiatic Fleet and commanded by Adm. Thomas C. Hart, USN, was based at Manila, in the Philippines. It consisted of three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and twenty-nine submarines. British, Dutch, and Free French naval forces in the South Pacific consisted of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, eleven light cruisers, twenty destroyers, and thirteen submarines. The Japanese Combined Fleet consisted of ten battleships, ten carriers, eighteen heavy cruisers, twenty light cruisers, one hundred and twelve destroyers, and sixty-five submarines. See Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, (Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 289.

31.Marquis Koichi Kidō was the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Japanese Emperor Hirohito during World War II. While not a member of the government, Kidō was Hirohito's closest adviser. He was also the liaison between Hirohito and the government. The best known "Kido diary" is the one kept from 1930 to 1945. See "The Diary of Kido Takayoshi," vol. II: 1871–1874. Review by Robert M. Spaulding, Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 41 no. 1 (Spring 1986), 117–119. See also the Diary of Jō Eiichirō, Nomura Minoru, ed. (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1982).

32.SHŌBŌGENZŌ, THE TRUE DHARMA-EYE TREASURY, Volume I, (Taishō Volume 82, Number 2582, translated from the Japanese by Gudo Wafu Nishijima and Chodo Cross, 2007.

33.Jeffrey Record, "Japan's Decision For War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons," (The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2009).

34.Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, The True Story of a Man and a Nation Under Attack, (Henry Holt Publishers, 2001), 148.

35.Stimson was an outspoken advocate of strong opposition to Japanese aggression. Ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Stimson entered in his diary the following statement: "[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we are likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday. The Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

36.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), 180.

37.Ibid., 181.

38.Francis Pike, 181.

39.Hewitt was awarded a Navy Distinguished Service Medal as commander of the United States Eight Fleet for the last two years of the war. In 1945, he chaired a Pearl Harbor investigation. Adm. Ernest King served in the Spanish-American War. He received his first command in 1914, leading the destroyer USS Terry in the occupation of Veracruz. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, King was appointed as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet. In March 1942, he succeeded Harold Stark as Chief of Naval Operations.

40.NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 17.

41.Jeffrey Record, "Japan's Decision For War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons," (The Strategic Studies Institute, February 2009).

42.Robert P. Stinnett and Stephen Budiansky, "Truth About Pearl Harbor: A Debate," (Independent Institute, January 30, 2003.)

43.Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 277.

44.Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 148.

45.The Japanese launched the invasion by sea from Formosa over 200 miles (320 kilometers) to the north of the Philippines. The conquest of the Philippines by Japanese is often considered the worst military defeat in United States. About 23,000 American military personnel were killed or captured, while Filipino soldiers killed or captured totaled around 100,000. MacArthur was forced to abandon the Philippines island fortress of Corregidor under orders from Pres. Franklin Roosevelt in March 1942. Deeply disappointed, he issued a statement to the press and the people of the Philippines, "I Shall Return." See John T. Correll, "Caught on the Ground," (Air Force Magazine, December 2007), vol 90, no. 12, 68; Walter D. Edmunds, They Fought with What They Had, 1992, 77, 83.

46.John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese frontier in the Pacific, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 50–56.

47.The Australian naval base of Rabaul, on the islands of New Britain, was attacked by Japan on January 20, 1942. About noon on January 20, eighty-six planes from the Akagi, Kaga, Zuikaku, and Shokaku delivered heavy strikes against Rabaul, followed up on January 21 by surprise raids by 75 planes of the Zuikaku and Shokaku on Lae, Salamaua, and Madang, on the east New Guinea coast. Rabaul became a major supply base for the Japanese operations in the Pacific and one of the most heavily defended positions in the theater. Rabaul was significant because of its proximity to the Japanese territory of the Caroline Islands, site of a major Imperial Japanese Navy base on Truk. Gen. Hitoshi Imamura, headquartered at Rabaul, commanded Japan's 70th Army in the Solomons; they were reinforced by the 18th Army, tasked with defending northern New Guinea. See Bruce Gamble, Darkest Hour: The True Story of Lark Force at Rabaul – Australia's Worst Military Disaster of World War II, (St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2006). See also Kengoro Tanaka, Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater during World War II. (Tokyo: Japan Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society, 1980).

48.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), 335.

49.Ibid., 335.

CHAPTER 9

LAND AND SEA INVASIONS

1.Jeffrey Record, “Japan’s Decision For War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons,” (The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2009).

2.The Pacific was geographically the largest theater of World War II. It includes the vast Pacific Ocean Theater, the Southwest Pacific Theater, and the Southeast Asian Theater. Japan’s invasion of China began the war in the Pacific Theater. By the end of February 1942, Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), capturing Kuala, Lumpur (Malaya), the islands of Java and Bali, and British Singapore. It also attacked Burma, Sumatra, and Darvin (Australia). See Dower John William, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, (Pantheon, 1987). See also Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph 1942–45, (Yale University Press, Reprint Edition (August 28, 2012), 1, Werner Gruhl, Imperial Japan’s World War II, 1931–1945, (Transaction, 2007), 9; Williamson Murray, Allan R. Millet, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Harvard University Press, 143).

3.McMillin George, Carano (ed.), “Surrender of Guam to the Japanese,” (Guam: University of Guam, April-September 1972), 9–25.

4.Tokubetsu-keibi-tai (Imperial Japanese Army), counter-insurgency units of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Emergency Service Unit was a rapid reaction force of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department in the pre-World War II era. The Imperial Japanese Navy Keibitai (Naval Special Police) was a Navy Guards unit tasked with detaining prisoners of War (POW).

5.Rainbow 5, destined to be the basis for American strategy in World War II, assumed that the United States was allied with Britain and France and provided for offensive operations by American forces in Europe, Africa, or both. The plans developed by the Joint Planning Committee (which later became the Joint Chiefs of Staff) were officially withdrawn in 1939 in favor of Five Rainbow Plans developed to meet the threat of a two-ocean war against multiple enemies. See Spector Ronald H. (1985), Eagle against the Sun, 59. See also Miller Edward S., War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945, (Annapolis, MD: United States Institute Press, 1991); Ross Steven, U.S. War Plans: 1938–1945, (Lynne Rienner, 2002), 2.

6.Formerly, Hart had considered himself to be a friend of MacArthur, but in the lead up to the outbreak of war, their relationship had deteriorated dramatically. Hart confided to his wife before the outbreak of hostilities that “Douglas is, I think, no longer altogether sane; he may not have been for a long time.” Francis Pike, Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury, 2016), 198.

7.Pacific War: Japan’s Strategy in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica).

8.Ibid., 199.

9.Ibid., 199.

10.Ibid., 199.

11.Ibid., 199.

12.Louis Morton, “The Decision to Withdraw to Bataan,” in Greenfield, Kent Roberts (ed.), Command Decisions, (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 1960), 151–172.

13.Manila an Open City, Sunday Times, December 28, 1941. See also Manila Occupied by Japanese Forces. Sunday Morning Herald, January 3, 1942. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 445.

14.See Roger Paul P., The Good Years: MacArthur and Sutherland, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990), 160–169.

15.MacArthur returned to the Philippines with his army in late 1944. The return was not easy. The Japanese Imperial General Staff decided to make the Philippines their final line of defense, and to stop the American advance towards Japan. The kamikaze corps was created specifically to defend the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The Battle of Leyte Gulf ended in disaster for the Japanese. The campaign to liberate the Philippines

was the bloodiest campaign of the Pacific War. On MacArthur's evacuation from the Philippines, see George W., Smith, MacArthur's Escape: John "Wild Man" Bulkeley and the Rescue of an American Hero, (St. Paul Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2005). See also William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

16.William E. Dyess, Bataan Death March: A Survivor's Account, (University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 201.

17.Stanley L. Falk, Bataan: The March of Death, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1962).

18.In the worst massacre of POWS of the battle, the Japanese killed at least forty-seven people after taking the Ridge. Among the dead was Major Charles Sydney Clarke of China Command HQ. Around thirty civilians were massacred at Blue Pool. Three captured persons were executed at Causeway Bay. At Wong Nai Chung Gap ten men of the St. John Ambulance were killed, as well as a policeman and a medic. The Japanese executed fourteen captives at Overbays. A further seven were killed at Eucliff. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission report that five men of the Royal Air Force went missing near the Ridge on December 20, perhaps captured and killed. Six men of the Middlesex were killed defending PB 14 at Deepwater Bay Ride. Around hundred were killed during the massacre perpetrated at St. Stephen's College. At least eight men —six of the Middlesex and two Royal Engineers— were killed after capture at Maryknoll Mission. See Tim Carew, Fall of Hong Kong, (London: Anthony Blond Ltd., 1960). See also Charles G. Roland, "Massacre and Rape in Hong Kong: Two Case Studies Involving Medical Personnel and Patients," (Journal of Contemporary History, July 26, 2016).

19.K XIV was one of five K XIV class submarines build for the Royal Netherlands Navy. Used for patrols in the Dutch colonial waters, the submarines diving depth was 80 meters (260ft). Three of the five of them were lost in World War II.

20.ANZAC PORTAL, Australian Government, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Fall of Rabaul, "The 2/22nd Battalion (about 900 men and 38 officers) formed the bulk of Lark Force. It had arrived in Rabaul on Anzac Day 1941. By December, Lark Force had increased to about 1400 troops. They included a headquarter group; part of the 2/10th Field Ambulance with 6 members of the Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS); anti-tank and coastal artillery batteries; and a number of militias in the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, some of whom were only 18 years old. Ten Wirraways and four Hudsons from 24 Squadron joined them just as Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Malaya. In addition, approximately 150 men and officers of the First independent Company were based on nearby New Ireland."

21.Senshi sōsho: rikukaigun nenpyō, fu heigo yōgo no kaisetsu (1980), 104; Shiryō Chōsakai, ed., Daikairei: kaisetsu (Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1978), 1978), 122; also see the interpretation of these moves in Nakao, "Dai Tō'A sensō ni okeru bōsei teni chien no yōin,"110. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 446–753.

22.Shiryō, Daikairei, kaisetsu, 97

23.Port Moresby was a strategic location on the south side of New Guinea that could potentially control air and sea off northern Australia; as well as the southern end of the Bismarck Archipelago.

24.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 446.

25.Sugiyama memo, ge, 81–82, cited in Nakao, 110–11. The policy document was entitled "Kongo torubeki sensō shidō no taikō" (Outline for conducting future war guidance). Its third item stated: "We will decide on concrete measures for more positive war guidance after giving consideration to our national power, changes in operations, the war situation between Germany and the Soviet Union, U.S. – Soviet relations, and trends in Chungking." Also cited in Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 446 and 753.

26.ANZAC PORTAL, Australian Government, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Japanese Advance (December 1941- March 1942; "Approximately 400 of the troops escaped to the mainland and another 160 were massacred at Tol Plantation. In July 1942, about 1,000 of the captured Australian men, including civilian internees, were drowned when the Japanese transport ship Montevideo Maru was sunk by an American submarine off the Philippines coast en route to Hainan."

27.Bix, 446.

28.See Martin Smith, Burma–Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1991), 49. See also Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma, (C. Hurst & Co, Publishers, 1987), 284.

29.Nakao Yūji, “Dai Tō’A sensō ni okeru bōsei teni chien no yōin,” in Gunjishi Gakkai, ed. Dainiji sekai taisen (3), Gunji shigaku 31, nos. 1 & 2 (Sept. 1995), 110. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), 445.

30.Francis Pike, Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 334.

31.Ibid., 335.

32.Ibid., 335.

33.Looking to the example of the Russo-Japanese War, which ended with the spectacular Japanese victory at the Battle of Tsushima, Yamamoto wanted to draw the U.S. Navy into a battle that would decide, then and there, who ruled the Pacific. With a Japanese victory, he hoped the U.S. would be forced to negotiate for peace.

CHAPTER 10

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

1.The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects, Dietrich Fleck, The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 322.

2.Articles 13 to 16 state that prisoners of war must be treated humanely without any adverse discrimination and that their medical needs must be met. See 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols and their Commentaries, (International Committee of the Rd Cross, 2013).

3.Although the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War provided the regulations how prisoners of war should be treated, the empire of Japan never signed the agreement (except the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Sick and Wounded). See Geoff Gilbert, Responding to International Crime (International Studies in Human Rights, September 30, 2006), 358. See also Fujiwara, Nitchû Sensô ni Okeru Horyo Gyakusatsu, Kikan Sensô Sekinin Kenkyû 9, 1995, 22, Bert Röling and Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger, (Polity, 1994), 76–77.

4.Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, April 25, 1946.

5.Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials, (University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 112–113.

6.The London Agreement & Charter became the basis for the trials of the Nazis before the IMT at Nuremberg. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was outlined in article 6 of the Charter. This article defined the crimes the defendants could be charged with; crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Parties to the agreement were France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the United States.

7.Unlike the Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals, where there were four chief prosecutors, to represent Great Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR, the Tokyo trial featured only one chief prosecutor. Joseph B. Keenan, a former assistant to the U.S. attorney general, was the chief prosecutor.

8.See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 333; Hora Tomio, Nankin jihen (Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha 1972), 84–85; Kasahara Tokushi, Nitchū zenmen sensō to kaigun: Panai gō jiken no shinsō (Aoki Shoten, 1997), 283; Suzuki Kenji, Sensō to shin bun (Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1995), 123–124.

9.At the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Matsui led the Japanese forces engaged in the Battle of Shanghai. After winning the battle, he convinced Japan's high command to advance on the Chinese capital city of Nanjing. The troops under his command who captured Nanjing on Dec. 13, 1937, were responsible for the notorious Nanjing Massacre. See Torsten Weber "The Greater Asia Association," and Matsui Iwane, "In Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History," vol. 2, eds. Sven Saaler and Christopher Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 140. See also Carrington Williams, "The Tokyo War Crimes Trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East," in International Humanitarian Law: Origins, Challenges, Prospects, vol. 1, eds. Peter Duus, et al. (Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 154.

10.Ikuhiko Hata, Nanking Jiken Gyakusatsu no Kozo, (Chuko-Shinsho, Pub, 2007), 197.

11.See Saburō Hayashi, Alvin D. Cox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War, Quantico, Virginia: The Marine Corps Association, 1959.

12.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 325–26; Senda Kakō, Tennō to chokugo to Shōwa shi (Sekibunsha, 1990), 257–58.

13.See H. J. Timperley, What War Means: Japanese Terror in China, 284, 285. See also Chang Iris, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Basic Books, New York, 1997), 172.

14.It is difficult to estimate “civilian casualties” because IC members did not and indeed, could not, make a distinction between three groups of Chinese: civilians, soldiers who changed into civilian clothes as the city fell. Thus, many persons and corpses identified by the Westerners as “civilians” in fact were, or had been, Chinese belligerents. There is no doubt, however, that the Japanese army did arrest and unjustly execute huge numbers of Chinese civilians assumed to be soldiers. In addition to that organized form of violence and murder, there is abundant evidence in the primary documentation attesting to random acts of rape and murder by countless numbers of Japanese troops, either as individuals or in small groups. As noted by Hata Ikuhiko, a leading historian of the Nanking Atrocity, huge numbers of Japanese soldiers were simply out of control. (Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocities, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 96.

15.Michael Bristow, “Nanjing Remembers massacre victims,” BBC News. Retrieved, 2007–12–13.

16.Ara Kinichi, Nanking-jiken Nihon-jin 48 min no Shogen, Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2002.

17.See Lu Suping, They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals, and Terror in Minnie Vautrin’s Nanjing: Diaries and Correspondence, 1937–38; H. Katsuichi, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronting Japan’s National Shame (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1999), 42–45.

18.J. G. Magee, Case 3, Film 2 Folder 7, Box 263 Record Group 8, Special Collection, (Yale University: Divinity School Library). See also J.G. Magee, “A letter to Rev. J.C. Mckim,” April 2, 1938, Folder 62, Box 4 Record Group 10, Special Collection, (Yale University: Divinity School Library).

19.Based on: “John Gillepsie Magee’s Diary,” Yale University of Library.

20.In 1953, Magee left the 16mm camera and the film to his son David, who had accompanied him in Nanking. In 2002, when David heard of the news that China was going to build a museum in memory of the people who were killed during the Nanking Massacre, he came to Nanking. According to his father’s last wish, he offered the historical materials without charge. To remember the special contribution that Magee had made to the Nanking people, a library was built in John Magee’s name. See John E. Woods, The Good Man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe, (1998), 187. See also Asahi Shimbun, “Nanking Smiles,” December 25, 1937. (14)

21.Quoted in Hatano and Sochi, 138.

22.Peter Harmsen, Nanjing 1937: Battle for a Doomed City, (Casemate Publishers, 2015), 267. Also see the New York Times, February 8, 1938.

23.Brian Victoria, “Zen Masters on the Battlefield (Part II),” (The Asia-Pacific Journal 27, no. 4, (July 2014).

24.Frank Oliver, New York Times, January 9, 1938.

25.H. Katsuichi, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronting Japan’s National Shame, 164–165. The survivor’s name, according to the Chinese original, should be “Tang Shunshan” rather than “Tang Junshan” in Katsuichi’s book. Tang Shunshan’s witness account is also on “A Collection of Survivors’ Witness Accounts about the Nanjing Massacre Perpetrated by the Invading Japanese Troops, ed. by Zhu Chengshan, (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1994), 71–73. (23).

26.Archibald T. Steele, Journalist, 89, The New York Times, March 4, 1992.

27.Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940, (Berkeley University of California Press, 1987.)

28.James Espy, “The Conditions at Nanking, January 1938,” (January 25, 1938), 8, (Department of State File No. 793.94/12674), Microfilm Set M976, Roll 51, Record Group 59, (the National Archives II, College Park, MD).

29.The New York Times, January 9, 1938.

30.Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–45, and the American Cover-up, (Rutledge, First published 1994), 5. “Japanese scientists had engaged in research on biological (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) throughout the region from the moment Japan occupied all of Manchuria in 1931–1932 until its surrender in August 1945. The scientists, with the enthusiastic support of the highest government leaders, erected secret bases throughout the territory. Here scientists could experiment freely on animals and human subjects without interference from any authority. Japan, during its occupation, in effect, turned Manchuria into one gigantic biological and chemical warfare laboratory.”

31.See R. J. Pritchard and – S.M. Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol. 20, judgment and annexes, (Garland Publishing Inc., New York, 1981), 49, 608.

32.Wu Chang teh, Testimony at the Court of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. II, Tribunal Proceedings, ed., by R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, (Garland Publishing Inc., New York 1981), 2, 605. Also see Suping Lu, Courage under the Reign of Terror, Minnie Vautrin’s Efforts in Protecting Women Refuges from Japanese Atrocities during the Nanjing Massacre, (DEP no. 10/2009, 11–12).

33.Ibid., (DEP no. 10/2009, 11–12).

34.On the judgment of the International Tribunal for the Far East, 1069.

35.Author Iris Chang wrote a best-seller on the Nanking topic in 1998. In 1997, Princeton University hosted a conference “Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Nanking Massacre.” The event, and the resulting publications, received widespread press coverage in the United States and across Asia. Focusing on information and horror, the conference organizers assumed that there were many undergraduate-aged students at Princeton and other universities who had never heard of the Nanking atrocity. Their top priority remained “to inform the video generation” of this horrible event. Hence, the conference’s photo and film gallery were especially powerful and effective in that task. In Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials, (The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 153.

36.Ironically MacArthur’s father, Lt-Gen. Arthur MacArthur had been the commander of the US Army’s 2nd Division, 8th Corp at the Battle of Manila against Philippine forces in 1899 and afterward in the brutal suppression of Filipino forces in Luzon campaigns in which an estimated 250,000 Filipinos lost their lives. Cited by Francis Pike in Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), 213, 214.

37.Francis Pike, Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury, 2016), 213.

38.Ibid., 213.

39.Notable captives and survivors of the Bataan March: Jose Agdamag, Hamilton Hughes, Ramon Bagatsing, Bert Bank, Lewis C. Beebe, Clifford Bluemel, Albert Brown, Thomas F. Breslin, William E. Brougher, Jose Calugas, Virgillo N. Cordero, Jr., Charles C. Drake, William Dyess, Alva R. Fitch, Arnold J. Funk, Martin Gison, Samuel Grashio, Samuel L. Howard, Ray C. Hunt, Harold Keith Johnson, Albert M. Jones, Joe Kieyoomia, Edward P. King, Jesse Monroe Knowles, Charles S. Lawrence, Maxon S. Lough, Robert W. Levering, Joe Lingad. Allan C. McBride, George F. Moore. John E. Olson, George M. Parker, Clinton A. Pierce, Salvador A. Rodolfo, Sr., Alfredo M. Santos, Robert Sheats, Austin Shofner, Edward W. Stewart, Benigno G. Tabora, Robert P. Taylor, Mario Tonelli, Thomas J.H. Trapnell, James R. N. Weaver, Edgar Whitcomb, Manuel T. Yan, and Teófilo Yidefonso.

40.Other sources report widely differing prisoner of war casualties prior to reaching Camp O’Donnell: from 5,000 to 18,000 Filipino deaths and 500 to 650 American deaths during the march. See Kevin C., Murphy, Inside the Bataan March: Defeat, Travail and Memory. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2004, 328. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 447–448.

41.Masaharu Homma was a lieutenant general in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. Homma commanded the Japanese 14th Army, which invaded the Philippines and perpetrated the Bataan Death March. See Sides, Hampton, The Trial of General Homma, Rockville, MD: American Heritage Society, 2009. See also Application of Homma, 327 U.S. 759, 1946.

42.On August 16, 1945, following Emperor Hirohito's radio address declaring his intention to surrender, Ōnishi committed ritual suicide in his quarters. His suicide note written the night before expressed his personal apology for sending special attack pilots to their deaths and urged the people of Japan to follow the lead of the emperor for a peaceful occupation.

43.Edwin P. Hoyt, Hirohito: The Emperor and the Man, 142.

44.The practice was most prevalent from the Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 1944, to the end of the war. Dropped usually from an altitude of over 25,000 feet (7,500 meters) and more than 50 miles (80 km) from its target, the missile would glide to about 3 miles (5km) from its target before the pilot turned on its three rocket engines, accelerating the craft to more than 600 miles per hour (960 km per hour) in its final drive. Kamikaze attacks sank 34 ships and damaged hundreds of others during the war. See Steve Zaloga), Kamikaze: Japanese Special Attack Weapons 1944–45, (Osprey Publishing, 2011), 12. See also Kamikaze origin, (Online Etymology Dictionary, December 11, 2015).

45.The tradition of death instead of defeat was deeply entrenched in Japanese military culture. One of the primary traditions was loyalty and honor until death. See John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War, (Pantheon 1987), 216.

46.The peak period of kamikaze attack frequency came during April-June 1945 at the Battle of Okinawa. On April 6, 1945, waves of aircraft made hundreds of attacks in Operation Kikusui. 389 men were killed in one attack on USS Bunker Hill. Suicide attacks by planes or boats at Okinawa sank or put out of action at least 30 U.S. warships and at least three U.S. merchant ships, along with some from other Allied forces. About 3,800 kamikaze pilots died during the war, and more than 7,000 naval personnel were killed by kamikaze attacks. See Steven J. Zaloga, Kamikaze: Japanese Special Attack Weapons, 1944–45, (Osprey Publishing, 2011), 12.

47.In Iwo Jima the United States Marine Corps and Navy landed on February 19, 1945 and captured the island from the Imperial Japanese Army. Some 70,000 U.S. Marines landed on Iwo Jima. In 1954, the U.S. Marines dedicated the Marine Corps War Memorial, also known as the Iwo Jima Memorial, near Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia to honor all Marines. Buell, Thomas B., Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Ernest J. King, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 473.

48.Peter C. Smith Kamikaze to Die for the Emperor; (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2014), 37–39. See also Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941–1945, 2016, 858–999.

49."I had only one chance to see an analysis of a live maruta [prisoner]," says Nobuyuki Abe. "I was just an observer. My job was to carry buckets, ropes, little jobs like that. The analysis itself was carried out by the specialists. When they did the live analysis, they fixed the maruta to a table. It's alive, and it's struggling, of course. They give it a bit of ether, but it's still alive, and the organs are still working normally. Then they start the analysis. There are screams, and groans, and when they get too loud, they put a mask over the maruta's face. Every organ is taken – they used to say you got better samples from live maruta. When they find a good one, they preserve it in formaldehyde. The maruta didn't survive." Richard Lloyd Parry in Marioka, Human guinea pigs advance medical science, Japan/the shame of Unit 731, (Independent, April 16, 1995).

50.Particularly concerned with reports of cannibalism and biological warfare experiments, historian Yuki Tanaka explained that Japan's wartime behavior was a temporary state of mind influenced by "Emperor Ideology" politics. He attacked the Allies for committing plenty of atrocities of their own. Tanaka's work suggested to some that Japan was beginning to deal with its past, even though his "temporary madness" and "everybody did it" thesis was strangely reminiscent of 1950s German wrangling over the crimes of the Third Reich. Tanaka's investigations revealed shocking details of specific atrocities. Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, (The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 5. Also see Tanaka's book, Hidden Horrors, published by (Westview Press in Boulder, Colorado, 1996). Especially see Tanaka's final chapter, "Conclusion: Understanding Japanese Brutality in the Asia-Pacific War."

51.Harumi Ozawa, "Japanese war veteran speaks of atrocities in the Philippines," TAIPEI TIMES, Nov 6, 2007, 9. After remaining silent for decades, Makino revealed details to the public in 2006. Makino's account is one of only a few from Japanese veterans concerning human experimentation in Southeast Asia during World War II. In his

revelation, Makino said: “We should not repeat such miseries again. I want to tell the truth about the war, even if it is to only one person or two.”

52.AFP (Oct 28, 2007), “Japanese veteran haunted by WWII surgical killings,” Archived from the original on March 17, 2014, Retrieved May 16, 2014.

53.Richard Lloyd Parry, “Dissect them alive: chilling Imperial that order could not be disobeyed”, THE AUSTRALIAN, February 26, 2007, Retrieved May 16, 2014.

54.Harris H. Sheldon, “Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–45, and the American Cover-up, (Routledge, First published 1994), 142–143. “On February 9, 1939, Hirohito’s younger brother, the exuberant Prince Chichibu, attended a two-and-one-half-hour Ishii “spell-binding” lecture in the War Ministry’s Grand Conference Hall in Tokyo. The BW expert was so well known by then that “the vast grand conference hall was completely packed, a “standing room only” audience had gathered to hear him…Prince Chichubi, broke away from his busy military responsibilities and honored the meeting with his royal presence and listened most intently to the proceedings.” In 2018, in response to a request by Katsuo Nishiyama, a professor at Shiga University of Medical Science, Japan has disclosed the names of thousands of members of Unit 731. “This is the first time that an official document showing the real names of almost all members of Unit 731 has been disclosed,” Nishiyama told the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper. “The list is important evidence that supports testimony by those involved. Its discovery will be a major step toward unveiling concealed facts.” The document lists members of the Kwantung army’s Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department – the unit’s official name – and is dated 1 January 1945. It includes the names, ranks and contact details of more than 1,000 army medics, as well as dozens of doctors, surgeons, nurses, and engineers. Japan reluctantly acknowledged the unit’s existence in the late 1990s but has refused to discuss its activities. Cited in “Unit 731: Japan discloses details of notorious chemical warfare division,” by Justin McCurry, (The Guardian, 17 April 2018).

55.Harris H. Sheldon, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–45, and the American Cover-up, (London: Routledge, First published 1994), 11. “Manchuria was used as a test site for national command planning by the bureaucrats… and a test side for the Continental Institute of Science which was established in 1935 at Harbin… as an experimental model of a science mobilization system that would never have been permitted in Japan proper. Professor Tsuneishi Kei-ichi notes that “The scientists and technologists were better accommodated in Manchuria than in Japan with respect to availability of research funds and freedom to select research themes. Manchuria was probably a newly found paradise for these people. He concludes that in Manchuria, scientists and technologists were able to immerse themselves in research without frustration from shortage of funds and harassment from no specialist bureaucrats and others. There are those who believe that this was indeed the ideal environment for a scientific research system.”

56.Daniel Barenblatt, “A Plague Upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan’s germ Warfare Operation,” (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 44.

57.Keiichi Tsuneishi, “Unit 731 and the Human Skulls Discovered in 1989: Physicians Carrying Out Organized Crimes.” Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research. Ed. William LaFleur, Gernot Böhme, and Susumu Shimazono, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 73–84.

58.Ken Yuasa, Demons from the East: Army Doctor, Japan at War: An Oral History, Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, (New York: The New Press, 1992), 145.

59.See Emperor Hirohito: A Life from Beginning to End, (Hourly History, 2018), 26.

60.Ibid., 26–27.

61.Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda held executive responsibilities at Pingfan. See Richard J. B. Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima, London: Routledge, First published in 1994, 174. Also see Alan Jay Vanderbrook, Imperial Japan’s Experiments Before and During World War Two, (University of Central Florida (STARS), 2009), 12.

62.Ishii led the development and application of biological weapons at Unit 731 in Manchuria during the Second Sino-Japanese War. At Unit 731, he engaged in forced human experimentation on civilians and prisoners of war that resulted in the death of over 10,000 people and was responsible for some of the most notorious war crimes of Imperial Japan. See Hal Gold, Unit 731 Testimony, 2003, 109. See also Barnaby Wendy, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare, (Frog Ltd., 1999).

63.See A.S. Wells, The A to Z of World War II: The War Against Japan, (Scarecrow Press, 2009), 42. “According to A.S. Wells, the majority of victims were Chinese with a lesser percentage being Russian, Mongolian, and Korean.”

64.Yoshio Shinozuka was a member of the Association of Returnees from China. According to his testimony, he was conscripted into Unit 731 at the age of 16. He claimed to have been involved in conducting experiments and vivisections on Chinese captives near the northern Chinese city of Harbin. In 1997, Shinozuka gave testimony on the activities of Unit 731 on behalf of 180 Chinese who were suing the Japanese government for compensation and an apology for deaths of family members they claimed were killed in experiments at the biological warfare laboratory.

65.See Eric Talmadge, “Japanese Soldier Faces the Poison of His Past,” Los Angeles Times, Sep. 19, 2004.

66.Article 171: The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices. The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armored cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited.

67.In December 1941, Okamura was authorized through Imperial General Headquarters Order Number 575 to implement the Three All’s Policy in north China, against the Chinese Red Army.

68.Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity, 2004, xii, 173, “In 2002, Changde, China, site of the plague flea bombing, held an “International Symposium on the Crimes of Bacteriological Warfare,” which estimated that the number of people killed by the Imperial Japanese Army germ warfare and human experiments was around 580,000. The American historian Sheldon H. Harris states that over 200,000 died.

69.Altheide Brandi, Biohazard: Unit 731 and the American Cover-up, (University of Michigan-Flint), 5.

70.In 1952 and 1984, China signed the Geneva Protocol and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Despite its engagement, many have suspected that China had maintained a biological weapons program since before the signing of the BTWC. Reports from the United States in 2010, 2012, and 2014 all state that China likely possesses a biological weapons program and that the Chinese military experts had helped Iran and other Middle Eastern nations build their biological weapons programs. On December 30, 1996, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC]. The U.S. alleged in 2003 that China has an “advanced chemical weapons research and development program.” China is commonly considered to have an active biological warfare program, including dedicated research and development activities funded and supported by the Chinese government in Beijing. Approximately 350,000 chemical munitions were left on Chinese soil by Japan during the Second World War. Today, despite the progress made by international conventions, biological weapons (BW) and chemical weapons (CW) still pose a threat.

71.Under the terms of the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria and captured a few key personnel from Unit 731. Other members of the unit eventually managed to return to Japan, often secretly. The Pingfang site was found in near destruction, having been destroyed by Unit 731 before the advance of Soviet troops. Almost all the documents were destroyed by the unit. See Peter Williams & David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II, (New York, Free Press, 1989), 7.

72.See John W. Powell, Japan’s Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 12.2 (1980): 2–17. See also “Japan’s Biological Weapons, 1930–1945: A Hidden Chapter in History,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37.8 (October 1981): 43–53. Awaya notes that the prosecution also had

information about the chemical warfare activities of Unit 1644 in China; see his contribution in Hosoya, 85–86, 116, and his essay in Asahi Jānaru, March 1, 1985, (installment 20), 39–40.

73.A frequently asked question concerns whether the United States used the information they gathered from the Japanese, and if so, in what capacity. According to The U.S. Army, the Japanese experiments lacked scientific rigor or had a relevant hypothesis that could have been tested without live human subjects. (Till Bärnighausen, “Data generated in Japan’s biowarfare experiments on human victims in China, 1932–1945, and the ethics of using them.” Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: Comparative Inquiries in Science, History, and Ethics. Eds. Jing-Bao Nie, Nanyan Guo, Mark Selden, and Arthur Kleinman, (London: Routledge, 2010), 81, 89, 90.

74.In December 1949, in the border city of Khabarovsk, the Soviet Union tried and convicted 11 members of Unit 731 and one member of Unit 100. The prison sentences ranged from 2 to 25 years in a labor prison camp. The convicted members of Unit 731 were:

• Gen. Otozō Yamada, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. (25)

• Lt. Gen. Ryuiji Kajitsuka, chief of Medical Administration in the Kwantung Army. (25)

• Maj. Gen. Kiyoshi Kawashima who oversaw the experimental division. (25)

• Lt. Gen. Takaatsu Takahashi, who was head of the Veterinary Division. (25)

• Maj. Tomio Karasawa who oversaw a section that produced germs on a large scale. (25)

• Lt. Col. Toshihide Nishi, who was responsible for breeding fleas, rats, mice, and guinea pigs. (20)

• Maj. Masao Onoue bred laboratory animals and trained laboratory assistants. (12)

• Maj. Gen. Shunji Sato was chief of Unit 8604 and Unit 1644. (20)

• Lt. Zensaku Hirazakura produced bacteria and poisons while in Unit 100. (10)

• Senior Sergt. Kazuo Mitomo manufactured anthrax, glanders cattle plague and sheep plague. (15)

• Corp. Kikuchi Norimitsu attempted to produce a medium for growing typhoid and other bacteria. (2)

• Private Yuji Kurushima was a laboratory orderly who dissected fleas, caught rats and put bacteria in test tubes, and was involved in BW against China. (3)

75.Charley Granvorka, “Comfort Women,” August 31, 2019, see Jean Sénat Fleury, Hirohito: Guilty or Innocent, The Trial of the Emperor, (Xlibris, 2019), 203: “Between 1931 and 1945, the Japanese army forcibly prostituted nearly 200,000 young women. There were Taiwanese, Filipinos, Indonesians, and Koreans all, mostly between the ages of forteen and eighteen. They were all forced to “sexual service” in houses run by the Japanese army as early as 1932, the date of the first census of “comfort stations,” another modest name for military brothels. The idea of “comfort stations” was justified by the Japanese authorities in 1932 after 27 percent of the Japanese army was decimated by venereal diseases during the Siberian expedition against the Red Army from 1918 to 1922. As adult Japanese women, professional prostitutes are often contaminated, it was therefore imperative to preserve the hygiene of the troops. It was born the project of filling them in fresh flesh, young, but above all healthy. In 1932, during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai, the Military Authorities recorded 223 cases of gang and individual rape by the Japanese soldier. In order to eradicate the spread of venereal diseases among the troops and channel their sexual energy, the High Military Command decided to create “comfort stations.” The ministries of the Army, Interior and Transport worked together to recruit young Korean women from mining areas north of Kyushu, with the promise of a job as a cook or laundress in camps in China.

76.Ibid., 205–206). “To accompany Japan’s expansionist plans in China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the Japanese army had to create more “comfort stations.” They hired the services of professional recruiters who crisscrossed the Korean countryside. The General Mobilization Act of 1938 was most often the shock argument put forward to win the support of young girls and their parents. In 1942, a ministerial document reported 400 comfort stations, 280 in China, 100 in Southeast Asia, 10 in the Pacific archipelago, and 10 on Sakhalin Island. The numbers will never cease to grow. The Chinese, Filipino and Malay campaigns were in turn covered by squads of recruiters tasked with forcibly taking the girls who fell to them. The same was true in Java, Burma, and New Guinea.”

77.See, G. Hicks, “The Sexual Slaves of the Japanese Army.” (The Comfort Women, Yen Books, 1995) translated from English by François Thévenod, Paris, Jacques Granger.

78.The comfort stations were first established at the request of the Japanese military authorities as part of war efforts in China. According to military documents, private agents first opened brothels for officers and men stationed in Manchuria, around the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. When the war spread to Shanghai after the First Shanghai Incident in 1932, the first comfort station was established. The number of comfort stations increased rapidly after the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937. It was apparently Yasuji Okamura, at that time the Vice Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, who first promoted the establishment of comfort stations for the Japanese army. Okamura Yasuji taisho shiryo I: senjo kaisohen, Tokyo, 1970, 302-303. “There were not ianfus (comfort women) in former years of military campaigns. To speak frankly, I am an initiator of the comfort women project. As in 1932 during the Shanghai Incident some acts of rape were committed by Japanese military personnel, I, Vice Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, following the example of the Japanese naval brigade, asked the governor of Nagasaki prefecture to send comfort women groups. As a result, rape crimes totally disappeared, which made me very happy. At present each army corps was accompanied by a comfort women group, as if the latter constitutes a detachment of its quarter-master corps. But rape acts did not disappear in the Sixth Division, even though it was accompanied by a comfort women group.” Notes from Asian Women’s Fund, who were the Comfort Women?

79.See Researching Japanese war crimes records: introductory essays by Edward Drea, Greg Bradsher, Robert Hanyok, James Lide, Michael Petersen, Daqing Yang, published by the National Archives and Records for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency (Working Group, Washington, 2006).

80.On “Japanese Crimes,” see Jean-Louis Margolin, “A Chronological Essay: Japan’s Use of Mass violence in Colonial and Foreign Wars (1894–1958),” (University of Provence in Aix Research Institute on South-East Asia (Marseille.)

81.Life as A “Comfort Woman”: Story of Kim Bok-Dong, Asian Boss, October 27, 2018; Kim Bok-dong still fighting for sex slave victims, Korea times, August 17, 2016.

82.Jean-Louis Margolin, Japanese crimes in Nanjing, 1937–38, (University of Provence: Aix Research Institute on South-East Asia, Marseille, 2006), 18.

83.Charley Granvorka, “Comfort Women,” see Jean Sénat Fleury’s book, The Trial of the Emperor, Hirohito: Guilty or Innocent, (Xlibris, 2019), 205–206: “Between 1947 and 2011, the ianfu tragedy remained virtually inaudible despite a novel published in 1947, a study by the journalist, Senda Kako, in 1973, and the testimony of Kim Hak-sun (1924–1997) in 1991. It was her public speaking that encouraged other women to overcome their shame and dare to tell and denounce how the unspeakable was organized legally. The national interest, the performance and hygiene of the troops or the superstition that having sex before the war or better still possessing a pubic hair, were synonymous with protection and victory? A symbolic tribunal, the International Tribunal for War Crimes against Women, with the aim of trying the leaders of the Imperial Army was set up in Tokyo in December 2000. Historically, sexual crimes during armed conflict scant as such since Imperial Lame was introduced in Tokyo in December 2000. Historically, sexual crimes in armed conflict have never been recognized as such, since the cause of “comfort women” has always been ignored by military courts.” See also Yoshimi, Y. “Comfort Women: Sexual slavery in the Japanese military during World War II,” (Columbia University Press, 2000).

84.The Japanese chapter of VAWW-NET came up with the idea of creating this tribunal at the end of the international “Violence against Women in War” (VAWW) conference which brought together about forty women

from twenty countries around the world in Tokyo in 1997. The conference was the result of lively debates on atrocities committed against women in armed conflicts and the eradication of such crimes, echoing international awareness of such violence following the events of Yugoslavia. See this article by Christine Levy, “The Women International War Crimes Tribunal, Tokyo 2000: A feminist response to revisionism, (University Bordeaux, Montaigne, January, 2014).

85.See Akemi Nakamura “NHK censorship ruling reversed,” The Japan Times; (2008–06–13), International Organizing Committee for the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001–12–14). “The Hague Final Judgment,” Violence Against Women in War-Network Japan, 280 of 312.

86.Charley Granvorka, “Comfort Women,” see Jean Sénat Fleury’s book, The Trial of the Emperor, Hirohito: Guilty or Innocent, (Xlibris, 2019), 206: “An official apology to the international press is what the Ianfu survivors had been waiting for from the Japanese authorities. A barbaric sexual slavery under the pretext of organized and legally planned patriotism in official military brothels in the name of the supreme interest. This is what the lives of thousands of young girls have been rejected into oblivion, the collective denial of their shameful existence. Fifty-five years after the end of the war and despite their compensation in 2015 despite the standardization agreement between Japan and Korea dated on June 22, 1965, the existence of these women is still controversial; why should any credit be given to the voices of rural, poor, illiterate women since there is no official document to attest to the existence of military brothels?” Also see Schmidt, D, A. “Ianfu-the Comfort Women of Imperial Japanese Army of the Pacific War.” (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000).

87.Commission on Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Forty-fifth session, Item 4 of the provisional agenda, July 2, 1993, 29 Chapter III State Responsibility, 40–49.

88.The Fourth World Conference on Women, having met in Beijing from 4 to 15 September 1995. It adopts the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Actions and recommends to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fiftieth session to endorse the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as adopted by the Conference.

89.Japanese Government Statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statements, (Columbia Law School, Center for Korean Legal Studies).

90.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato on the issue of the “wartime comfort women” from (The Korean Peninsula, July 6, 1992).

91.David White, “The Japanese Occupation of China 1937–45: The Divided Opposition and its Consequences, (Openhistorysociety.org).”

92.Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 1997), 49.

93.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the issue of comfort women, (August 4, 1993).

94.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, on the “Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative, (August 31, 1994).

95.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, (July 15, 1998).

96.McDougall J. Gay was Executive Director of Global Rights, Partners for Justice (from September 1994 to 2006). In August 2005, she was named the first United Nations independent expert on minority issues, serving until 2001.

97.The International Tribunal on Crimes against Women took place on March 4–8, 1976 in Brussels. The qevent was created with the intention to “make public the full range of crimes, violently brutal and subtly discriminatory, committed against women of all cultures.” Diana E.H. Russell and Nicole Van Den Ven, the main organizers of the tribunal, were inspired by Bertrand Russell’s International War Crimes Tribunal, a people’s tribunal on crimes committed in the Vietnam War. See Chesler Phyllis, Rape as a War Crime: Reaching Moral Clarity, On the Issues, May 1996, 14.

98.On drug trafficking, The Trials, see Zhaoqi Cheng, A History of War Crimes Trials in Post 1945 Asia-Pacific, (Palgrave Mavmillan, Singapore, 2019), 71–103.

99.On Mitsui and Mitsubishi drug trafficking see Steven B. Karch, “A Brief History of Cocaine,” 149-155. Several companies in Japan such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi were involved in the drug trafficking. Mitsubishi was the second-largest company in Japan. It also made money by selling drugs and engaging people to work as forced labor during World War II. On November 29, 2018, South’s Korea’s Supreme Court ordered Mitsubishi to compensate South Koreans forced to work in its factories during World War II. The top court upheld a lower court ruling that ordered Mitsubishi to pay each of five women 100 million won to 150 million won, or about $89,000 to $133,000. In a separate ruling, the court also ordered Mitsubishi to pay 80 million won to each of the six men who said they were subject to forced labor at a Mitsubishi shipyard and machine tool factory in 1944.

100.The Opium Convention of 1912, which Japan signed on January 23 of that year, provided that participating countries would enact laws controlling drug production, sales, and exports. However, in 1918, Hoshi Pharmaceutical, with approval of both the Japanese Home Ministry and the Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs in Peru, purchased a 500-acre coca plantation in Peru. At almost the same time, Hoshi began growing coca leaf in the Kagi district of Taiwan Formosa. As testimony given at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials subsequently revealed, Japanese bureaucrats routinely “cooked the books,” adjusting production figures for opium and heroin production to agree with the permissible values set by the League of Nations. The Japanese imported coca leaf and crude cocaine not just from Taiwan, but also from coca plantations on Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Java.

101.On the destruction of the archives see Japan Society of Archives Institution ed., Nihon no monjokan undo: Zenshiyokyo no nijunen (Archives Movement in Japan: Twenty Years of the Japan Society of Archives Institutions (Iwata Shoin, 1996) 242. Also see Shohei Muta, Senior Researcher, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, Myth and Reality about Pre-World War II Government Records, Japan-U.S. Archives Seminar, May 2007, 1. “The National Archives of Japan was established in 1971. On November 28, 1959, the Science Council of Japan under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister made a recommendation to Prime Minister Shinsuke Kishi requesting governmental action for preventing scattering and loss of official documents. It is true that a considerable number of important government records were lost due to war damage and “artificial destruction and extinction,” as the Science Council feared.”

102.On Japan attacking hospital ships see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company, 2000) 447; see also Smith Clarence McKittrick, The Technical Services – The Medical Department Hospitalization And Evacuation, Zone of Interior, United States Army in World War II, (Washington D.C. Center of Military History, 1956), United States Army; Condon Hall, Mary Ellen, Cowdrey Albert E. (1998), The technical Services: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War against Japan. United States Army in World War II, Washington D.C. Center of Military History, United States Army. “Japan had signed the Hague Convention of 1907 that stated attacking a hospital ship is a war crime. However, on April 23, 1945, the USS comfort (AH-6) was struck by a Japanese suicide plane. Casualties were 28 killed (including six nurses), and 48 wounded, with considerable damage to the ship. Three weeks earlier, on April 2, 1945, the USS Relief was attacked and damaged at Guam. The USS Hope (AH-7) was attacked and damaged during the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the Battle of Okinawa. On February 19, 1942, the HMHS Manunda was dive bombed during the Japanese air raids on Darwin, 12 crew and hospital staff were killed, and others were seriously wounded. On May 14, 1943, the Australian AHS Centaur was sunk by Japanese submarine I-177 off Stradbroke Island Queensland with 268 people died. The Royal Netherlands Navy hospital ship SS Op ten Noort was bombed on February 21, 1942 in the Jana Sea; one surgeon and three nurses were killed, eleven were badly wounded.”

103.The Japanese used many camps where prisoners were interned during World War II. In the Philippines: Canatuan, Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Camp O’Donnell, Los Baños, Santo Tomas Internment Camp, Bilibid Prison, Puerto Princesa Prison Camp, Camp John Hay, Camp Holmes Internment Camp, Camp Manganese, Guindulman, Bohol, Camp Malolos, Bulacan. In Malaya and Singapore (Changi Prison, Salarang Barracks, River Valley Camp, Outram Prison, Blakang Mati. In Formosa (Tamazato, Karenko, Kukutsi, Oka, Toroku, Inrin, Kinkaseki, Taichu, Churon, Tiahokum). In China (Fengtai Prison, Kiangwang POW Camp, Zikawei Camp, Woosung POW Camp, Lushun POW Camp. In Manchuria (Hoten Camp, Harbin Camp, Mukden POW Camp). In Korea (Inchon, Hamhung). In Hong Kong (Argyle Street Camp, Ma Tau Chong Camp, Ma Tau Wai Camp, North Point Camp, Sham Shui Po Camp, Stanley Internment Camp). In Japan (Achi Yamakita, Aioshi, Akasaka, Akita,

Akenobe, Amagasaki Camp, Aokuma, Arao, Asahigawa, Ashio, Atami, Beppu, Chiba, Chugenji, Fuse, Futatsui City, Hakone, Himeji, Hiraoka, Hitachi, Ikuno, Hitachi, Hirohata).

104.In his book, Prisoners of the Japanese, Gavan Davis wrote, “The idea that a soldier would surrender rather than die or stay alive in a prison camp rather than kill himself, was just alien to the Japanese. Describing the execution of an Allied intelligence officer in New Guinea on March 29, 1943, an anonymous Japanese soldier wrote: ‘“Major Komai stands up and says to the prisoner, ““We are going to kill you.”” When he tells the prisoner that in accordance with Japanese Bushido he would be killed with a Japanese sword and would have two- or three-minutes grace, he listens with bowed head. Now the time has come, and the prisoner is made to kneel on the bank of a bomb crater, filled with water. He is apparently resigned. The precaution is taken of surrounding him with guards with fixed bayonets, but he remains calm. He even stretches his neck out. He is a very brave man indeed… The Major had drawn his favorite sword… He taps the prisoner’s neck slightly with the back of the blade, then rises above his head with both arms and brings it down with a powerful sweep.”’ [Source: Eyewitness to History, edited by John Carey, Avon Books, 1987].

105.IMTFE Judgment, Archives of the Douglas MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Va.

106.With more than a thousand men confined in China’s Fushun War Crimes Prison, Uno Shintarō was the only one of the eight hundred below the rank of captain to receive a severe sentence. He was an information officer for the infantry, and he wrote The Chrysanthemum and the Samurai Sword (published by Tanizawa Shoten).

107.Johnson Chalmers was president and co-founder with Steven Clemons of the Japan Policy Research Institute, an organization that promotes public education about Japan and Asia.

108.On Sasaki confession, see an article published in China Daily (2014–07–06) The confession of Japanese war criminal Nosuke Sasaki. In 2014, China’s State Archives Administration has released the fourth of 45 confessions from Japanese World War II criminals. Lt. Gen. Nosuke Sasaki came to China to join the war in September 1932. He confessed to committing horrendous war crimes and being responsible for the deaths of countless Chinese soldiers and civilians. According to Sasaki’s written confession, in October 1940, in the city of Zhuji, in Zhejiang province, he ordered the execution of about six hundred prisoners of war from the Chongqing Army, forty of them had been seriously wounded in battle.

109.A diary entry of Japanese army doctor Hosaka Akira, assigned to an infantry unit (3rd Infantry Battalion, 13th Regiment, 16th Division in the Shanghai Expedition Army) closing in on Nanking, gives us some idea of that inhumanity: “At 10:00 on November 29, 1937 we left to clean out the enemy in Chang Chou and at noon we entered the town. An order was received to kill the residents and eighty of them, men and women of all ages were shot to death [at dusk]. I hope this will be the last time I’ll ever witness such a scene. The people were all gathered in one place. They were all praying, crying, and begging for help. I just couldn’t bear watching such a pitiful spectacle. Soon the heavy machine guns opened fire and the sight of those people screaming and falling to the ground is one I could not face even if I had had the heart of a monster. War is truly terrible.” (In War Crimes in Japan-Occupied Indonesia: A case of Murder by Medicine, by J. Kevin Baird, Sangkot Marzuki, (University of Nebraska Press, 2015), chapter 3, Beginning at the End.

110.On the Nanking Campaigns, see Yamamoto Masahiro Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000). Yamamoto’s interpretation is based on the diaries of soldiers Mataichi Inoie and So Mizutani; see also David Askew, “The Scale of Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing: An Examination of the Burial Records,” (Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 2004).

111.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 361. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Matsuno Seiya, “Dokugasusen kankei shiryō II, Kaisetsu,” in Jugonen senso gokuhi shiryōshū, hokan 2, Dokugasusen kankei shiryō II (Funi Shuppankan, 1997), 27.

112.Ibid., 361.

113.Ibid., 361–362.

CHAPTER 11

EMPIRE'S DEFEAT

1.At the starting of the Pacific War in 1941, the Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence Unit (HYPO) in Pearl Harbor, under Capt. Joseph Rochefort, had developed sophisticated decrypting techniques. Rochefort and his team worked largely on the FLAG OFFICERS Code while other code breaking teams in Washington and the Philippines worked on the Navy's man code known as JN-25 (JAPAN NAVY). See Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 368.

2.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 386, "As the pre-eminent post-war American naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison concluded, the Battle of the Coral Sea was a "tactical victory for the Japanese but a strategic victory for the United States. The overwhelming importance of the battle to the Allied cause was not the insignificant matter of the sinking of the light carrier Shōhō or the putting out of action of the Shōkaku, but the saving of Port Moresby that was then weakly defended by inexperienced Australian troops."

3.Adm. Sankichi Takahashi, retired former commander in chief of the combined fleet, told a correspondent from the Asahi Shimbun that the smashing of the American fleet at the Battle of the Coral Sea, unlike the static attack at Pearl Harbor, proved that the British and American navies could not live with the matchless Japanese Navy.

4.The fleet carrier Shōkaku was badly damaged and was lucky to survive sinking when damaged plates sprang loose on the journey home. Moreover, the Shōkaku was fortunate to avoid American submarines and get back to Japan for major repairs. Although the Zuikaku escaped any hits, it was also forced to return to Japan to pick-up replacement aircraft and pilots, Bix, 387.

5.Chester W. Nimitz was a fleet admiral of the United States Navy. He played a major role in the Pacific War as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, commanding Allied air, land, and sea forces during World War II. Nimitz was the leading U.S. Navy authority on submarines. On Chester Nimitz see Potter, E.B., Nimitz, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 45. Also see Edwin Hoyt, How they won the war in the Pacific: Nimitz and his admirals, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); James C. Bradford, "Nimitz, Admiral Chester (1885–1966), Gordon Martel, ed., (The Encyclopedia of War, 2011).

6.See H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942, (US Naval Institute Press, 2008).

7."Japan's human losses from the battle at Midway were significant. Out of 2,000 naval airmen available to Japan in total, 110 airmen were lost from the four carriers at Midway, Kaga (21), Soryu (10), Akagi (7) and Hiryu (72). Moreover 721 aircraft technicians were killed, which represented 40 percent of those who embarked. More significant in terms of the balance of naval power was the loss of four of Japan's six fleet carriers; the weapon that above all, after Pearl Harbor and until the development of the atom bomb just four years later, defined the ability of the maritime nations to design their war strategies and project their power." Cited by Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 418.

8.Operation Forager was an offensive launched by the United States forces against imperial Japanese forces in the Mariana Islands and Palau in the Pacific Ocean between June and November 1944 during the Pacific War. See D. Colt Denfelt, Hold the Marianas: The Japanese Defense of the Mariana Islands, (White Mane Pub, 1997).

9.Hellcats were credited with destroying a total of 5,223 enemy aircraft while in service with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm. This can be broken down as 5,163 in the Pacific and 8 more during the invasion of Southern France, plus 52 with the FAA during World War II.

10.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 1022.

11.This vast armada of ships, all in all some 1,439 ships, was the largest fleet ever assembled. At the Normandy D-day landings there were 1,213 ships. See Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), 1023.

12.Ibid., 1024.

13.The Japanese troops on the island commanded by Ushijima had been ordered to hold onto the island at all costs. See Bill Sloan: The Ultimate Battle, p. 18; SSgt Rudy R. Frame, Jr., Okinawa: The Final Great Battle of World War II. Marine Corps Gazette, Archived from the original on December 14, 2013. Also see "Okinawa: The Typhoon of Steel," (American Veterans Center, April 1, 1945).

14.Weighing 72,800 tons and outfitted with nine 18.1 guns, struck by 19 American aerial torpedoes, the battleship Yamato was sunk, drowning 2,498 of its crew.

15.See Sarah Pruitt, Remembering the Battle of Okinawa, June 19, 2015. According to Francis Pike in Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), overall navy losses in personnel were more than 4,900 sailors killed and 4,800 wounded.

16.Overall navy losses in personnel were not insignificant. During a campaign planned for three-weeks that lasted three months, more than 4,900 sailors were killed and 4,800 were wounded. Spruance tried multiple strategies to obviate the damage of the attacks including trying to persuade the army to seize several islands to the north of Okinawa, on which radar stations and fighter directors could have been placed. Similarly, Spruance wanted to seize the large island of Kumei to the west to help pick up the approach of kamikaze from Formosa. Spruance later lamented, "The Army always had some reason why they could not do this." (Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War (1941–1945), 1026.

17.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 395.

18.Louis Allen, Burma: The longest War, (Dent Publishing, 2005). See also Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–45, (Yale Library of Military History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).

19."Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II," (Military History, 24).

20.Ibid., 1057.

21.See Yasuyuki Kitawaki, (former mayor of Hamamatsu, director of the Center for Multilingual Multicultural Education and Research, (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies), (CEMMER), "A Japanese approach to municipal diversity management: The case of Hamamatsu City, 2015, 8–13.

22.Ibid., 8–13.

23.William Craig, The Fall of Japan: The Final Weeks of World War II in the Pacific, (Open Road Integrated Media, 2017), 34.

24.National Diet Library, Japan, 2013.

25.In spite of the ban on bombing the Imperial Palace, either because of inaccuracy or the willful disobedience of the B-29 aircrews, a raid on Tokyo on May 25, 1945, saw the twenty-seven buildings in the Imperial Palace grounds burned to the ground, with just one reception chamber surviving. Twenty-eight members of the imperial staff were killed. See Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 1056.

26.See Hisashi Yamanaka, Kodomotachi no taiheiyō sensō [Children at National Schools and the Age of the Pacific War], 1986. Iwanami Shinsho (Ki 356) (in Japanese). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. See also Ben-Ami Shillony, Universities and Students in Wartime Japan, (The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 45, no. 4, August 1986), 769–787.

CHAPTER 12

FIGHT TO THE DEATH

1.During the crucial interval between the Potsdam Declaration and the August 6 atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito himself said and did nothing about accepting the Potsdam terms. Twice, however, on July 25 and 31, he had made clear to Kido that the imperial regalia had to be defended at all costs. (Nakao, “Dai Tō’A sensō ni okeru bōsei teni chien no yōin,” 119, citing Senshi sōsho: Minami Taiheiyō rikugun sakusen (2) (1969), 444. Also cited by Bix, in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), 502.

2.On the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, see William Craig, The Fall of Japan: The Final Weeks of World War II in the Pacific, (Open Road Integrated Media, 1976), 76–113.

3.Francis Pike, Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) 1058.

4.Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office: 1376–1377.

5.Francis, Pike, 1059.

6.Blinded by their preoccupation with the fate of the imperial house and committed to an optimistic diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, those leaders let pass several opportunities to end their lost war. Citing by Bix, in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 521.

7.See Ellis Zacharias, Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer, (New York: US Naval Institute Press, 2003).

8.See Mokusatsu, “Japan’s Response to the Potsdam Declaration,” Kazuo Kawai, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1950), 409-414.

9.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 500.

10.Yamada, Daigensu Shōwa tennō, 203; Grace P. Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan (Naval Institute Press, 1982), 190.

11.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 501.

12.Ugaki Matome, Senmoroku (Hara Shobō, 1968), 224. Cited by Bix, 501.

13.Yamada, Daigensui Shŏwa tennŏ, 205. Cited by Bix, 503.

14.The bomb was known as “Little Boy”: a uranium gun-type bomb that exploded with about thirteen kilotons of force. The Hiroshima bombing was the second man-made nuclear explosion in history, after the Trinity test. On “Atomic bomb”, see Bernstein, Jeremy, Nuclear Weapons: What You Need to Know, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Also see Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man, (Waukesha, Wisconsin: J. Coster-Mullen, 2012).

15.See William Craig, The Fall of Japan: The Final Weeks of World War II in the Pacific, (Open Road Integrated Media Inc., 2017), 78.

16.Yamada, Daigensui Shōwa tennō, 202. Cited by Bix, 502.

17.Even as the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviets made surrender inevitable, Hirohito continued to consider capitulation as an unacceptable option. Instead of surrendering, he supported the military and civilian leaders who welcomed a final battle on Japanese soil. War Minister Korechika Anami believed, “Japan could at least for a time repulse the enemy and might thereafter somehow find life out of death.” Telling the truth, it is right to say that, after Midway, Japanese naval leaders secretly concluded that Japan’s outlook for victory was poor. The fall of Saipan on July 9, 1944 brought U.S. bombers into Japan homeland’s airspace. At that time, inside the Imperial Palace, it had been decided that a new strategy with a new leadership was necessary to fight the war. The Tōjō cabinet was replaced by that of Koiso Kuniaki. Koiso formed a supreme war-direction council designed to link the cabinet and the high command. It was clear that the war was lost, but declaring defeat was not acceptable to a large

group of officers in the Japanese army and navy, who had been dreaming only of victories. Great firebombing raids in 1945 brought destruction to every major city in Japan. Despite that reality, the Generals were bent on continuing the war, confident that a major victory would help gain more concessions from the Allies during the process of capitulation.

18.On April 1, 1945, 50,000 U.S. combat troops, under the command of Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner Jr., landed on the southwest coast of the Japanese island of Okinawa, 350 miles south of Kyushu, the southern mainland of Japan. The Koiso government fell and was replaced by a Cabinet led by Adm. Suzuki Kantarō. The first action of the new government was to ask the Soviet Union, which was still at peace with Japan, to intercede with the Allies. The Soviet government had agreed, but its reply was delayed while Soviet leaders participated in the Potsdam Conference in July. The Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26. Eleven days later, on August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb nicknamed “Little Boy,” was dropped onto the city of Hiroshima. The bomb detonated some 1,800 feet above the city center of Hiroshima. It took a few seconds for a massive fireball to erupt and instantly vaporize everything in an immediate one-mile radius. Nearly 80,000 Japanese had been killed.

19.Senda Kakō, Tennō to chokugo to Shōwa shi (Sekibunsha, 1983), 394. Cited by Bix, 530.

20.On Hirohito’s decision to surrender read this article by Robert Trumbull, “A Leader, Who Took Japan to War, to Surrender, and Finally to Peace”, (the New York Times, Jan. 7, 1989).

21.In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizō, Naimushō tai Senryōgun (Tokyo: Asaki Bunko, 1987), 16. By another calculation, between the emperor’s broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. Quoted Dower, Embracing Defeat, Notes, 569.

CHAPTER 13

AFTERMATH

1.Margaret MacMillan, Rebuilding the World after the Second World, 2009, (The Guardian, September 11, 2009), 1.

2.Ibid., 2.

3.Ibid., 2.

4.Ibid., 4.

5.The battle has been referred to as the “typhoon of steel” in English, and tetsu no ame (“rain of steel”) or tetsu no bōfū (“violent wind of steel”) in Japanese.

6.“All of these individuals naturally looked forward to returning home quickly. For many, however, repatriation would take years not months, and hundreds and thousands were destined to die without seeing their homeland again. For these millions of individuals, surrender merely marked the beginning of a new stage in lives of escalating uncertainty and brutalization. They became victims of the chaos that reigned in war-torn “liberated” Asia, of epidemic diseases, and of maltreatment by the victorious Allies. In September 1946, more than a year after the emperor’s broadcast, over 2 million Japanese still remained unrepatriated and the government acknowledged that the where-about of 540,000 others were unknown.” This information is cited in John W. Dower’s book, Embracing Defeat, 50.

7.On the Great Purge in Russia, see Christopher Andrew; Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, (New York: Basic Books, 2000). Also see Robert Conquest,

The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, (revised ed.) (London: Macmillan, 1968).

8."As many as 7.8 million Koreans were conscripted as forced labor or soldiers during Japan's imperial expansion before and during World War II, according to South Korean estimates. They toiled in mines and munitions factories across Asia and fought alongside Japanese troops. Women were sent to military-run brothels." Hulbert, H. B., History of Korea, (Routledge 1999).

9."Hundreds of the abandoned children, invariably poor and speaking only Chinese, began to come to Japan on officially sponsored trips in the 1980s to try to reestablish contact with their families. Even where reunions did occur, they were excruciatingly painful." John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, note (23), 570.

10.See Margaret MacMillan, Rebuilding the world after the Second World War, 2009 (The Guardian, September 11, 2009), 2–6.

11.John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan In the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999), 90–91.

12.The basic minimum standard of 2,200 calories was established in the Japanese government's first "economic white paper," published in 1947. See Rekishi Kagaku Kenkyūkai, Nihon Dōjidai Shi, p. 196; SNNZ 7:191, 323; Yomiuri Shimbun Shūsen Zengo, 122–23. Also see Dower, 96.

13.John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999), 45.

14.The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issue by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official Ōkurashō (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 11, 15–19. Cited by Dower, chapter 1, note (14), 570.

15.Ibid., 45–46.

16.Reports of General MacArthur on the Kyushu vivisections. The reports describe the treatment some POWs received from lower-level camp attendants. By one count, a total of 32,624 Allied POWs were released within Japan, from a total of 127 camps, 102–4, 169–70, 173). See also John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company/ The New Press, 2000), 54.

17."The wartime floods turned almost four million people —over 20 percent of the total population— in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu into refugees. In Henan, the province for which the most detailed statistics are available, the Yellow River floods displaced more than 1,172,000. Refugees displaced by the foods came to 67.7 percent of the total population in Xihua, 55.1 percent in Henan's Fuguou County, 52.2 percent in Weishi County, 32.2 percent in Taikang County, and more than 10 percent in Zhongmu County." On the Yellow River flood see Micah Muscolino, The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938-1950, (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

18.Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 30, 1945, cited in Yoshida, Nihonjin no sensōkan, 26–27. Also cited by Bix, in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 557.

19.Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 30, 1945, cited in Yoshida, Nihonjin no sensōkan, 26–27. Also cited by Bix, in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 557.

20.Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth, (Villard Books, New York, 1989), 361.

21.Ibid., 363.

22.Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

23.See History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (5 volumes; accessed 2011–10–30).

24.Clinton Hartley Grattan is the author of A Preface to Chaos: War in the Making (New York: Dodge, 1936), The United States and the Southwest Pacific, (Harvard University Press, 2014), (1961).

25.William Henry Chamberlin was the author of several books about the Cold War, Communism, and US foreign policy, including the Russian Revolution of 1917–1921—(1935), which was written in Russia between 1922 and 1934 while he was the Moscow correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor.

26.Sheldon Richman, The Consequences of World War II, (The Future of Freedom Foundation, November 1, 1991).

CHAPTER 14

PAYING FOR THE WAR

1.The Cairo Declaration was the outcome of the Cairo Conference in Cairo, Egypt, on November 27, 1943. Pres. Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China were present. The declaration developed ideas from the 1941 Atlantic Charter, which was issued by the Allies of World War II to set goals for the post-war order. The Cairo Declaration is cited in Clause Eight (8) of the Potsdam Declaration, which is referred to by Japanese Instrument of Surrender. See “Cairo Communiqué, December 1, 1943,” (Japan National Diet Library, December 1, 1943).

2.On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union officially declared war on Japan, flooding 1.6 million troops into Manchuria, an area of 600,000 square miles in the North-East of China. “Despite a strong Japanese army of a million men awaiting them, the Soviet force, under command of Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, swept into China, Korea and the Kuril Islands, forcing a rapid retreat. By the end of the engagement, the Soviets had only lost around 8,000 troops compared to the 80,000 lost by Japan”. (The Moscow Times, August 8, 2019).

3.The Jewel Voice Broadcast (Gyokuon-hōsō) was the radio broadcast in which Japanese Emperor Hirohito read out the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the Greater East Asia War, (Daitōa-sensō-shūketsu-no-shōsho), announcing to the Japanese people that the Japanese government had accepted the Potsdam Declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of the Japanese military at the end of World War II. This speech was broadcast at noon Japan Standard Time on August 15, 1945. The speech was the first time that an emperor of Japan had spoken to the common people. A digitally remastered version of the broadcast was released on June 30, 2015.

4.On September 2, 1945, representatives from the Japanese government and Allied forces assembled aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay to sign the Japanese instrument of Surrender, which effectively ended World War II. The Document was prepared by the U.S. War Department and approved by Pres. Harry S. Truman. The Japanese signatories of the surrender were Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and Gen. Yoshijiro Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff; acting as supreme commander of the Allied Forces, Gen. Douglas MacArthur accepted their surrender. The formal ceremony was witnessed by delegates from the other Allied nations, including China, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.

5.George Catlett Marshall, “The Papers of George Catlett, “The Man of the Age,” (JHU Press, October 1, 1949), 205.

6.See FRUS, 1951, 6: 1293—96. The quote is from 1295.

7.“There is enclosed a draft letter to Mr. Dulles informing him of his designation and setting forth the terms of reference of his mission.” See George Catlett Marshall, “The Papers of George Catlett, “The Man of the Age,” 29, 325, 427. The letter included a statement that Dulles should keep in mind during his negotiations that the United States intended to commit troops to assist in the defense of Japan, that it desired that Japan should eventually be able to defend itself, and that the US would enter into mutual assistance agreements with Australia, New Zealand,

the Philippines, and perhaps Indonesia to “resist aggression from without” and from within should Japan “again become aggressive.” (Acheson and Marshall to Truman, memorandum and enclosure, January 9, 1951, NA/RG 330, CD 387 [Japan].

8.This draft was not formally circulated to other interested powers.

9.China was not invited, the latter due to disagreements on whether the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China represented the Chinese people. Korea was also not invited due to a similar disagreement on whether South Korea or North Korea represented the Korean people. On the Treaty of San Francisco, see Treaty of Peace with Japan (including transcript with signatories: Source attributed: United Nations Treaty Series 1952 (reg. no. 1832), vol. 136, 45–164. See also on the issue, John Price, Cold War Relic: The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and The Politics of Memory, (Asian Perspective, vol. 25, no. 3 (2001), 31–60.

10.Treaty of Peace with Japan (with two declarations). The Treaty was signed at San Francisco, on September 8, 1951.

11.In accordance with Article 14 of the Treaty, Allied forces confiscated all assets owned by the Japanese government, firms, organization and private citizens, in all colonized or occupied countries except China, which were dealt with under Article 21. China repossessed all Japanese assets in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Moreover, Article 4 of the treaty stated that “the disposition of property of Japan and of its authorities presently administering such areas and the residents… shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities.” Although Korea was not a signatory state of the treaty, it was also entitled to the benefits of Article 4 by the provisions of Article 21.

12.According to Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951): “Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war…Payments of reparations started in 1955, lasted for 23 years and ended in 1977. On War reparations see F. Occhino, K. Oosterlinck, K. and E. White (2008), “How much can a victor force the vanquished to pay”? (Journal of Economic History, 68), 1–45.

13.Article V: “Japan is prepared to pay reparations to the Union of Burma in order to compensate the damage and suffering caused by Japan during the war and also is willing to render co-operation in order to contribute towards the economic rehabilitation and development and the advancement of social welfare in the Union of Burma. Nevertheless it is recognized that the resources of Japan are not sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all the damage and suffering of the Union of Burma and other countries caused by Japan during the war and at the same time meet its other obligations…” On Japan’s assistance to Burma see David I. Steinberg, Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (1990), 51–107.

14.“The Japanese occupation of the Philippines occurred between 1942 and 1945, when Imperial Japan occupied the Commonwealth of the Philippines during World War II. The invasion of the Philippines started on December 8, 1941, ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Lacking air cover, the American Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines withdrew to Java on December 12, 1941. General MacArthur was ordered out by President Truman, leaving his men at Corregidor on the night of March 11, 1942 for Australia. The 76,000 starving and sick American and Filipino defenders in Bataan surrendered on April 9, 1942 and were forced to endure the infamous Bataan Death March. Japan occupied the Philippines for over three years, until the surrender. The puppet republic was headed by President José P. Laurel. The only political party allowed during the occupation was the Japanese-organized KALIBAPI. More than a thousand women, some being under the age of 18, were imprisoned as “comfort women,” kept in sexual slavery for Japanese military personnel during the occupation. One such place where these women were imprisoned is Bahay na Pula.” On the occupation of the Philippines by Japan, see Daniel B. Schirmer, Stephen Rosskamm, Shalom, “War Collaboration and Resistance. The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance, (International Studies: South End Press. See also William J. Pomeroy, The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance, (International Publishers, 1992).

15.“The Japanese military entered Vietnam in September 1940 and remained there until the end of World War II (August 1945). By occupying Vietnam, Japan hoped to close off China’s southern border and halt its supply of weapons and materials. Vietnam’s occupation also fit into Japan’s long-term imperial plans. For most of their occupation, the Japanese left the French colonial government in place. The Japanese troops during the Pacific War had used Vietnam for the conquest of Thailand and Burma, and a staging point for attacks further south.” On

Japan's occupation of Vietnam see Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey, and Steve Thompson, "The Japanese Occupation of Vietnam," (Alpha History, January 10, 2018).

16."On July 26, 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and China issued the Potsdam Proclamation, which stipulated, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." The status of "minor islands" such as Dokdo would be subject, therefore, to the decision by Allied Powers based on historical facts." On Resolution of Territorial Disputes over Islands in East Asia after the end of World War II, see Seokwoo Lee, "International Law and the Resolution of Territorial Disputes over Islands in East Asia," (unpublished doctoral Thesis, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, July 2001), 244–245.

17.The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945.

CHAPTER 15

EMPEROR SHŌWA OR WARRIOR'S MONARCH

1.On Article 11 of the Meiji constitution, "The Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were under the emperor's direct control," see Akita George, "Foundations of constitutional government in modern Japan, 1868–1900. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). See also William G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

2.See Patrick H. Choi, The Ambiguous Emperor: Hirohito's Role in Engaging and Ending the Pacific War, (Harvard University Extension School, 2017), 24. See also Norikazu Kawagishi, "The Constitution of Japan: An Unfinished Revolution," (Yale Law School, 2003), 63.

3.In "A View of International Law in the Kellogg-Briand Pact" and "Britain's New Monroe Doctrine and the Effect of the No-War Treaty," both published in 1928, Tachi belabored the obvious point that the signatories to the pact had renounced war "as an instrument of national policy," but not the right of self-defense. Focusing on the interpretive notes that France, Great Britain, and the United States exchanged prior to signing the Pact on August 27, 1928, he observed that: Britain does not recognize the application of the No-War Pact in regions where it claims to have a vital interest…If other countries recognize this claim of Britain, it will lead to a situation where the United States too will claim that war based on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine is not prohibited by the No War Pact. I have to acknowledge, therefore, that, in addition to cases of the activation of the right of self-defense, wars exist that cannot be prohibited by the Pact in connection with the Monroe Doctrine of the United States and the New Monroe-ism of Britain.

4.Honjō Shigeru, Honjo Diaries: Honjo Nikki, trans. Mikiso Hane, Tokyo, (Tokyo University Press, 1967), 75.

5.The Sakurakai or Cherry Blossom Society was the name chosen by young officers within the Imperial Japanese Army in September 1930 for their secret society established with the goal of reorganizing the state along totalitarian militaristic lines, via a military coup d'état. See James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History, (W.W. Norton Company, 2002), 414. During World War II, the cherry blossom was used to motivate the Japanese people, to stoke nationalism and militarism among the populace. See also Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and the Militarization of Aesthetics in Japan History, (University of Chicago, 2002), 9–10.

6.Operation Chahar known in Chinese as the Nankou Campaign was the second attack of the Kwantung Army and the Inner Mongolian Army of Prince Teh Wang on Inner Mongolia after the failure of the Suiyuan Campaign (1936). The Chahar Expeditionary Force was under the direct command of General Hideki Tōjō, the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army. Later, the 1st Army, under General Kiyoshi Katsuki, was also involved. See Philipp S. Jowett, Rays of the Rising Sun, Armed Forces of Japan's Asian Allies 1931–45, Volume 1: China & Manchuria, (Helion & Co. Ltd., 2004).

7.Ogasawara's Tōgō gensui sōden first appeared in a limited edition in the spring of 1921; it was reissued in an inexpensive popular edition in 1925. See Tanaka Hiromi, "Kyozō no gunshin Tōgō Heihachirō," 234–35. Cited also by Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (Harper Collins, 2016), 239.

8.Ibid., 239–240. See also Tanaka, "Kyozō no gunshin Tōgō Heihachirō," 225, 236, 239.

9.On Mukden Incident, OSS agents took photographs of Japanese depredations and wrote reports on the activities of the Japanese forces in Manchuria. All Chinese were forced to leave Mukden after Japan's occupation.

10.During the Pacific War, Army Imperial Headquarter was continually communicating with the Imperial household in detail about the military situation. On 8 October, Sugiyama signed a 47-page report to the emperor (sōjōan) outlining in minute detail plans for the advance into Southeast Asia. On September 27, 1940, under Hirohito's leadership, Japan became a contracting partner of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy forming the Axis Powers. From those facts, it is correct to say, "As time passed, Hirohito became more involved in Japanese politics throughout the 1940s."

11.In his "Monologue," Hirohito noted that he had brought an end to the fighting in Shanghai. "When the suspension of hostilities occurred on March 3," it was "because I had expressly ordered Shirakawa beforehand not to expand the conflict.

12.Gordon M. Berger, Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945 (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 97-153.

13.C. Peter Chen, Japan's Refusal of Washington Treaty, (Northern Vermont, University Online, Dec 19, 1934).

14.James B. Cowley, "Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930s," (The Journal of Asian Studies, 1962). See also Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism, (Greenwood Press, 1957).

15.Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954), 229.

16.Ibid., 229.

17.Edward Behr, Hirohito behind the Myth, (Villard Books, 1989), introduction.

18.Daikichi Irokawa, The Age of Hirohito, (New York: Free Press, 1995), 77–80.

19.Noriko Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, (University of Washington Press), 6.

20.MacArthur's precise position over the future of Emperor Hirohito has stimulated a lot of speculation. Due to declassifications dated in the past twenty years and the personal interest of MacArthur Memorial archivist James Zobel, some worthy documentation emerges on the MacArthur-Hirohito relation.

21.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 11–12.

22.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2015), see introduction and background.

23.In his early career, Inoue established himself as a Marxist historian, publishing works on the Japanese imperial system and buraku.

24.Edward, Behr, Hirohito behind the Myth, (Villard Books, 1989) xxxiii.

25.Ibid., 55.

26.The authenticity of the document was long accepted, and it is still quoted in some Chinese textbooks, but historian John Dower states that "most scholars now agree that it was a masterful anti-Japanese hoax.") See William G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, (Oxford University Press, 1991). See also John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War; 1987, and John T. Stephan The Tanaka Memorial (1927): Authentic or Spurious? (Modern Asian Studies, 1973), 733–745.

27.Cited by John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat in chapter sixteen: What Do You Tell the Dead When You Lose?, 488,

28.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2015), 20.

29.Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki held several key leadership positions during World War II. These included chief of staff for Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the 1st Battleship Division that included the giant battleships Yamato and Musashi, and commanding officer of the 5th Air Fleet as he directed kamikaze attacks against Allied ships off Okinawa. His diary written from October 1941 to August 1945 provided an invaluable primary source of the Imperial Japanese Navy's wartime strategy and battle tactics.

30.Cited by Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 461: "On December 31, 1942, the Imperial Headquarters Conference was held with Hirohito and the Army General Staff led by Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama at the Imperial Palace. The chiefs of staff reported they would cancel the attempt to recapture Guadalcanal, and the withdrawal of troops would begin at the end of January. Hirohito sanctioned that decision but insisted, "It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere." Sugiyama promised to "take the offensive in New Guinea area and restore the morale of the troops." By placing their hopes on a new offensive in New Guinea, Hirohito and the General Staff delayed one again Japan's strategic shift to the defensive in the Pacific."

31.For the full exchange at the Aug. 5, 1943, audience, see Sugiyama memo, ge, "Kaisetsu," 24–25. Cited by Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 466.

32.Ibid., 463.

33.See Herbert P. Bix on the conference of the Imperial Headquarters on September 30, 1943, 468–469.

34.Hirohito's regular military teachers included Gen. Ōsako Naoharu, an expert on the Russo-Japanese War; two navy rear admirals; and four active-duty lieutenant generals. Hirohito's army lectures also included two generals who had commanded troops in China during World War I, Gen. Ugaki Kazushige and Gen. Nara Takeji. Another naval officer who lectured Hirohito was his own uncle, Adm. Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, an expert on German military theory. From them, the emperor learned the inherent superiority of offense over defense. See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 44–45.

35."A skilled pilot who, late in 1937, had helped plan and direct the first air offensive against China's cities from the aircraft Kaga, Jō Eiichirō was very close to the emperor. As a naval officer, he served on the Navy General Staff and taught at the Navy and Army War Colleges. He was the vice commander of the Thirteenth Naval Air Force, charged with bombing operations deep within China. Jō came with the plan for a "kamikaze" Special Attack Corps in June 1943. The Corps recruited and trained young pilots willing to smash their Zero fighters, armed with 550-pound bombs, into the decks of American ships." See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 450–451. See also Jo nikki, 324.

36.Ibid., 471–472.

37.This historic first meeting between Gen. Douglas MacArthur appointed supreme commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Emperor Hirohito was held on the morning of September 27, 1945 at the American Embasy in Tokyo. The two met for minutes and one photo was taken. Hirohito accepted responsibility for the conduct of the war. See Motoko Rich, "Aide's Diary Suggests Hirohito Agonized Over His War Responsibility," (The New York Times, Aug. 24, 2018).

38.According to Professor Bix, Kidō always tried to leave the impression that he and Hirohito were consistent opponents of the militarists. Interviewed on April 6, 1966, he declared: "On the whole, our minds were already prepared [for surrender] earlier. That's why we weren't shocked by the atomic bombs…There was also a plus aspect to the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. I assumed at the time that if there had been no atomic bombs and the Soviet Union hadn't joined in, we might not have succeeded." The following year he opened boastfully: "Because the Soviets and the atomic bombs did the job for us, one could say that Japan was able to revive to this extent." "Kido Kōichi-shi to no taiwa," in Kanazawa Makoto et al., eds., Kazoku: Meiji hyakunen

sokumenshi (Hakuyō Sensho, 1978), 185; Wa da Haruki, “Nisso sensō” in Hara Teruyuki et al., eds., Kōza Suravu no sekai 8, Suravu to Nihon (Kōbundō, 1995), 119. Quoted in Bix’s note, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 765.

39.In Kido’s Diary it is clear that although Hirohito never visited the war theaters but he exercised a decisive and controlling influence on theater operations. As Bix said, Hirohito received in audience generals and admirals returning on duty from the Pacific and China battlefronts. He carefully edited his rescripts to be sure exactly what words were used. He inspected military schools, granted audiences to industrial leaders to encourage production, took a keen interest in weapons development, and everywhere drove home the message of sacrifice for the state.” See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 441.

40.Ibid., 441.

41.One of the greatest atrocities of the Japanese army during the Pacific War was the use of chemical weapons. On July 1937, Hirohito authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese soldiers and civilians during the invasion of Wuhan (1938), then in 1939 in Guangzhou, and in 1943 at the Battle of Changde. Cited on World War II Database, Contributor: C. Peter Chen, In Dec 1941, Okamura received and obeyed the scorched earth policies dictated by his superiors under army order number 575; his troops were responsible for the killing of over two million Chinese, mostly civilians in Hebei and Shandong, as the result of this order.

42.See John W. Dower, “Japan Addresses Its War Responsibility,” (The Journal of the International Institute), volume 3, Issue 1, Fall 1995.

43.On sentencing Lieutenants Dean E. Mark and William G. Farrow etc. see John Chandler Griffin, Lt. Bill Farrow: Doolittle Raider, (Pelican, 2006). See also B. Chance Saltzman and Thomas R. Searle, Introduction to the United States Air Force, Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, and (Air University Press Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 2001).

44.National Lawyers Guild (NLG) a progressive public interest association founded in 1937 and dedicated to the need for basic and progressive change in the structure of the political and economic system in the U.S., with finality that human rights shall be regarded as more sacred than property interests,” as early December 1945, had unanimously called for a Hirohito trial. Calling him Japan’s “despotic master,” the Guild insisted that Hirohito was no different from Hitler or Mussolini. “Try Hirohito, Philippines Lawyers Urge,” (Pacific Stars and Stripes, Dec. 23, 1945), 1, 2. “Apprehension, Trial and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East,” Apr. 25, 1946, (MacArthur Archives). The role of Japanese journalism over the years in denying the reality of horrible World War II massacres, such as that at Nanjing, is a major matter of concern in the work of Katsuichi Honda. Honda is a Japanese journalist and famous for his writing on the Nanjing Massacre. During the 1970s, he wrote a series of articles on the atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese soldiers during World War II called “Chūgoku no Tabi” (Travels in China). The series were published by the Asahi Shimbun. Honda also worked as a war correspondent in Vietnam during the Vietnam War, an experience which contributed to stocking his interest in Japanese wartime history.

45.The Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Philippines on December 8, 1941, nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States controlled the Philippines at the time and possessed important military bases there. As at Pearl Harbor, American aircraft were severely damaged in the initial Japanese attack. General MacArthur was ordered out, leaving his men at Corregidor. The 76,000 American and Filipino defenders the Philippines surrendered on April 9, 1942 and were forced to endure the infamous Bataan Death March on which between 8,000 and 10,000 died or were murdered. Japan occupied the Philippines for over three years. On October 20, 1944, U.S. forces landed on Leyte. General Yamashita was assigned to defend the Philippines “at all costs.” In early 1945, American troops under the command of MacArthur crushed Japanese forces during the Battle of Manila in which an estimated 1,000 U.S. soldiers, 16,000 Japanese soldiers, and 100,000 Filipino noncombatants died. See Richard Connaughton, John Pimlot, and Duncan Anderson, Battle of Manila, (Presidio Press, 2002). See also S. Sandler, World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia Military History of the United States, (Routledge, 2000).

46.Prior to this battle, Japan was ruled by daimyo (samurai lords) who established their own small kingdoms. Forces led by Toyotomi Hideyoshi defeated those of the shogun (military dictator). With Akechi Mitsuhide had

begun the reunification of Japan. Hideyoshi's brilliant generalship has been compared to that of Napoleon Bonaparte. Daimyō rule remained in effect in some areas of Japan coming to an end in 1871.

47.Francis Pike, in Hirohito's War: "Thus Hirohito spent most of the Pacific War dressed in military uniform and followed the tides of conflict in minute detail from the war room built in the basement of his palace – increasingly offering the military the benefits of his cryptic advice as Japan stumbled toward defeat. It is notable that the two most decisive interventions of his reign – the last being his acceptance of the Allies' unconditional terms of surrender in August 1945 – came when the army was in a state of decision-making paralysis.

48.Atcheson served as Gen. Douglas MacArthur's political adviser and allied council chairman. Before that position, he was US diplomat in China, there he tried to mediate in the conflicts between Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party for US government but failed. See Christopher R. Lew and Edwin Pak-wah Leung, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War, (Scarecrow Press, 29 July 2013), 95; see also John Paton Davies, Jr., China Hand: An Autobiography, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 31 January 2012), 267–269.

49.The international Far Eastern Commission exempted the emperor as a war criminal on April 3, 1946; the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East did so publicly on June 18. Formal U.S. policy consideration of "treatment of Hirohito" was removed from the agenda of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on June 12). This text is quoted in notes from John W. Dower's book, Embracing Defeat, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 599.

50.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 545.

51.See Kido Koichi, Diary of Marquis Kido, (Praeger, 1984).

52.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 571.

53.FRUS, Diplomatic Papers 1945: The Far East, vol. 6, 270. Cited by Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HaperCollins, 2016), 543.

54."Guide to the papers of Sir William Webb," Australian War Memorial, Retrieved 1 December, 2005.

55.Fellers, Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan, with appendices and minutes of the Conference on Psychological Warfare Against Japan," Manila, May 7–8, 1949, 2–3, 7–10, 14; box 4 of Fellers papers. "In the spring of 1945, MacArthur's command convened a meeting of psychological-warfare personnel from the combined U.S. and British forces in Manila. By then, Fellers in his staff had compressed "Japanese behavior patterns" that could be exploited by the Allies into a fifteen-point mantra: "inferiority complex, credulousness, regimented thought, tendency to misrepresent, self-dramatization, strong sense of responsibility, superstition, face-saving tendency, intense emotionality, attachment to home and family, and Emperor worship." A "wedge" policy was agreed upon, as was the idea of using the emperor 'to further our aims' at a proper time." "At one point, the naval intelligence officer for the British fleet in the Pacific suggested, apparently in all seriousness, that kamikaze suicide attacks might be deterred by painting the emperor's picture on the sides of Allied ships." Fellers, "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan" (May 7–8), 10, 11, 13, 18, 22, 31–32.

56.Fellers memorandum to commander in chief, October 2, 1945, in box 3 of the Fellers papers in the Hoover Institution. See William P. Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 360–361.

57.The international Far Eastern Commission exempted the emperor as a war criminal on April 3, 1946; the persecution at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East did so publictly on June 18. Formal U.S. policy consideration of "treatment of Hirohito" was removed from the agenda of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on June 12. Cited by John W. Dower in his notes, Embracing Defeat, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 599.

58.The debate between Truman and MacArthur over the "proper" rehabilitation of postwar Japan is a major focus of Hans H. Baerwald, former MacArthur staffer turned post-Occupation Government analyst. According to Baerwald, Truman and MacArthur shared the same ambition to purge Japan from its militarist past, but their

“similar personalities” and “conflicting responsibilities” led to disagreements over “tactics and strategy.” Baerwald, Purge of Japanese Leaders. Hadley who had a minor role in MacArthur’s Tokyo command shared a similar analysis. See, Eleanor M. Hadley, Antitrust in Japan, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970).

59.Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida memoirs; the story of Japan in crisis, (London, Heinemann, 1961).

CHAPTER 16

ANGEL'S FACE AND DEVIL'S SOUL

1.Charley Granvorka in Jean Sénat Fleury's book, The Trial of the Emperor: Hirohito Guilty or Innocent, (Xlibris, 2019), xi.

2.Ibid., xi.

3.Ibid., xi.

4.Charley Granvorka in Jean Sénat Fleury's book, Adolf Hitler and Hirohito: On Trials, (Xlibris, 2020), 274.

5.Ibid., 277.

6.Since 1926, Hirohito was head of state and supreme commander of the Army and Navy. He was assisted by a lord privy seal as political secretary and adviser. But operational control of the services fell to the Army Chief General Staffs, who made up the Supreme Command. The central institutions of government were an Imperial House, the Diet (legislative assembly), and the cabinet headed by a prime minister. See Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, (Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 73.

7.The General Staffs of the Army and Navy held unusually strong and independent positions under the Prussian-style Meiji Constitution adopted in the late nineteenth century. Subject theoretically to the Emperor, the Supreme Command acted outside the administrative authority of the cabinet, including that of its Army and Navy minister members. Military strategies, plans, and operations were the sole prerogative of the chiefs of staff, and they need not to be disclosed to anyone save the emperor, to whom they had direct access. Ibid., 73–74.

8.Imperial Headquarters Army Order Number 8.

9.On South China Morning Post, "Japan used chemical weapons in war against China and now there's a military report to prove it, historian says," July 7, 2019. "Although the Imperial Japanese Army systematically destroyed all records of the war after its defeat, according to historian Seiya Matsuno, now there is a military report to prove that Japan used chemical weapons in war against China. The official report, compiled by a frontline nerve gas battalion of the Japanese Army posted in northern China, recorded that the unit used munitions containing a blister agent and a sternutatory agent in 1939 during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Matsuno said it was the first discovery of a report in which the Japanese army itself details the use of poison gases."

10.The diary is found in NA, RG 153, entry 180, War Crimes Branch, China War Crimes File, 1945–48, box 5, folder: Field Diary Kept by Member of Japanese Medical Corps. See Daqing Yang, Diary of a Japanese Army Medical Doctor, 1937.

11.On Conference, see statements by Suzuki, Togo, Yonai, Hiranuma, Toyoda, Ikeda, Hoshina, Yoshizumi, Sakimizu, and Kido. See also Memoirs of Togo, Toyoda, Sakomizu, and Toshikazu Kase. (7)

12.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), 373.

13.Ibid., 373.

14."Hirohito's Imperial Headquarters departed from Meiji's practice in excluding civil officials on the ground that they had no right to know military secrets. His Imperial Headquarters also allowed the military to participate in shaping national policy and global strategy from a more privileged position than in the past. Conversely, it

strengthened the emperor's (and thus his advisers') voice in military and political decision making. Power that Hirohito had lost to the military earlier in the decade was recovered as the war expanded and the defective nature of Japan's total war machine became increasingly apparent." Cited by Bix, in Notes (329–331, 331–335), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 735–736.

15.On August 18, 1941, with the question of war in the balance, Konoe proposed a meeting at the highest government level. A formal reply was never received. The meeting was never held. U.S. ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew's wrote in his diary, "is a gauge of the determination" of the Konoe administration to resolve the ongoing crisis.

16.Facing an oil embargo by the United States, the Japanese government decided to execute a plan developed by the military branch largely led by Osami Nagano and Isoroku Yamamoto to bomb the United States naval base in Hawaii.

17.Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932–1945 (Oxford University Press, 1979).

18.Chisuga, "War Diary," (Goldstein and Dillon, eds., Pearl Harbor Papers), 183–84.

19.Relations between the United States and Japan had been deteriorating quickly since Japan's occupation of Indochina in 1940 and the implicit menacing the Philippines (an American protectorate), with the occupation of the Cam Ranh naval base approximately 800 miles from Manila. American retaliation included the seizing of all Japanese assets in the States and the closing of the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping.

20.William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940–194, highly detailed semi-official US government history, 871–901.

21.On Hull's note to the Japanese ambassador see Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, (Yale University Press, 1948).

22.The Hull note, officially the Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan, was perceived as an ultimatum by the Japanese government. The note asked Japan to withdraw its troops from China and other occupied territories. Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō said to his cabinet that "this is an ultimatum." Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983).

23.Charley Granvorka, The Trial of the Emperor: Hirohito Guilty or Innocent, (Xlibris, 2019), 208. Also cited by Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 519.

24.Cited in Sonni Efron's article, "New book shows Hirohito was not whipping boy," (Los Angeles Times, September 5, 2000).

25."Although Hirohito never visited the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised a decisive and controlling influence on theater operations, both in planning and execution, whenever he chose to do so. As during the first four years of the China was, he went on issuing the highest military orders of the Imperial Headquarters, and sometimes audited the conferences that led to the decisions transmitted in his name. He continued to receive in audience generals and admirals returning on duty from the Pacific and China battlefronts…" Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 441.

26.See Herbert Bix, "The Shōwa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," in Journal of Japanese Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer 1992), 307.

27.Independence of the supreme command of the military is generally considered as the touchstone of the complex relationship between the military and politics in imperial Japan. Criticized by both Western and Japanese historiography as having paved the way for the emergence of militarism, this "independence" is alleged to go back to the establishment of the Army General Staff Office as an organ detached from the Ministry of the Army, having direct access to the throne according to the Prussian model. See Éric, Seizelet, The birth of the independence of the

supreme command of the military in Japan at the time of Emperor Meiji (1868–1912), 647, (Revue Historique 2018/3 (No 687).

28.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), 329. Also see Sejima Ryūzō, Taiken kara mita Dai Tō'A sensō," in Gunjishi Gakkai, ed., Dai niji sekai taisen (3): shūsen (Kinseisha, Sept. 1995), 398–99.

29.See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), notes #36, 736, "Final decisions of the Imperial Headquarters on matters of grave strategic import, like important decisions of the liaison conference, required meetings in the emperor's presence. However, as Yamada Akira pointed out, sometimes the two chiefs of staff made decisions of the Imperial Headquarters without ever convening a formal conference. When such a decision was formally submitted to the emperor, and approved by him, it went into effect automatically. Yamada, Dai gensui Shōwa tenno, 70.

30.The Meiji constitution was founded on the principle that sovereignty resided in the person of the emperor by virtue of his divine ancestry "unbroken for ages eternal," rather than in the people. The Meiji constitutional regime was based upon a system in which the most important element of modern constitution, freedom of expression, was extremely fragile from its inception because of the premise that the constitution had been bestowed upon the nation as a gracious imperial gift. Article 11 declares that the emperor commands the army and navy. According to the Meiji Constitution, the emperor has supreme command over the army and navy. He has the authority to declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, appoint and dismiss all civil and military officers, confer marks of honor, order pardons, and open and close parliament and dissolve its house. Ministers of state are responsible to the emperor. See Frank O. Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 115–132; Kawagishi, "The Constitution of Japan," 62; Saki Dockrill, Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor, Review of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 4 (Cambridge University Press, October 1992), 319–333. Also see David H. Rosenbloom, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States and Great Britain, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 18.

31.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), 120.

32.See MNN, 289–91, where he discusses Hirohito's and his own participation in naval exercises staged outside Tokyo Bay between October 20, and 25, 1927. Makino's entry of Aug. 23, 1921, notes: "Yesterday the chief military aide-de-camp visited me and said, 'I think it's necessary to devise a method for him to learn political affairs following his return.' I agreed emphatically… and told him to study the matter." MNN, 25.

33.Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth, (New York, NY: Random House: vintage, 1990).

34.See Chaen Yoshio, Zusetsu Ni Niroku Jiken, Nihon Tosho Center, 2001, 136, 146. See also Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism, (Greenwood Press, 1957), 137, 143; James B. Crowley, Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930s, (The Journal of Asian Studies, 1962), 11, 322, 323.

35.From 1927–29 and 1932–34, Okada served as minister of the navy. He later became the thirty-first prime minister of Japan. He resigned as prime minister after the abortive military coup of February 26, 1936, in which he narrowly escaped assassination. See Jesse Russell, Keisuke Okada, (Book on Demand Ltd., 2013). See also Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins Publishers, 2016); and Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, (Oxford University Press, 2003).

36.Admiral Suzuki served in the First Sino-Japanese War, commanding a torpedo boat and participated in a night torpedo assault in the Battle of Weihaiwei in 1895. During the Russo-Japanese War, he commanded Destroyer Division 2 in 1904, which picked up survivors of the Port Arthur Blockade Squadron during the Battle of Port Arthur. After serving as chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, he retired and accepted the position as privy councilor and grand chamberlain from 1929 to 1936. He narrowly escaped assassination in the February 26 incident in 1936. On April 7, 1945, after Prime Minister Kiniaki Koiso's resignation, Suzuki was appointed at his place and contributed to the final peace negotiations with the Allied Powers in World War II. See Richard Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, (Penguin, 2001). See also Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History, (Holt, 2004).

37.Kōichi Kido, nikki, jō, 167. The naval officers had been influenced by Ōkawa Shūmei and Lt. Comm. Fujii Hitoshi, an ultranationalist killed in Shanghai in February 1932. See TN, dai nikan (Chūō Kōronsha, 1995), May 20, 1933, 78. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 252.

38.From a constitutional point of view, Hirohito's position was clear. The Meiji constitution gave the Emperor absolute power. The Meiji constitution, promulgated on February 11, 1889 (the anniversary of the National Foundation Day of Japan in 660 BC), asserted, …the emperor was the successor in an unbroken, sacred blood lineage, based on male descendants, and that government was subordinated to monarchy on that basis. It defined him as "sacred and inviolable," "head of empire" [genshu], supreme commander [daigensu] of the armed forces, and superintendent of all powers of sovereignty. He could convoke and dissolve the Imperial Diet; issue imperial ordinances in place of law; and appoint and dismiss ministers of state, civil officials, and military officers and determine their salaries. Cited by Francis Pike on Hirohito's War: The Great Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), 115–116.

39.According to the historian Hata Ikuhiko, the rebels contacted General Honjō both by phone and written message prior to the attack on the Okada cabinet. Honjō, the first of the entourage to learn of the mutiny, could have warned the intended targets of their danger if he had been so inclined. He did not. By the time Honjō came to court at 6:00 A.M. on the twenty-sixth, however, Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata already knew that Saitō had been murdered and Suzuki seriously wounded. So too did the emperor. Francis Pike on Hirohito's War: The Great Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016), 298–299.

40.Ikki Kita, was a harsh critic of the Emperor system and the Meiji constitution, he asserted that the Japanese were not the emperor's people, rather the Emperor was the "people's emperor." He advocated a complete reconstruction of Japan through a form of fascism. See Wilson George M., Radical nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki 1883-1937, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969). See also Walter Skya, Japan's Holy War: The ideology of Radical Shinto Ultranationalism, 123–125.

41.Hakkō ichiu, "eight crown cords, one roof" i.e. "all the world under one roof") was a Japanese political slogan that became popular from the Second Sino-Japanese War to World War II, and was popularized in a speech by Prime Minister of Japan Fumimaro Konoe on January 8, 1940. See Edwards Walter, "Forging Tradition for a Holy War: The Hakkō Ichiu Tower in Miyazaki and Japanese Wartime Ideology." Journal of Japanese Studies 29:2, 2003. Also see Brownlee John, Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945: The Age of the Gods. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997).

42.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1945, (Bloomsbury, 2016).

43.Ibid., 116.

44.Cited by Sonni Efron in Los Angeles Times, August 11, 2000. On Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, by historian Herbert P. Bix.

CHAPTER 17

THE DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY

1."In Japan, there has been a debate over the extent and nature of the Nanjing Massacre. Relations between Japan and China have been complicated as a result, as denial of the massacre is seen in China as part of an overall unwillingness on Japan's part to admit and apologize for its aggression, or a perceived insensitivity regarding the killings." Bob Tadashi, Wakabayashi (ed.) The Nanking Atrocity 1937–38: Complicating the Picture. See also Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, (University of California Press, 2000).

2.Since most Japanese military records on the killings were kept secret or destroyed shortly after the surrender of Japan in 1945, historians have been unable to accurately estimate the death toll of the massacre. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo estimated in 1946 that over 200,000 Chinese were killed in the incident. See Judgment: International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Chapter VIII: Conventional War Crimes (Atrocities), November 1948.

3.Brasher, "Tokyo Publisher Target of Attack." The role of Japanese journalism over the years in denying the reality of horrible World War II massacres, such as that at Nanjing, is a major matter of concern in the following work, which is co edited by Katsuichi Honda, a reporter for Asahi Shimbun: Honda and Gibney, The Nanjing Massacre).

4.On February 5, 2009, the Japanese Supreme Court ordered Higashinakano and the publisher, Tendensha, to pay 4 million yen in damages to Mrs. Xia, who had testified that she had been a massacre victim. According to the court, Higashinakano failed to prove that she and the girl were different persons, and that she was not a witness of the Nanjing massacre, as Higashinakano had claimed in his book. Xia Shuqin sued Higashinakano for defamation for a claim made in his book written in 1988 that the murder of her family had been performed by Chinese, rather than Japanese soldiers. See Syodo Higashinakano, The truth of the Nanking Operation in 1937 (1937 Nanking Koryakusen no Shinjitsu).

5.Higashinakano, by making the statement that the intervention of the Japanese Army in Nanking was in accordance with international law, was wrong. Along with the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions were among the first formal statements of the laws of war and war crimes in the body of secular international law. Japan and China ratified the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907. Also, by killing Chinese soldiers and civilians at Nanking, the Japanese violated the spirits and the statements of laws of war. According to the Hague Convention of 1907, "in any war between signatory powers, the parties will abstain from using projectiles "the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." This declaration was ratified by all major powers, except the United States.

6.Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, (University of California Press, 2000), 46–48. See also Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge: Standing Strong against the Military, Economic, and Political Threats that Imperil America, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 9–10.

7.In Japan, public opinion of the massacre varies, but few deny outright that the event occurred. See Takashi Yoshida, "The Making of the Rape of Nanking," (Oxford University Press, 2006), 157–58.

8.The controversy surrounding the massacre remains a central issue in Japanese relations with other Asia-Pacific nations as well, such as South Korea. See Marc S. Gallicchio, The Unpredictability of the Past, 2007, 158.

9.Although Japan's ally, Germany, also committed horrendous acts of barbarism during the war, the Germans have fully admitted to the crimes and tried to atone for the behavior. But the Japanese seen unable to comprehend the anger in many Asian countries generated by the behavior of the Japanese army during World War II – and worse, the continued Japanese denial, despite the overwhelming evidence, increases the anger in many countries, especially potential friends such as Korea, Singapore, and Philippines. See Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge: Standing Strong against the Military, Economic, and Political Threats that Imperil America, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 10.

10.Charley Granvorka, Comfort Women, August 31, 2019, in Jean Sénat Fleury's book, The Trial of the Emperor, Hirohito: Guilty or Innocent, (Xlibris, 2019), 205–206). "In 2015, there were only 46 surviving Korean shoppers who dared to break out of the silence and collective denial of their lives, only to overcome their shame and self-disgust, to demand reparation from Shinzo Abe's government. The ianfu tragedy has for decades been Japan's controversial, if not hidden, counter-history until 2015." Historian Jean-Louis Margolin asks the question of the nature of the "work" of the ianfu. Would they be '"forced workers"' or, on the contrary, would they all be sex volunteers, venal women or prostitutes as the Japanese authorities always claimed until the beginning of the 21st Century?"

11.Abe, who became prime minister for a second time in 2012, is the first Japanese leader to have visited the Yasukuni shrine since Junichiro Koizumi just over seven years ago.

12.See Shizuo Kambayashi/AP, "…In Tokyo Thursday, Dec. 26, 2013, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe visited Yasukuni war shrine in a move sure to infuriate China and South Korea. The visit to the shrine, which honors 2.5 million Japanese killed in duty including convicted class A war criminals, appears to be a departure from Abe's "pragmatic" approach to foreign policy, in which he tried to avoid alienating neighboring countries. It was the first visit by a sitting prime minister since Junichiro Koizumi went to mark the end of World War II in 2006." See also Chico Harlan, "Japanese prime minister's visit to Yasukuni war shrine adds to tensions in Asia," (The Washington Post, December 26, 2013).

13.Quoted in "Apologies and Threat Reduction in Postwar Europe," by Jennifer M. Lind Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), 2, "Over the past fifty years, Germany has made numerous efforts for its World War II aggression and atrocities. German apologies, reparations, and education about its past actions are praised as a model for other states. Today Europe appears to be in a state of deep peace, great-power war among European states appears nearly inconceivable. Scholars and journalists have argued that German apologies have helped reduce perception of a German threat in Europe." See also Professor Jennifer M. Lind's book, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics, (Cornell University Press, 2010).

14."In striking contrast, Japan has avoided discussion of its past, apologies by Japanese leaders are often vague and contradictory, and Tokyo has avoided paying official reparations. Japan's relations with its neighbors remain dense, and many observers attribute this tension to Japan's failure to apologize adequately for its past misdeeds." See Thomas Christensen, China, the U.S. - Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East-Asia (International Security, 1999) 23: 49–80; Robert Dujarric, Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia, (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute 1998); Aaron Friedberg, Rape for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia. In East Asian Security, edited by M.E. Brown, S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996); Yoichi Funabashi, Japan's Depression Diplomacy, (Foreign Affairs, 1998) 77: 26–36; Saburo Ienaga, The Glorification of War in Japanese Education in East Asian Security, edited by M.E. Brown, S.M. Lynn-Jones and S.E. Miller, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). See also Professor Jennifer M. Lind's book, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics, (Cornell University Press, 2010), 2.

CHAPTER 18

APOLOGIZING FOR THE WAR

1.The New York Times, "Hirohito quit Yasukuni Shrine over concerns about war criminals," April 26, 2007.

2.In a July 31, 2001, entry of his diary, published by the Asahi newspaper, the chamberlain, Ryogo Urabe, wrote that "the direct cause" was that the emperor was "displeased about the inclusion of "Class A" war criminals."

3.Fujita Yukihisa, (August 2006), "Prime Minister Kishi's Diplomacy of Reconciliation," (Japan Echo, archived from the original on July 18, 2011.)

4."Kishi had been the economic czar of the puppet state of Manchukuo and was accused, among other things, of being responsible for the enslavement of untold thousands of Chinese as forced labores. After the Japanese surrender to the Allies in August 1945, Kishi was imprisoned at Sugamo Prison for three years as a "Class A" crime suspect. He was released in 1948 by MacArthur who considered him to be the best man to lead a post-war Japan in a pro-American direction. He went on to consolidate the Japanese conservative camp against perceived threats from the Japan Socialist Party in the 1950s, and is credited with being a key player in the initiation of the "1955 System", the extended period during which the Liberal Democratic Party was the overwhelmingly dominant political party in Japan. He served as Japan's official representative at the funeral of Sir Winston Churchill in 1965." See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, (W.W. Norton & Company 2000), 454. See also "Kishi and Corruption: An Anatomy of the 1955 System, Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 83, December 2001; Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (New York: Perennial, 2001), 660.

5.See Lee Tong Wong, The Secret Story of the Japan-ROK Treaty: The Fated Encounter of Two Diplomats, (PHP, 1997).

6.See James Sterngold, “Kakuei Tanaka, 75, Ex-Premier and Political Force in Japan, Dies,” New York Times, 17 December 1993. See also Sam Jameson, “Conviction of Former Japanese Leader Tanaka Upheld”, (Los Angeles Times, 29 July 1987).

7.Cited by Dario Lisiero, Papal Apology, (Lulu Publisher), 49.

8.See Kent E. Calder, Japan in 1991: Uncertain Quest for a Global Role, (Asian Survey, 32–41).

9.This declaration was one of the strongest statements on Japanese aggression before and during World War II, Hirohito said, he regretted his country’s 35-year colonial domination of Korea. See Todd R. Eastham, Emperor Hirohito, in one of his strongest statements on… (UPI Archives, Sept. 6, 1984).

10.Karel van Wolferen, “The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation,” (New York: Vintage, 1990), 264.

11.On Nakasone’s speech to the United Nations, see Ivan Zverina, “Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone today warned against protectionism…” (UPI Archives, Oct. 23, 1985).

12.David E. Sanger, “Takeshita Now Admits World War II Aggression,” (NewYork Times, 7 March 1989).

13.After serving in the assembly of Osaka Prefecture, Nakayama was elected to the Diet for the first time in 1968 as a member of the House of Councilors and to the House of Representatives for the first time in 1986. On April 18, 1990, Nakayama made that statement during the 188th National Diet Session Lower House Committee of Foreign Affairs.

14.David Butts, “Japanese emperor apologizes to South Korean president,” (UPI Archives, May 24, 1990). See also Steven R. Weisman, “Japanese Express Remorse to Korea,” (New York Times, May 25, 1990).

15.Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made this statement on May 25, 1990.

16.Edwin P. Hoyt, Hirohito: The Emperor and the Man, (Praeger Publishers, 1992), 4.

17.Margot S. Strom, Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior, (Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation, 1994), 488.

18.Morihiro Hosokawa, “Speech at 127th National Diet Session,” The World and Japan Database Project. Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. Archived from the original on April 20, 2015. Retrieved September 24, 2004.

19.At the 128th National Diet Session on September 21, 1993, Hosokawa repeated the terms in his speech on August 15, 1993 at the annual war memorial services. He publicly acknowledged that World War II was a “war of aggression, a mistaken war” and expressed responsibility and condoleances to the war victims and survivors, in Japan, its Asian neighbors, and the rest of the world.

20.Cited on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s website.

21.For the first time since the end of the war, a Japanese Prime Minister expressed his apology and admitted that Japan had, “through its colonial rule and invasion, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.”

22.On Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Conference on: Visit of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the People’s Republic of China, September 6, 1997).

23.MOFA: Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century,” www.mofa.go.jp. Retrieved May 31, 2020.

24.The Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China was signed on September 27, 1972 in Beijing. The document has nine articles among them, Art 1) peace treaty between Japan and China, 2) the status of Taiwan, 3) the question of hegemony in East Asia, and 4) Japan's reversed relations with China and Taiwan. See Ryosei Kokubun, "1972 System" to "Strategic Mutual Benefits" — Japan's Foreign Policy toward China," (PDF). Nihon No Gaiko Dai 4 Kan. 4:111–142.

25.The treatment of American and allied prisoners by the Japanese is one of the most horrific crimes of World War II. Of the 27,000 Americans taken prisoner by the Japanese, 40 percent died in captivity, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service. According to a directive on 5 August 1937 by Emperor Hirohito, the constraints of the Hague Conventions were explicitly removed from prisoners of war from China, the United States, Australia, Britain, Canada, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines held by the Japanese armed forces and these POWs were subject to murder, beatings, brutal treatment, forced labor, medical experimentation, starvation rations and poor medical treatment. See Laura Hillenbrand, Unbroken: A World War II Story of survival, resilience, and redemption, (New York, NY: Random House, 2010).

26.Cited in Dower, Embracing Defeat, 477, 478, 479: "A revealing example of official thinking on such matters can be found in the draft of an "Urgent Imperial Decree" composed sometimes during these early months. This secret order never saw the light of day, but it is as vivid an example as we are likely to find of the lengths to which the ruling groups were willing to go, on their town, on the issue of responsibility – so long as such an inquiry could be coupled with reaffirmation of the emperor's virtue and innocence. Its full, baroque title was "Urgent Imperial Decree to Stabilize the People's Mind and Establish the Independent Popular Morality Necessary to Maintain National Order," and its royalist logic was elemental: the disastrous war constituted a betrayal of the emperor's trust, a tragic perversion of his abiding commitment to peace. Just as the victor nations assumed that historically and culturally, they embodied the "civilized" ideals of respect for peace and humanity, so these authors depicted the same ideals as lying at the heart of their imperial tradition.

"The core of the draft decree's indictment was laid out, in cumbersome fashion, in the first of its twelve provisions:

1. The aim of this decree is to stabilize the people's mind and establish the independent popular morality which is necessary to the maintenance of national order, and to this end to punish, remove, or dissolve those persons, institutions, or social organizations who or which, by going against the national polity, abusing their assistance to the emperor, and failing to follow his great spirit in leading government policies and popular trends, thus violating the instructions of the Meiji emperor and inviting military-clique politics, with political parties knowingly aiding and abetting this, thereby instigating the Manchurian Incident, China Incident, and Great Asia War, which destroyed the lives and assets of our people and various other peoples and endangered the national polity.

2. The following persons shall be sentenced to death or lifetime restraint for the crime of treason:

a. Persons who without the emperor's order moved troops, needlessly initiated military activities, and commanded aggressive activities, making the Manchurian Incident, China Incident, and Great East Asia War unavoidable;

b. Persons who violated the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of Meiji 15 [1882] and invited the situation of military-clique politics, going against the emperor's great spirit of peace by discarding the true essence of the national polity and engaging in despotic behavior or the like, thereby make the Great Asia East Asia War inevitable.

3. The following persons shall receive sentences ranging under 10 years restraint to life for collaboration in the crime of treason:

a. Persons directly involved in plans under provision 2a above;

b. Persons who agreed to the military-clique politics of provision 2b above, conspiring to strengthen or knowingly supporting this;

c. Persons who knowingly supported and cooperated with prewar plots and propaganda by military politicians and others or created prewar public opinion contrary to the emperor's great spirit of peace, thus making the initiation of war inevitable."

The draft went on to indicate that in certain cases such punishments might be commuted to what amounted to a purge from public office and loss of the rights ordinarily accruing to subjects. Investigations, indictments, and trials would be handled under the Attorney General's office, which would take up cases against individuals on receipt of petitions containing one hundred signatures.

This fascinating document was discovered by Professor Awaya Kentarō among the Makino Shinken Papers in the National Diet Library, and is reproduced in his Tokyo Saiban Ron, 160–62; the translation here is from that work. A full English translation is appended to Awaya's contribution in Hosaya, 87–88. The authorship and date of origin of the draft decree are unclear, but Awaya concludes from internal evidence that it probably was prepared under the Shidehara government, which was in office from October 1945 to April 1946.

27.MOFA: Prime Minister's Address to the Diet." www.mofa.go.jp. Retrieved May 31, 2020.

28."Shinzo Abe Echoes Japan's Past World War II Apologies but Adds None, by Jonathan Soble, The New York Times, August 14, 2015.

29.Cited in John W. Dower's note (51) Embracing Defeat, 640, "…In general, apart from the strong initial response to the revelation of the 1945 atrocities in Manila, the Japanese do not appear to have been particularly sensitive to the victimization of peoples of Southeast Asia. This hierarchy of Asian victims had tended to persist even in the postwar literature of progressive scholars and activists deeply committed to exposing the extent of Japan's World War II atrocities, where primary focus had tended to be on first, Japan's Chinese victims, and second, its Korean victims. Although it can be argued that these two peoples suffered most at Japanese hands, such emphasis cannot be explained in quantitative terms alone. Considerations of geographical, historical, cultural, racial, and psychological distancing also are involved."

30.The School Education Law enacted in 1974 created the current system of textbook approval. Until the end of World War II, the government generally authored textbooks. The publishers create textbooks and submit them for official examination and approval by the Ministry of Education. These books must meet the requirements of the Curriculum Guideline, a set of curriculum standards for Japanese schools.

31.Having two of their cities hit with nuclear bombs, the Japanese consider themselves as victims of World War II. The Japanese school curriculum doesn't teach the detail of the war in the Pacific and South East Asia. The Japanese educational system promotes the concept of Japan as victim. See "How Japan Teaches Its Own History," by James Reston Jr., The New York Times Magazine, Oct. 27, 1985.

32.Fellers memorandum to commander in chief, October 2, 1945, in box 3 of the Fellers papers in the Hoover Institution. This also is reproduced in William P. Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952, and Japanese Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 360–61.

33.One of Japan's most important intellectuals, Nambara Shigeru defended Tokyo Imperial University against its rightist critics and opposed Japan's war. He is the author of War and Conscience in Japan published in 2010.

34.On December 1, 1948, National Security Council document 13/2 was transmitted to MacArthur. It formally approved the shift in U.S. occupation policy from political democratization to economic reconstruction and remilitarization. The United States decided to strengthen Japan not only economically and politically but military. Following instructions from Washington, on December 18, MacArthur ordered the second Yoshida cabinet to carry out "nine principles" designed to ensure wage and price control and maximize production for export. See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, 2016), 635.

35.Matsui was Hirohito's interpreter for his eighth through eleventh meetings with MacArthur, and for his two meetings with Dulles on February 10 and April 22, 1951. During the first meeting between the emperor and MacArthur, on September 27, 1945, the two leaders communicated via the imperial translator, Okumura Katsuzo.

36.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), xiv.

37.A prime example of political expediency was of course the U.S. decision to retain Hirohito on the throne. Hebert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 690.

CHAPTER 19

JAPAN'S EMPIRE DISASTER

1.Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 19–20.

2.On the Meiji constitution see W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, (St Martin's Press, 2000), 77–80. In the Meiji constitution of 1889, many powers were reserved to the emperor, including declaration of war, conclusion of treaties, and supreme command of the armed forces. In addition, the emperor had exclusive ordinance rights and could freely adjourn or prorogue the national assembly, the Diet. More than a symbol, the emperor could take a full part in the decisions of the Executive Council or cabinet. The first chapter of the constitution described the emperor as "sacred and inviolable." It also asserted that his sovereignty rested, not on a personal divinity, but on the fact that he belonged to 'a line of Emperors unbroken for age's eternal.' In other words, he came before his people, not principally as ruler, but as a symbol of the imperial lineage, stretching back beyond the state itself to the time of the world's creation.

3.Ibid., 21.

4.Ibid., 43. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016) note (20), 696, "Itō removed the top of the military chain of command from the prime minister's jurisdiction and deliberately weakened the prime minister's powers in order to enhance the emperor's. He also strengthened the independent advisory authority of ministers of state and made cabinet decisions depend on unanimous consent rather than on simple majority vote. In the final stage of his constitution making, Itō established a privy council to deliberate on the constitution. Although Emperor Meiji actively participated in virtually all its meetings, it is doubtful if he really understood the enormous political and military obligations, he was foisting on himself – obligations that would fall with even greater weight on the shoulders of Hirohito. For details see Minobe Tatsukichi, Chikujō kenpō seigi zen (Yūhikaku, 1931), 523; Sakano Junji, "Naikaku," in Nihonshi daijiten, dai gokan (Heibonsha, 1993), 289–90; Masuda Tomoko, "Meiji rikken kunshusei ni okeru Sūmitsuin," in Rekishi to chiri 355 (March 1985), 1–14; and Tanaka, Tennō no kenkyū, 168.

5.Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, McGraw-Hill, 1986), 35).

6.In 1906, following the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Kropotkin served as member of the State Council of Imperial Russia. In 1907, he wrote his own version of the Russo-Japanese War, which was published in several books in several languages. The Russian government reportedly confiscated the history he wrote. On the Russo-Japanese War, see Geoffrey Reagan, Military Anecdotes, (Guinness Publishing, 1992). See also Robert W. Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers, (Hoover Press, 1976).

7.U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in the negotiations and won the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediating efforts.

8.The Hibiya incendiary incident, also known as the Hibiya riots, occurred in Tokyo, Japan, from 5 to 7 September 1905.

9.See Courtney Browne, Tojo The Last Banzai, (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1998), 24.

10.Ibid., 50–51.

11.See John Albert White, Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895–1907, (Cambridge University Press, June 27, 2002), 334.

12.China and Japan were intensely competitive over who would rule Korea. Both countries frequently interfered with Korean political development, including arresting and executing Korean leaders, and seeking to undermine any government that Tokyo or Beijing believed conflicted with their national interests. Both countries stationed ever-larger numbers of troops in the country. Finally, war broke out in 1894, and Japan's modern military easily beat China's antiquated forces. In the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended what was to be only the first Sino-Japanese War, Korea was transferred from Chinese suzerainty to become a protectorate of Japan. China also ceded Formosa (Taiwan) and Port Arthur to Japan. Cited by Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge: Standing Strong against the Military, Economic, and Political Threats that Imperil America, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 9.

13.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, 2016), 129.

14.Ibid., 40.

15.The Triple Entente describes the informal alliance between the Russian Empire, the French Third Republic and the United Kingdom. It built upon the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between Paris and London, and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. It was created for the purpose of mutual protection against the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. See Fiona K. Tomaszewski, A Great Russia: Russia and the Triple Entente, 1905–1914, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002).

16.Hoyt, Fall of Tsingtao, (hereafter Fall of Tsingtao), 100–130.

17.Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, Translated by John Bester, (Kodansha USA Inc., 1982), 30.

18."One of the reasons for this refusal was the American feeling that Japan had mistreated China in her drive for empire. Another was the racism that played into the hands of the isolationists and took America on a solo course in foreign policy that meant isolationism for the next twenty years. The Versailles Treaty, rejected by the United States, gave Japan virtually all she had asked for in China and the Pacific. Her troops remained in Siberia until 1922, the last to leave Soviet Russia. She occupied northern Sakhalin and remained there until 1926." Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 48.

19.For the numbers on Japan's influenza pandemic see Siddharth Chandra, "Deaths Associated with influenza Pandemic of 1918–19, Japan, (Emerging Infectious Diseases [internet], April 2013)," "The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 caused unprecedented devastation; worldwide it is estimated to have taken 25–100 million lives, exceeding the combined death toll of both world wars. One of the strangest aspects of the currently held wisdom about the pandemic is the curiously low death rate attributed to Japan compared with other countries in Asia. Official records for Japan put the death toll at 257,363 persons, resulting in a crude influenza-attributable death rate of 0.47 percent. Patterson and Pyle reported 350,000 deaths. Given Japan's population of >54 million at the time, the influenza-attributable mortality rates (0.64 percent to 0.71 percent) are remarkably low by Asian standards, although they are similar to the rates calculated for the United States, Canada, and western Europe (0.65 percent, 0,61 percent, and ≈ 0.48 percent, respectively). Patterson and Pyle's conservative estimate of a global rate of 1.66 percent and Johnson and Mueller's substantial upward revision of that percentage to 2.77 percent suggest that the estimates for Japan, which are less that one quarter of the latter estimate, merit closer scrutiny. Although the epidemiologic approach used by Richard et al., which also uses death statistics reported by the Japanese health authorities, raises the estimate to 481,000 (or 0.88 percent of the population at the time), even this estimate is extraordinarily lower than estimates from other parts of Asia." See also SA Richard, N Sugaya, L. Simonsen, A comparative study of the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic in Japan, USA and UK: mortality impact and implications for pandemic planning, (Epidemiology infectious, 2009); I. Taeuber, The population of Japan, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1959; A Kawana, Naka G, Fujikura Y, Kato Y, Mizuno Y, Kondo T, et

al. Spanish influenza in Japanese Armed Forces, 1918–1920, (Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2007); S. Tōkeikyoku, Summary statistics of the Empire of Japan [in Japanese], Tokyo: Tōkyō Tōkei Kyōkai, 1910.

20.“It was argued that the rapid growth of Japan’s population –which stood at close to 65 million in 1930– necessitated large food imports. To sustain such imports, Japan had to be able to export. Western tariffs limited exports, while discriminatory legislation in many countries and anti-Japanese racism served as barriers to emigration. Chinese and Japanese efforts to secure racial equality in the League of Nations had been rejected by Western statesmen. Thus, it was argued, Japan had no recourse but to use force.” Britannica, “The rise of the militarists.”

21.Thus, internal violent discontent against Japanese war-making, diplomacy and economic management caused the fall of two national governments within less than twenty years at the turn of the 20th century. By any measure, there were not good indicators of empire-building success.

22.Edwin Hoyt, Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 51.

23.Joshua Hammer, The Great Japan Earthquake of 1923, (Smithsonian Magazine, May 2011).

24.Edwin Hoyt, Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 51.

25.Ibid., 51–52.

26.Ibid., 50.

27.Ibid., 50–51.

28.W. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 197.

29.Edwin Hoyt, Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), 197–198.

30.On the matters of violence and political instability see the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877; Assassination of Prime Minister Hara Takashi in the evening of November 4, 1921; Daisuke Namba attempted to assassinate Hirohito in 1923; Fumiko Kaneko and Pak Yol plotted to assassinate the emperor in 1925; The issues of the Osaka brothel scandal in early 1927; The 1928 assassination of Chiang Kai-shek; The attempted assassination of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi on November 14, 1930; Col. Hashimoto Kingorō’s plans to overthrow the government in March 1931; Lee Bong-chang attempted to assassinate Hirohito in 1932 (the Sakuradamon Incident); The May 15 Incident and the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932; The February 26 Incident in 1936; USS Panay Incident in 1937; The Nanking Massacre in 1937; The Bataan Death March in 1942.

31.The victory of the Control faction in the army, committed to a program of military modernization, together with the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in China in 1937, resulted in further economic problems and opportunities for Japan. Military spending rose from just over 9 per cent of gross national expenditure in 1933–37 to 38 percent in 1938–42, that is, to 11,900 million yen out of a total of 31,000 million. See W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, (St. Martin Press, 2000), 189.

32.W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, (St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 122.

33.Ibid., 125.

34.See Kim Kyu-won, staff reporter at Hankyoreh, “Records of Imperial Japanese Workforce survey in 1940 revealed to public for the first time,” posted on Nov. 1, 2019; “On October 31, the National Archives of Korea (NAK, affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior and Safety) unveiled the original version of a March 1940 titled “Regarding the Labor Resource Survey,” produced by the office of the Governor-General of Korea. Also revealed were originals from among 2,337 records donated to the NAK in 2017 by the late Zainichi Korean researcher Kim Gwang-ryeol, including documents, photographs, diagrams, and other materials related to the forced mobilization of Koreans.”

35.National Mobilization Law (Kokka Sōdōin Hō) was brought in the Diet of Japan by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe on March 24, 1938, to put the national economy of the Empire of Japan on wartime footing after the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The National Mobilization Law had fifty clauses, which provided for government controls over civilian organizations (including labor unions), nationalization of strategic industries, price controls and rationing, and nationalized the news media. The laws gave the government the authority to use unlimited budgets to subsidize war production, and to compensate manufacturers for losses caused by war-time mobilization. See Eric Pauer, Japan's War Economy, (Routledge, 1999). See also Richard Sims, Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation 1868–2000, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

36.Francis Pike, Hirohito's War: The Pacific War 1941–1942, Bloomsbury, 2016, 334, 335.

37.See James Graham, Japan's Economic Expansion into Manchuria and China in World War Two (historyorg.com, May, 2004). Together with Inner Mongolia, China produced nearly 23 million tons of coal and 5 million tons of iron ore in 1941–42. Manchukuo alone was responsible for 20 percent of Japan's total production of pig iron and 8 percent of its steel. Later, Japan's invasion conquest and occupation of South East Asia added more resources and strategic locations. In Burma, in the Irrawaddy river zone, there were the Yenangyaung and Chauk oil fields, 300 miles (500 km) north of Rangoon. These sources and others in Singu extracted 260,000,000 gallons in 1938, and there was an unexploited coal deposit. Burma had other strategic and valuable minerals that were exploited by the Japanese forces during the occupation such as amber and jade (nephrite stone), lapis lazuli, lazurite, rubies, and sapphires. There was a major mine in Bawdwin, producing silver, lead, zinc, nickel and copper. In Mergui and Tavoy (Tenasserim area) mines produced tungsten and tin from 1910. Tin extraction rose to 6,623 tons in 1937. In Thailand, the Japanese forces extracted an important quantity of tin. On the south coast guano, they opened factories for fertilizer production. In French Indochina, in Honggay (near Haiphong) the Japanese extracted 2,308,000 tons of coal in 1937. Minerals included Tungsten, chromium, tin, antimony and manganese in the northern area and phosphate rock in the southern area. In Dutch Indies, the Japanese took over the oil refineries in the Palembang (Sumatra), Djambi, Medan and Borneo fields in Balikpapan and Tarakan. Additionally, there was coal in Sumatra and Borneo, Sulphur and manganese in Java, and nickel in Celebes. The Japanese mining business in the Bintang Island tin deposits produced 275,000 tons in 1943, supposedly one sixth of world production. In the Philippines, when the Japanese forces invaded the country the iron reserves were estimated as 500 million tons. In the Pacific Sea lands Japanese forces seized a large quantity of Gold deposits in Bulolo (East New Guinea) with other minerals in these islands. In Solomon Islands they captured sources of gold, copper and phosphates. In Palau Islands they exploited bauxite.

38.Kokutai is a concept in the Japanese language that means "system of government," "sovereignty," "national identity," "essence and character," national polity, body politic; national entity; basis for the Emperor's sovereignty; Japanese constitution.

39.As Professor Herbert P. Bix said in his book Hirohito: The Making of Modern Japan, "Many Japanese people were naturally deeply offended at being considered racially, biologically inferior. Some even felt that the proponents of anti-Japanese immigration had declared war on Japan. The problem was that not only did Japan lack the power to do anything about it, its own national ideology was fixated on the purity of forgivable; this at a time when people and nations should be focused on their immediate emergencies and disasters." Bix continued to say: "This Western eugenics concepts, public health measures, and colonialism were considered parts of the modernization process and adopted together." See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), XIX.

40.Rana Mitter, China's War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival, (London: Allen Lane, 2013), Review by Richard Overy, June 6, 2013.

41.The Qing Dynasty's cession of Taiwan to Japan in April 1895 at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War. See Hungdah Chiu, China and the Taiwan Issue, (London: Praeger, 1979).

42.Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, (McGraw-Hill, 1986), Preface, viii.

43."Eight corners of the World under one roof" was a Japanese political slogan that became popular from the Second-Japanese War to World War II and was popularized in a speech by Prime Minister of Japan Fumimaro Konoe on January 8, 1940. In AD 660, Emperor Jimmu decreed that he would: …extend the line of Imperial

descendants and foster right mindedness. Thereafter, the Capital may be extended so as to embrace all of the six cardinal points and the eight cords may be covered so as to form a roof.

44.Ibid., 52–53.

45.See Samuel Hideo Yamashita, Daily life in Wartime Japan, 1940–1945, (University Press of Kansas, 2016), "Here is the family struggling to feed her family while supporting the war effort; the eager conscript from snow country enduring the harshest most abusive training imaginable in order to learn how to fly; the Tokyo teenagers made to work in wartime factories the children taken from cities to live in the countryside away from their families and with little food and no privacy; the Kyshu farmers pressured to grow ever more rice and wheat with fewer hands and less fertilizer; and the Kyoto octogenarian driven to thoughts of suicide by his inability to contribute to the war…"

46.Paul Ham, Hiroshima Nagasaki, (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2011). See also Laura Hein, and Selden Mark, Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

47.John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 54.

48.Cited by John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 50–51, note (23), 570, "Hundreds of these abandoned children, invariably poor and speaking only Chinese, began to come to Japan on officially sponsored trips in the 1980s to try to re established contact with their families. Even where reunions did occur, they were excruciatingly painful.

49.Throughout Japanese history, the emperor had been viewed as a demi-god, remote from the populace. In 1945 when Emperor Hirohito made a 673-word radio broadcast accepting the terms of the July 26th Potsdam Declaration, his announcement marked the first time commoners in Japan, with a few exceptions, had heard the emperor's voice. See Andrew Glass, "Hirohito accepts Japan's surrender terms, Aug. 14, 1945, in Politico, 08/14/2018.

50.John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 91.

51.Ibid., 90.

52.Ibid., 95.

53.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 539.

54.The Imperial Japanese Navy (Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kaigun) was the navy of the Empire of Japan from 1868 until 1945. It was the third largest Navy in the world by 1920, behind the Royal Navy and the United States Navy (USN). It was supported by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service for aircraft and air strike operation from the fleet. It was the primary opponent of the Western Allies in the Pacific War.

55.See Mark Stille, The Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War, (Osprey Publishing, 2014). See also J. Charles Schencking, Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, And the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1868–1922, (Stanford University Press, 2005). See Jonathan Watts, "Japan guilty of germ warfare against thousands of Chinese," (The Guardian, 28 August 2002). See also Peter Williams and Wallace David, Unit 731, (Grafton Books, 1989), 44; Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death, (Routledge, 2002), 29; Barenblat Daniel, A Plague upon Humanity, 2004, 37.

56.The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia. See also John William Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, (Pantheon, 1987).

57.On the Korean War see William W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); see also from the author, The Korean War: An International History, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

58.On Korean War crimes and damages see David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, (New York: St Martin's, 1964); see also Jerry Ravino and Carthy Jack, Flame Dragons of the Korea War, (Paducah, KY: Turner, 2003).

59.See Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, (University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

60.See Louis B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate, (Lexington Books, 2011), 44–45.

CHAPTER 20

THE TOKYO TRIAL

1.The International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (IMTFE Charter) was the decree issued by General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Allied-occupied Japan, on January 19th, 1946 that formulated the laws and procedures by which the Tokyo Trials were to be conducted. See Sandra Wilson, Cribb Robert, Trefalt Beatrice, Aszkielowicz Dean, Japanese War Criminals: the Politics of Justice after the Second World War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

2.Sir William Flood Webb was a judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland and the High Court of Australia. He was appointed on February 20, 1946, as president of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East after the end of World War II. See Webb, Sir William Flood (1887–1972), Australian Dictionary of Biography.

3.Born on October 8, 1899, in Arles, France, Justice Henri Bernard of France was a colonial magistrate from the age of twenty-eight. He had spent his entire career in French-speaking Africa and was, at the time of his appointment, general counsel in Bangui. A former colonel, he was a government commissioner in Beirut in 1944. In 1946, Henri Bernard and Robert Oneto, a judge and a prosecutor respectively, were appointed to represent France in Tokyo. Bernard replaced Henri Reimburger, legal adviser to the French ministry overseas. Reimburger was the first appointed by the French authorities, but he resigned for personal reasons before leaving for Tokyo. As Bernard was appointed to replace Reimburger, no one was suspicious of the fact that he had been sentenced to death in absentia in July 1941 by the military court of Gannat for his participation in the insurrection of August 28, 1940, against the Vichy administration, for France free in Brazzaville. The French Minister of the Colonies at the time, Georges Mandel, gave Bernard his support. After almost a year of proceedings at the Tokyo Tribunal, Justice Bernard decided to express his disapproval on the way the Trial was being conducted. He alerted the president of the tribunal, Justice Webb, of his views, by way of a memorandum dated 30 January 1947.

4.Bernard Röling was appointed as a judge at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) in 1946. He was the younger judge at Tokyo and one of the three dissents —the two others were Henri Bernard and Radhabinod Pal— who disagreed with the judgment in 1948. Bernard disagreed with the Majority on two issues. The more general related to the basis of the Tribunal, which was based on the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. The war, which was ended by this surrender, was between Japan and China from 1931, and the other Allies from December 1941. This was an issue because the USSR sought to bring charges relating to the Lake Khassan and Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol) incidents in 1938–39. Both conflicts ended in peace treaties but were prosecuted as crimes against peace before the Tokyo Tribunal. The defense argued that these charges were outside the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal. See inter alia, in Defense Motion, Paper No 54, May 13, 1946, submitted by Hiranuma Kiichirō, Matsuoka Yōsuke, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Tōgō Shigenori, and Umezu Yoshijirō.

The defense emphasized that the Allies Powers had “no authority to include in the Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable “Crimes against Peace”; that the terms of surrender, following the Potsdam Proclamation, had stipulated that “Conventional War Crimes as recognized by international law at the date of the Declaration (26 July 1945) would be the only crimes prosecuted”; that killings in belligerent operations, except as they violated the rules and customs of war, could not be construed as “murder” as charged in the indictment; and that some of the accused, as prisoners of war, should have been tried in courts martial as provided by the Geneva Convention of 1929 and not by the tribunal. The legal scholar Knut Ipsen argues that “crimes against peace” and the related charge of individual responsibility were indeed “ex post facto legislation” and, thus, “incompatible with the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, which the Tokyo tribunal itself recognized expressly as a ‘general principle of justice.’ ”

A better case can be made for the constitutionality of “crimes against humanity,” he argues. See Ipsen’s contribution in Hosoya, 37–45.

Justice Bernard Röling, contrary to his other colleagues, was agreed with those arguments. Later on, Röling became a member of the Dutch delegation to the United Nations, where he was involved in international disputes. In 1949, he was named professor of criminal law, criminal procedure and criminology in Groningen. In 1962, he founded the Institute of Polemology in Groningen for research into the causes of war and the requirements for peace. For Röling, see B.V.A. Röling, “The Tokyo Trial and the Quest for Peace,” in The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium, ed. C. Hosoya, N. Andō, Y. Onuma, and R. Minear (New York: Kodansha International, 1986), 130; Röling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peace monger, ed. Antonio Cassese (Cambridge: Polity Press, in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1993), esp. 65–68, 86–91. “Dissenting Judgment of the Member from France,” in Röling, Ruter, The Tokyo Judgment, vol. 1, 496.

5.Too concerned about the preparation of the trial of two thousand Japanese who were about to be tried, he had been replaced by Mei Ju Ao, a prominent lawyer, and member of the Legislative Assembly where he chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee.

6.In 1935, Major Zarayanov sentenced to death three white Russians hired by the Japanese as secret agents in Manchuria.

7.Serving as general counsel of the armed forces during the war against Japan Northcroft was the one who was to replace Webb in case of absence.

8.Lord Patrick was considered one of the best lawyers in the court.

9.John Higgins, president of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, was selected by the Truman administration to represent the United States. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. Myron Cramer, general counsel at the military court. Cramer had conducted an official investigation, at Truman’s request, into the events at Pearl Harbor. He was, along with Zaryanov, the only officer of the court.

10.Pal Radhabinod was one of the three Asian judges appointed to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the “Tokyo Trials” of Japanese war crimes committed during World War II. A graduate of the University of Calcutta, Pal was an adviser to the City Court of Appeal. Among all the judges of the tribunal, he was the only one who submitted a judgment that insisted all defendants were not guilty. Justice Pal’s dissenting judgment was translated and edited by Tanaka Masaaki under the title Zenyaku: Nihon Muzai-ron (Tokyo: Nihon Shobō, 1952); the title translates as “Complete Translation: On Japan Being Not Guilty.” Tanaka also published an edited volume that same year entitled Nihon Muzai Ron– Shinri no Sabaki [On Japan Being Not Guilty– The Verdict of Truth] (Tokyo: Taiheijō Shuppan, 1952). In the mid-1980s, he was still bringing to public forums the argument that “the entire trial was nothing but a farce;” Hosoya, 153–54. Cited by John Dower, Embracing Defeat, note (74), 633. See also Radhabinod pal, “Judgment,” in the Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 29 April 1946–12 November 1948. Edited by B.V.A. Röling and C.F. Rüter. Amsterdam: University Press Amsterdam, 1977.

11.Delfín Jaranilla was a justice to the supreme court of the Philippines and a professor of law at a university. During the war, he had been a prisoner of the Japanese and had participated in the abominable Bataan March. It was agreed from the outset that neither India nor the Philippines were an independent state during the war, and, therefore, these two countries could not have their representatives in court. The Indian and Philippine governments had protested the decision. MacArthur, on April 6, 1945, issued an amendment to the charter providing for the appointment of eleven judges instead of the original nine. As a result of this late appointment, Pal arrived in Tokyo on May 17 and Jaranilla on June 13.

12.Born in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, on January 1, 1888, Joseph Keenan was a graduate of Brown University (1910) and the Harvard Law School (1913). He had served with the 137th Field Artillery during World War I and later with the Judge Advocate General’s Department. Usually wearing his trademark extra-large bow tie, he was known for his courtroom theatrics and unique facial expressions. He was assisted by several assistant prosecutors. Every nation that had been at war with Japan had the right to appoint an assistant prosecutor. The group of

prosecutors, known as the International Prosecution Section, originally composed of thirty-nine U.S. prosecutors, became a multinational group of five hundred people with lawyers, translators, and stenographers.

13.Modeled after the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter stipulated that crimes of the Japanese could be tried. Three categories of crimes were defined: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Article 6 of the Tokyo Trial also stated that holding an official position or acting pursuant to order of his government or of a superior was no defense to war crimes, but that such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

14.In November 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Keenan as Chief Prosecutor for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. As Chief Prosecutor, he led efforts to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed by Japanese leaders during World War II. This included prosecuting 28 high-ranking wartime defendants.

15.Joseph B. Keenan, chief prosecutor in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, with a focus in his introduction on organized war crime.

16.Soon after the war, the Allied powers indicted twenty-eight persons as “Class-A” criminals, and 5,700 persons were indicted as “Class-B” or “Class-C” was criminals by Allied criminal trials. Of these, 984 were initially condemned to death, 920 were executed, 475 received life sentences, 2,944 received some prison terms, 1,018 were acquitted, and 279 were not sentenced or not brought to trial. These numbers included 178 ethnic Taiwanese and 148 ethnic Koreans.

17.Tōjō Hideki was chief of staff from 1937 to 1938. He was prime minister and minister of war in Japan from 1941 to 1944. Appointed Prime Minister to replace Fumimaro Konoe, he openly advocated a negotiated peace with China and the continuation of negotiations with the United States. He was the mastermind that led Japanese troop attacks on China in 1937. Tōjō attempted suicide on November 11, 1945, before his arrest by American troops. After pleading guilty at trial, he was sentenced to death on November 12, 1948, and executed by hanging, on December 23, of the same year.

18.Before becoming prime minister, Koki Hirota was minister of foreign affairs at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, during which atrocities in Nanking occurred. He opposed the plans of the high commander of the Imperial Army, particularly the military escalation following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, as it contradicted his plans for an alliance between Japan, Manchuria, and China against Soviet Union. In 1945, he unsuccessfully led negotiations to maintain peace with the USSR. Convicted of war crimes at his trial, he was executed by hanging on December 23, 1948.

19.Itagaki Sheishiro was strongly linked to the Kwantung Army, in which he served as chief of intelligence in 1931. He played a key role in the Mukden Incident before becoming a military adviser to the Manchurian government from 1932 to 1934. As minister of war, he helped develop the so-called Hakko ichiu expansion doctrine to establish a new order in Asia under the leadership of Japan. He was convicted of war crimes by the court, including his role in the Mukden Incident, the escalation of military and diplomatic tensions with the Allies, and the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war during his time as commander of the Japanese forces in Southeast Asia in 1945. He was executed on December 23 by hanging.

20.Matsui Iwane was the commander of the Japanese forces sent to China at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. He was a strong advocate of Pan-Asianism. Retired in 1935, he was recalled to service in August 1937 in the context of the military escalation with China. Under his command, the Japanese won the Battle of Shanghai at the end of November 1937 and took Nanking a few days later. He encouraged his troops to loot the city and undertake the massacre of at least two hundred thousand inhabitants, a horrific fact that was remembered as the Nanking Massacre. He left the army again in 1938. He was arrested in 1945 and tried in Tokyo for his decisive role in the atrocities committed in Nanking.

21.Doihara was the head of the Manchukuo Secret Service. An officer in the Kwantung Army, he was one of the strategists of the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. He was named “Lawrence of Manchuria.” He was accused of deliberately organizing the destruction of the traditional Chinese structure in Manchuria in order to lessen the

resistance of the local population to the colonization of their country by the Japanese. He was convicted, sentenced to death, and hanged on December 23, 1948.

22.Kimura was chief of staff in the Kwantung Army from 1940 to 1941. He was deputy Minister of war in 1941 in the Tōjō government, assisting the prime minister in planning military campaigns in China and the Pacific. From 1943 to 1944, he was a member of the Supreme War Council (Japan's highest authority during the war). From the end of 1944, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in Burma. In 1945, he was charged with war crimes for his role in planning military attacks in China and the Pacific and for violating the rights of prisoners of war in Burma. He was sentenced to death and executed on December 23, 1948.

23.Linked to the Kwantung Army, Muto was serving there as Head of the Intelligence bureau at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. He served in China during the first months of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and his troops participated in the atrocities during the Nanking Massacre. In 1939, he was appointed major general and served in the planning office of the Ministry of War. He then served in Singapore in 1941, then in Sumatra in June 1944, before being posted to the Philippines in October 1944, where he was appointed chief of staff of the 14th Regional Army under Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita. Accused in massacres on the Philippine population, as well as on prisoners of war, he was convicted and executed on December 23, 1948.

24.Twenty-eight Japanese originally were indicted for "Class A" war crimes, of who two died while the trial and one was excused on grounds of mental incompetence. See the chart of verdicts and sentences in Horowitz, 584; this is reproduced, with useful added data on deaths and parole dates, in Richard Minear's entry on "War Crimes Trials," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1983), 8: 223–25. The granting of clemency in 1958 is noted in Minear, Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 175.

25.Hirohito was not put on trial, but he was forced to explicitly reject the claim that the Emperor of Japan was an incarnate divinity. See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, (W.W. Norton, 1999), 308.

26.The New York Times, June 18, 1946. At his Washington news conference, Keenan declared that the emperor was not a war criminal so much as "a figurehead and a fraud perpetrated on the Japanese people."

27."Allied Decision to Retain Emperor Was Wise Move, U.S. Editors Told," (Nippon Times, Feb. 6, 1947), 1, 2.

28.Cited in Tim Maga's notes, Judgment at Tokyo, 157, "MacArthur's precise position over the future of Emperor Hirohito has stimulated plenty of speculation. See, for example, Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, 331–50. The final word has yet to be typed, although MacArthur kept little written record on the topic. Thanks to recent declassifications and the personal interest of MacArthur Memorial archivist James Zobel, some worthy documentation finally emerges on the MacArthur-Hirohito tale. See William J. Sebald, U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, to H. Merrell Benninghoff, deputy director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department, Oct. 26, 28, 1948, RG 5, box 107/2, "Political Advisor to SCAP," MacArthur Archives. MacArthur quoted Sebald to Benninghoff. Sebald's lengthy memos to Benninghoff include summaries of conversations with General MacArthur on a Hirohito trial, abdication, or suicide. See also Willoughby interview; Elliott R. Thorpe, brigadier general, U.S. Army, ret., interviewed by J.H. Griffin, lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army, 1981, Senior Officer Oral History Program, project 81–11, RG 15, box 33/11, U.S. Army Military History Institute Interviews, MacArthur Archives. Both Willoughby and Thorpe were close to MacArthur and were also advisors on the Hirohito issue."

29.Sonni Efron, "New book shows Hirohito was not whipping boy," (Los Angeles Times, September 5, 2000).

30.For Keenan's work and views while serving with the IMTFE, contact James Zobel, archivist and Tokyo War Crimes Trials specialist, at the MacArthur Memorial. See also U.S. Department of State, Trial of Japanese War Criminals, 1–13; "Joseph Keenan Meets the Press;" Keenan, "Observations and Lessons."

31.See the interesting bibliography of popular as well as scholarly materials about war crimes and war responsibility in Shisō, May 1984. Under "writings and last testimonials of war criminals," these lists between 1950 and 1954 and a total of thirty-one through 1982. By 1954, there also had been published at least nine "insider" accounts of war-criminal defendants and suspects in Sugamo Prison, one book on the U.S. – conducted Yokohama trials of "B" and "C" Class defendants, and six books about various "B/C" trials throughout Asia;

twenty-nine more titles on the latter subject are listed between 1956 and 1983. The Japanese translation of A. Frank Reel's The Case of General Yamashita, a powerful statement of the injustice of that trial, was published in 1952, the same year the translation of Justice Pal's dissenting judgment appeared.

32.See Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Emperor Hirohito on Localised Aggression in China, (York University, Toronto).

33.After Japan surrendered, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney accompanied MacArthur to Atsugi Air Base and became Chief of the Government Section at GHQ. With Lt. Col. Milo Rowell, he drafted the Constitution of Japan and sent it to the Diet for approval. Whitney remained close to MacArthur during the entire time of the occupation and served as chief of government section at his headquarters. In 1956, Whitney's biography of his commander, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History was published. See also Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under McArthur, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

34.The trials stimulated a considerable number of critics in Japan and outside the country, and both American and Japanese officials worried about what that might mean for the future of regional relations. See Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 280–84.

35.Judge Pal published his dissenting opinion privately in India in 1953. The full corpus of majority, concurring, and dissenting judgments was first published privately in 1977; see TJ. The full proceedings of the trial were made available in a twenty-two-volume commercial library edition in 1981; see TWCT. See John Dower, Embracing Defeat, note (18), 627.

36.Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, during a visit to India in August 2007, paid tribute to Judge Radhabinod Pal in a speech to the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and then traveled to Calcutta to meet the judge's eighty-one-year-old son. A monument to the judge was erected in 2005 at the Yasukuni Shrine, the memorial to Japan's war dead and a rallying point for Japanese nationalists. Pal was the only one of eleven Allied justices who handed down a not guilty verdict for Japan's top wartime leaders at the post-World War II International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or the Tokyo trials. "Justice Pal is highly respected even today by many Japanese for the noble spirit of courage he exhibited during the International for the Far East," Mr. Abe told the Indian Parliament. See The New York Times, on August 31, 2007.

37.John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 444.

38.See Bernard addendum, "The Dissenting Judgment of the Member from France of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 12, 1948," to "Petition in the Case of Togo Shigenori." See also Bernard, "Dissenting Judgment"; Webb addendum: "The Separate Opinion of the President, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 1, 1948, RG 5, OMS, box 60, "WE-WED," MacArthur Archives.

39.See Richard Minear's, "War Crimes Trials," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983, 8: 223–25. The granting of clemency in 1958 is noted in Minear, Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 175.

40.On the fear that without a strong presence of the American forces in Japan, the Marxist ideology would spread rapidly on the Asian continent, see Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Treat from the East, 1933–41, 92–94. "Since mid-1937 China had benefited from having signed a secret non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which was delighted to have Japanese power embroiled in China. Soviet aid took the form of military advisers, pilots, planes, equipment, and munitions shipped overland from Siberia and Central Asia, and by sea to Haiphong, then to Rangoon for movement over the Burma Road. Though substantial, it could never compensate for Chiang's repeated defeats on the battlefield." Cited in Herbert P. Bix note (117), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 742.

41.There were powerful men in Washington who did want Hirohito tried, but there was no consensus, and MacArthur took advantage of that situation for pragmatic reasons, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State Under MacArthur by Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

42.Cited by John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, note (41), 611–612 …In response to a query from Takayanagi Kenzō, chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, MacArthur stated flatly that “The preservation of the Emperor system was my fixed purpose. It was inherent and integral to Japanese political and cultural survival. The vicious efforts to destroy the person of the Emperor and thereby abolish the system became one of the most dangerous menaces that threatened the successful rehabilitation of the nation.” See JCC/FR, 73–74; Takayanagi, 79. Japanese as well as American scholars tend to agree that a major motivation behind Article 9 was to alleviate criticism of the retention of the imperial system. See, for example, Hata Ikuhiko and Sodei Rinjirō, Nihon Senryō Mitsushi (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1977), vol. 2, 8–11; Hata, Shiroku: Nihon Saigunbi (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjūsha, 1976), 47–78; Theodore McNelly, “General Douglas MacArthur and the Constitutional Disarmament of Japan,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, third series, vol. 17 (1982), 30.

43.John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company, 2000).

44.Philippe Pons is the Tokyo correspondent for Le Monde. He is the author of many books, including From Edo to Tokyo: Memory and Modernity, Macao, Misère et crime au Japan du XVIIe siècle à nos jours. His most popular book is The Old Capital.

45.See Awaya Kentarō, “The Tokyo Tribunal, War Responsibility and the Japanese People,” translated by Timothy Amos, (Shukan Kinyobi on Decmber 23, 2005).

46.On April 3, 1946, the international Far Eastern Commission exempted Hirohito as a war criminal. The prosecution at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East did so publictly on June 18. Formal U.S. policy consideration of “treatment of Hirohito” was removed from the agenda of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on June 12.

47.Cited by John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, note (49), 631, “The pioneer work exposing the cover-up of Unit 731 activities was done by John W. Powell. See his “Japan’s Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crimes,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 12.2 (1980): 2–17, and “Japan’s Biological Weapons, 1930–1945: A Hidden Chapter in History,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37. (October 1981): 43–53. Awaya notes that the prosecution also had information about the chemical warfare activities of Unit 1644 in China; see his contribution in Hosoya, 85–86, 116, and his essay in Asahi Jānaru, March 1, 1985 (installment 20), 39–40.

48.For defense counsel complaints to MacArthur, Keenan, and Truman, including copies of specific correspondence and follow-up analyses of defense counsel actions, see Capt. B.M. Coleman to MacArthur and his lengthy report, “American Defense Activities,” May 13, 1946; Lt. J.W. Guider, IMTFE, to MacArthur, May 31, 1946; Truman to MacArthur, June 2, 8, 1946, all in RG 5, box ½. “Master File, November 1945–October 1946,” MacArthur Archives. Also see the following articles for details on the language barrier issue, all in Nippon Times: “Witness Tanaka Clears Kimura of Blame at Tribunal Session Tuesday,” Jan. 8, 1947, 1; “Actions of Japan Which Led to War Defended at Trial,” Feb. 25, 1947, 1, “Defense Continues to Reveal Strategy,” Feb. 27, 1947, 1; “Tribunal Squashes Defense Attempt,” Mar. 4, 1947, 1; “Defense Witness Grilled at Trial,” Mar. 8, 1947, 1, 2; Quoted in Tim Maga note (33), Judgment at Tokyo, 2001, 160.

49.The trials stimulated a considerable degree of criticism in Japan, and both American and Japanese officials in Japan worried about what that might mean for the future of regional relations. See Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 280–84.

50.The government of Nazi Germany announced the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn Forest in April 1943. See David Engel, Facing a holocaust: The Polish government-in-exile and the Jews, 1943–1945, (UNC Press Books, 1993), 71. See also George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory, (Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2005), 44.

51.New York Times, June 18, 1946. At his Washington news conference, Keenan declared that the emperor was not a war criminal so much as “a figurehead and a fraud perpetrated on the Japanese people.” The idea of the imperial institution itself as a “fraud” designed to control an unenlightened people dates to Basil Hall Chamberlain’s essay of 1912, The invention of a new Religion. Cited in Herbert P. Bix note (19) Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 782.

52.Jacques Arnaud Démézier, in Jean Sénat Fleury's book, Hitler and Hirohito: On Trials, (Xlibris, 2019), xxiii.

53.Philippe Pons is the Tokyo correspondent for Le Monde, and author "Le Japan des Japonais," (Liana Levi, 2003).

54.For a technical comparison of similarities and dissimilarities between the two trials, see "The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: History and Analysis" (Lake Success, N.Y.: International Law Commission, General Assembly, United Nations, 1949), 81–86. See also John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 454.

55.International opinion concerning the emperor is summarized in Kiyoko Takeda, The Dual Image of the Japanese Emperor (New York: New York University Press, 1988). A major portion of the voluminous U.S. archival record on these matters appears in the U.S. Department of State series Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS]. See FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 497–1015, and FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 85–604; Hadley Cantril, ed., Public Opinion, 1935–1946 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 392.

56.After the defense had finished its presentation on September 9, 1947 the IMT spent fifteen months reaching judgment and drafting its 1,781-page opinion. The verdict and sentences of the tribunal were confirmed by MacArthur on November 24, 1948.

57.On the release of war crimes suspects, see Sebald to Sec of State, Dec. 24, 1948, in FRUS 1948, vol. 6, The Far East and Australasia, 936–37; and Far Eastern Commission policy decisions of February 24 and March 31, 1949.

58.Japanese sources indicate that SCAP did not permit Pal's dissent to be translated; see Bessatsu Rekishi Tokuhon, op. cit., 48.

59.Judge Pal published his dissenting opinion privately in India in 1953. He felt so strongly about the criminality of the use of the atomic bombs that when he published his dissenting opinion, he included as an appendix reproductions of twenty-five photographs of victims and physical destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that had appeared for the first time in Japan in the August 6, 1952, issue of the magazine Asahi Gurafu (identified in Pal's book as "The Asahi Picture News"). See International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Dissentient Judgment of Justice R.B. Pal (Calcutta: Sanyal, 1953); quoted in John W. Dower note (72), Embracing Defeat, 633.

60.Justice Pal's dissenting judgment was translated and edited by Tanaka Masaaki under the title Zenyaku: Nihon Muzai-ron (Tokyo: Nihon Shobō, 1952); the title translates as "Complete Translation: On Japan Being Not Guilty." Tanaka also published an edited volume that same year entitled Nihon Muzai Ron – Shinri no Sabaki [On Japan Being Not Guilty – The Verdict of Truth] (Tokyo: Taiheiyō Shuppan, 1952). In the mid–1980s, Tanaka was still bringing to public forums the argument that "the entire trial was nothing but a farce"; Hosoya, 153–54; cited in John W. Dower note (74), Embracing Defeat, 633.

61.On the Tokyo Trial, see Neil Boister, Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment, and Judgments, volume 1, (Oxford University Press, 2008). See also Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, (New York: Morrow, 1987).

62.Pal had acquitted all defendants because he viewed World War II as an anti-white Asian nationalist, rather than "from an interpretive perspective located in the South," as Richard Falk claims in "Telford Taylor and The Legacy of Nuremberg," in Columbia Journal of International Law 37, no. 3 (1999), 697, n. 12; cited in Herbert Bix note (67), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 780.

63.The initial U.S. lists of primary war crimes suspects did include secret society heads as well as several leading industrialists notably —Ayukawa, Yoshisuke, Nakajima Chikuhei, and Fujiwara Ginjirō, — who were arrested but not indicted; see, for example, FRUS 1945, 6:968, 978. The Soviet Union led by Stalin had insisted strongly on indicting both the emperor and at least one "representative" zaibatsu leader. According to Russian scholars, the U.S.S.R. originally did propose indicting the three zaibatsu leaders who had been arrested (Ayukawa, Nakajima, and Fujiwara). Keenan was against this decision. See Horowitz, 495–97, on the criteria for determining whom to indict.

64.On April 13, 1946, MacArthur had released from prison Gokō Kiyoshi, chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, imperial Japan's main arms-maker, and Prince Nashimoto. Shortly afterwards, he released four other top business leaders, including Ikeda Seihin, managing director of the Mitsui zaibatsu. See Awaya, "Tokyo saiban ni miru sengo shori," in Awaya, et al., Sensō sekinin, sengo sekinin: Nihon to Doitsu wa dō chigau ka, 98. On the release of war crimes suspects, see Sebald to sec. of state, December 24, 1948, in FRUS 1948, vol. 6, The Far East and Australasia, 936–37; and Far Eastern Commission policy decisions of February. 24 and March 31, 1949. Cited in Bix notes (20–31), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 782–783.

65.The full proceedings of the trial of Tokyo were made available in a twenty-two-volume commercial library, edition in 1981; see TWCT.

EPILOGUE

1.From China Power, "How much trade transits the South China Sea," June 8, 2019.

2.Review of Maritime Transport 2018, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 12, 2019.

3.Eleanor Freund, "Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2019.

4.Jane Perlez, "Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims in South China Sea," The New York Times, 12 July 2016.

5.An arbitral tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague had ruled on July 11, 2016, in Manila's case against Beijing's claims in the South China Sea. The five-judge tribunal was established under the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and despite China's refusal to participate in the proceedings; its ruling is final and legally binding.

6.Tweed David and Ting Shi, "China's South China Sea Claims Dashed by Hague Court Ruling," Bloomberg, 20 November 2016.

7.Chris Chung, Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China's Claim in the South China Sea, 1946–1974, (Modern China, 2016) 42 (1): 38–72. See also Zhongqi Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective", Journal of Chinese Political Science, 12 (1): 72.

8.James William Morley and Nishihara Masashi, Vietnam Joins the World, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 124.

9.Taylor M. Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31 May 2019.

10.B. Raman, "South China Sea: India should avoid rushing in where even the US exercises caution," 24 September 2011.

11.John Pike, "South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas," globalsecurity.org, 4 October 2014. See also in Tencent News, "Oil bonanza in South China Sea," 23 April 2011.

12.J. Valencia Mark, China and South China Sea Disputes: Claims and Potential Solutions in the South China Sea, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995), 298. See also John Pike, "South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas, globalsecurity.org, October 4, 2014.

13.On July 13, 2020, China sanctioned three senior Republican lawmakers and a U.S. envoy over Beijing's treatment of Uighurs in the Western Xinjiang region. Senators Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Congressman Chris Smith were targeted by the action, as well as the U.S. ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, Sam Brownback.

14.On July 27, 2020, Chinese officials took control of the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, ending a thirty-five-year U.S. presence in the city. The Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing called the shutdown a “legitimate and necessary response” to the U.S. closure of China’s consulate in Houston, Texas, over concerns about espionage and other illegal activity.

15.Carnegie Asia Program Senior fellow, Yukon Huang told FRONTLINE and NPR. See Abby Johnston and Catherine Trautwein, “What is the China Model? Understanding the Country’s State-Led Economic Model,” Frontline, May 17, 2019.

16.Hebert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), xviii, see Tania Branigan, “China Monitored US B52 Bombers Flight through Disputed Air Defense Zone, The Guardian, Nov. 27, 2015, http://www.the guardian.com/world/2013/nov/27/china-air-defense-zone; see also Simon Denyer, “China Deploys Missiles in South China Sea, as Obama Meets Rivals,” Washington Post, Feb. 17, 2016.

17.Cited by Mari Yamaguchi “Seventy-five years later, 1 million Japanese wars dead are still missing,” (Kyodo News via AP, August 12, 2020).” “After Japan’s disastrous retreats in the Pacific in 1943, the military started sending back empty boxes with stones to bereaved families, without providing details about the deaths. Japan insisted all war dead would be honored as gods at Yasukuni Shrine. Similar practices were continued by postwar governments, which didn’t put an emphasis on identifying individual remains to return to families, experts said. Japan sent its first overseas remains collection mission in 1952 after a seven-year U.S. occupation ended. The efforts were unwelcomed in many Asian countries that had suffered under Japanese wartime aggression. In 2016, Japan’s parliament passed a law launching an eight-year remains recovery initiative through 2024.”

18.Jeffrey Record, “Japan’s Decision For War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons,” (The Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 5.

19.Quoted in Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 336.

20.See John Mueller, “Pearl Harbor: Military, Inconvenience, Political Disaster,” (International Security, Winter 1991–1992), 191–194.

21.Sheldom H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932–45 and the American Cover-Up, (Routledge, 2002), see Chapter 16 “Japanese Biomedical Experimentation during the World –War-II-Era.”

22.Quoted in John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2000), 22.

23.Hakkō ichiu, “eight crown cords, one roof” i.e. “the entire world under one roof” or Hakkō iu was a Japanese political slogan meaning the divine right of the Empire of Japan to “unify the eight corners of the world.” The emperor’s full statement reads: “Hakkō wo ooute ie to nasan,” and means: “I shall cover the eight directions and make them my abode.” Tanaka interpreted the statement attributed to Jinmu, as meaning that imperial rule had been divinely ordained to expand until it united the entire world.

24.Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (HarperCollins, 2016), 27.

25.Ibid., 27–28.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amieto, Vesta. Secret Agent of Japan. Litte Brown & Co, 1938.

Amrine, Michael. The Great Decision. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959.

Andrade, Tonio. Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Appleman, Roy E. et al. Okinawa, the Last Battle. Washington: Historical Division, U.S.

Department of the Army, 1948.

Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2007.

Arnold, Henry. Global Mission. New York: Harper & Bros, 1949.

Ashihei, Hino. Wheat and Soldiers. New York NY: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939.

Bayly, C.A. and Harper T. Forgotten Armies. The Fall of British Asia 1941–45. London, Allen Lane, 2004.

Baker, Paul R. The Atomic Bomb. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

Ball, W. Macmahon. Japan: Enemy or Ally? New-York: John Day, 1949.

Bank, Fuji. Tokyo Times. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949.

Beard, Charles A. President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 (Yale UP, 1948).

Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945. Oxford University, Press, 1991.

Beasley, W. G. The Rise of Modern Japan. Revised Edition St. Martin Press, 2000.

Behr, Edward. Hirohito: Behind the Myth. New York: Villard Books, 1989.

Behr, Edward. Hiro-Hito: l'empereur ambigü. Paris, Éditions Laffont, 1989.

Benton, Gregor. New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance along the Yangtze and the Huai 1938-1941. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1999.

Bergamini, David. Japan's Imperial Conspiracy: How Emperor Hirohito Led Japan into War against the West. New York: William Morrow, 1971.

Bernard, Millot. Divine Thunder. New York: Pinnacle Books, 1970.

Bert, V. A. Röling. The Tokyo trial and beyond: reflections of a peacemonger. 1993.

Blair, Clay Jr. Silent Victory. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975.

Bill, Emmott. The Limits to Japan's Economic Power. Simon & Schuster Inc., 1991.

Bisher, Jame. White Terror: Cossak Warlords of the Trans- Siberian. Routledge, 2005.

Bix, Herbert P. "Showa History, Rising Nationalism, and the Abe Government." The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue. No. 2, No. 4, (December 2015).

Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York, HarperCollins, 2016.

Borg, Dorothy. The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Borton, Hugh. Japan's Modern Century. New York: Ronald Press, 1955.

Brines, Russell. MacArthur's Japan. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1948.

Brook, Timothy. Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Brooks, Lester. Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Brownlee, John S. "Four Stages of the Japanese Kokutai." JSAC Conference. British Columbia: University of British Columbia, 2000.

Burdick, Charles B. The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau: World War in Asia. Hamden CT: Archon Book, 1976.

Burke, Davis. Get Yamamoto. New York: Random House, 1970.

Butow, Robert J.C. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Phillips, Cabell. The Truman Presidency. New York, Macmillan Co., 1966.

Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. New York NY: Basic Books, 2012.

Carey, McWilliams. Prejudice: Japanese Americans, Symbol of Racial Intolerance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944.

Charles, Bateson. The War with Japan: A Concise History. Sydney: Ure Smith, 1968.

Charles, Musgrove. China's Contested Capital: Architecture, Ritual, Nanjing. Honolulu HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2013.

Chennault, Claire Lee. Way of a Fighter. New York NY: C.P. Putnam's Sons, 1949.

Ch’i His-sheng. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937–45. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1982.

Choi, H. Patrick. The Ambiguous Emperor: Hirohito’s Role in Engaging in and Ending the Pacific War. Harvard University Extension School, November 2017. War. Harvard University Extension School, November 2017.

Christopher, Robert C. The Japanese Mind. New York: Fawcett, 1982.

Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948.

Coffey, Thomas M. Imperial Tragedy. New York: World, 1970.

Cohen, Theodore. Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal. New York, Free Press, 1987.

Colegrove, Kenneth W. “The Japanese Emperor, II.” American Political Science Review 26, no. 4 (1932): 828–845.

Colegrove, Kenneth W. Militarism in Japan. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936.

Compton, A.H. Atomic Quest. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.

Connors, Lesley. The Emperor’s Adviser. Kinmochi Saiponji, Croom Helm and Nissan Institute for Japanese studies, 1987.

Cook, Haruko Taya & Theodore F. Cook. Japan at War: An Oral History. New York: The New Press, 1992.

Corner, E.J.H. “His Majesty Emperor Hirohito of Japan, K.G., 29 April 1901– 7 January 1989,” Biographical Memoirs of the Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 36 (Dec., 1990), 243.

Costello, John. The Pacific War 1941-1945. Rawson, Wade, 1981.

Graig, Albert M. and Donald H. Shively. Personality in Japanese History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

Craigie, Sir Robert. Behind the Japanese Mask. Hutchinson, 1945.

Crowley, James B. Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy 1930–1938. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932–1945. Oxford University Press, 1979.

David, Banett. Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommodation. Stanford University Press, 2001.

Davis, Kenneth S. Experience of War. New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1965.

Davis, Donal A. Lighting Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor. St Martin's Press, 2005.

Daws, Gavan. Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific. New York: William

Morrow & Co, 1994.

Day, David. The Great Betrayal. Angus and Robertson, London 1988.

Deane, John R. The Strange Alliance. New York, Viking Press, 1947.

Douglas, MacArthur. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.

Dower, John W. War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York, Pantheon, 1987.

Dower, John W. Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays. New York: The New Press, 1993.

Dudden, Alexis. Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States. New York:

Columbia University Press, 2008.

Edwin, O. Reishauer. Japan’s Past and Present. Duckworth, 1947.

Endicott, Stephen and Hagerman, Edward. The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea. Indiana University Press, 1999.

Endo S. The Sea and Poison. Gallagher M, trans. London: Peter Owen, Ltd, 1972.

Evans, David C. and Peattie, Mark R. Kaigun: Startegy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Feary, Robert. The Occupation of Japan – Second phase, 1948–50. New York, McMillan, 1950.

Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Fermi, Laura. Atoms in the Family. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. Penguin, edition 2001.

Fuchida, Mitsuo and Masatake Okumiya. Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1955.

Funabashi, Yōichi. Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific. Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2003.

Fuller, Richard. Shokan: Hirohito’s Samurai. London: Arms and Amor, 1992.

Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Gayn, Mark. Japan Diary. William Sloan Associates. NY 1948.

Gentile, Emilio. The Sacralization of Politics in Facist Italy. Harvard University Press, 1996.

Georges, Blond. L'Amiral Togo, Samourai de la Mer. Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1958.

George, Sansom. The Western World and Japan. New York, Knopf, 1965.

Ginn, John L. Sugamo Prison, Tokyo: An Account of the Trial and Sentencing of Japanese War Criminals in 1948 by a U.S. Participant. McFarland, 1992.

Gilbert, Martin. The Second World War: A Complete History, Holt, 2004.

Gold, Hal. Unit 731 Testimonies. Tokyo: Yen Books, 1996.

Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Gordon, W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein & Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept. McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Gordon, W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein & Katherine V. Dillon. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. McGraw-Hill, 1986.

Gordon, W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein & Katherine V. Dillon. December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor. McGraw-Hill, 1988.

Gordon, Gary. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire. Derby, Conn.: Monarch Books, 1962.

Gordon, Joseph. The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941. Columbia University, 1959.

Graig, William. The Fall of Japan: A Chronicle of the End of an Empire. Galahad, April 16, 2005.

Gravereau, Jacques. Le Japon, l'Ère de Hiro-Hito. Édition Notre Siècle, 1988.

Green, Shane. The Asian Auschwitz of Unit 731. Article in the Age, 2002–08–29.

Grew, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943.

Guillain, Robert. Extrême Orient. Paris: Éditions Arléa-le-Seuil, 1988.

Hallion, Richard P. Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910–1945. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010.

Han, Xiao. Compilation of Camp 731 savage fascist acts. Unforgettable history. Harbin, 1985, Ly Cheng, trans.

Harmsen, Peter. Nanjing 1937: Battle for a Doomed City. Casemate Publishers, 2015.

Harris, Sheldon H. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932–45 and the American Cover-Up. Routledge, 1994.

Harrison, B. J. and K.W. Palmer. China and Japan Between the Wars. Sydney: William Brooks, undated. Random House, 1994.

Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East (1933–41). University of Hata, Ikuhito. "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937," Pittsburgh Press, 1992.

Hatano, Sumio and Sochi, Junichiro. "The Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45: Japanese Military Invasion and Chinese Resistance," in Japan-China Joint History Research Report. Tokyo, 2001, vol. 1, 128–164.

Henshall, Kenneth. Historical Dictionary of Japan to 1945. Lanhan MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013.

Hess, William N. Pacific Sweep. New York: Zebra, 1974.

Hiroyuke, Agawa. The Reluctant Admiral. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1981.

Hogan, Michael J., ed. Hiroshima in History and in Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Skyhorse Publishing, 2007.

Honda, Katsuichi. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

Hornfisher, James D. The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific (1944-1945). Bantam, 1 edition, October 25, 2016.

Horvitz, Alan, Christopher, Leslie & Catherwood. Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide.

Hsu Long-Hsuen and Chang Ming-Kai. History of the Sino-Japanese War 1937–-45. Taipei: Chung Wu Pub. Co., 1971.

Hoyt, Edwin P. Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.

Hyot, Edwin P. Hirohito: The Emperor and The Man. NY: Praeger Publishers, 1992.

Hyot, Edwin P. Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986.

Ikle, Fred Charles. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Ike, Nobutaka. Japan's Decision for War. Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.

Ikuhito, Hata. Hirohito: The Shōwa Emperor in War and Peace. New York: BRILL/Global Oriental, 1991.

Ishiwara, Kanji. Japan’s confrontation with the West. Princeton University Press, 1957.

Ishida, Jintaro. The Remains of War: Apology and Forgiveness. The Lyons Press, 2002.

Ito, Masanori, with Roger Pineau. The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy. New York: W.W. Norton, 1962.

Ito, Masashi. The Emperor’s Last Soldiers. New York: Coward McCann, 1967.

James, David A. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire. London, Allen and Unwin, 1951.

James, D. Clayton. The years of MacArthur. Houghton Mifflin, 1985.

James, William. The China Quagmire: Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941. New York NY: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press, 2000.

Jaudel, Étienne. Le Procès de Tokyo: Un Nuremberg oublié. Odile Jacob, Paris, avril 2010.

Jemings, John M. The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia 1895–1945. Praeger, 1997.

John, Goette. Japan Fights for Asia. New York NY: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1943.

Joseph, C. Grew. Ten Years in Japan. Hammond & Hammond, London.

Justin, McCurry. “Japan’s sins of the past.” The Guardian, 28 October 2004.

Kai-shek, Chiang. The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. New York NY: The John Day Company, 1946.

Kato, Masuo. The Lost War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.

Kawamura, Noriko. Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, University of Washington Press, 2015.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. Penguin, 2005.

Kessler, Lawrence D. The Jiangyin Mission Station: An American Missionary Community in China, 1895–1951. Chaptel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Knell, Hermann. To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and Its Human Consequences inWorld War II. Boston MA: Da Capo Press, 2003.

Kort, Michael. The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Kosakai, Yoshiteru. Hiroshima Peace Reader. Translated by Michiko Tashiro and Akira Tashiro. Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 1983.

Kratoksa, Paul. Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories. M.E. Sharpe and Singapore University Press, 2005.

Kushner, Barak. The Thought War, Japanese Imperial Propaganda. University of Hawaii Press, 2006.

Kurosawa, Akiro. Comme une autobiographie. Seuil, cahier du cinéma, 1985.

Kowner, Rotem. Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. The Scarecrow Press, 2006.

Large, Stephen. Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Latimer, Jon. Burma: The Forgotten War. London, John Murray, 2004.

Laurence, Rees. Horror in the East. British Broadcasting Company, 2001.

Lawrence, Olson. Japan in Postwar Asia. New York, Praeger, 1970.

Lee, Bradford A. Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939: A Study in the Delemmas of British Decline. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Lewin, Ronald. The American Magic: codes, cyphers and the defeat of Japan. Farrat Strauss Giroux, 1982.

Liang, Chin-Tung. The Sinister Face of the Mukden Incident. New York: St. John's University Press, 1969.

Lind, Jennifer. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Liu, Bea Exner. Remembering China 1935–1945: A Memoir. Moorhead MN: New Rivers Press, 1996.

Liu, F.F. A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949. Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1956. 1969.

Liu, James T.C. "German Mediation in the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-38," in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2, February 1949, 157–171.

Lord, Russell of Liverpool. The Knights of Bushido. A History of Japanese War Crimes During World War II. Greenhill Books, 2006.

Lory, Hillis. Japan's Military Masters. The Army in Japanese Life. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1943.

Lu Suping (ed.). They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnesses by American and British Nationals.

Lum, Peter. Six Centuries in East Asia. New York: S. G. Philipps, 1973.

Maga, Timothy P. Judgment at Toky: The Japanese War Crimes Trials. University Press of Kentucky, 2001.

Magee, John. G. “Letter to wife,” in Zhang Kaiyuan (ed.). Eyewitnesses to Massacre, 166–195.

Magee, John. G. “Magee Film,” im Zhang Kaiyuan (ed.). Eyewitnesses to Massacre. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, 201–227.

Maki, John M. Japanese Militarism: Its Cause and Cure. New York: Knopf, 1945.

Manning, Paul. Hirohito, the war years. Dodd mead and Co, NY 1986.

Martin, Caldi. A Torch to the Enemy. New York, Ballantine Books, 1960.

Martin, Christopher. Russo-Japanese War. New York: Abelard Schuman, 1966.

McCallum, James H. “Account of Japanese Atrocities at Nanking during the Winter of 1937–38,” in Zhang Kaiyuan (ed.). Eyewitnesses to Massacre, 229–242.

Meirion, Harries. Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York, Random House, 1991.

Meskill, Joanna. Hitler and Japan. New York, Etherton, 1966.

Mikiso, Hane, and Honjo. Emperor Hirohito and his chief Aide-De-Camp: The Honjo Diary, 1933–1936. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966.

Mikitani Hiroshi. The Power to Compete. Wiley, 2014.

Millet, Allan R. “Assault from the Sea: The development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars.” Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Minear, R. H. Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Princeton University Press, 1971.

Minichiello, Sharon. Retreat from Reform. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1984.

Montgoomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan. Charles Helm, London, 1988.

Moore, Joe. Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945–1947. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.

Moore, Frederick. With Japan's Leaders. New York: Scribners, 1942.

Morgan, Young A. Imperial Japan. W. Morrow, 1938.

Morgenstern, George Edward. Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War. The Devin-Adair Company.

Morley, James William. The Fatal Choice: Japan's Advance into South-East Asia. Columbia UP, 1980.

Mosley, Leonard. Hirohito, Emperor of Japan. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

Nagatsuka, Ryuji. I Was a Kamikaze. London: Abelard Schuman, 1972.

Nakamura, Masanori. The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the « Symbol Emperor System », (1931–1991). Armonk, N.Y.: M.F. Sharpe, 1992.

Neil, Boister and Robert Cryer (eds.). Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Neier, Aryeh. War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for Justice. Times Books, Random House, New York, 1998.

Nicolson, Harold. The War Years 1939–1945. New York, Putnam, 1970.

Northedge, Frederick S. The League of Nations: Its life and Times, 1920–1946. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986.

Okagai, Tomoko T. The Logic of Conformity: Japan's Entry into International Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.

Olivier, Frank. Special Undeclared War. London: Jonathan Cape, 1939.

Omi, Hatashin. “Japanese Organizational Decision Making 1941.” International Journal of Management and Decision Making 12, no. 1 (2012): 69–84.

Oppler Alfred C. Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back. Princeton University Press, 1976.

Osanaga, Kanroji. Hiro-Hito, an intime portrait of the Japanese Emperor. Gateway Publishers, 1975.

Otto, Tolischus. Tokyo Record. Reynal and Hitchcock, 1953.

Over, Richard. Why the Allies Won? W.W. Norton & Co., 1995.

Owen, Lattimore. Solution in Asia. Boston, Little, Brown, 1945.

Ozawa, Harumi. Japanese war veteran speaks of atrocities in the Philippines. TAIPE TIMES, p. 9, November 6, 2007.

Paine, S.C.M. The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Packard, Jerrold M. Sons of heaven. Scribners, 1987.

Pal, Radhabinod. International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Dissentient Judgment. Calcutta, Sanyal, 1953.

Peattie, Mark R. Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Peattie, Mark et al. (eds.). The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2013.

Percival, A.E. The War in Malaya. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1949.

Piccigalo, Philip R. The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951. University of Texas Press, 1979.

Piers, Brendon. The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s. Vintage, 2002.

Pike, Francis. Hirohito's war: The Pacific War, 1941-1945. Bloomsbury, Academic, 2016.

Piotr, Olender. Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894-1895. MMP Books Publishers, 2014.

Piotr, Olender. Russo-Japanese Naval War 1905. MMP Books Publishers, 2010.

Powell, John B. My Twenty-Five Years in China. New York NY: The Macmillan Company, 1945.

Prance, Gordon W. Pearl Harbor, the Verdict of History. McGraw Hill, 1986.

Prichard, R. John and Maganua Zaide Sonia. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. N.Y. & London: Garland, 1981.

R. John, Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Comprehensive Index and Guide to the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. New York and London, Garland, 1981, 1987.

Rabe, John. The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. New York NY: Vintage Books, 1998.

Reel, A. Frank. The Case of General Yamashita. New York, Octagon Books, 1949.

Richard, Frank. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Penguin, 2001.

Roberts, John G. Misui: Three Centuries of Japanese Business. Wectherhill, 1991.

Roling, B.V.A. The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), April 29, 1946 – November 12, 1948. Amsterdam University Press of Amsterdam, 1977.

Rummel, R.J. Statistics of Japanese Democide: Estimates, Calculations, and Sources. University of Hawaii, 2002.

Russel, Brines. MacArthur's Japan. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1948.

Redford, L.H. The Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita: A Case in Command Responsibility Master's thesis, Old Dominion Univ., 1975.

Rogers, Robert F. Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam. Honolulu: Univiversity of Hawaii, Press, 1995.

Russel, Edward F.L. The Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes. London, Cassell, 1958.

Saburo, Ienaga. The Pacific War. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

Saburo, Shiroyama. War Criminal: The Life and Death of Koki Hirota. New York, Kodansha International, 1977.

Sansom, G. B. Japan a Short Cultural History. New York: Appleton Century, 1962.

Sakudo and Takao Shiba. World War II and the Transformation of Business Systems. Tokyo University Press, 1994.

Sherman, Christine. War Crimes: International Military Tribunal. Turner Publishing Company, 2001.

Shilloney, Ben-Ami. Revolt in Japan, The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Shimbun, Manning,. Fifty years of Light and Dark, 1959.

Soichi, Sasaki. Fundamentals of the Japanese Constitution. Tokyo: Shiragikukai, 1954.

Spector, Ronald. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan. Simon & Schuster, New Edition, 2012

Sydney, Ronald Seth. Encyclopedia of Espionage. Doubleday, 1974.

Seagrave, Sterling & Peggy. Gold Warriors: America's Secret Recovery of Yamashita's Gold. Verso Books, 2003.

Shigenori, Toco. The Cause of Japan. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1956.

Shudo, Higashinakano. The Nanking Massacre: Fact versus Fiction. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2005.

Sigal, Leon V. Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Smoke, Richard. War: Controlling Escalation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun. New York: Free Press (Macmillan), 1985.

Silberman, Bernard, and Harootunian Harry. Japan in Crisis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Stefan, John J. Hawaii Under the Rising Sun. Japan's Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984.

Stephan, John T. The Tanaka Memorial (1927): Authentic or Spurious? Modern Asian Studies, 1973.

Steinberg, David Joel. Philippine Collaboration in World War Two. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1970.

Stimson, Henry L. The Far Eastern Crisis. New York: Howard Fertig, 1974.

Stokesbury, James L. World War II. William Morrow & Co., 1980.

Storry, Richard. A History of Modern Japan. Pelican, 1960.

Symonds, Craig L. World War II at Sea: A Global History. Oxford University Press, May 2, 2018.

Takeyama, Michio. Showa no Seishinshi. Tokyo, 1956.

Tanaka, Yuki. Tim McCormack and Gerry Simpson Leiden. Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited. Boston: M. Nijhoff, 2011.

Tanaka, Yuki. Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. Westview Press, 1996.

Tanaka, Kakuei. Building a New Japan: Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. Simul Press, 1973.

Tanin, O. When Japan Goes to War. New York: Vanguard Press, 1936.

Tanin, O., and E. Yohan. Militarism and Fascism in Japan. New York: International Publishers, 1934.

Terasaki, Gwen. A Bridge to the Sun. Michael Joseph, 1958.

Teruhiko, Asada. The Night of a Thousand Suicides. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970. The Tokyo Judgement: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946 – 12 November 1948, edited by B.V.A. Röling and C.F. Ruter, 2 volumes (Amsterdam: APA-University Press, 1977).

Thorne, Christopher. Allies of a Kind. The U.S., Britain and the War Against Japan 1941–45. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978.

Timberley, Harold J. Japanese Terror in China. Freeport NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1969.

Titus, David Anson. Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Tojo, Hideki. Affidavit of Hideki Toyo, Individual defense. Tokyo: IMTFE, Dec. 19, 1948.

Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. Random House, 1970.

Tolischus, Otto D. Through Japanese Eyes. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945.

Toshiaki, Kawahara. Hirohito and His Times: A Japanese Perspective. Kondansha America, 1990.

Tsurumi, Kazuko. Social Change and the Individual: Japan before and after Defeat in World War II. Princeton University Press, 1970.

Turnbull, S. R. The Samurai: A Military History. New York: Macmillan, 1977.

Ugaki, Matome. Dai-Toa Senso Hiki (Great East War Secret Diary). Tokyo: Gensho Moshi, 1950.

Utley, Freda. China at War. London: Faber and Faber, 1939.

U.S. Department of State. Trial of Japanese War Criminals. Publication no. 2613. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946.

Van Wolferen, Karel. The Enigma of Japanese Power. Mac Millan, 1989.

Vautrin, Minnie. Terror in Minnie Vautrin's Nanjing: Diaries and Correspondence, 1937-38. Urbana and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008.

Victor, Madej W. Japanese Armed Forces of Battle, 1937–45. Allentown, Pa.: Game Marketing Co., 1981.

Vogel, Ezra. Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979.

Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York, Basic Books, 1977.

Watts, Andrew. Pawns of the Pacific (The War Planners). Independently published, May 5, 2017.

Weber, Torsten. “The Greater Asia Association and Matsui Iwane, 1933,” in Saler, Sven et al. (eds). Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Vol. 2, 1920–Present. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Wendy, Barnaby. The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare. Frog Ltd, 1999.

Wetzler, Peter. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan. University of Hawaii, (1998).

Wheeler, Gerald F. Prelude to Pearl Harbor. Columbia, MO.: University of Missouri Press, 1963.

Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with Destiny. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.

Wieviorka, Annette. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. Paris, Complexe Editions, 1996.

Wilcox, Robert. The Secret War. W. Morrow, 1987.

Willard, Price. Japan and the Son of Heaven. Duell Sloan and Pearse, 1945.

Williams, Peter. Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II. Free Press, 1989.

Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Willoughby Westel W. Japan’s Case Examined. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1940.

Wilson, Sandra. Japanese War Criminal: The Politics of Justice After the Second World War. New York, Columbia University Press, 2017.

Woods, John E. The Good Man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe. Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.

Workers Party of Korea. Reminiscences of the Anti-Japanese Guerillas. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970.

Yagami, Kazuo. “The Role of Emperor Hirohito in the Pacific War 1941–1945: The Views of the Revisionists.” Virginia Review of Asian Studies 10, no. 1 (2012): 136–147.

Yamamoto, Masahiro. Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Praeger Publishers, 2000.

Yoshida, Shigeru. Memoirs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

Yoshihashi, Takehiko. Conspiracy at Mukden. The Rise of the Japanese Military. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. Comfort Women, Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II. Columbia University Press, 2002.

Yoshiro, Kodama. I was Defeated. Booth and Fukuda, 1957.

Yoshitake, Oka. Konoe Fumimaro, a Political Biography. University of Tokyo Press, 1983.

Yutaka, Yokata, and Joseph Harrington. Kamikaze Submarine. New York: Leisure Books, 1962.

Zeiler, Thomas W. Unconditional Defeat: Japan, America, and the End of World War II.

Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2004.

Zhukov, Y. M. The Rise and Fall of the Gumbatsu. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.

AUTHOR

C areer judge, teacher, writer, Jean Sénat Fleury was born in Haiti and currently lives in Boston. A former intern at the National School of Magistrates (Paris and Bordeaux), he has held various positions within the Haitian judiciary. He was in turn a trainer at the National Police Academy (1995 – 1996) and director of studies at the School of Magistrates of Pétion-Ville (2000 – 2004). Author of the book The Stamp Trial , he wrote several other historical works, such as: Jean-Jacques Dessalines: Words from Beyond the Grave , Toussaint Louverture: The Trial of the Slave Trafficking, Adolf Hitler: Trial in Absentia in Nuremberg, The Trial of Osama Bin Laden, Hirohito Guilty or Innocent: The Trial of the Emperor , and Adolf Hitler and Hirohito: On Trials.

Mr. Fleury had immigrated to the United States in 2007. He earned a master's degree in public administration and a second in political science from Suffolk University. His new book, Japan's Empire Disaster, provides an understanding of the expansionist policy practiced by Japan during the end of the nineteenth and the first period of the twentieth century. From the adoption of the Meiji constitution in 1889 and the first period of the Shōwa era (1927–1945), the military controlled the new Japanese constitutional government. The result was years of political instability, more internal conflicts, violence, murders, assassinations, overseas aggression, and war crimes in occupied territories.

The book demonstrates that in Japan during the Pacific War, the real driving force to war was the Japanese military. Hirohito, as supreme commander, gave full support to the army and the navy. On multiple occasions, as an emperor, he sanctioned many government policies. Accordingly, he was responsible for the war and for the atrocities that the Japanese troops committed in Asia during the Pacific War.

Japan's Empire Disaster is a book of information and training; a reference document that should be read as an educational tool on the history of the

modernization of Japan and the war launched by Emperor Meiji and Hirohito to build Japan Empire in the Pacific and East Asia. The book shares the view of the author on Hirohito's responsibility on the events that marked Japan's entry into World War II that began when the Japanese troops invaded Manchuria on September 19, 1931, and culminated with Japan's surprise attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941.

As the daughter of a WWII Army Veteran I am grateful for your book as it shows the world the hard fight the U.S. and other countries endured from Japan for our liberty and freedom today. The book is illuminating and riveting and a superb account of the evolution of our world order.

Prof. Ginny Greiman

This file was downloaded from Z-Library project

Your gateway to knowledge and culture. Accessible for everyone.

z-library.sk z-lib.gs z-lib.fm go-to-library.sk

Official Telegram channel

Z-Access

https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Z-Library